Investigating the radical democratic potential of social media use by new social movements in South Africa by Zdanow, Carla
 
 
 
 
INVESTIGATING THE RADICAL DEMOCRATIC 
POTENTIAL OF SOCIAL MEDIA USE BY NEW 
SOCIAL MOVEMENTS IN SOUTH AFRICA 
 
 
 
 
 
C.S. ZDANOW 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2015 
  
 
 
 
INVESTIGATING THE RADICAL DEMOCRATIC POTENTIAL 
OF SOCIAL MEDIA USE BY NEW SOCIAL MOVEMENTS IN 
SOUTH AFRICA 
 
 
 
 
By 
 
Carla Zdanow 
 
 
 
 
Submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of 
Philosophy: Media Studies (Research) to be awarded at the Nelson Mandela 
Metropolitan University 
 
 
 
April 2015 
 
 
 
 
 
Supervisor: Prof A Konik 
  
 
 
DECLARATION 
 
I, Carla Zdanow (205021158), hereby declare that the thesis for Doctor of 
Philosophy: Media Studies (Research) is my own work and that it has not previously 
been submitted for assessment or completion of any postgraduate qualification to 
another University or for another qualification.  
 
 
        4 December 2014 
 
 
Carla Zdanow 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Official use:  
 
In accordance with Rule G4.6.3,  
 
4.6.3 A treatise/dissertation/thesis must be accompanied by a written declaration on 
the part of the candidate to the effect that it is his/her own work and that it has 
not previously been submitted for assessment to another University or for 
another qualification. However, material from publications by the candidate may 
be embodied in a treatise/dissertation/thesis.   
 
 
Table of contents 
 
Summary                 i 
Acknowledgments              ii 
List of acronyms             iii 
Introduction                1 
Chapter One: An Overview of the Emergence of New Media, and Its Socio-cultural and 
Politico-economic Impact              9 
1.1  Introduction              9 
1.2  The rise of the internet          10 
1.3  The emergence of Web 2.0          15 
1.4  Neoliberalism and the internet         21 
1.5  Networked cyber-society: conflicting perspectives       28 
  1.5.1  New media optimism          29 
  1.5.2  New media ambivalence         35 
  1.5.3  New media skepticism         39 
1.6 Conclusion            43 
 
Chapter Two: Online Democratic Praxis           45 
2.1  Introduction            45 
2.2  New media and liberal democratic praxis        47 
2.3  Neoliberalism and online democratic praxis        52 
2.4  Radical democracy           58 
  2.4.1  Deliberative democracy          59 
  2.4.2  Autonomous democracy          69 
2.5  Conclusion            83 
 
Chapter Three: The Theory of Agonistic Radical Democracy       84 
3.1 Introduction            84 
3.2  Agonistic democracy           85 
3.3  Laclau and Mouffe’s agonistic conception of radical democracy     90 
3.4  Conclusion                                105
      
 
 
 
Chapter Four: A Global Perspective on Online Agonism      107 
4.1 Introduction          107 
4.2  General theorizations of emergent online agonism     109 
4.3  Emergent online agonism        114 
4.3.1  The Zapatista Army of National Liberation     115 
4.3.2.  Revolutionary Association of Women of Afghanistan (RAWA)  121 
4.3.3  The alter-globalization movement      125 
4.3.4  The Occupy movement       132 
4.4 Conclusion          139 
 
Chapter Five: Online Agonism in South Africa       142 
5.1 Introduction          142 
5.2  The South African political context       144 
5.3  The role of civil society in South Africa’s democratic transition              147 
5.4  The neoliberal turn of the ANC       149 
5.5  The emergence of post-apartheid new social movements    153 
5.6.  The South African new media landscape      156 
5.7  The ‘right to life,’ the ‘right to a better life,’ and the ‘right to a better life for 
all’ online          159 
  5.7.1  The ‘right to life’ movements       160 
  5.7.2  The ‘right to a better life’ movements     170 
  5.7.3  The ‘right to a better life for all’ movements     179 
5.8 Conclusion          187 
 
Conclusion            190 
6.1 Thesis overview          190 
6.2 Recommendations         198 
 
Bibliography            215
i 
 
Summary 
 
Since its inception, the internet ‒ and in particular Web 2.0 ‒ have been valorized as 
potentially revolutionary democratic spaces. Despite the emergence of concerns over the 
progressively neoliberal orientation and narcissistic effects of the internet, evidence of the 
radical democratic potential of this media has received considerable attention. This thesis is 
orientated around both an exploration of such evidence, and a consideration of its relevance 
for South Africa. In this regard, the thesis commences with an exploration of the neoliberal 
underpinnings of the internet and the growing translation of dominant neoliberal discourses 
into the online practices of mainstream liberal democratic politics. Focus then shifts toward 
the mounting influence of alternative radical democratic positions online, through an 
investigation of the virtual manifestations of deliberative, autonomous, and agonistic 
approaches to radical democracy. And following an examination of the online political 
practices of selected recent global social movements, the primacy of agonism in online 
expressions of radical democracy is advanced. In turn, resonances and dissonances between 
the online activity and practices of such global social movements, and the use of the internet 
and social media by well-known South African new social movements, are explored. Finally, 
this thesis concludes by recommending a fourfold new media approach through which the 
agonistic radical democratic potential of the internet can be realized more fully by the new 
social movements of South Africa. 
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Introduction 
 
Social media and new media technologies have become an increasingly influential component 
of contemporary society. From Facebook to Twitter and YouTube, interactive web- and 
mobile-based media technologies are steadily becoming more accessible, and thus more 
popular forms of online communication. However, although already prevalent within 
personal, community, and business environments, social media use is also becoming 
increasingly evident in the realm of political communication and social movement activism. 
Indeed, few, if any, technological developments over the past decades have garnered as much 
interest as digital Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs) ‒ in particular the 
internet and social media ‒ for their transformative political potential. As Margolis and 
Moreno-Riaño note, the internet has been viewed by many as holding a democratic “promise 
for bringing about a broader political community with increased international solidarity, and 
greater human empowerment” (2013:1). Consequently, related arguments supporting the use 
of the internet to promote, facilitate, and extend democratic values and practices are 
widespread, as are understandings of the internet, on the one hand, as an indispensable tool in 
the creation of an engaged and active citizenry, and on the other hand, as an open and 
decentralized space in which challenges to anti-democratic discourses and hegemonic power 
can be put forward. That is, not only has the internet been lauded for its potential to initiate 
greater participation in traditional politics; in addition, it has also been valorized for its 
potential to offer minority and marginalized groups greater opportunities for political 
participation, in a way that allows established political interests to be challenged (Hauben and 
Hauben 1997; Morris 1999; Rheingold 1993; Shapiro 1999). Admittedly, in contrast to such 
optimism, ambivalence and skepticism related to the democratic potential of the internet and 
social media have also emerged. That is, despite theorization of the political dynamism of 
such media, concerns related to their widespread co-optation by neoliberalism frequently 
arise, insofar as some critics question the ability of this media to escape the control of 
established systems of power, while others argue that online interaction does little more than 
continue to promote and support current dominant discourses. And these theorists tend to 
reject the potential of the internet to support democracy, and instead highlight its capacity to 
advance anti-democratic, racist, capitalist, and fundamentalist discourses and ideas, and to 
promote consumerist, narcissistic and alienated individuality. Yet, notwithstanding these 
concerns, growing examples of internet and social media use by new social movements to 
communicate, organize, and mobilize around calls for social justice and democracy, at local, 
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national and international levels, continue to spark interest. Consequently, the debate around 
the democratic potential of online and mobile media rages on, especially in relation to the 
potential of online media to support the promotion of alternative or radical forms of 
democracy. In terms of this, recent developments in social media and ICT use around the 
world have received much thematization. As De la Barra and Dello Buono argue, “the 
explosion of blogs and other websites create[s]…dynamic new virtual spaces” for progressive 
social movements, and “these spaces accompany the day to day communications of people 
who are socially networking with an agenda for social transformation” (2009:239). Indeed, 
this increased connectivity between divergent social movements, and the accompanying 
challenges of anti-democratic practices (both online and offline), has led not only to an 
explosion of online activist sites and networks, but also to greater opportunities for political 
participation and democratic change. In relation to this, certain theorists have advanced that, 
despite the overarching online influence of neoliberalism, the internet and communication-
focused new media technologies may still provide a contemporary platform for the promotion 
and facilitation of radical forms of democracy. That is, forms of democracy focused on an 
ever greater approximation of the original democratic ideas of liberty and equality. Arguably 
this has been evinced through the use of social media technologies by recent major social 
movements around the world, as a means to communicate their various politico-economic and 
socio-cultural positions. And while reflections of deliberative, autonomous and agonistic 
forms of radical democracy have emerged through such online means, in many ways, it is 
toward the agonistic radical democracy advanced by Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe that 
such online politics have gravitated. Accordingly, this raises the question of the radical 
democratic potential of the use of social media by new social movements in South Africa, and 
the extent to which they approximate an online agonistic public space that can deepen and 
expand the democratic ideals of liberty and equality in the country, and facilitate the 
formation of something akin to the left-wing hegemony spoken of by Laclau and Mouffe.  
In the interest of exploring the above issues in more detail, Chapter One will 
commence with a consideration of the evolution of the internet, from Cold War military 
‘packet-switching’ technologies through to the development of Web 2.0 and the emergence of 
the internet as it is known today. Then, following a brief discussion of the participatory 
possibilities of the various social media platforms available today, the neoliberal and 
consumerist underpinnings of contemporary online activities will be elaborated upon. In 
particular, in relation to Dan Schiller’s notion of digital capitalism (2000), the role of 
neoliberalism as a driving force behind the expansion of the internet will be discussed, with a 
view to highlighting the progressive corporate colonization of cyberspace. Next, the impact of 
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the internet and new media technologies on human identity, communication, and interaction, 
will be discussed in relation to various conflicting scholarly perspectives. That is, positive 
appraisals of the potential of such media to build communities, increase participation in public 
life, and expand freedom in society ‒ as advanced by Rheingold (1994), Turkle (1995), Poster 
(1995), and Jenkins (2006), will be detailed. After this, the more circumspect and ambivalent 
perspective of Castells (1996, 1997, 1998), who both promotes certain aspects of online 
networks and denounces others, will be explored. Finally, the skeptical and negative 
appraisals of new media technologies for their promotion of narcissistic individualism and 
alienation from society, as advanced in Buffardi (2008), Campbell (2008), Twenge (2009) and 
Turkle in her most recent work (2011) will be examined. This will be done in order to 
elaborate on the current debate surrounding the influence of the internet and new media 
technologies on identity, society, and democracy, and to provide insight into both the 
opportunities and challenges that new media, respectively, afford and pose to digitally-
connected people in the contemporary era. 
Next, Chapter Two will begin with an exploration of the online dynamics of 
mainstream political new media use. In this regard, the use of the internet and social media to 
encourage and enhance mainstream political participation in contemporary society will be 
considered in relation to the social media campaign of the 2008 US presidential elections. 
Following on from this, concerns related to the orientation of such mainstream online political 
practices around a standardized neoliberal-consumer model of politics, which promotes 
uncritical, individualized, and consumer-orientated political dynamics, will be explored in 
relation to the respective arguments of Davis (1999), Resnick and Margolis (2000), 
Schlosberg (2006), and Gutmann and Thompson (2004), among others. Then, moving away 
from the use of the internet and social media in mainstream politics, the latter part of this 
chapter will investigate the use of such media by proponents of alternative radical democratic 
politics. That is, the use of the internet and social media technologies by advocates of radical 
forms of democracy will be examined, with a view to highlighting the potential of this media 
to promote and propagate alternative visions of democracy. In this regard, following a brief 
introduction to the theory and practice of radical democracy, the deliberative democratic 
position, which has largely been attributed to the ideas of John Rawls (1993) and Jürgen 
Habermas (1996), and which proposes that reasonable discussions and objective and rational 
consensus-based decision-making are precursors to democratic transformations of society, 
will be considered. After this, the potential of the internet to advance this form of radical 
democracy via a range of deliberative online platforms will be explored. Next, the 
autonomous approach to radical democracy, which highlights the role of community, self-
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determination, and freedom from centralized systems of power in democratic practice, will be 
examined. This will be done with particular reference, on the one hand, to the works of 
Castoriadis (1991, 1997), who calls for a system of self-government and highlights the need 
for a return to a society committed to autonomy and the ‘original’ meaning of democracy, and 
on the other hand, to the works of Hardt and Negri (2000, 2004), who denounce the current 
liberal democratic system as a neoliberal ‘Empire’ and call for both a political revolution 
against the power of capitalism, and the creation of autonomous community and organization. 
Subsequently, a consideration of autonomous democratic use of the internet and new media 
networks to challenge neoliberal discourses and power, to bypass centralized forms of control 
and capitalist systems, and to allow for an online formation and extension of a ‘commons,’ 
will be investigated. In short, in this chapter, the ‘traditional’ liberal consumer model of 
online politics and e-democracy will be contrasted with the potential of the internet and social 
media to offer a platform or arena for the realization of alternative ‒ deliberative and 
autonomous ‒ forms of radical democracy. 
Following on from this, Chapter Three will draw particular attention to a third 
category of radical democracy, namely agonistic democracy. Offering an alternative to 
deliberative and autonomous approaches, the theory of agonistic democracy will be discussed 
generally in relation to the ideas of Connelly (1991), Tully (2002), Honig (1996), and Owen 
(2002), who advance the importance of conflict, difference, identity, and contestation in 
democratic transformations. After this, specific focus will fall on Laclau and Mouffe’s 
influential conception of agonistic radical democracy ‒ as expressed through their book 
Hegemony and Socialist Strategy (2001), and via their individual theoretical works ‒ which 
comprises one of the most succinct and cogent articulations of political agonism. In short, the 
reasons for their rejection of deliberative and autonomous approaches to radical democracy 
will be elaborated upon, before their promotion of a new political strategy of left-wing 
hegemony and radical democracy will be examined. In the latter regard, stressing the 
overarching presence of antagonisms and differences in contemporary politics, Laclau and 
Mouffe advance that democracy should not be about achieving consensus, but rather about 
providing a platform for the confrontation of inevitable differences, and the constant 
renegotiation of issues based on these conflicts. Furthermore, their assertion that previously 
unconnected or dissimilar groups should recognize the similarities in their progressive 
struggles or ideas, and come together to support the radically democratic purpose of 
deepening and extending liberty and equality, will be engaged with. Finally, their promotion 
of co-operation between civil society and social movements as essential to the development of 
such a ‘left-wing hegemonic’ project, and as imperative to the formation of agonistic forms of 
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radical democracy, will be considered along with some of the criticisms which their ideas 
have received.   
Building on the theory of the previous chapter, in Chapter Four, existing general 
theorizations of online agonism will be thematized, before specific investigations into the 
salient agonistic use of the internet by recent major global social movements will be 
undertaken. That is, to begin with, the potential of the internet and social media to function as 
an agonistic domain and platform, will be examined in relation to the works of Kahn and 
Kellner (2006), Kowal (2002), Downey and Fenton (2003), Moghadam (2013), Rahimi 
(2011), Langman (2005), Cammaerts (2008), Hands (2007) and Dahlberg (2007a, 2007b, 
2007c). After this, specific examples of the radical democratic use of the internet will be 
explored, via an investigation into the online political practices of the Zapatista, the 
Revolutionary Association of Women in Afghanistan (RAWA), the alter-globalization 
movement, and the Occupy movement. This will be done with a view to highlighting the 
resonances between the online politics and practices of these movements, and the dynamics of 
agonistic democracy. Accordingly, what will be advanced is the potential of the above social 
movements’ respective internet and social media use to function as something akin to an 
online agonistic public space in which, firstly, counter-publics can be developed, secondly, 
diverse groups and people can come together to network and articulate collective identities, 
and thirdly, counter-public contestation of dominant discourses can emerge. Finally, the 
implications of such online agonistic dynamics for the realization of Laclau and Mouffe’s 
theoretical perspectives will be considered.  
In turn, with a view to discovering whether or not such global online developments 
have a local component, Chapter Five will explore the radical democratic use of the internet 
and social media by new social movements in South Africa. That is, following a brief 
discussion of the South African political landscape and history, the ANC’s neoliberal turn in 
1994, and the subsequent emergence of post-apartheid new social movements, the online 
activities of three new social movement categories ‒ namely ‘right to life,’ ‘right to a better 
life’ and ‘right to a better life for all’ ‒ will be analyzed and discussed, and the radical 
democratic potential of their current social media use will be considered. In this regard, 
selected South African new social movements’ online activity will be explored with a view to 
determining, firstly, the extent of their respective digital connectivity evinced by their use of 
the internet and social media, secondly, their respective proximity to the radically democratic 
ideals of agonistic democracy, and thirdly, both the current possibilities for ‒ and the 
limitations to ‒ their use of this media (i) to support the development of counter-publics and 
counter-discourses, (ii) to allow for the articulation of collective identities and the 
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strengthening of oppositional strategies, and (iii) to facilitate contestations of dominant 
discourses, and the establishment of something akin to a left-wing hegemony and radical 
democracy in the country. In short, the above mentioned movements’ current use of the 
internet and social media will be examined in relation to their levels of engagement, 
participation, and contestation, before the potential of such media use to function effectively 
as an online agonistic public space will be considered.  
Finally, in the Conclusion, tentative recommendations for how the internet and social 
media can more effectively be used as online agonistic public spaces in the promotion of 
radical democracy in South Africa, will be advanced, particularly in relation to concerns 
surrounding the current predominant use of these media by new social movements as 
‘technological tools’ for information dissemination, rather than as ‘cultural technologies’ for 
change. That is against the backdrop of wariness about the neoliberal underpinnings of the 
internet, which propagate alienation and commodity-based narcissism rather than social or 
community engagement, a fourfold new media approach will be proposed. This will involve, 
firstly, the augmentation of existing dialogic functions at a cyber-structural level; secondly, 
the active and enthusiastic engendering of virtual discursive momentum; thirdly, the provision 
of a critical buffer against online neoliberal influences as the digital divide is progressively 
overcome in South Africa; and fourthly, the exploration and progressive utilization of 
alternative software that constitutes a more democratic and safer means of social networking 
than current commercial sites and applications. In short, this thesis will advance that social 
media increasingly constitute a potentially valuable platform for the deepening and 
strengthening of democracy in South Africa, the importance of which needs to be underscored 
in light of current challenges to new social movement communications and organization.  
In terms of methodology, this thesis is based on information obtained from both 
primary and secondary academic sources, and from the websites, blogs, and social media 
pages of selected new social movements and activist groups. Thus, this exploratory study ‒ 
couched in an interpretative approach ‒ will use qualitative data to produce its findings. 
Qualitative studies usually aim for depth rather than “quantity of understanding” (Henning 
2004:3), insofar as they involve in-depth analysis of the data in question. In terms of this, 
Cheek explains discourse analysis as providing “insight into the functioning of bodies of 
knowledge in their specific situated contexts by generating interpretive claims with regard to 
the power effects of a discourse on groups of people” (1997:23-27). However, this study will 
be couched in terms of Foucauldian discourse analysis. For Foucault, discourse analysis 
involves the analysis of power relations within social situations, and via his genealogical 
works he illustrates and argues that power does not belong to any particular agent, but is 
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instead spread out across a variety of social practices. Accordingly, he maintains that power 
should be viewed as both a constraining and a productive force; that is, power  
 
does not only weigh on us as a force that says no, but…it [also] traverses and produces things, it 
induces pleasure, forms knowledge, produces discourse. It needs to be considered as a 
productive network which runs through the whole social body, much more than as a negative 
instance whose [only] function is repression. (Foucault 1980:119) 
 
Consequently, for Foucault, “power provides the conditions of possibility for the social” 
(Jørgensen and Phillips 2002:13), because power does not come from one central point and 
cannot be possessed, but is rather produced at all levels of social relations by individuals, 
groups, institutions, and so forth. In short “power is everywhere; not because it embraces 
everything, but because it comes from everywhere” (Foucault 1980:93), such that domination, 
resistance, and freedom are all interconnected. Indeed, where there is power there is 
resistance, and resistance can occur at any point in a web of relations, to produce new social 
arrangements.  
 On the one hand, “micro-discourse analysis looks in fine-focus at specific instances of 
talk and text, and seeks to understand what is going on in particular interactions…when 
people talk to each other, in speech and writing.” On the other hand, Foucauldian discourse 
analysis, or “macro-discourse analysis is more concerned with identifying different discourses 
in play around a particular topic or phenomenon or social action.” In this regard, “macro-
discourse analysis starts from [a]…taxonomy, mapping out the discourses in play in rhetorical 
competition between competing ways of ‘making sense’” (Stainton Rodges 2011:132). As 
such, “the task of Foucauldian discourse analysis is the analysis of discourses. This is a very 
different enterprise from the fine-grained investigation of talk and texts undertaken in 
discourse analysis and discursive psychology” (Wooffitt 2005:146). Accordingly, in this 
thesis, a taxonomy of three classes of new social movements in South Africa, namely the 
‘right to life,’ ‘right to a better life,’ and ‘right to a better life for all’ will be constructed, their 
representative candidates will be identified, and their online activities – as facilitated by 
cyber-infrastructure – will be analyzed. 
This will be undertaken, moreover, in relation to Laclau and Mouffe’s ideas of radical 
democracy, which were developed against the backdrop of Foucault’s emphasis on the 
importance of resisting dominant socio-cultural norms. Echoing Foucault, “they recognize 
that wherever there is power there is resistance,” and that this “resistance can take many 
forms” (Smith 1998:6). Thus, since “Foucault’s works are one of the main sources of 
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inspiration for Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe” (Dowding 2011:193), related discourse 
analysis is an appropriate method through which to examine the potential of the internet and 
social media to offer a space for current South African power relations to shift, through 
collective resistance that facilitates cracks or fissures in the dominant neoliberal discourse of 
the country.  
While this thesis will examine discursive patterns and trends that have emerged in 
South African new social movements’ use of the internet and social media as a form of 
activist communication, the rationale of such research is to contribute toward the 
strengthening of new social movement strategy and influence, with a view to deepening and 
expanding the democratic project in our country. 
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Chapter One: An Overview of the Emergence of New Media, and Its Socio-
cultural and Politico-economic Impact 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 
The dawn of the Information Age and the emergence of new media have radically altered the 
world in which we live, and indeed how we see ourselves within that world. That is, despite 
its relatively short history, the rise of the internet in the contemporary era has had an 
extraordinary impact on society, insofar as it has made possible a move away from the largely 
passive reception of information via industrial age media – such as television and radio – 
toward increasing degrees of interactive response and exchange of information. 
Understandably, this has been indissociable from a broad array of socio-cultural and politico-
economic changes, and in the interest of exploring these – with a view to laying a conceptual 
foundation for all the subsequent chapters of this thesis – in what follows, an overview of the 
emergence and impact of new media will be proffered. 
This chapter will commence with a brief exploration of the origins of the internet as a 
Cold War communications tool. That is, the internet as we know it will be discussed in 
relation to early developments in Cold War communications strategies and packet switching 
technologies. These were developed in the United States in reaction to growing tensions 
between it and the Soviet Union, and in response to the need for a decentralized 
communication system which could ensure uninterrupted connections between military and 
government organizations in the event of a Soviet nuclear strike.  
Next, the commercial growth of these technologies into the World Wide Web in the 
1990s will be discussed, before the development of Web 2.0 and its impact on the evolution 
of this technology into the internet as it is known today, will be thematized. In this regard, 
Web 2.0 will be examined in terms of its facilitation of growing possibilities for interaction 
and participation. Moreover, the related forms of social media ‒ including virtual worlds, 
blogs, social networks, collaborative sites and content communities ‒ will also be explored 
with a view to highlighting the interactive possibilities offered by such new media 
communication technologies.  
Following this, since the politico-economic paradigm of neoliberalism has been an 
important driving force behind internet expansion, this chapter will explore the neoliberal 
underpinnings of the internet, by examining, on the one hand, the influence that the growth of 
neoliberalism has had on the popularization and commodification of the internet, and on the 
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other hand, the impact that such neoliberal underpinnings have had on the contemporary use 
of this media. In this regard, through the role of neoliberalism in facilitating the imbrication of 
the internet and new media technologies into the everyday life of contemporary society, use of 
such technology has, to a large extent, been subject to related capitalist axiological inflection. 
And this has been viewed in both a positive and negative light. Consequently, the latter part of 
this chapter will focus on the various conflicting perspectives surrounding the perceived 
values and threats that the internet, social media and new media technologies hold for 
contemporary life. That is, positive appraisals of the potential of such media will be examined 
in relation to the works of Rheingold (1993), Turkle (1995), Poster (1995), and Jenkins 
(2006), before the more circumspect ambivalence of Castells will be explored. Hereafter, the 
negative appraisals of new media technologies will be discussed in relation to the arguments 
of Buffardi (2008), Campbell (2008), Twenge (2009), and Turkle’s most recent work (2011).  
All of the above will be undertaken in order to elaborate on the current debates 
surrounding the influence of the internet and new media technologies on society, and to 
provide insight into both the opportunities and challenges that such media present to digitally-
connected people in the contemporary era. 
 
1.2 The rise of the internet 
 
In his 1945 Atlantic Monthly article, Vannevar Bush insisted that inadequacies in the 
exchange of new theories and ideas were slowing down scientific progress in America.  In 
response to these inadequacies, Bush visualized a “system of rapid dissemination and 
organization of information” that would be instantly available to anyone who sought to find it. 
He called this system the Memex. The Memex, he proposed, would offer a “transparent 
plateau” on which books, journals, articles, images, and so forth, would be accessible around 
the world (Sherry and Brown 2004:114). Fifty years later, the introduction of the World Wide 
Web and its internet technologies saw Bush’s vision emerge as a reality.  
 For many contemporary users of new media, it is difficult to imagine that the internet 
– with which their social and business lives are so inextricably intertwined – arose as a 
consequence of the growing need for an integrated communication network in America. 
According to Sherry and Brown, early computing technologies had two goals. Firstly, the 
desire to “increase the ease of communication across distance,” and secondly, the “desire to 
provide resources…[to] assist the efficient processing of information” (2004:114). While 
these desires were already prevalent in the early twentieth century, it was the tensions related 
to the Cold War that initiated momentum for the realization of these goals. 
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 The Cold War (1945-1991) was a period of sustained tension between the United States (US) 
and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), and it was both a struggle for physical 
control of certain territories (Germany, the Middle East, Northeast and Southeast Asia), and 
an ideological “contest to prove the superiority of contending political and economic systems 
in generating power and well-being” (Harper 2011:1). Although there was relatively little by 
way of  direct military combat between the two superpowers ‒ as a result of the threat posed 
by the nuclear weapons that both sides possessed ‒ numerous tensions and proxy wars 
emerged in various parts of the world during this period (Sheehan 2003:4).
1
 
Within this context of growing political pressure and related positioning, one of the 
major components of the Cold War was intelligence gathering and espionage.
2
 As a result, 
communication technologies and information transfer capabilities became a primary concern 
for both sides. Such concern received significant augmentation during the Cuban missile 
crisis of 1962,
3
 when the possibility of a nuclear confrontation between the US and the USSR 
seemed inevitable. In reaction to this, the US began to explore ways in which they would be 
able to communicate after a nuclear attack had eliminated key infrastructural centers. Since it 
was highly conceivable that neither basic military command and control networks, nor long-
distance telephone systems, would survive a nuclear attack, it became apparent that an 
alternative form of communication would be required – one which was nodal instead of 
centralized. At the same time that Cold War defense measures became a hot topic on the 
                                                          
1
 These proxy wars and conflicts included the Berlin Blockade (1948–1949), the Korean War (1950–1953), the 
Suez Crisis (1956), the Berlin Crisis (1961), the Cuban Missile Crisis (1962), the Vietnam War (1959–1975), the 
Yom Kippur War (1973), the Soviet war in Afghanistan (1979–1989), the Soviet downing of Korean Air Lines 
Flight 007 (1983), and the “Able Archer” NATO military exercises (1983). For more on this see: Lightbody, B. 
1999. The Cold War. London: Routledge; and Arnold, J., and Wiener, R. 2012. Cold War: Essential Reference 
Guide. Santa Barbra: ABC-CLIO.  
2
 According to Knightley, “the hardest and most bitterly fought confrontation between the Soviet Union and the 
western democracies during the 50 years of the Cold War was on the espionage front. In this arena the KGB, the 
‘sword and the shield’ of the USSR, pitted its wits against its principal adversaries – the Central Intelligence 
Agency of the United States (CIA) and the British Secret Intelligence Service (SIS)” (2011:1).  
3
 The Cuban missile crisis occurred between the USA, USSR and Cuba on 15 October 1962. According to 
Green, “photographs taken by US spy planes indicated that Soviet missile bases were being built in Cuba. The 
revelations triggered a high-stakes standoff between the USA and USSR…[, commonly referred to as] ‘the days 
the world held its breath’” (2010:20). During this time, post nuclear attack communication possibilities were 
considered and the need for a decentralized communication network was recognized. As will be indicated in 
what follows, the development of this decentralized communication network ultimately led to the creation of the 
internet. 
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American political agenda, the Soviet Union launched Sputnik, the first man-made satellite. 
With fears that the Soviet Union was out-performing America in space technology, and 
consequently national defense, the Eisenhower administration committed to providing 
significant support to defense research. The Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA) 
was developed in reaction to the above fears, and was officially established as the US 
government’s key space and defense technology research agency in 1958. While the ARPA 
received significant funding for space and military technology development, it also gave 
scientists working with the agency the opportunity to advance their academic pursuits ‒ many 
of which involved computer science and information processing (Abbate 1999). 
In 1960, building on Bush’s ideas of the Memex, Joseph Licklider, a mathematician 
and behavioral psychologist hired as the head of the ARPA’s control and command division, 
proposed the concept of interactive computing. In addition to this, he was the first person to 
envision the linking of numerous computers at various distant locations. In his essay entitled 
“Man-Computer Symbiosis,” he wrote:  
 
It seems reasonable to envision…a “thinking center” that will incorporate the functions of 
present-day libraries together with anticipated advances in information storage and 
retrieval…The picture readily enlarges itself into a network of such centers, connected to one 
another by wide-band communication lines and to individual users by leased-wire services. In 
such a system, the speed of the computers would be balanced, and the cost of the gigantic 
memories and the sophisticated programs would be divided by the number of users. (Licklider 
1960:15) 
 
Licklider’s idea of an interactive network of computers offered an intriguing possibility for 
computing in the 1960s, and based on this idea, Robert Taylor, the director of the Information 
Processing Techniques Office, suggested the building of a system which could link 
researchers’ computers electronically, irrespective of geographical location or distance – soon 
to be known as the ARPANET (Hafner and Lyon 1996). However, the technology of the time 
did not support this notion of extended networks. According to Sherry and Brown, two 
obstacles to the creation of such a network existed. Firstly, problems emerged relating to the 
ability to “receive and process data over existing telephone lines fast enough to allow 
efficient, real-time processing,” and secondly, issues developed relating to “creating a 
network that could support the unique needs involved in the exchange of computer generated 
data” (2004:116). Yet in 1960, Kleinrock proposed a new computer technology that could 
possibly overcome these obstacles. This technology would later become known as packet 
13 
 
switching. Based on the ideas of redundancy and digital technology,
4
 packet switching was “a 
rapid store-and-forward design.” According to the Research and Development (RAND) 
Corporation, packet switching worked in the following way: “when a node receives a packet it 
stores it, determines the best route to its destination, and sends it to the next node on that path. 
If there was a problem with a node (or if it had been destroyed) packets would simply be 
routed around it” (RAND 1964). According to Flew, packet switching allowed long messages 
to be broken down into smaller ‘packets,’ messages to be rerouted, and messages to be sent in 
an asynchronous mode whereby the message was only received by the receiver after some 
time (Flew 2008:5). This introduction of packet switching not only helped to reduce the 
limitations of circuit-switched telephone networking, but also assisted in the establishment of 
a decentralized network with no single point of control – an important element of Cold War 
military defense. This decentralization, together with the use of digital technology, Gillies and 
Cailliau insist, was central to the development of the internet (2000:18-25).  
However, it is important to remember that the path toward the internet as it exists 
today, was not linear but rather involved a series of technological detours. Based on the 
principle of packet switching, the Advanced Research Projects Agency Network, or 
ARPANET (a national long-distance computer network), was established in 1969 and the first 
electronic mail (email) was delivered in 1971 (Curtis 2011). Subsequently, the first small 
virtual community emerged with Christensen and Suess’s creation of the non-commercial 
computerized ‘bulletin board system’ (BBS), which was used to “inform friends of meetings, 
make announcements and share information” (Bennett 2012). After this, between 1978 and 
1989, a variety of commercial developments, such as Usenet, Prodigy, America Online 
(AOL), and Internet Relay Chat (IRC), further advanced the communication capabilities of 
the internet.
5
 However, it was ultimately the development of the World Wide Web in the 
1990s that launched the internet as it is known today. That is, Tim Berners-Lee’s 1989 notion 
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 Redundancy, which allows for the duplication of critical components of a design, eliminates any need for 
reliance on one communication link, and thereby prevents a network from being destroyed. 
5
 Resembling the bulletin board system, Usenet is an international internet discussion platform that involves a 
combination of email and web forums, and which encourages users to read or post messages to various content 
categories. Prodigy was an online facility that allowed members with a valid subscription to gain access to a 
variety of networked services, including news, shopping, games, banking, travel, stocks, weather, columns, and 
so forth. AOL is an American brand company that invests in and grows, brands and websites (Lunden 2012). 
AOL’s business is based online and offers consumers, advertisers, and publishers, a variety of products, contents 
and services. IRC is a service that offers real-time internet chat facilities. Although it was designed specifically 
to allow group communication in the form of discussion forums, private messaging, data transfer and file sharing 
are also now allowed (Kalt 2000:4). 
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of the World Wide Web,
6
 and its development by Berners-Lee and CERN (Conseil Europeen 
pour la Recherche Nucleaire) from 1991 onward,
7
 resulted in a dramatic transformation of the 
communication possibilities of the internet (Flew 2008:6-7). And the significance of this 
transformation became increasingly apparent in 1992, when the National Centre for 
Supercomputing Applications (NCSA) at the University of Illinois developed Mosaic, the first 
graphical browser, which has been credited with bringing the World Wide Web into the 
public domain (Vossen and Hagemann 2007:2; Bennett 2012). This graphical user interface 
(GUI) provided user-friendly access to the internet, and thereby allowed individuals who were 
not experienced in the technical elements of computing to gain access to data and information. 
According to Forrest (2003), Mosaic’s graphical capabilities acted to capture individuals’ 
attention and laid the foundation for all future browsers.
8
 Mosaic was renamed Netscape in 
1994, and was soon competing with Internet Explorer, an alternative browser released by 
Microsoft in 1995. That the emergence of these multimedia graphical user interfaces led to the 
mass popularization of the internet is evinced by the incredibly rapid growth in the number of 
users.
9
 Also, during this time, a variety of additional applications were developed which 
allowed users to create their own websites and user profiles, and which thereby gave birth to 
blogging.
10
 In turn, Google opened as a major internet search engine in 1998,
11
 and Friends 
                                                          
6
 The World Wide Web (WWW) was conceived as a “global networked environment of interconnected 
documents and data accessible through the internet” (McPherson 2010:5). 
7
 In 1991 Berners-Lee and CERN made the World Wide Web available on the internet. According to the 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), “by giving the specifications for HyperText Markup Language 
(HTML: the code in which Web sites are written), HyperText Transfer Protocol (HTTP: the code by which sites 
are moved into and out of the Web), and UDIs (now a.k.a. URLs), Berners-Lee made it fairly easy for anyone 
with Internet access to contribute, as well as collect, information” (1999).  
8
 Mosaic offered its users a graphical interface that included full-color images, sound and textual formatting. 
This graphical interface was unlike any other internet format and, according to Forrest, “once users discovered 
that perusing documents in cyberspace could be fun and relatively easy, more people started getting interested in 
using the Internet and the number of Web pages available began to multiply exponentially. Businesses also 
began taking notice of the Internet and its potential as a marketplace and advertising medium” (2003). 
9
 Increasing significantly from six hundred websites in 1993 to ten thousand in 1994, and from there to half a 
million in 1996, the influence of graphical user interface browsers on internet growth is immense (Marshall 
2012). 
10
 A blog (short for Weblog) is a website on which individuals (or a group of people) upload information or 
discussions in reverse chronological order. Blogs usually follow the format of a diary entry and often link up to 
other blogs or websites. The contents of blogs can vary dramatically, and a comment function at the end of most 
blogs allows readers to interact with the writer, ask questions and state their own ideas or opinions related to the 
blog topic. According to Rettberg, blogging is “a part of the history of communication and literacy, and 
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Reunited emerged in 2000 as the first social networking site to gain widespread popularity. 
By 2000, seventy million computers were connected to the internet (Curtis 2011; Bennett 
2012), and from 2001 onward, numerous new media forms such as social networking sites, 
virtual communities, and online communication networks, have continued to emerge. 
According to Mandiberg, these new media technologies, which further engendered a 
decentralization process, “focused squarely on active audience participation” and allowed 
“formally passive media consumers to make and disseminate their own media” (2012:1). As 
such, the internet can be defined as “the electronic network of networks that links people and 
information through computers and other digital devices allowing person-to-person 
communication and information retrieval” (DiMaggio et al. 2001:307). 
 
1.3 The emergence of Web 2.0 
 
Directly related to the emergence of new media as a socio-cultural and politico-economic 
catalytic force, is the event of Web 2.0. Web 2.0 is the name given to the aspect of the World 
Wide Web that emerged just over ten years after its genesis, and which is characterized by 
“interactive applications that allow users to participate in contributing, organizing, and 
creating their [own] content” (Shelly and Frydenberg 2010:1). The term ‘Web 2.0’ was first 
introduced in 2003, and conferences related to the idea were held by O’Reilly Media in 2004. 
Tim O’Reilly, a key advocate of Web 2.0, defined it as 
 
the business revolution in the computer industry caused by the move to the internet as platform, 
and an attempt to understand the rules for success on that new platform. Chief among those 
rules is this: Build applications that harness network effects to get better the more people use 
them…[via] harnessing collective intelligence. (O’Reilly 2006) 
 
To this end, Web 2.0 posits that as the use of such sites increase, so too will the quality of the 
sites improve. According to Flew, the core principles of internet sites that conform to Web 2.0 
are: many-to-many connectivity, user focus, simple design, lightweight administration, start-
up and development costs, decentered organization, openness, and constant evolution 
(2008:17). Through such principles, Web 2.0 allows for large amounts of users to connect and 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
emblematic of a shift from uni-directional mass media to participatory media, where viewers and readers become 
creators of media” (2008:1).  
11
 Google is now ranked as the number one search engine in the world with approximately 1.17 billion unique 
users every month (eBizMBA 2014). Established in 1998, Google aimed to “make huge quantities of 
information available to everyone” (Google Beta Inc. 1999). 
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communicate with each other, it focuses on user interaction and experience, is easy to use, 
and offers a cost effective communication medium. Furthermore, it is decentralized in terms 
of control, and open in relation to technology standards and Applications Programming 
Interface (API). Finally, Web 2.0 is constantly evolving and changing as users make 
modifications to the various sites. Some of the fastest growing websites based on these 
principles include virtual worlds such as the gaming site World of Warcraft and the social 
world Second Life, blog and micro-blogging sites such as Blogger and Twitter, social 
networking sites such as Facebook and MySpace, collaborative projects and online 
encyclopedia’s such as Wikipedia, and content communities such as photography sites 
Instagram and Flickr, and the user-generated video site YouTube, among many others. These 
new interactive forms of media are commonly referred to as social media, and have become 
an essential part of much of popular culture around the world.  
The first examples of online interaction involving social media communication were, 
of course, already seen in the construction of virtual games and virtual worlds during the 
development of integrated network systems and the internet. That is, although virtual social 
spaces have been around since the mid-1970s – games such as Maze War introduced the idea 
of online interaction on ARPANET – virtual worlds first appeared on the internet in the form 
of MUDs (Multi-User Dungeons/Domains) in the late 1970s and early 1980s.
12
 MUDs 
offered an online virtual world where many players could participate in various forms of text-
based role playing games, in real time. And the popularity and growth of MUDs led to their 
expansion into MMORPGs (Massively Multiplayer Online Role-Playing Games),
13
 which 
have informed the virtual game and social worlds that are now so much in vogue. As an 
important dimension of social media, online virtual worlds provide users with three 
dimensional online environments where they are able to create personal avatars and interact 
with the avatars of others in a ‘real life’ setting. It has been argued that virtual worlds “are 
probably the ultimate manifestation of social media, as they provide the highest level of social 
presence and media richness” (Kaplan and Haenlein 2010:64). Virtual worlds are usually 
divided into two forms. The first form is the virtual game world, where users are required to 
                                                          
12
 According to Steed and Oliveria, Maze War was the first ‘first-person shooter’ game to work on the internet 
(2010:23). Developed in 1973 at NASA Ames Research Centre, Maze War evolved from a “single-player game 
where the player had to find the exit to the maze,” to an eight-player game where players were able to shoot each 
other inside the maze (Thompson 2004, in Steed and Oliveira 2010:23).  
13
 Massively multiplayer online role-playing games (MMORPGs) are a genre of online virtual games in which 
thousands of players are able to connect to the internet and interact, communicate, and role-play in the same 
virtual environment, in real-time.  
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abide by strict rules related to the massively multiplayer online role-playing game they are 
engaged in. World of Warcraft along with EverQuest,
14
 are popular examples of such games. 
The second form is the virtual social world. In these worlds, users are not limited by rules and 
are encouraged to live their ‘lives’ as they please – either in conformity with, or in contrast to, 
their real life. Second Life is arguably the most well-known example of such a virtual social 
world, and Kaplan and Haenlein describe it in the following way: 
 
Besides doing everything that is possible in real life (e.g., speaking to other avatars, taking a 
walk, enjoying the virtual sunshine), Second Life also allows users to create content (e.g., to 
design virtual clothing or furniture items) and to sell this content to others in exchange for 
Linden Dollars, a virtual currency traded against the U.S. Dollar on the Second Life Exchange. 
(2010:64) 
 
Virtual worlds are moreover connected to other forms of social media in that they all offer a 
certain degree of virtual communication and interaction (Papp 2010:3). Other forms of social 
media differ from virtual worlds, however, in that users do not need to create an avatar to 
interact with each other in these mediums, and most interactions take place “asynchronously 
with a time delay” (Papp 2010:3). Blogs, social networks, collaborative projects, and content 
communities are indicative of this difference and offer a wide variety of alternative forms of 
online interaction. 
As one of the earliest forms of social media, blogs are becoming increasingly 
popular,
15
 with microblogging gaining widespread acceptance in the past few years as an 
effective communication platform. As already mentioned, blogs are “types of websites that 
usually display date-stamped entries in reverse chronological order” (Kaplan and Haenlein 
2010:63), and they usually relate to an individual’s life, beliefs, interests, and so forth. They 
also invite interaction in the form of comments and responses from others within networked 
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 World of Warcraft (WoW) is a massively multiplayer online role-playing game (MMORPG) with almost 
seven million subscribers as of August 2014 (Makuch 2014). WoW allows players to log-in to the online world 
and, via their avatar, explore their surroundings, fight monsters, complete quests, and interact with other players. 
Certain rules are set by the game, but the direction of play is mostly led by the player. Similar to WoW, 
EverQuest is a 3D MMORPG that is set in the fantasy world of Norrath. In this game, players must select an 
avatar (commonly known as a char or toon) from a wide array of options, including humans, elves, trolls, frog-
people, dragon-people, and so forth, and must then select an occupation, patron deity, and starting city. Players 
then use their avatars to explore the world of Norrath, fight enemies, find treasures, and master trade skills.  
15
 The first blog appeared in 1994 when college student Justin Hall launched his website, Justin’s Links from the 
Underground. His blog was published for eleven years and he became widely known as the ‘founding father of 
personal blogging’ (cited in Hayden and Tomal 2012). 
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communities. Moreover, blogs often offer links to similar subjects on other blogs or websites, 
and may provide links to video and photo related blogs. Bruns and Jacobs argue that “the 
social networking of blogs and the[ir] potential for collaboration…[offer] a decidedly human 
dimension to the publishing and publicising of information” (2006:5). This dimension, they 
assert, allows an author to connect to and communicate with an audience that was never 
before available to them. Figures leave little doubt concerning the immense appeal of this 
platform. By the end of 2013, there were roughly 152 million active blogs online, with 
Tumblr and Wordpress standing out in terms of popularity (Gaille 2013).  
However, in 2006, microblogging, a derivative of blogging which focuses on short, 
character restricted updates that are sent out to people who subscribe to the posts, was 
launched. In terms of microblogging, Twitter is the most popular site, with approximately 271 
million monthly active users worldwide (Twitter 2014).
16
 Twitter is a simple application that 
is conducive to immediate updates in breaking news, celebrity watch, and the latest events, 
and with roughly one million accounts being added to Twitter every day, this microblogging 
facility’s influence over and penetration into society cannot be overlooked (Bullas 2012).17 
Soon after blogging appeared on the social media landscape, one of the most widely 
used and well-known forms of social media, namely social networking media, was introduced 
into ‘cyber-society.’ In this regard, the 1995 Classmate.com, a social networking site that was 
designed to help people reconnect with friends and classmates from primary school, high 
school, college, and so forth, paved the way for the creation of the numerous social 
networking sites available today. These social networks commonly provide an interactive 
space for online communication between people with similar interests or backgrounds (Mazer 
                                                          
16
 Hands defines Twitter as “a microblogging service on the worldwide web in which users post messages of up 
to 140 characters to their account page or ‘profile.’ Their messages can then be viewed by any other account 
holder, or users can choose to ‘follow’ each other, in which case messages are streamed instantly to the accounts 
of their followers.” This, she argues “produces a form of virtual network that can quickly expand to allow large 
numbers of users to communicate simultaneously and in near-real time” (2011:191). 
17
 Indeed, in his book, Twitter and Microblogging: Instant Communication With 140 Characters or Less (2012), 
Colin Wilkinson advances that “Twitter has proved that it has enormous practical, professional, personal and 
social value.” He further asserts that “Twitter has an ability to instantly reach an enormous number of users 
worldwide,” and this “has made it popular with news outlets, sports marketers, advertisers, events promoters, 
celebrities, political and advocacy groups, retailers, museums, entertainment media and many other groups 
seeking to share information, sell products, and raise awareness” (2012:21). In addition to this, Breslin and his 
colleagues assert that microblogging “is useful for interacting with your community or communities of interest” 
(2009:86), while at the same time it is increasingly being used in the corporate environment in “facilitating 
informal communication, learning and knowledge exchange” (2009:87). 
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et al. 2007; Pempek et al. 2009). Furthermore, they provide the opportunity for users to 
participate in identity construction and presentation. Social networks therefore offer a 
different experience to blogs, which are a form of online diary entry and which focus on a 
specific topic and encourage feedback related to that topic. Instead, social networks allow 
people who have similar interests to interact and form connections online that are not 
necessarily topic related. Facebook, LinkedIn, and MySpace are all good examples of social 
networks and each have tremendous followings around the world, with millions of users 
logging in regularly to interact with each other. Indeed, as of February 2014, Facebook – the 
most widely used social networking service – had approximately 1.23 billion active users, 
with 170 million users being added in one year (Kiss 2014).
18
 And as of July 2014, 
Facebook’s net worth reached 33.1 billion dollars. Facebook was created by Harvard 
University student Mark Zuckerberg in February 2004,
19
 and the name of the site was derived 
from printed handbooks ‒ known as ‘face books’ ‒ that were given out to students at the 
beginning of the university year. These ‘face books’ allow students to become acquainted 
with each other, thus the idea behind the Facebook website was similarly to create an online 
version of these directories, where students could produce, personalize, and update their own 
profiles (Awl 2009:4). Available to anyone with a legal email address, Facebook allows users 
to create a personal profile, list personal information, interests, and contact details, invite 
friends, communicate using private or public messages and chat features, add photos, play 
games, and join groups, among many other things. Popular for the immense possibilities of 
social interaction it makes available, Facebook is currently the leading social networking 
website based on monthly unique users. LinkedIn, a popular professional business social 
network, has approximately 332 million users, with two new members joining every second 
(Smith 2014), while MySpace, reached thirty-six million users in October 2013 (McHugh 
2013).
 
 
In 2000, collaborative projects became another popular form of social media. 
According to Kaplan, “collaborative projects enable the joint creation of content by many 
end-users” (2010). In this regard, collaborative projects consist either of wikis, such as 
Wikipedia, which allows users to add, remove, edit, and change text-based content, or 
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 The use of the internet via mobile phones is also becoming increasingly popular. In fact, of the approximately 
seven billion mobile phone subscriptions currently in use, 2.096 billion of them allow for internet access 
(Mobiforge 2014). 
19
 Although Zuckerberg has largely been advanced as the creator of Facebook, it must be noted that this site was 
developed with the help of fellow computer science students, Eduardo Saverin, Dustin Moskovitz, and Chris 
Hughes (Harris 2012:7). 
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bookmarking sites, such as Delicious, which allow users to collect and rate internet links and 
media content as a group, among others. Collaborative sites differ from social networking 
sites in various ways. As Byrne points out, while networking allows users to “discover, 
discuss and brainstorm” different ideas and information, collaboration sites allow users to 
“organise” and “formalise” this information (cited in Franklin 2011). Thus, networking can be 
seen as “more preliminary and exploratory, where collaboration tends to formalize and act 
upon the results of networking” (Franklin 2011). 
Content communities are another form of social media. While blogs focus on topics, 
social networks focus on interest, and collaborative projects focus on organization, content 
communities focus on content. That is, their core purpose is to share information or content 
between users, and there are many different varieties of such content communities, each 
focusing on a specific form of media. For example, YouTube is a video sharing content 
community with one billion unique users per month and over 100 hours of video uploaded to 
its archives every minute (YouTube 2014). Consequently, many branders have caught on to 
the popularity of YouTube, and have “seized on its power…[as] a viral media that augments 
traditional advertising media such as TV” (Bullas 2012). In addition, Flickr and Instagram 
allow users to share photos, while Slideshare encourages the sharing of PowerPoint 
presentations. Pinterest is another example of a content community, whereby information and 
ideas are uploaded onto a virtual ‘pin board,’ shared and commented on. Understandably, the 
growing popularity of content communities makes them an attractive platform for individuals, 
organizations, businesses, and marketers to gain and spread various forms of information. 
As a component of new media, the term social media, as illustrated in the above 
discussion, is popularly used to describe online tools that allow online communication of 
information, collaboration, and participation (Newson et al. 2009:49). Lievrouw defines new 
and social media as “the combination of material artefacts, people’s practices, and the social 
and organizational arrangements involved in the process of human communication” 
(2011:15). These new media, she asserts, differ in four important ways from traditional 
media: (1) They are recombinant, insofar as they are central to all aspects of digital media but 
are constantly changing and being changed. (2) They are networked by virtue of their 
widespread connections and sharing capabilities. (3) They are ubiquitous, on account of the 
fact that they are found throughout the World Wide Web and are available wherever an 
internet connection can be made. Finally, (4) they are interactive because of their possibilities 
for collaboration (Lievrouw 2011:15). These four characteristics can further be related to the 
ways in which digitally-connected contemporary people differ from those unacquainted with 
new media. The digitally-connected are similarly recombinant, insofar as their lives are 
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influenced by and have evolved out of a combination of their immediate life-worlds and the 
virtual new media technologies that constantly shape it. They are networked through the 
internet and new media and are able to be ‘virtually’ anywhere at any time. They are 
ubiquitous, insofar as their resulting sense of identity is spread out through an array of 
investments – from financial to political and from relational to private. Finally, and most 
importantly, they are interactive, insofar as they use new media to interact, communicate, and 
participate in the virtual world made possible by the internet. Yet, such recombinant, 
networked, ubiquitous, and interactive subjectivity is by no means free, insofar as the 
technical and politico-economic infrastructure required for its realization entails not only 
immense wealth, but also the belief in the possibility of infinite wealth generation through 
rapacious and single-minded capitalist competition. In a word, neoliberalism, and the 
consequence of this is a related capitalist axiological inflection of such subjectivity, albeit to 
different degrees in different cases. With a view to exploring this issue, it is necessary at this 
point to consider the neoliberal underpinnings of the internet and new/social media.  
 
1.4 Neoliberalism and the internet 
 
As alluded to earlier, although the technology used in the development of the internet was 
initially created and funded respectively through the US military and government, funding 
soon shifted from the public to the private sector, with big business and corporations 
beginning to invest significantly in digital network development. That is, despite the internet’s 
development in response to the nuclear threat posed by the Cuban missile crisis, and the 
corresponding need for second strike capability, its period of non-commercial use was of 
relatively short duration, and its subsequent history has largely been determined by its growth 
in an expanding neoliberal political economy. One involving a deregulated zone open to 
market forces orientated around the single aim of generating profit through information 
sharing.
20
   
Unlike Keynesianism,
21
 which allowed government intervention in the economy in 
times of crisis, neoliberalism is a politico-economic movement which shifts the control of 
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 According to McChesney, “the early Internet was not only noncommercial, it was anticommercial. Computers 
were regarded by many of the 1960s and 70s generation as harbingers of egalitarianism and cooperation, not 
competition and profits” (2013:111). 
21
 Introduced by twentieth-century economist John Maynard Keynes, primarily in his book The General Theory 
of Employment, Interest and Money, Keynesianism involves economic policies which encourage government 
intervention and public investment in the economy (Dillard 1948:2). This approach was widely adopted as an 
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market factors from the public to the private sector. In short, promoting economic 
liberalization and free trade, neoliberalism advances that governments should protect private 
property, decrease deficit spending, restructure tax law to broaden the tax base, limit trade 
protectionism, eliminate fixed exchange rates (which otherwise ensure the stability of a 
currency by securing it against another fixed currency, or marker such as gold), support 
deregulation of trade, limit grants, and privatize state-run businesses (Harvey 2005; Braedley 
and Luxton 2010). According to Kotz, neoliberalism is hence “both a body of economic 
theory and a policy stance” (2002:1), orientated around the idea  
 
that a largely unregulated capitalist system not only embodies the ideal of free individual choice 
but also achieves optimum economic performance with respect to efficiency, economic growth, 
technical progress, and distributional justice. The state is assigned a very limited economic role: 
defining property rights, enforcing contracts, and regulating the money supply. State 
intervention to correct market failures is viewed with suspicion, on the ground that such 
intervention is likely to create more problems than it solves. (Kotz 2002:1) 
 
Steger and Roy point out that the term neoliberalism was first introduced in post-World War 
One Germany “by a small circle of economists and legal scholars affiliated with the ‘Freiburg 
School,’ to refer to their moderate programme of reviving classical neoliberalism” (2010:ix). 
Following this introduction, neoliberalism remained a relatively academic concept for a long 
time, only being applied in isolated cases, such as the 1970s adoption of the term 
neoliberalismo by a group of Latin American economists, to explain their pro-market 
economic model (Steger and Roy 2010:x). A good example of the implementation of such 
neoliberalismo was Augusto Pinochet’s economic approach following his 1973 military coup 
in Chile. Nineteen days after being appointed commander-in-chief of the Chilean Army, 
Pinochet lead a CIA-supported military coup that ousted the democratically elected president 
Salvador Allende and his socialist government. Following the bombing of the presidential 
palace, “martial law” was declared and parliament and the media were closed. After the arrest 
and deportation of “thousands of Allende supporters, many of whom were subsequently 
executed by the military” (Solimano 2012:23), Pinochet immediately began to implement an 
aggressive policy of neoliberalism in the country. Inspired by the theories of the Chicago 
school economist Milton Friedman, Chile’s military-enforced neoliberalism was introduced 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
economic model after World War II, and continued to gain popularity during the global economic expansion 
experienced between 1945 and 1973. Advocating theories related to government monetary and fiscal policy that 
aimed to increase employment and stimulate business activity, Keynesianism rejected previous laissez faire 
economic policy and insisted instead that, at times, government intervention was imperative. 
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by a group of economists known as the Chicago Boys, who developed a “500-page economic 
blueprint for the country’s economy…which called for extensive and immediate deregulation 
and privatization measures as well as deep cuts to social spending, the reduction of tariffs, and 
the lifting of price controls” (Steger and Roy 2010).22 According to Winn, this “highly 
ideological version [of neoliberalism] made it a vehicle for aggressive attack on Chile’s 
workers,” in terms of both an “economic assault on the gains of wages, benefits, and working 
conditions that workers had won since the 1930s,” and  “violent repression of labor unions 
and worker activists” (2004:3).  
Yet, notwithstanding this example of a militaristic authoritarian form of neoliberalism, 
by the early 1980s Chile faced its “worst economic crisis since the Great Depression” (Winn 
2004:3), and its policy of aggressive, repressive neoliberalism was soon replaced by a form of 
neoliberalism more closely connected to that of Britain’s Prime Minister Margret Thatcher. In 
this regard, the rise of neoliberalism, as it is known today, is most notably associated with the 
efforts of Margaret Thatcher and US president Ronald Reagan. Margret Thatcher,  who was 
elected as prime minister of Britain in 1979, initiated her office with a promise to reduce trade 
union power and eliminate the ‘stagflation’ that had been prominent in the country for the 
previous ten years (Harvey 2005:1).
23
 Following the election of Ronald Regan into the 
presidency of the US in 1980, and the concomitant acceptance of Paul Volker’s new monetary 
policy,
24
 together with additional policies to “curb the power of labour, deregulate industry, 
agriculture, and resource extraction, and to liberate the powers of finance both internally and 
on the world stage,” neoliberalism began to emerge as a significant politico-economic 
ideology on both sides of the Atlantic (Harvey 2005:1). And such strong political support, 
together with the continuation of the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT),
25
 and 
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 The Chicago Boys was the name given to the group of economists who had all pursued postgraduate studies at 
the University of Chicago’s Department of Economics, and who were appointed by Pinochet to oversee the main 
economic positions in his post-coup neoliberal government.  
23
 Stagflation is a term used in economics to explain the situation that develops when the inflation rate is high, 
the economic growth rate is low, and the unemployment rate is high (Johnston 2011:76).  
24
 Paul Volker was selected as chairman of the Board of Governors for the Federal Reserve System in August 
1979. He is widely credited with bringing an end to the stagflation crisis of the 1970s, by raising interest rates 
from 11.2% to 20% between 1979 and 1981 (Johnston 2011:78). 
25
 The General Agreement on Trades and Tariffs (GATT) was an agreement on international trade which aimed 
to ensure a “substantial reduction of tariffs and other trade barriers and the elimination of preferences, on a 
reciprocal and mutually advantageous basis” (Dupey and Vignes 1991:510). The GATT was replaced by the 
World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995, which continues to pursue an analogous international agenda 
(Cherunilam 2006:587).  
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the 1980s debt crisis,
26
 created a favorable climate for the introduction of neoliberalism 
around the world. 
 McChesney explains the concept and outcomes of contemporary neoliberalism particularly 
well, when he describes it as 
 
the defining political economic paradigm of our time – it refers to the policies and processes 
whereby a relative handful of private interests are permitted to control as much as possible of 
social life in order to maximise their personal profit…Neoliberalism has for the past two 
decades been the dominant global political economic trend adopted by political parties of the 
centre, much of the traditional left and the right. These parties and the policies they enact 
represent the immediate interests of extremely wealthy investors and less than 1000 large 
corporations. (1999:8) 
 
In relation to this, Hands argues that the radical mobility of capital ushered in by 
neoliberalism has resulted in vast amounts of power being placed in the hands of a select 
group of unelected financial institutions and global corporations, which has led to the 
“disempowerment of local communities,” privatization on a global scale, commodification of 
previously common resources, and the “undermining of democratic governance” (2011:142).  
Similarly, Callinicos points out that it was through the latter in particular that “the 
International Monitory Fund and the World Bank [achieved] the leverage they needed to force 
Third World governments to accept neo-liberal programmes of ‘structural adjustment’” 
(2003:2).
27
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 Following the stagflation of the 1970s, “high inflation meant that real interest rates…were quite low, making 
borrowing appear to be cost free for many countries…Official debt – in other words, loans from governments 
and multilateral institutions – affected all parts of the developing world.” As such, “lenders at the time made the 
assumption that countries would not default and were aggressive in offering them loans.” Yet, “changes in the 
global economy made the loans increasingly difficult for poor countries to repay. In 1979, OPEC nations 
doubled the price of oil, and in response in 1981 the US Federal Reserve raised US interest rates above 20 
percent to fight inflation.” As a result, “international interest rates rose,” thus “sparking a worldwide recession” 
(Clapp and Dauvergne 2005:194).   
27
 Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, the US and other powerful northern countries were involved in 
implementing a series of structural adjustment programs (SAPs) in countries of the global South. According to 
Oringer and Welch, “formulated as loan conditions by Northern governments and the International Financial 
Institutions (IFIs), SAPs mandate[d] macroeconomic policy changes that obligate[d] recipient nations to 
liberalize their trade and investment policies” (1998). Notwithstanding the economic growth benefits promised 
by the pundits of the SAPs, the adoption of neoliberal policies often resulted in Third World countries reducing 
their spending on education, healthcare, and development in favor of loan repayment, which ultimately 
perpetuated poverty, inequality, and environmental degradation within their borders (Reed and Sheng 1997, 
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The deleterious consequences of these SAPs notwithstanding, they were met with less 
and less critical resistance. And part of the reason for this was that the progressive collapse of 
Communism in the Soviet Union and Central and Eastern European countries, which had up 
until then presented an ideological challenge to neoliberalism, allowed for the further steady 
spread of neoliberalism around the globe. Indeed, the 1990s saw a swift economic and 
political transition from Communism to market economy and democracy even in Eastern 
Europe (Aligica and Evans 2009:1). In terms of this, mass privatization programs backed by 
western governments and financial institutions acted to solidify the new politico-economic 
conditions, and rapidly ushered Eastern Europe into the realm of neoliberalism. However, by 
the middle of the 1990s, “rising unemployment, inflation, deteriorating living standards, the 
collapse of social services, and soaring crime” resulted in growing frustrations with such 
global capitalist transformation (Amsden et al. 1994:vii). Although Kenety argues that the aim 
of the privatization process was to “guarantee a swift ‒ and irreversible ‒ transition to 
capitalism for the countries formerly behind the Iron Curtain,” instead of “ushering in a new 
era of prosperity, the mass privatization programs helped bankrupt Russia and other former 
Soviet bloc countries” (2012). According to Clark, “the level of economic output crashed 
throughout the region” and “the average fall in GDP was nearly 30% in the early 1990s…as 
Eastern Europe suffered a slump far worse than the Great Depression experienced by the US 
and the UK 60 years earlier” (2012). Yet, despite the failures of neoliberalism in many of the 
previously Communist Eastern European countries, the transformation of former state run 
socialist economies into neoliberal market economies became a priority. And within the 
increasingly complex market-orientated milieu which ensued, the development of new 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Westra and Werhane 1998:38). Instances of this can be seen throughout the developing world, Brazil, Peru, 
Ghana, and Malawi, to name but a few. The World Bank funded 1980 Polonoroeste highway development 
project in Brazil is a case in point, which resulted in the destruction of miles of Amazonian rainforest and the 
harassment and decimation of many indigenous communities (Goldman 2005:95). And while the economic crisis 
stemming from analogous early structural adjustment programs of the 1980s resulted in severe malnutrition and 
hunger in Peru (Sweetman 2002:75), Ghana’s adoption of SAPs between 1983 and 1986 were coterminous with 
the severe deforestation of the country. Indeed, Clapp and Dauvergne assert that the commercial logging 
attributed to the adoption of SAPs has “contributed to the shrinking of the country’s forest area to one-quarter of 
its original size” (2008:206). Furthermore, the lack of subsidized fertilizer in Malawi between 1984 and 1987 
had negative impacts on smallholder farmers, and ultimately contributed to a growing nutritional deficit, and a 
subsequent susceptibility to HIV related seroconversion. In addition to this, increased school fees ‒ as a result of 
reduced government spending ‒ meant that many children in Malawi were no longer able to receive an education 
(Lewis et al. 2001:46).  
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information and communication technologies became utterly imperative, not only in Eastern 
Europe, but also in the neoliberalized countries of the global South, discussed earlier.  
To be sure, although the economic implications of neoliberalism emerge as significant, 
it is important to note that neoliberalism is not simply an economic doctrine (Foucault 1978; 
Mirowski 2009). As Harvey points out in A Brief History of Neoliberalism, 
“neoliberalism…has pervasive effects on ways of thought to the point where it has become 
incorporated into the common-sense way many of us interpret, line in, and understand the 
world” (2005:3). According to Read, neoliberalism “is an ideology that refers not only to the 
political realm, to an ideal of the state, but to the entirety of human existence.” That is, he 
insists that neoliberalism “claims to present not an ideal, but a reality;” in particular, a concept 
of “human nature” (Read 2009:2). This concept of human nature can be related to the work of 
Michel Foucault and his idea that “neoliberalism is not just a manner of governing states or 
economics, but is intimately tied to the government of the individual, to a particular manner of 
living” (Read 2009:3). Devoting a year of lectures at the Collège de France to the idea of 
neoliberalism, Foucault in 1978 drew attention to the notion of “governmentality;” a 
mentality through which people are governed and govern themselves (2008:185-214). 
According to Read,  
 
the operative terms of this governmentality are no longer rights and laws but interest, 
investment and competition. Whereas rights exist to be exchanged, and are in some sense 
constituted through the original exchange of the social contract, interest is irreducible and 
inalienable, it cannot be exchanged. The state channels flows of interest and desire by making 
desirable activities inexpensive and undesirable activities costly, counting on the fact that 
subjects calculate their interests. As a form of governmentality, neoliberalism would seem 
paradoxically to govern without governing; that is, in order to function its subjects must have a 
great deal of freedom to act – to choose between competing strategies.
28
 (2009:6-7) 
 
As such, while neoliberalism is largely considered a politico-economic system, is can also be 
viewed in terms of its ability to infiltrate every aspect of human life, organizing modern 
knowledge, and influencing contemporary subjectivity.   
In this regard, in the concluding chapter of The Road From Mont Pèlerin (2009), 
Mirowski insists that two things need to be remembered about neoliberalism. The first is that 
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 Strinati elaborates on this idea when he discusses freedom within capitalistic societies. He asserts that people 
within capitalist society who think they are free, are not actively free in terms of being an autonomous, 
independent and consciously thinking human being. Rather, he argues, “their freedom is restricted to the 
freedom to choose between different consumer goods and different brands of the same goods” (2004:54). 
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“neoliberalism masquerades as a radically populist philosophy, which begins with a set of 
philosophical theses about knowledge and its relationship to society” (2009:425). Drawing on 
Friedrich Hayek’s article The Use of Knowledge in Society (1945) – in which he denies the 
existence of objective knowledge and supports an idea of the market as a “prosthesis for [the] 
discovery of knowledge” – Mirowski notes the movement of neoliberalism toward the 
demeaning of “hard-won knowledge,” and the concomitant praise of market-like 
aggregations, or the “wisdom of crowds” (2009:425). Secondly, he argues that while such 
market-like aggregation of knowledge is praised, in those spaces where such “spontaneous 
participation is permitted, knowledge in fact degrades rather than improves” (2009:426). But 
this, he argues, is the point. This is because “the absolute validity of knowledge is not the true 
motive or objective” of neoliberalism, which is concerned instead with the “subbordination of 
the overall process to corporate strategic imperatives that provide the real justification” for 
neoliberalism and its “economic foundation” (2009:426).  
In relation to the emergence of the internet as an information sharing technology, 
Mirowski also highlights parallels between the market as an “information processor” and the 
internet and social media as highly complex inter-engagements of ideas. Indeed, drawing 
attention to Hayek’s argument concerning the use of knowledge in society (1945), Mirowski 
notes similarities between the respective roles of the market and the internet as a societal 
“information processor.” Based on this comparison, some have argued that the social 
significance of the internet has less to do with its promotion of individualism and 
consumerism, and more to do with its ability to orchestrate knowledge and communication in 
such a manner that the power of the dominant neoliberal system is ensured.  
In this regard, Schiller points out, in his Digital Capitalism: Networking the Global 
Market System that the rise of neoliberalism would be largely unthinkable without the 
concomitant boom in the development of information sharing technologies, which lent 
immense impetus to a process of globalization predicated on common consumer interest 
(2000:11). That is, corporations began to spend large amounts of money on the development 
of information technologies that allowed for information sharing between corporations and 
individuals, and “between 1970 and 1996…the percentage of all US corporate capital 
investment allocated to information technology climbed steeply, from 7 percent to around 45 
percent” (2000:16). In relation to this, Schiller examines the global political economy of 
cyberspace, and the shift from public to private integration of networks under neoliberalism. 
And he emphasizes his skepticism about the democratic potential of cyberspace, because of 
his belief that “cyberspace itself is being rapidly colonized by the familiar workings of the 
market system.” Furthermore, his examination of how the telecommunications system has 
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been imbued with a new commercial purpose as a result of its exposure to neoliberal and 
market related policies, highlights the concomitant empowerment of transnational 
corporations, the subsequent intensification of social inequalities, and the growing ability of 
cyberspace to cultivate consumerism on a transnational scale (2000:xiv). In effect, Schiller, 
among others,
29
 argues that the new export orientation and transnational production strategies, 
which were unleashed by the end of the Cold War, required that the ideology of neoliberalism 
be spread across the world. Consequently, investment by US corporations in the development 
of information and communication technologies had a strong ideological component, because 
while neoliberalism funded the development of new media, at the same time the global reach 
of new media contributed to the extension of the belief in the viability of neoliberalism. Thus, 
although the corporate takeover of the internet wrested power from the hands of the US 
government and military, it nevertheless continued along their same ideological trajectory, 
insofar as it presented a ubiquitous, decentralized challenge to all non-capitalist ideas. In this 
regard, such aggressive corporate interest not only defended the American Dream better than 
the US government and military ever could. In addition, it also extended the ideological 
frontier of America to the rest of the world, by holding out the promise of consumer bliss to 
all who are digitally connected. But whether or not this version of the American Dream 
involves the correlative extension of democracy, through the engendering of a critically and 
socially engaged subjectivity, is an issue of significant debate.  
 
1.5 Networked cyber-society: conflicting perspectives   
 
For Hassan and Thomas, the idea that people are “living through a phase of technological, 
economic and cultural change is now undeniable,” and they insist that “deep-level 
computability transforms how we represent life through the ubiquity of mutable digital 
imagery.” And through doing so, it plays a role in transforming “life through the industries, 
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 In Democracy’s Dilemma: Environment, Social Equity and the Global Economy, Paehlke supports Schiller’s 
concerns over digital capitalism when he uses the similar term electronic capitalism to identify “the emergent 
system of political economy characterised by increasing global economic and financial integration[,] and 
increasingly dominated politically, economically, and culturally by the use of electronic media and computers” 
(2003:27). Analogously, Dawson and Foster, in their article “Virtual Capitalism: The Political Economy of the 
Information Highway” (1996), refer to this role of new information technology in the concentration and 
centralization of capital as virtual capitalism, while Fitzpatrick refers to it as informatics capitalism in his article 
“Critical Theory, Information Society and Surveillance Technologies” (2002). In turn, Haug (2003) advances the 
concept of high-tech capitalism when issues surrounding the role of computers and ICT’s in the creation of a 
globalized capitalist economy are discussed.  
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cultures, and institutions that produce and sustain our sense of being in the world” (Hassan 
and Thomas 2006:2). However, because these changes have been significantly informed by 
and orientated around the economic ideals of neoliberalism, in many cases, the use of such 
technology has been subject to correlative capitalist axiological inflection. Consequently, 
while, on the one hand, some argue that there now exist hitherto unimaginable virtual 
possibilities for democratic interactivity and global connectedness, on the other hand, others 
feel that a growing sense of extreme individualism, commoditization, self-indulgence, and 
narcissistic alienation, has been engendered through the use of such cyber-communication 
channels. In this regard, theorists such as Howard Rheingold, Sherry Turkle, Mark Poster, 
Henry Jenkins, Manuel Castells, Lauren Buffardi, Keith Campbell and Jean Twenge, among 
others, have contributed significantly to the debate concerning the internet and new media, 
and the impact it has had on contemporary identity, cultural, communal, and societal 
formation. In order to highlight the resonances and dissonances between these various 
theorists’ works and ideas, a weighing up of their positive and negative appraisals of the 
socio-cultural impact of new media technologies is required, and in what follows, such a 
schematization will be presented. In short, this will involve a discussion of the positive 
appraisals of Rheingold, Turkle, Poster, and Jenkins, followed by a consideration of the more 
cautious and ambivalent perspectives of Castells, before the negative appraisals of new media 
technologies found in the arguments of Buffardi, Campbell, Twenge, and in Turkle’s most 
recent work, are engaged with.  
 
1.5.1. New media optimism 
  
To begin with, soon after the widespread integration of the internet and new media 
technologies into the daily lives of individuals and communities around the world, interest in 
the social psychology of new media use began to emerge. Often seen as a forerunner of new 
forms of identity, cultural, communal, and societal formations, new media technologies and 
the computer-mediated-communications (CMC) that they propagate became the object of 
various investigations. Some of these were focused on the ‘visionary utopian’ idea 
(Buckingham 2000:46), in terms of which people were construed as immersed within a digital 
environment that promised a more interactive, communicative, and democratic world than 
ever before (Rheingold 1993; Turkle 1995; Schuler 1996). For such theorists, new media was 
“playful, fun, interactive, socially progressive, and very possibly a better world than that of 
your ‘real’ or ‘offline’ social experience” (Flew 2008:50). Indeed, in one of the most well-
known explorations of new media (CMC) based online cultures, Howard Rheingold’s The 
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Virtual Community, online communities are advanced as “social aggregations that emerge 
from the Net when enough people carry on…public discussions [on the internet] long enough, 
with sufficient human feeling, to form webs of personal relationships in cyberspace” (1994:5). 
That is, for Rheingold, virtual communities effectively offer possibilities for renewed forms 
of community-building and participation in public life, and he asserts, moreover, that these 
possibilities continue to grow due to the three inter-influential elements of new media 
technologies or CMCs. The first element is related to the creation of social networks and 
connections. According to Rheingold “as individual human beings, we have perceptions, 
thoughts, and personalities…that are affected by the ways we use the medium and the ways it 
uses us.” The effects of these influences on personality are evident, he argues, in the divergent 
connections and social networks that are emerging online. The second level of change, 
Rheingold asserts, is related to “person-to-person interactions where relationships, 
friendships, and communities happen.” The sharing of knowledge, information and 
experience through ‘online community’ interaction is at the heart of this level of possibility. 
Finally, the third level which creates the possibility for new media induced societal change is 
related to the new potential for political participation. In terms of this, Rheingold argues that 
“the political significance of CMC lies in its capacity to challenge the existing political 
hierarchy’s monopoly on powerful communications media, and…thus revitalize citizen-based 
democracy” (1993:xxix). On the basis of his significant investigations into various virtual 
communities, Rheingold ultimately maintains that “the technology that makes virtual 
communities possible has the potential to bring enormous leverage to ordinary citizens at 
relatively little cost.” According to him, these include “intellectual leverage, social leverage, 
commercial leverage, and most importantly political leverage.” And because of these 
possibilities, Rheingold believes that the growth of new media technologies will have a 
profound influence on public life and culture. Indeed, he even insists that “because of its 
potential influence on so many peoples’ beliefs and perceptions, the future of the Net…[will 
be] connected to the future of community, democracy, education, science, and intellectual 
life” (1993:xxvii, xxix, xix).  
 Following on from and building upon Rheingold’s ideas of identity and community 
formations, Sherry Turkle in Life on the Screen: Identity in the Age of the Internet, similarly 
described virtual communities as sites of play and performance, which unfolded via the 
creation of online identities. Focusing on the transition from modernity to post-modernity,
30
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 According to Aylesworth, postmodernism “can be described as a set of critical, strategic and rhetorical 
practices employing concepts such as difference, repetition, the trace, the simulacrum, and hyperreality to 
destabilize other concepts such as presence, identity, historical progress, epistemic certainty, and the univocity of 
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and relying significantly on psychoanalysis,
31
 Turkle examined how members of virtual 
communities increasingly begin to see “real life” as merely one “window” through which a 
variety of personalities can be created and communicated (1995:13). Seen as a potentially 
liberating space, CMCs and ICTs offer a virtual platform, she argued, through which “the 
obese can become slender, the beautiful plain, [and] the ‘nerdy’ sophisticated” (Turkle 
1995:12). In this regard, Turkle offered supporting insights into the positive impact of 
networked technologies on identity construction, by examining the interactions of participants 
in virtual communities – most notably those in MUDs (Multi-User Dungeons) and MOOs 
(Multi-User Object-Orientated Domains)
32
 – along with the differences between online 
personas and ‘real’ life social interactions. On the basis of these examinations, Turkle 
maintained that people were happy to adopt ‘multiple’ identities in multiple contexts, because, 
plurality, multiplicity and choice are at the center of identity formation. That is, people have 
always had many identities and have smoothly transitioned from one identity to the next, as 
required by the changing context within which they find themselves, and cyber-technologies 
and the interactions they facilitate simply emphasize this dynamic. Furthermore, Turkle 
suggested that the multiplicity and plurality of the relevant cyber-identities may have 
therapeutic value, in that internet users are able to express elements of their personalities and 
identities online that they feel obliged to hide in the ‘real’ world (Turkle 1995:263-264). In 
many respects, Robins corroborates Turkle’s idea when he argues similarly that many people 
see new media as a means of escaping from a dull everyday reality into a new, exciting, virtual 
reality (1995:39). This participation in, and idealization of, the new simulated online realities 
made possible by new media technologies, he suggests, are positive and “powerful 
expressions of fantasy and desire…articulated through the discourse of science and 
rationality” (Robins 1996:39). Siapera also supports this perspective when she says that  
                                                                                                                                                                                     
meaning” (2005). Although first mentioned in Jean-Francois Lyotard’s The Postmodern Condition: A Report on 
Knowledge, philosophers such as Michel Foucault, Gilles Deleuze, Jacques Derrida, and Jean Baudrillard, 
among others, have all been associated with postmodern thought, in terms of which subjectivity is understood in 
non-essentialist terms and as something highly malleable.  
31
 Turkle’s interest in psychoanalysis was first reflected in her book Psychoanalytic Politics (1978, 1992), in 
which she “recognized a new decentering and an emerging conception of what it is to be human among 
computers” (Zheng 2010:2). See: Turkle, S. 1992. Psychoanalytic Politics: Jacques Lacan and Freud’s French 
Revolution. London: Free Association Books.  
32
 A MOO is a coexistent text-based virtual environment that can be accessed by large numbers of people from a 
variety of locations at the same time (Khosrowpour 2007:459). According to Roberts and his colleagues (2006), 
MOOs are “a type of multi-user dimension based on object-orientated programming, enabling users to create and 
manipulate objects.”   
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the anonymity and disembodiment of online subjects lead to identities liberated from past 
concerns – online no one knows who you are, so…you can be anyone you want. At the same 
time there is no ‘real’ you, your identity cannot be reduced to one of your ‘avatars’ or online 
personas. (2012:175) 
 
This idea of multiple identities can perhaps best be seen in the virtual social world of Second 
Life, in which people create an ‘avatar’ and live a second online life. For Turkle, this 
opportunity to experience a variety of identities (albeit only in a virtual space), allows 
individuals to live a more complete life, and accordingly gives them a greater sense of 
freedom (1995:263-264).
33
  
 In the same year that Turkle published Life on the Screen, Mark Poster in his book The 
Second Media Age argued that new media were reconstructing formations of the self and 
subjectivity. In this work he examines the shift from what he calls the first media age – 
namely the age of one-to-many communications, whereby a small number of producers 
disseminated information to numerous consumers – to the second media age, defined in terms 
of many-to-many communication and interactivity. Within the latter context, the opportunities 
offered by the internet for advanced communication has increased the power of media 
consumers and the public to influence contemporary culture in a more autonomous fashion. 
And accordingly, identity in the second media age is formed in reaction to various online 
interactions, and not simply in relation to uniform, media-generated conceptions. With regard 
to what he calls ‘thicker’ and ‘richer’ online interactivity, Poster states that 
 
if you look at it on the screen where the conversation is, let’s say in the chat-mode in real time, 
the individuals are absorbed in their conversation and the interactivity is very different but very 
intense. Especially in the MOO form, things go very quickly. You are in that conversation and 
it takes an incredible amount of attention to maintain the flow of the conversation. So one could 
argue that it is more thick, a richer interaction than, say, an interaction of a family at a dinner 
table, where people are distracted and maybe the television set is on and people are not really 
paying attention or listening to one another. (Poster 1995:149)   
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 It is interesting to note that already in 1968, Licklider and Taylor predicted a similar impact of new media 
technologies and the internet, when they asserted that “life will be happier for the on-line individual because the 
people with who[m] one interacts most strongly will be selected more by commonality of interests and goals 
than by accidents of proximity…[C]ommunication will be more effective and productive, and therefore more 
enjoyable” (1968:31). 
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Moreover, possibly drawing on Turkle’s ideas of cyber role-play and internet communities, 
Poster goes on to suggest that the internet “needs to be thought of less as a communication 
tool and more as a social space in which roles are played, identities are formed and re-formed, 
and meaning is reconfigured” (1997:205). For him, “individuals are constructed as subjects or 
identities (as cultural selves) in linguistic practices[,]…and [i]n repeated enunciations 
individuals become interpellated and recognised as coherent selves who function in a social 
world” (1995:9). Consequently “twentieth century electronic media are supporting…[a] 
profound transformation of cultural identity” because “‘multimedia’ reconfigure words, 
sounds and images so as to cultivate new configurations of individuality” (1995:80). 
According to Murry, through the above, Poster in fact develops a “critique of the subject and 
its socio-cultural contexts through a sustained reflection on nationhood and identity in the age 
of global technology” (2004). In relation to this, Poster insists that human identities are now 
being reconstructed through the transmission of information via global communication 
technologies. And he emphasizes the importance of new online relationships and community 
building,
34
 highlighting the integral role the new relational dynamics make possible in identity 
and subjectivity construction. Furthermore, Poster highlights the role of the internet in the 
democratization of communication, when he notes that “the magic of the internet is that it is a 
technology which puts cultural acts, symbolizations in all forms, in the hands of its 
participants” (2001:184).  In effect, for Poster, “networked machines shift the scene in which 
the individual becomes and continues to practice selfhood” (1995:9), and this view remains 
instrumental to his theory of how the internet is playing a crucial role in the growth and 
development of contemporary culture and identity.  
 Expanding on Poster’s argument that new media technologies in the second media age 
have created a shift in power relations between the media producer and consumer, Henry 
Jenkins examines this transformation in relation to the use of new media technologies among 
the Web 2.0 generation. In his book Convergence Culture: Where Old and New Media 
Collide, Jenkins links the participation offered by new media technologies to the newfound 
power that people have to limit the often exploitative actions of media corporations. That is, 
for Jenkins, ‘convergence culture’ refers to the bringing together of old and new media into 
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 In relation to the role of the internet in community building, Schuler also highlights the importance of the shift 
from traditional communities to new networked communities when he suggests that “the old concept of 
community is obsolete in many ways and needs to be updated to meet today’s challenges.” And he underscores 
the need for this by pointing to the fact that “the old or traditional community was often exclusive, inflexible, 
isolated, unchanging, monolithic, and homogeneous.” In contrast, “a new community – one that is fundamentally 
devoted to democratic problem-solving – needs to be refashioned from the remnants of the old” (1996:9).  
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one single creation ‒ the merging of all media into one format. And he moreover maintains 
that media convergence is an “ongoing process, occurring at various intersections of media 
technologies, industries, content and audiences” (2006a:154). Accordingly, he insists that “we 
are living in an age when changes in communications, storytelling, and information 
technologies are reshaping almost every aspect of contemporary life – including how we 
create, consume, learn, and interact with each other” (2006b). In particular, he sees such 
convergence culture and the connectivity that it brings as both a top down (corporate driven) 
and a bottom up (consumer driven) process, insofar as, 
 
right now, convergence culture is getting defined top-down by decisions being made in 
corporate boardrooms and bottom-up by decisions made in teenagers’ bedrooms. It is [thus 
being] shaped by the desires of media conglomerates to expand their empires across multiple 
platforms and by the desires of consumers to have the media they want where they want it, 
when they want it, and in the format they want. (2006b) 
 
Highlighting the convergence culture and participatory culture connected to Web 2.0, Jenkins 
explains that “consumers are learning how to use…different media technologies…and are 
fighting for the right to participate more fully in their culture” (2006a:18). To be sure, Jenkins 
admits that convergence culture is symptomatic of neoliberalism, yet he considers Web 2.0 as 
a place for both pleasure and exploitation, and a space of both participation and 
commoditization, “where grassroots and corporate media intersect, where the power of the 
media producer and the power of the media consumer interact in unpredictable ways” 
(2006a:2). Consequently, because it allows both consumers and corporations to create 
content, convergence [culture] allows for a blurring of the lines between corporate hegemony 
and powerless consumers. Drawing on Levy’s and de Kerckhove’s ideas of ‘collective 
intelligence,’35 Jenkins’s concept of convergence culture thus focuses on the shift in the 
public’s relationship to media and the correlative blurring of boundaries between economic, 
technological, social, and cultural aspects of cyber-society. Emphasizing primarily the 
positive aspects of Web 2.0, Jenkins highlights how the individual choice, creativity, and 
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intelligence as “the capacity of networked ICTs to exponentially enhance the collective pool of social knowledge 
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collective access to networked databases” (2008:21).  
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participation encouraged by new media technologies can improve society. Moreover, through 
examining different elements of popular culture, he illustrates how “the convergence of 
television, Internet and mobile technologies and affective economic strategies garnered 
popular support, loyalty from viewers and subjective identification through convergence 
technologies of participation” (cited in Shell 2009). As such, although he concentrates on user 
participation in consumerism, he also highlights the importance of such participation in the 
realization of individuality and identity construction, maintaining that identity can only be 
attained and understood through individual participation in contemporary consumer culture. 
Indeed, he even suggests that “social connectivity, creativity and learning [can only] take 
place through these various media-related experiences” (Jenkins 2006, cited in Wright 2006).  
Arguably, he is supported in this perspective by DasGupta, and by Brown and Adler, among 
others. That is, DasGupta asserts that the autonomy, interaction, and socialization promoted 
by Web 2.0, and the “user-controlled, peer-to-peer knowledge creation and network based 
enquiry” that is connected to it, result in the capitalization of “personalisation, participation 
and productivity.” And this ultimately leads to a learning experience that is “socially 
contextualized, engaging, and community based” (2006:430). Similarly, Brown and Adler 
argue that  
 
the latest evolution of the internet, the so-called Web 2.0, has blurred the line between 
producers and consumers of content and has shifted attention from access to information 
towards access to other people. New kinds of online resources ‒ such as social networking sites, 
blogs, wikis, and virtual communities ‒ have allowed people with common interest to meet, 
share ideas, and collaborate in innovative ways. Indeed, the Web 2.0 is creating a new kind of 
participatory medium that is ideal for supporting multiple modes of learning. (2008:18) 
 
To be sure, while the Web 1.0 technologies experienced by Rheingold, Turkle, and Poster 
were significantly different from the Web 2.0 capabilities examined by Jenkins, similarities 
between their optimism surrounding the potential of this newly developed, and continuously 
developing, medium acts to situate them within the same group of new media proponents.   
 
1.5.2 New media ambivalence 
 
In contrast to the above positive accounts of new media inspired change, participation, 
freedom, interactivity, and cultural progression, a growing number of theorists have also 
adopted a more circumspect approach to such technology, and have expressed more 
ambivalence over its potential to transform contemporary society for the better. That is, 
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although new media technologies have become synonymous with an increase in 
communication possibilities, interactivity, participation, and social connection, concerns over 
new media individualization, commoditization, self-absorption, and alienation, continue to 
emerge. In this regard, in his three volume work The Information Age: Economy, Society and 
Culture (The Rise of the Network Society, The Power of Identity, and End of Millennium), 
Manuel Castells adopts a more moderate and cautious approach to the rise of digital networks 
and the growing influence of new media technologies in contemporary society.  
In the first book of the trilogy, namely The Rise of the Network Society, Castells 
concedes that we live in a global network society that is shaped by new media and 
Information Communication Technologies (ICTs). And he shows how dominant functions 
and processes are increasingly organized around networks. For him, “networks constitute the 
new social morphology of our societies and the diffusion of networking logic substantially 
modifies the operation and outcomes in processes of production, experience, power and 
culture” (1996:469). Furthermore, he examines the global changes that have occurred in 
reaction to the 1970s information technology revolution, which he asserts, resulted in the 
restructuring of society into a digital network. In this regard, he argues that every feature of 
the self, identity, relationships, and experience is now related to and informed by the network 
society (Flew 2008:61). However, for him, the influence of ICTs and the network society is 
neither specifically utopian nor explicitly dystopian, but can be both positive in relation to 
certain elements of contemporary culture, and negative in relation to others. That is, as 
highlighted by Siapera, Castells’s society of the network is no longer based on the “organic 
solidarity of modernity…in which people depend on each other on the basis of their 
functional differentiation.” Instead, the ties between people are “tenuous and temporary, often 
based on common views and beliefs, uniting people across borders, but equally fragmenting 
them within given places” (2012:15). This means that even though people can perhaps 
experience a greater feeling of connection online ‒ through their expression of common goals 
and beliefs ‒ the connections and relationships that are built and maintained in this way may 
be detrimental to real life connections, made between people in the same ‘real-world’ 
communities. On the one hand, the advent of the internet has led to the development of a new 
digital communication system, which “is both integrating globally the production and 
distribution of words, sounds and images of our culture, and customising them to the tastes of 
the identities and moods of…individuals” (Castells 2000:2). And these identities have become 
an intrinsic part of this system, because “in a world of global flows of wealth, power, and 
images, the search for identity, collective or individual, ascribed or constructed, becomes the 
fundamental source of social meaning” (2000:3). Yet, on the other hand, Castells insists that 
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this meaning is no longer organized around what people do and the contributions that they 
make to society, but rather around who they believe themselves to be or pretend to be 
(2000:3). This idea can be linked to Turkle’s notion that we “come to see ourselves differently 
as we catch sight of our image in the mirror of the machine” (1995:9), which is multi-faceted 
and which enables people to present a variety of identities online. However, gone is the great 
optimism which characterized Turkle’s earlier assertions, and in its place one encounters far 
more ambivalence on the part of Castells concerning the socio-cultural effects of such 
interaction. Similarly, in relation to the works of Poster, the growth of individualism is 
another significant area of focus in Castells’s examination of the network society. The term 
‘networked individualism’ is an important concept in this regard, and it is used by Castells to 
describe a balance between individualism and interconnectedness. That is, he argues that 
“networked individualism is the synthesis between the affirmation of an individual-centred 
culture, and the needs and desire for sharing and co-experiencing” (2004:223). Again, on the 
one hand, this idea of networked individualism can be seen as a positive development in light 
of the augmented possibilities for individual choice, the increased abilities to manage 
sociality, and the emancipation from physical space, it entails. Yet, on the other hand, while 
he does not explicitly deny such possibilities, Castells also points out that the networks in 
question are also significantly influenced by structures of power that can easily marginalize 
certain individuals, and thereby enhance the inequalities experienced in contemporary culture. 
This idea can be seen in Castells’s assertion that “networks converge towards a meta-network 
of capital that integrates capitalist interest at the global level and across sectors and realms of 
activity” (1996:506). Here he insists that such convergence around ‘meta-networks’ of capital 
has resulted in the atomization of social relationships, whereby a significant shift can be seen 
away from community-based societies, focused on shared values and mutual interest, toward 
‘me-focused’ networks, where the maximization of personal gain becomes the ultimate goal. 
In short, where before, “communities were based on sharing of values and social 
organization,” the new “networks are built by the choices and strategies of social actors” 
(2001:127). In this regard, notwithstanding its potentially positive impact on society, for 
Castells, networked individualism – “a new pattern of sociability based on individualism” ‒ 
which focuses on people’s use rather than worth, can also easily destabilize real world 
collective organizing or group togetherness (2001:130). 
In the second volume of The Information Age, namely The Power of Identity, Castells 
develops upon the above mentioned caveat through a complex explanation of how groups and 
individuals are interconnected via various networked forms of communication. And he 
highlights the contradictions that emerge between the sense of self and the imperative to 
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search for meaning within society. In relation to this, Castells advances that the emergence of 
the 1970s technological paradigm led to the materialization of a new way of living, 
producing, and communicating. And in this regard, he asserts that “the rise of the network 
society and the growing power of identity are the intertwined social processes that jointly 
define globalization, geopolitics, and social transformation” (2010:xvii). 
Related to the above, in the final volume of the Information Age trilogy, End of 
Millennium, Castells provides a descriptive analysis of the influence that the rise of the 
network society, information economy, and global capitalism have had on specific countries 
and people around the world. In short, following on from the first two volumes, which 
focused, respectively, on the “processes of structural change” ‒ namely the rise of the network 
society and economy, and the significance of individual, community, and social identity 
within this paradigm – and on the “transformation of…macropolitical and macrosocial 
contexts that shape and condition social action and human experience around the world,” End 
of Millennium provides specific examples of this transformation (1998:2). Castells maintains 
that the third volume “explores some of these macro transformations, while attempting to 
explain them as a result of the interaction between processes characterising the Information 
Age” namely “informationalization, globalization, networking, identity-building, [and] the 
crisis of patriarchalism, and of the nation-state” (1998:2). Castells opens with a discussion of 
the unexpectedly swift collapse of Soviet Communism, and he argues that the Soviet Union 
and statism’s inability, on the one hand, to adapt to the emerging Information Age, and on the 
other hand, to transition to the network society, was at the root of its ultimate collapse. This 
failure of Soviet Communism, together with the conversion of Chinese Communism into 
authoritarian capitalism, resulted in the intensification of both informationalism and the global 
spread of capitalism. In terms of this, Castells goes on to examine the trends of 
“uncontrolled…global capitalist networks,” highlighting the growing prevalence of social 
exclusion and increasing divides between information ‘haves’ and ‘have-nots.’ Referring to 
the “black holes of information capitalism” (1998:167), he addresses the connection between 
the rise of informationalism and the “rise of inequality and social exclusion throughout the 
world” (1998:69). And he focuses on the impact of capitalist restructuring, together with the 
technological and organizational conditions espoused by the evolution of the Information 
Age, providing numerous examples of how millions of people around the world are being 
excluded from the benefits of informationalism and the network society. The End of 
Millennium thus provides a detailed description of the impacts of networked individualism 
and global capitalism on society at large, and how developing and developed nations are 
attempting to adapt to the accompanying technological and organizational changes. 
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1.5.3. New media skepticism 
 
Yet Castells’s above circumspect ambivalence ‒ for all its moderation ‒ can still be 
distinguished from the perspectives of those for whom new media are more trouble than it is 
worth. In particular, the impact of new media technologies on the growth of a contemporary 
focus on the self has come under significant scrutiny (Vaidhyanathan 2006; Baldwin and 
Stroman 2007; Orlet 2007; Buffardi and Campbell 2008). That is, changes in both capitalism 
and identity formation have been linked to a growth in information networks and an 
increasingly computer mediated, commoditized and narcissistic society. Indeed, evaluated in 
relation to ‘celebrity and consumer culture,’ and ‘new media,’ narcissism has been identified 
as “the fastest developing social disease of the peoples of the West,” with examples of vanity, 
self-aggrandizement, and self-promotion apparent in almost all aspects of cultural interaction 
(McLuhan and Powers 1992:100). “Seen to be at the root of everything from the ill-fated 
romance with violent revolution, to the enthralled mass consumption of state-of-the-art 
products,” and infatuation with “the ‘lifestyles of the rich and the famous’” (Tyler 2007:343), 
the most recent manifestation of the growth of narcissism has been attributed to society’s use 
of, and increasing reliance upon, new media technologies (Baldwin and Stroman 2007; Orlet 
2007; Buffardi and Campbell 2008). In particular, social media has been criticized for 
nurturing narcissism, by inspiring individualized fixations on the self, a corresponding 
inflated sense of self-concern and self-importance, and correlative exaggerated feelings of 
entitlement. In short, as prominent media theorist Manovich maintains, “most new media 
activates a ‘narcissistic condition,’” whereby the promotion of the self becomes an intense 
and pervasive endeavor (2001:235).  
In their article “Narcissism and Social Networking Web Sites,” Lauren Buffardi and 
Keith Campbell offer a particularly incisive account of the role of new media technologies in 
perpetuating this growing sense of self importance. For them, social networking websites 
“offer individuals the abilities, among others, to (a) create an individual Web page, (b) post 
self-relevant information (e.g. self-descriptions, photos), (c) link to other members (e.g. 
friends lists), (d) and interact with other members” (2008:1303). Through these means, 
individuality is, respectively, identified, elaborated upon, socially sanctioned, and then 
rendered vital through interaction which, in turn, leads to its further reinforcement. 
Accordingly, despite the resounding popularity of related websites,
36
 some researchers have 
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begun to question the value of new media’s promotion of extreme self-orientation (Baldwin 
and Stroman 2007; Orlet 2007; Buffardi and Campbell 2008). Buffardi and Campbell have 
raised concern that these “web sites offer a gateway for self-promotion via self-descriptions, 
vanity via photos, and large numbers of shallow friendships (friends are counted – sometimes 
reaching the thousands – and in some cases ranked),” and as such may present a potent 
platform for the growth of narcissism. In addition to this, they argue that, despite the fact that 
many people use social networking sites to preserve friendship and family ties, gain updates 
to events, and more recently, conduct business, such sites also provide narcissists with an 
unlimited platform to engender their preoccupation via social linking (2008:1303). In terms of 
the latter, after their examination of the activities and uploads of various Facebook users, 
Buffardi and Campbell insisted that social networking sites are “fertile grounds” for the 
development of narcissism, and they highlight two reasons for this. Firstly, they suggest that 
because “narcissists function well in shallow relationships,” social networking sites are 
attractive because they are built on many superficial ‘friendships,’ with some people having 
thousands of ‘friends’ (2008:1304). Secondly, since social networking sites are “decidedly 
controlled environments” (Vazire and Gosling 2004), they suggest that the ability of users to 
orchestrate practically all aspects of self-presentation and expression – by writing self-
promoting content and selecting attractive photos – appeals tremendously to narcissistic 
personality types. Consequently, they argue that social networks promotion of a growing 
culture of narcissism and the values of vanity, materialism, entitlement, and anti-social 
behavior, may not simply be possible, but also something highly probable. 
In their 2009 book, The Narcissism Epidemic: Living in the Age of Entitlement, 
Twenge and Campbell further examine the role of new media technologies in the growth and 
spread of self-involvement and narcissism. Particularly in the chapter entitled “Look at Me on 
MySpace: Web 2.0 and the Quest for Attention,” the authors insist that the internet post-2004 
– namely Web 2.0 – works in profound collaboration with cultural narcissism as a “‘feedback 
loop’…with narcissistic people seeking out ways to promote themselves on the Web and 
those same websites encouraging narcissism” (2009:107). Accordingly, they maintain that 
“narcissists thrive in social networking sites like MySpace and Facebook,” because the 
“structure of the site reward[s] the skills of the narcissist, such as self-promotion, selecting 
flattering photographs of oneself, and having the most friends” (2009:110). Highlighting the 
variety of ‘me’ focused new media platforms, Twenge and Campbell illustrate how   
 
internet domain names beginning with my nearly tripled between 2005 and 2008, and trademark 
applications with my quintupled in the ten years between 1998 and 2008. MySpace is the most 
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prominent example, but there’s also mycoke, My Subaru, My IBM, myAOL, My Yahoo, and 
My Times. (2009:108) 
 
YouTube, with its slogan ‘Broadcast Yourself,’ and Facebook, with its focus on image, are 
further examples of this growing focus on the self (Twenge and Campbell 2009:107). And 
they consider this problematic because “social networking sites shape the ways teens and 
twentysomethings view their worlds, and mould the malleable personality of young people 
like clay” (2009:113), most noticeably around crass commercialism. For them, the latter is 
rampant on social networking sites, and “often overtakes friendships that were there to begin 
with” (2009:116). As they point out,  
  
MySpace began as a place for bands to build a fan base, and many bands send out ‘friend’ 
comments about their latest album ‒ actually just a form of advertising. As MySpace evolved, 
spam postings from businesses became very common. Virtually every MySpace page has been 
hit with postings advertising ringtones, porn sites, prescription drugs – anything that can make a 
buck. (2009:116). 
 
Social networking sites are, of course, not the only promoters of narcissism. The narcissistic 
culture of the new internet, Twenge and Campbell insist, is also found in the “vapid exercises 
in self-expression and attention-seeking” found in blogs, and in the “attention and fame-
seeking” videos uploaded to the likes of YouTube. Although blogging provides a convenient 
way for people to update others on their lives, Twenge and Campbell maintain that the 
comment and response system often results in one-sided arguments. And they assert that this 
form of communication is “not a true dialogue, as verbal communication would be, but one 
diatribe followed by the response to the diatribe.” Moreover, “doing it all on screen also takes 
out the human element of empathy, nuance, and face-to-face interaction” (2009:117-120). 
Ultimately, for Twenge and Campbell, new media technology allows for the engendering and 
spread of narcissism in a variety of ways. On the one hand, the “internet allows the fantasy 
principle to trump the reality principle,” insofar as “the Internet makes it very easy to be 
someone you’re not, and that alternative persona is usually better, cooler, or more attractive” 
(2009:122). On the other hand, since most internet communications take place via images and 
self-descriptions, communication tends to be based on shallow aspects of personality and 
identity.  
In 2011, Life on the Screen author, Sherry Turkle – whose initial optimism over new 
media was discussed earlier – published another book, Alone Together: Why We Expect More 
from Technology and Less from Each Other. Distancing herself from her earlier optimism 
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over the freedom that accompanies online identity formation, in Alone Together, Turkle 
adopts a more critical stance in her examination of the impact of new media technologies on 
contemporary life. In terms of this, unlike her earlier view of the internet as a virtual sphere of 
uninhibited expression, she criticizes the corporatization of the internet and the power that it 
has to keep people tied to their technology (Turkle 2011:296). And, examining peoples’ 
relationships with technology‒  especially computers and robots ‒ Turkle challenges the use 
of social media as a genuine communication tool, and instead draws direct correlations 
between people’s growing online connections and their mounting feelings of offline 
loneliness, anxiety, and alienation. In this regard, she examines the psychological implications 
of new media, and how such technology and new forms of media are changing the ways in 
which people identify with themselves, and with those around them. In particular, she argues 
that people’s reliance on new technologies such as Facebook, Skype, Twitter, robots, email, 
and so forth, has resulted in less emphasis being placed on direct human interactions and 
encounters. In addition, she asserts that just as people are replacing telephone conversations 
and face-to-face discussions with text messages and Tweets, so too, people are now more 
inclined to become ‘friends’ with strangers on Facebook than to make ‘real’ friends in the 
‘real’ world. And such growing entanglement in a digital and technological world, and the 
increased feelings of loneliness, depression and alienation that such entanglement engenders, 
in turn problematize their purchase on reality even further. Consequently, while she concedes 
that digital “connectivity offers new possibilities for experimenting with identity,” Turkle also 
argues that, “when part of your life is lived in virtual places…a vexed relationship develops 
between what is true and what is ‘true here,’ true in simulation” (2011:152-153). Strogatz 
reiterates Turkle’s concern when he suggests that social media may actually make it 
increasingly difficult for people to differentiate between their important relationships in the 
real world, and the numerous casual relationships that are created or formed online. And as a 
result, “the distinction between genuine [or true] friends and acquaintances is becoming 
blurred” (cited in Jarvis 2012). The consequence of this, Turkle advances, is that in 
contemporary society people are networked together and yet feel “utterly alone” (2011:154). 
Loneliness, a fear of intimacy, and a need for overarching control over our connections and 
conversations, are all elements of what Turkle sees as a society increasingly experiencing 
feelings of being ‘alone together’ ‒ deeply connected but thoroughly alienated at the same 
time. In addition to this, she argues that the contemporary incorporation of new media 
technologies into almost every aspect of people’s lives not only changes what people do, but 
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also changes who they are. In a 2012 TED talk,
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 Turkle discusses this excessive reliance and 
overwhelming need to be connected to new media and the machines that they inhabit, and 
advances the following caveat:  
 
I think we are setting ourselves up for trouble – trouble in how we relate to each other, but also 
trouble in how we relate to ourselves and our capacity for self-reflection. We are getting used to 
a new way of being alone together, people want to be with each other but also elsewhere, 
connected to all the different places they want to be. (2012) 
 
In this regard, Turkle emphasizes the negative effects of this form of constant 
interconnectedness on ideas of the self when she asserts that growing expectations for twenty-
four hour connectivity and instantaneous responses can create personalities that are “so fragile 
that they need constant support,” thereby creating a host of “symptoms born of isolation and 
abandonment” (Turkle 2011:177-178). In this way, the overwhelming need to be identified 
and communicated with online, results not only in a reliance on new media technologies for 
identity construction and interpersonal forms of communication, but also in a growing sense 
of anxiety and insecurity over the sustainability of such identity and communication. 
 
1.6 Conclusion 
 
Based on the above discussion, it is evident that social media have become a ubiquitous 
means of interaction among individuals and groups in contemporary society, and the impact 
of these media has been viewed in a positive, ambivalent, and negative light. On the one hand, 
the opportunities that have been made available by new media in terms of communication, 
interaction, participation, and identity formation, are striking. However, on the other hand, 
concerns related to accompanying pronounced individualism, narcissism, anxiety, and 
alienation, have similarly emerged.  
Yet, notwithstanding concerns over the numerous, inconsequential casual relationships 
which dominate the online environment, what happens when online connections and 
communication are not based on vapid, consumerist conceptions of reality, but rather on ideas 
related to calls for democracy? To be sure, for a long time, such a situation has remained a 
rather utopian dream. This is because, although in principle possible, the realization of such a 
scenario is often undermined by the weight of capitalist imperatives within cyberspace, which 
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inflect interaction through new media away from socio-political activism, and in the direction 
of individualistic consumerism. And because of this, Poster’s and others’ ideas that the 
internet offers opportunities for the creation of a new public sphere, and the concomitant 
progression of the democratic process, have received considerable criticism ‒ especially in the 
wake of Poster’s argument that “the age of the public sphere as face to face talk is clearly 
over,” and that questions “of democracy must henceforth take into account new forms of 
electronically mediated discourse” (1997:220). Yet, while perceived as somewhat naïve in the 
wake of Castells’s more circumspect approach to networked society, recent developments in 
the political use of the internet indicate the possibility that such positive contentions may 
instead have simply been ahead of their time.
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 This is, of course, not to negate the concerns 
of Papacharissi and others, who insist that while the internet may offer a promise for reviving 
the public sphere, obstacles related to data storage and retrieval, inequalities in terms of 
access, political discourse fragmentation, and the influence of global capitalism, all stand to 
prevent democratic participation and the realization of a public sphere (2010:9). In this regard, 
even Castells, in his latest book, Networks of Outrage and Hope: Social Movements in the 
Internet Age (2012), has recognized the potential of internet networks to facilitate democratic 
change Rather, it is simply to consider both the possibility that the narcissistic and alienating 
effects of new media decried above, although deeply problematic, are thankfully not 
hegemonic, and correlatively, that instances of online democratic practices, however rare, 
might not be impossible, either now or at some point in the future.  
It is to consideration of this that we now turn, insofar as, in Chapter Two, the potential 
for new media technologies to be used in politically meaningful and critical ways will be 
examined. This will be done, on the one hand, in relation to increasingly popular uses of the 
internet and social media within the ambit of traditional mainstream liberal democracy, and 
on the other hand, in relation to the use of new media by groups, organizations, and 
movements focused on the spread of alternative ideas and radical forms of democracy.  
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 In this regard, in his latest book, Networks of Outrage and Hope: Social movements in the internet age (2012) 
Castells has recognized the potential of internet networks to facilitate democratic change. 
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Chapter Two: Online Democratic Praxis 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
As thematized in the previous chapter, the introduction of Web 2.0 has been construed by 
socio-political theorists in both a positive and a negative light. On the one hand, optimistic 
theorists advanced its capacity to increase interactive participation at a political level, and 
while a few were more cautious over its capacity in this regard, on the other hand, some 
expressed various degrees of pessimism concerning its emancipatory value, on account of the 
consumerist and narcissistic dynamics which they saw as being indissociable from it. Yet, in 
contrast to the problematic forms of communication and identity formation decried by Turkle, 
Strogatz, Baldwin, Campbell and Twenge, the formation of politically-engaged connections 
through social media has also recently become evident. Thus, despite the existence of 
numerous concerns related to the deleterious influence of the internet on society and 
democracy, the directness and interactivity that are the hallmark of new forms of social media 
technologies have once again been heralded as providing the latest instruments for the further 
democratization of political systems (Rheingold 1993; Poster 1995; Mossberger et al. 2008; 
Gurevitch et al. 2009). And such valorization stems less from optimistic speculation and more 
from recent examples of the adoption of new media for political purposes, ranging from the 
growing presence of political parties’ and politicians’ online profiles, blogs, and social 
networks, to the active engagement of citizens in these networks and related internet 
campaigns. However, the extent of these online interactions, and the potential of this media to 
offer a new form of electronically mediated public space, have yet to be confirmed, because 
the integration of a neoliberal democratic model of politics into the online environment 
continues to be accompanied by certain concerns. With a view to exploring the above, this 
chapter begins with a discussion of new media as an increasingly crucial factor in 
contemporary party politics, as evinced in particular by the 2008 US election campaign. 
However, because of correlative growing concern over the concomitant influence of 
neoliberal democratic policies on such online political interaction, subsequently, alternatives 
to the standard liberal democratic model of online politics will also be discussed, and their 
potential to usher in more radically democratic forms of online participation, will be 
elaborated upon. 
 That is, firstly, the political potential of social media will be discussed in relation to 
the growing use of this media in American politics in general, and by the current US president 
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Barack Obama in particular. In this regard, as indicated by Hendricks and Denton in 
Communicator-In-Chief: How Barack Obama Used New Media Technology to Win the White 
House, and Metzgar and Maruggi in “Social Media and the 2008 U.S. Presidential Election,” 
among others,
39
 the use of social media by both politicians and citizens during the 2008 US 
presidential election points toward the immense role that social media can play in political 
party communications. Indeed, it has even been suggested that the social media tactics of 
Barack Obama and his campaigners helped to facilitate his subsequent growing popularity 
and, ultimately, his continued presidency of the United States.   
Secondly, the role of liberal democratic politics in current online participation will be 
examined, in relation to the contemporary growth of liberal democracy as a dominant global 
discourse. That is, on the one hand, the concept of liberalism will be discussed in terms of its 
history and influence on current notions of democracy, and on the other hand, liberal 
democracy will be examined in relation to contemporary online and offline political practices. 
With regard to the latter, although some have argued for the greater realization of democracy 
through the internet, because it can allow citizens to participate in decision-making and to 
analyze and criticize power discourses (Rheingold 1993; Hauben and Hauben 1997; Kahn and 
Kellner 2004), others have begun to argue that the internet simply offers a platform for the 
perpetuation of dominant offline liberal-consumer models of democracy (Gutmann and 
Thompson 2004; Papacharissi 2009; Schiller 2000; Schlosberg at al. 2006). With this in mind, 
arguments for and against the potential of online politics and e-democracy will be 
investigated. 
 Thirdly, against the backdrop of concern over the promotion of individualized, 
consumer-orientated choices, alternative uses of new media technologies will be examined in 
relation to growing calls for new forms of political participation – namely those orientated 
around and informed by the concept of radical democracy. In this regard, radical democracy 
as a general political concept will briefly be discussed, before two of its three main versions ‒ 
namely deliberative and autonomous democracy ‒ will be elaborated upon, along with their 
respective online manifestations. This will be followed, in Chapter Three, by a detailed 
discussion of the third form of radical democracy, namely, agonistic democracy, and its 
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 See also: MacNamara, J. 2010. The 21st Century Media (R)Evolution. New York: Peter Lang Publishers; Noor 
Al-Deen, H., and Hendricks, J. 2011. Social Media: Usage and Impact. Plymouth: Lexington Books; and 
Hendricks, J. 2011. Techno Politics in Presidential Campaigning: New Voices, New Technologies, and New 
Voters. London: Routledge.   
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online manifestations, which in terms of scope arguably dwarf those of deliberative and 
autonomous democracy.  
 
2.2 New media and liberal democratic praxis 
 
The contemporary increase of citizen involvement in mainstream politics, via social media, 
points toward the possibility that new media technologies can be used in a way that is more 
politically meaningful than the private narcissistic use decried by the theorists discussed in the 
latter part of the previous chapter. In this regard, Siapera suggests that “the openness and 
directness of the internet and the new media as means of communication have given rise to 
hopes regarding the political system and its further democratization” (2012:83). This is 
because the interactive and familiar features of social media have opened up opportunities for 
a more cooperative form of communication between politicians and citizens. This 
communication, it has been argued, not only allows for the creation of a platform for the 
advancement of political conversations, but may also act to encourage the unification and 
mobilization of citizens around shared political goals (Mossberger et al. 2008). In short, their 
capacity to disseminate information and encourage active participation, in ways that make 
possible a new form of ‘public sphere,’ are some of the factors attributed to the rise in use of 
new media technologies in mainstream political activities and campaigning.
40
 
Accordingly, it has been advanced that the increase in societal access to ever more 
interactive communication technologies that enable the generation of individual content and 
the creation of alternate networks of information distribution, has meant the waning of the 
gatekeeping monopoly of traditional media. For example, Gurevitch and his colleagues. argue 
this point when they assert that   
 
from interactive news Web sites that receive tens of thousands of comments from the public 
each day to YouTube videos challenging government policy, it is apparent that media producers 
can no longer expect to operate within an exclusive, professionalized enclave. Media audiences 
are now able to intervene in political stories with a degree of effectiveness that would have been 
unthinkable ten or twenty years ago. (2009:168) 
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 The term ‘public sphere’ refers to an area in social life where people can come together to analyze and 
deliberate over social problems, and through these deliberations, influence political action. According to Hauser, 
it is “a discursive space in which individuals and groups congregate to discuss matters of mutual interest and, 
where possible, to reach a common judgment” (1998:86). 
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This is, of course, not to advance traditional media like television as an instrument of 
totalitarian domination; on the contrary, for a long time, television was construed as making 
possible a more “informed, inclusive and partisan democracy” (Gurevitch et al. 2009:164).41 
Nevertheless, despite the important role that television has played – and still plays – in the 
communication of political ideas and campaigns, it has been suggested that the long 
relationship between television and politics is beginning to fade. This is because the 
popularization of new media technologies has resulted in a shift in the balance of power, from 
the media conglomerate to the citizen (Gurevitch et al. 2009; Trent et al. 2011). This shift 
arose as a result of the emergence of the internet and social media technologies, which have 
impacted significantly on the way that information is produced and communicated, and 
which, as Gronbeck indicates, has resulted in the transition from “candidate-centered” 
political campaigns to “citizen-centered campaigns” that encourage political participation 
(cited in Trent at al 2011:366). Similarly, according to Baringhorst and his colleagues, 
“political campaigning has become a mode of articulation of the political that encompasses all 
political subject areas and types of political actors” (2009:9). Furthermore, they assert that 
political campaigns are now typically seen as political forms of strategic communication, 
which “position actors in processes of political competition, interest or value-orientated 
conflicts” (Baringhorst et al. 2009:12). Thus, despite the differences between various political 
campaigns, media interaction and involvement is becoming indispensable. Correlatively, in 
the contemporary political landscape, the integration of social media strategies into political 
campaigning, through which audiences are emerging as active participants in message 
communication, is increasingly becoming the norm.  
As already mentioned, historically, the first instance of new media technologies being 
used in the mainstream political paradigm occurred in the 1970s, with the introduction of 
online bulletin boards, through which conversations took place based on standard topics or 
similar interests. And while by the end of the 1980s, email had become a standard method of 
communication, the introduction of the World Wide Web in 1991 resulted in the development 
of a variety of politically-motivated websites and ‘virtual’ campaigns. However, it was in 
America, during the Clinton presidential campaign of 1992, that the internet ‒ email, 
discussion groups, and listserv ‒ was first used in mainstream politics (Trent et al. 
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 For Blumler, television not only “conveys impressions of the world of politics to individuals whose access to 
serious coverage of current affairs is otherwise quite limited,” but also “promote[s] the development of more 
effective patterns of citizenship” (1970:100). Indeed, the impression of intimacy, friendship, and privacy offered 
by the television has historically been perceived as endearing, and politicians have utilized this medium as a 
means to engage in ‘conversation’ with audiences.    
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2011:367).
42
 Subsequently, the number of political groups using the internet as an 
informational tool increased dramatically by 1994, and by 2004 the US presidential elections 
bore testimony to the new influence and impact of the internet and social media on political 
praxis. According to Trent and his colleagues, in the related campaigns, approximately 100 
million people used the internet to gain political information, 52% of voters said that this 
information influenced their vote, almost fifty million people had politics related discussions 
via email, and thirteen million people made online donations to political parties. Moreover, 
the introduction of blogs was of particular importance, insofar as online traffic to a number of 
blog sites surpassed the viewership of campaign related programming on major television 
news networks (2011:367). In terms of this, Wiese and Gronbeck maintain that six major 
developments related to new media technologies emerged during the 2004 elections. These 
included:  
 
(1) the introduction of network software and theory to online campaign strategy; (2) the move 
to expand database functions to enhance e-mail and wireless functions; (3) the incorporation of 
coproduction features…to increase citizen participation in online campaigns; (4) the 
entrenchment of Web video and Web advertising for online campaign messages…(5) the 
evolution of candidate Web sites into a standard genre of Web text; and (6) the introduction of 
blogs to the political cyberspace. (2005:220) 
 
Following on from the growth in social media use during the 2004 campaign, the 2008 US 
political campaign proved instrumental in the elevation of the status of social media as an 
important tool within contemporary political practice. As Hendricks and Denton assert, “the 
2008 campaign was unique in that it became the first national campaign in which traditional 
media such as television, radio, and newspapers were overshadowed by new media 
technologies and the internet” (2010:xi). In fact, Barack Obama’s use of social media, during 
the 2008 campaign, as a means to connect and communicate with his burgeoning supporters 
has been interpreted as the factor which secured his popularity and made possible his rise to 
the presidency of the United States (Aaker and Smith 2010:34). In this regard, specialists at 
Edelman Research argue that Obama won the election by “converting everyday people into 
engaged and empowered volunteers, donors, and advocates through social networks, email 
advocacy, text-messaging and online video” (Lutz 2009:2). And there exists significant 
evidence to support this. By the time he was elected, Obama had approximately five million 
‘friends’ on over fifteen different social networking sites, nearly two thousand official videos 
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 Listserv was an early electronic messaging system which allowed one email to be sent to a list of receivers. 
50 
 
on YouTube which were watched over eighty million times, thirteen million people on his 
email list, three million online donors who contributed six-and-a-half million times, and three 
million mobile connections signed up for his text-messaging program (Lutz 2009:5).  
In addition to the Obama team’s use of a variety of existing social media tools, 
MyBarackObama.com (MyBO) – an easy-to-use social networking site, similar to Facebook – 
emerged as a key component of the Obama strategy. In short, MyBO, which encouraged 
citizen participation and interaction with the Obama campaign, allowed people to connect 
directly with each other and with the party in a variety of ways. And it achieved this through 
encouraging Obama supporters to set up a personal profile, invite friends, join groups, 
connect and chat with other members, plan offline campaign related events, and raise funds. 
According to Aaker and Smith, “the mission, design and execution of the site echoed the 
single goal of the grassroots effort: to provide a variety of ways for people to connect and 
become deeply involved” with the Obama campaign (2010:34). That is, via MyBO, citizens 
were not only able to gain campaign related information and updates, but were also able to 
become actively involved in the campaigning process. Examples of this involvement can be 
seen in MyBO volunteers’ use of seventy thousand online personal fundraising pages to 
successfully raise thirty million dollars for the Obama campaign (De Cock 2011:139), along 
with the actions of forty-five thousand online volunteer groups, who came together to 
organize approximately 200 000 offline awareness and fundraising events (Vargas 2009). In 
addition to this, Obama supporters uploaded 442 000 user-generated videos related to the 
campaign to YouTube, and 400 000 Obama related blog posts were written online (Lutz 
2009:5). Against the backdrop of such evidence, Aaker and Chang suggest that “a major 
success factor for Obama’s victory was how Obama’s campaign used new media 
technologies” as an integral part not only of its strategy “to raise money,” but also, “more 
importantly, to develop a groundswell of empowered volunteers who felt they could make a 
difference” (2009). These connections and interactions resulted in people becoming deeply 
involved in the mainstream political campaigning process, in a way that allowed them to have 
a direct impact on the election results. 
Admittedly, despite the success of this campaign and Obama’s election as US 
president, it is important to remember that the use of social media in mainstream political 
campaigning and communication is not the only determinant of campaign success. In addition 
it is also determined by the campaign philosophy and candidate connectedness. In this regard, 
as Grove explains, 
  
51 
 
there’s a tendency to think of new media as a secret sauce that suddenly unlocks this viral 
potential, and there’s truth to that. But there’s no such thing as some view count fairy dust that 
the Obama campaign had that somehow made their YouTube videos climb that chart. They had 
a very talented candidate who was a great communicator and they had a campaign philosophy 
that matched and mirrored very well the Internet – openness, inclusiveness, self-organizing, 
grassroots. If they didn’t have that campaign philosophy, they wouldn’t have gone anywhere. 
(cited in Aakar and Smith 2009:41) 
 
Against the backdrop of both the successes of the 2008 US presidential election campaign, 
and the above caveat, social media are increasingly becoming a popular political tool around 
the world, with politicians from all levels of government using these media to promote their 
agendas and gain support. For example, in Latin America, traditional political campaigners 
are increasingly turning to the internet to muster support for their cause.
43
 Moreover, as 
Clarke asserts, politicians and various organizations now routinely use social media as a 
means to “disseminate political messages, learn about the interests and needs of [their] 
constituents and the broader public, raise funds, and build networks of support” (2010). 
Clarke further explains that many politicians and parliamentarians in Canada have started 
using social media platforms – such as Facebook and Twitter – not only to communicate ideas 
related to policy and official work, but also to reveal aspects of their personal life in order to 
connect more personally with their supporters (2010). 
Yet, notwithstanding its prevalence in contemporary democratic practice, it is 
important to consider carefully the above developments, and to avoid too readily advancing 
such public ‘political’ use of new media as some sort of panacea. To be sure, such political 
use of new media remains salutary, insofar as it is predicated upon and linked to actual events 
in the world, the politico-economic and socio-cultural consequences of which stand to be very 
significant. However, cognizance must also be taken of the extent to which such ‘political’ 
use of new media remains beholden to, and confined within, both the framework of liberal 
democracy, and the context of neoliberalism. This is because, as will be discussed next, for all 
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 This is illustrated by a ComScore study which found that “when Hugo Chavez joined Twitter in April 2010, 
the Venezuelan audience for the site increased by 4.8% over the span of just a few months, not including the 
number of people that connected via their cell phones or via public computers like those used in Internet cafés. 
The Brazilian presidential campaign of 2010 was also a race on social networks during which Dilma Roussef, 
elected president in 2010, engaged the services of the web agency who advised President Barack Obama during 
his 2008 campaign. The day she appeared on national television for a country-wide discourse, messages peaked 
at 90,000 messages” (cited in Igarza 2012:6). 
52 
 
its innovative dynamism, such political use of new media remains significantly ‘traditional’ in 
orientation, in terms of its propagation of dominant politico-economic discourses. 
 
2.3 Neoliberalism and online democratic praxis 
 
Historically, liberal democracy emerged in relation to the sixteenth-century Reformation in 
Europe and the subsequent destruction of Catholic hegemony.
44
 In short, the Reformation 
resulted in the progressive dismantling of Roman Catholic political power, and the gradual 
emergence of a type of politics never before experienced in the Western world. Accordingly, 
prior to the Reformation, the ultimate task of the state had been viewed as the cultivation of 
“virtue and pious behaviour…[among] citizens” (Wolterstorff and Cuneo 2012:1). However, 
the Reformation led to critical reflection on the above ‘perfectionist view’ of the state, 45 and 
its replacement by a more protectionist interpretation of state functions. That is, the idea that 
the fundamental task of the state was the protection of citizens’ rights from violation by other 
citizens, foreigners, or the state itself, soon emerged (Wolterstorff and Cuneo 2012:2). And 
this was linked to the notion of “an impersonal and privileged legal or constitutional order 
with the capability of administering and controlling a certain territory” (Held 2006:58). Most 
keenly associated with the emergence of this tradition of political thought is Thomas Hobbes, 
who declared the limiting of religious authority to be imperative under the auspices of a social 
contract between subjects, which gave power to a chosen sovereignty, and which marked the 
transition from the terror and violence of the state of nature. Subsequently, John Locke’s 
ideas, which limited the overarching powers of Hobbes’s sovereign, through the separation of 
legislative and executive power, and through placing them at the service of the people whose 
rights they were obliged to protect, signaled the commencement of the liberal constitutionalist 
tradition (Ebenstein and Ebenstein 1991:397-406, 425-434): a tradition which involved the 
“attempt to uphold the values of freedom of choice, reason and toleration in the face of 
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 The sixteenth-century Reformation resulted in a separation of Christians in western Europe into Protestants 
and Catholics, and this division both destroyed religious unity in Europe, and led to a growing focus on regional 
interests. According to Bergin and Speake, the Reformation played a role in the process of “nation-building by 
breaking the moral and economic power of the old Church” (2004:208). See D’Aubigne, J. 2003. History of the 
Reformation of the 16
th
 Century 1846. Whitefish: Kessinger Publishing, for a detailed examination of the 
sixteenth- century Reformation and its political consequences. 
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 According to Wolterstorff and Cuneo, the perfectionist view of the state entails the idea that it is the task of the 
state “to ‘perfect’ its citizens” (2012:1); in other words, this view purports that the state, like the church, needs to 
play a role in the promotion of morally acceptable behaviors and an honorable realization of the ‘good life.’  
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tyranny, the absolutist system and religious intolerance” (Held 2006:59). In turn, following on 
from Locke’s ideas, liberalism was increasingly viewed as the means of maintaining and 
expanding individual liberty, while simultaneously upholding important elements of public 
order (McGowan 2007:11). One of the first couplings of liberalism with democracy ‒ and the 
elaboration of issues pertaining to the conflict between freedom and equality ‒ occurs in the 
work of Jean Jacques Rousseau, whose concept of the ‘General Will,’ while it limits natural 
liberty, facilitates civil liberty, and ultimately makes possible moral liberty (1947:19).
46
 Yet, 
after the elevation of democracy onto the political stage by the French Revolution, and its 
instantiation as the political modus operandi in America, the potential challenges to liberty 
and equality which accompanied it soon became apparent. As Alexis de Tocqueville, cautions 
in Democracy in America, not only does public opinion have the power to suppress 
idiosyncratic views (1840:261), but the rise of an aristocracy of manufacturers also threatens 
to become the harshest and most dehumanizing that has ever existed (1840:160). But while 
his concerns in this regard were echoed by John Stuart Mill (1840),
47
 their collective fears 
were also negated by Herbert Spencer, who saw himself as a defender of liberalism in its 
classical sense, through his advancement of radical individualized and laissez faire 
economics.
48
 In this regard, he not only coined the phrase, ‘survival of the fittest’ (later use by 
Charles Darwin) and criticized welfare systems for undermining the evolution of society.
49
 In 
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 For Rousseau, the general will refers to the will of all the people, and in a democratic society the state 
represents the general will of the people. As such, natural liberty, “which knows no bounds but the power of the 
individual” is reduced to civil liberty by the general will. Moreover, the general will allows moral liberty to 
emerge when man is rendered as the “master of himself,” via his freedom to obey a law which he has prescribed 
to himself  (1947:19). See Rousseau, J. 1947. The Social Contract. New York: Hafner Publishing.   
47
 In support of de Tocqueville, Mill argues that “the most serious danger to the future prospects of mankind is in 
the unbalanced influence of the commercial spirit” (1859:73). In his autobiography, Mill, a keen reviewer of 
Democracy in America, notes “how much he owes to Tocqueville from whom he learned the specific virtues and 
defects of democracy.” In response, de Tocqueville “wrote to Mill that of all reviewers of Democracy in America 
he was the one who best understood the meaning of the work.” According to Ebenstein and Ebenstein “the two 
met during Tocqueville’s second visit to England in 1835, and their friendly association lasted until 
Tocqueville’s death in 1859” (1991:627).  
48
 Spencer promoted laissez faire as natural economic equality, and insisted that such equality arises due to the 
fact that in any economic transaction, each person is “free to offer; each is free to accept; each is free to 
refuse…but…no one may force another to part with his goods; no one may force another to take a specified 
price; for no one can do so without assuming more liberty of action than the man whom he thus treats” 
(1873:165). 
49
 Connected to the idea of ‘natural selection,’ Spencer argued for an extreme form of laissez faire economics 
which rejected any form of state intervention. Spencer argued that intervention of government in social affairs 
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addition, he also argued that where liberalism had once sought to limit the power of 
monarchs, it must now strive to limit the power of parliaments, in order to protect the right of 
individuals to succeed according to their capacity.
50
 Arguably, although the influence of 
Spencer in American political thought diminished after the nineteenth century, echoes and 
reflection of his single-minded support for individualized and laissez faire economics persist 
throughout the work of twentieth-century theorists, such as Milton Friedman, whose ideas 
have proved immensely powerful in shaping the contemporary political landscape (Gerrard 
2006:30; Well 2002:62; Zafirovski 2007:30). In short, although liberalism is a seventeenth-
and eighteenth-century idea, and democracy a nineteenth-century phenomenon, the 
connection between the two ideas is profound, and the combined notion of liberal democracy 
continues to be used to describe the ideological viewpoints of twentieth- and twenty-first-
century western democratic political systems.
51
 In this regard, Farnsworth defines liberal 
democracy as a political system which seeks to 
  
defend and increase civil liberties against the encroachment of governments, institutions and 
powerful forces in society[;] restrict or regulate government intervention in political, economic 
and moral matters affecting the citizenry[;] increase the scope for religious, political and 
intellectual freedom of citizens[;]  question the demands made by vested interest groups seeking 
special privileges[;] develop a society open to talent and which rewards citizens on merit, rather 
than on rank, privilege or status [, and to] frame rules that maximise the well-being of all or 
most citizens. (2013) 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
distorts “the necessary adaptation of society to its environment” (Krehm 2010:125). Furthermore, he stated that 
government interference “encourages the multiplication of the reckless and incompetent by offering them an 
unfailing provision,” thus disrupting the “natural order of things [through which] society is constantly excreting 
its unhealthy, imbecile, slow, vacillating, faithless members” (1851:323-324). Consequently, non-interference 
from the state, he argued, would result in the ‘withering away’ of the weak and unadaptable, and the correlative 
‘survival of the fittest.’  
50
 In this regard, Spencer argued that democratic reformers were the enemies of ‘true liberalism,’ and cautioned 
that as parliaments gained momentum, the potential for them to threaten the rights of private property would 
grow. As such, he insisted that the role of true liberalism was to put a “limit to the power of parliaments” 
(1969:183). 
51
 Although the concept of democracy only became recognized as legitimate political praxis in modern society in 
the 1830s, it should of course be remembered that the notion of democracy was first conceived and introduced 
by Cleisthenes in classical Athens (508/7 B.C.). Democracy in Athens is the best known historical example of 
the classical version of direct democracy, in which citizens govern themselves, because all of them have the right 
to “participate in decision making” (Hansen 1999:1). As will be discussed shortly, direct democracy differs from 
modern forms of democracy which are indirect, on account of the way in which the only decision that citizens 
are directly involved in concerns the initial choice of decision-makers.  
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Vernon supports Farnsworth’s definition of liberal democracy, and adds that, to be recognized 
as liberal democratic, “regimes must meet a certain standard of electoral accountability, and 
provide some level of constitutionally protected liberty to their citizens” (2001:1). Related to 
this, following the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989 and 
1991 respectively, Francis Fukuyama praised the expansion of liberal democratic regimes 
around the globe, which for him evinced “a remarkable consensus concerning the legitimacy 
of liberal democracy as a system of government,” even to the point of marking “the endpoint 
of mankind’s ideological evolution” (1992:xi). Yet, in spite of its standing in the world today, 
and Fukuyama’s valorization of it, Vernon also emphasizes that liberal democracy has “never 
ceased to be in question” (2001:1), and Hollinger similarly insists that liberal democracy 
continues to receive considerable criticism (1996:xi). That is, seen to be too dependent on the 
economic individualism, capitalism, and elitism valorized by Spencer and Friedman, among 
others, leftist critics ‒ echoing the concerns of de Tocqueville and Mill ‒ argue that liberal 
democracy “does not generate anything beyond…‘thin’ democracy.” In other words, a form 
of democracy that is only focused on politics and the political activity of voting (Hollinger 
1996:xi). Indeed, despite the numerous versions of liberalism and liberal democracy that have 
been developed over the years, contestations of its principles have grown, with critics arguing 
that it contains, among other things, “a false sociology, misrepresenting society as a collection 
of atomistic individuals, recognizing only voluntary ties, and neglecting the basic facts of 
unchosen human solidarity.” It has also been accused of locating “the source of happiness in 
lonely [consumer] endeavours” (Vernon 2001:2), in a way that undermines the classical idea 
of democracy, through the breeding of “rampant economic individualism” and, 
correspondingly, “repressive social policies and restrictions in the moral, social, and cultural 
spheres” of life (Hollinger 1996:xi).  
The reason for this, as already discussed in Chapter One, is that the liberal democratic 
model of politics has, since the 1980s, become increasingly entrenched in the economic ideals 
of neoliberalism, along with the consumer related ideology that it espouses. And according to 
McChesney, what this has resulted in is the emergence of a form of (neo)liberal democracy. 
In this regard, McChesney sees neoliberal democracy as the “largely vacuous political culture 
that exists in the formally democratic market-driven nations of the world,” insofar as 
“neoliberalism operates not only as an economic system but as a political and cultural system 
as well” (1999:110). Vazquez-Arroyo corroborates this growing connection between liberal 
democracy and neoliberalism, when he highlights how “liberal democracy has provided a 
56 
 
depoliticized framework that nurtures neoliberalism, while providing it with a cloak of 
legitimacy” (2008:127). 
Thus, although some theorists now construe the internet as a place that allows citizens 
to analyze and criticize social issues, and to play a role in democratic decision-making 
(Rheingold 1993; Hauben and Hauben 1997; Kahn and Kellner 2004, 2005), and although the 
use of new media in ‘traditional’ liberal democratic politics allows citizens to connect with 
and support their representatives, the ultimate connection of the internet and such social 
media use with neoliberalism cannot be overlooked.  
That is, as alluded to in Chapter One, on the one hand, some scholars argue that web-
based participation could be the answer to recent declines in interest in democratic 
citizenship. This is because, according to them, the “emergence of computerised ICTs have 
prompted less hierarchical discourses, characterised by the prospect of more intense 
democratic participation, visible-ness, public-ness and open-ness” (cited in Malina 1999:23). 
For example, in his book The Virtual Community, Rheingold promotes such a vision of digital 
democracy, and asserts that new media technologies, “if properly understood and defended by 
enough citizens…[have] democratising potential” (1993:279). However, on the other hand, it 
has also been suggested that the movement of mainstream offline politics into the online 
environment in the late 1990s, has simply resulted in a more widespread online adoption of a 
standardized liberal-consumer model of politics and contemporary e-democracy (Davis 1999; 
Resnick and Margolis 2000). In relation to this, Dahlberg and Siapera assert that “a liberal-
consumer model of politics that valorizes the individual as a self-seeking utility maximizer 
choosing between an array of political options,” has been embraced around the world 
(2007:3). Accordingly, they suggest that,  
 
in this consumer model the Internet is understood to be the most powerful communications 
medium yet for providing individuals with information on competing political positions and the 
means for registering their choices (e-voting, petitions, e-mail, polls). Concurrently competing 
political interests [have been]…given a relatively cheap and effective medium for organising 
their supporters and selling themselves. (2007:4) 
 
Moreover, Dahlberg and Siapera go on to argue that the internet is often seen as “an 
information conduit for pre-constituted instrumental selves to transmit and transact through” 
(2007:4). In other words, instead of allowing for meaningful participation and the adequate 
contestation of power, the majority of internet politics simply provides a platform for citizens 
to participate in a relatively uncritical, individualized, consumer-orientated, political process. 
Schlosberg and his colleagues corroborate this idea when they suggest that many current 
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mainstream uses of social media are conducive to the engenderment of self-interest, isolation, 
and an aggregative rather than discursive form of democracy. This is because such media use 
tends to encourage largely unreflective participation, through which unfounded preferences 
are simply aggregated, such as in voting or polling (Schlosberg at al. 2006:217; Gutmann and 
Thompson 2004:13).
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 Accordingly, Schlosberg and his colleagues, assert that online forms of 
aggregative interactions and communications “do nothing to appeal to the shared public 
good,” and instead “actually encourage self-interested comment” (2006:224). And their 
argument is supported by the fact that many political websites simply require members to 
select the ‘join’ link to add their name to the party’s membership numbers, or to select an 
option in an opinion poll, or to select a sharing option for information dissemination. This 
means that, with the exception of relatively rare and transitory moments of attention given to 
the various policies or issues at stake – via the click of a mouse – further participation or 
action is neither expected nor allowed for.  
Moreover, apart from the above criticisms surrounding the proliferation of such 
‘uncritical’ democratic participation, the commercialization of the internet is another concern 
for researchers who study the prospective transactional capacity of this ‘virtual sphere.’ 
According to Papacharissi, “the internet has gradually transitioned into an online multi-
shopping mall and less of a deliberative space, which influences the orientation of digital 
political discussion” (cited in Chadwick and Howard 2009:235). That is, since the internet 
emerged within a neoliberal capitalist context as a means of extending its economic dynamics, 
it is predisposed to the influences of a profit-focused market and, as such, cannot prioritize 
democratization and civic engagement (Schiller 2000). Following on from this idea, Dahlberg 
maintains that, despite the partial success of some online democracy projects, they remain for 
the most part habitually “marginalized by commercial sites…and liberal individualistic 
political practices” (2001:615). In addition to these concerns, Galloway, in his books 
Protocol: How Control Exists after Decentralization (2004) and The Exploit: Theory of 
Networks (2007), questions the ability of the internet to be free and democratic. That is, in 
reaction to his examination of how network protocols create new forms of control, he argues 
against the possibilities for a democratic cyberspace.   
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 Aggregative democracy is a form of democracy which seeks to find out citizens’ preferences, and aggregate or 
combine them together to determine which policies should be adopted. This aggregation is usually achieved 
through voting (Perote-Pena and Piggins 2011:1). According to Gutmann and Thompson, this concept of 
democracy only seeks to determine the preferences of society, and does not ask for a justification of these 
preferences (2004:13). 
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 Yet, despite the dominance around the globe of neoliberal democracy, counter-
discourses and alternative forms of democracy are steadily growing in popularity, and interest 
in more radical forms of political participation ‒ involving liberty and equality pursued under 
the auspices of a return to the origins of the ‘democratic revolution’ ‒ continue to gain 
momentum. These popular expressions of democracy take as their point of departure not the 
compromised complexity of neoliberal democracy, but rather older and simpler concepts of 
democratic praxis, in relation to which they seek to articulate their current positions and future 
trajectory.
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 These alternative conceptions of radical democracy point toward enduring 
concerns with both the conceptualization and realization of democracy, understood not just in 
the sense of the individual or private liberty upheld in neoliberal democracy, but also in 
relation to the original ideas of liberty and equality. And in terms of this, online new media 
technologies are increasingly being turned to in the interest of realizing these objectives. Yet, 
before such radical democratic use of social media can be explored, the different concepts of 
radical democracy need to be considered.    
 
2.4 Radical democracy 
 
According to Dahlberg, radical democracy concerns two interlinked and generally established 
root meanings or conditions of democracy, namely, “the free and equal participation of ‘the 
people’ (the dêmos) in power (kratos)” and “that democracy – including any of its criteria, 
institutions, and decisions – has no grounds, justifications, or guarantees outside of the 
people.” Accordingly, because democracy is “self-grounding, self-legitimising and self-
constituting…it is in a constant state of anxiety and self-reflexive questioning,” underpinned 
by “a self-revolutionizing logic” (2013). And it is this self-grounding, Dahlberg further 
argues, which allows for the possibility of liberty and equality being approximated to ever 
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 In addition to de Tocqueville and Mill’s ideas, mentioned earlier, Aristotle’s assertions in his Politics provides 
significant inspiration in this regard. Accordingly, “the basis of a democratic state is liberty…[and o]ne principle 
of liberty is for all to rule and be ruled in turn, and indeed democratic justice is the application of numerical not 
proportionate equality…Every citizen, it is said, must have equality…This then is one note of liberty which all 
democrats affirm to be the principle of their state. Another is that a man should live as he likes. This, they say, is 
the privilege of a freeman, since, on the other hand, not to live as a man likes is the mark of a slave. This is the 
second characteristic of democracy, whence has arisen the claim of men to be ruled by none, if possible, or, if 
this is impossible, to rule and be ruled in turns; and so it contributes to the freedom based on equality” (2005:97). 
To be sure, original (classical Greek) ideas of democracy were ultimately exclusionary, since only certain males 
were entitled to citizenship, but the underlying original concepts of freedom and equality are the focal point of 
more radical forms of democracy today. 
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greater degrees (2013). Yet, notwithstanding the global advancement of democratic societies, 
these two intertwining ideas have often been forgotten in contemporary liberal democracies. 
Consequently, the word ‘radical’ has been added to the notion of democracy to highlight a 
reconnection to these two ideas. That is,  
 
radical democratic theorists have added ‘radical’ as a supplementary term to ‘democracy’ so as 
to draw out the two root conditions. Moreover, as a supplement, ‘radical’ does not just add to 
our current understandings and practices of democracy, but problematizes them, showing them 
to be not all encompassing: always incomplete and thus always revisable. (Dahlberg 2013) 
 
As with most political ideologies, different understandings of the conceptions of equality, 
liberty and democratic community have led to the classification of radical democracy under 
various categories, and a corresponding emergence of an array of interpretations and 
conceptualizations of what ‘radical democracy’ entails. Although some of these 
conceptualizations relate to the deliberative democratic theories of John Rawls and Jürgen 
Habermas, others are derived from the autonomous democratic theories of Cornelius 
Castoriadis, Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, while still others take as their point of 
departure post-Marxist theories, the most well-known of which is the agonistic democracy 
advanced by Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe. And in what follows, each of the above 
forms will be considered in turn, with a view to examining the extent to which the dynamics 
of each are currently reflected in online political activity.  
 
2.4.1 Deliberative democracy 
 
The deliberative democratic position is perhaps the most broadly recognized dimension of 
radical democratic theory today. Viewed as an alternative form of public decision-making, 
scholars of deliberative democracy highlight the importance of open discussion, citizen 
participation, and an active public sphere (Ackerman and Fishkin 2004; Cooke 2000; Leib 
2004; Roberts 2008). Most commonly connected to the theories of John Rawls and Jürgen 
Habermas, deliberative democracy proposes the general idea that “political problems…can be 
resolved through the force of the better argument: through people coming together and 
deliberating upon the best way to resolve particular disputes” (Dahlberg and Siapera 2007:8). 
That is, viewed in relation to the transformation rather than the aggregation of preferences, 
deliberative democracy focuses on the “need to justify decisions made by citizens and their 
representatives” (Gutmann and Thompson 2004:3). In this regard, decisions need to be 
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reasonable enough to satisfy the demands of both rationality and democratic legitimacy. 
According to Bohman and Rehg, deliberative democracy can thus be seen as a “normative 
account of legitimacy…[that] evokes ideals of rational legislation, participatory politics and 
civic self-governance” (1997:ix). Although a variety of definitions for deliberative democracy 
can be found, all of them reflect cognizance of two main concepts. On the one hand, the idea 
of a collective method of decision-making, and on the other hand, the idea that decision-
making is based on arguments made by (and presented to) participants who are devoted to the 
values and ideals of rationality and objectivity. In addition to these two ideas, Gutmann and 
Thompson maintain that deliberative democracy should, firstly, affirm “the need to justify 
decisions made by citizens and their representatives;” that is, reasons need to be given for 
certain decisions. Secondly, it requires that “reasons given in this process should be accessible 
to all the citizens to whom they are addressed,” and, thirdly, they argue that deliberative 
democracy must seek “a decision that is binding for some period of time” (2004:3-5). Against 
the backdrop of such understanding, Nabitchi insists that deliberative democratic “processes 
offer a concrete way to bring together citizen views and insights in a way that is both 
inclusive and sensitive to value plurality” (2010:386). Similarly, Levinson argues that 
deliberative democracy  
 
fosters cooperation and mutual understanding rather than winning and losing…[, as] it purports 
to give all citizens a “voice” rather than just the most powerful or the most numerous (as tends 
to occur in majoritarian democracy); and it encourages citizens to make decisions based on 
“public reasons” that can be supported through deliberation rather than on individual prejudices 
that thrive in the privacy of the voting booth. (Levinson 2002:262) 
 
Some argue that the 1980s saw the formulation of the deliberative ideal of democracy, which 
opposed the hitherto dominant aggregative notions of voting and bargaining (Cohen 1989; 
Sunstein 1991; Knight and Johnson 1994). Unlike aggregative democracy, which is “vote 
centric,” deliberative democracy is advanced as “talk-centric,” insofar as discussion and 
deliberation are considered to be at the heart of democratic practices (Chambers 2003:308). 
That is, the aggregative model of democracy, which is found in most representative 
governments today, uses voting and bargaining to aggregate individuals’ preferences and, 
subsequently, to validate public policy decisions (Mansbridge 1980; Young 2000). Yet, it has 
been argued that this form of democracy promotes individualistic and strategic behavior based 
on economic incentives (Buchanan and Tullock 1962; Riker 1982; Mansbridge 1980; Barber 
1984). In contrast to this model, deliberative democracy involves a movement away from the 
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individualistic competition of “the market,” toward a more collective rationality of “the 
forum” (Bohman 1998:400). In this regard, Chambers asserts that deliberative democracy 
 
is a normative theory that suggests ways in which we can enhance democracy and criticize 
institutions that do not live up to the normative standard. In particular, it claims to be a more 
just and indeed democratic way of dealing with pluralism than aggregative or realist models of 
democracy…[It] begins by turning away from liberal individualist or economic understandings 
of democracy and toward a view anchored in concepts of accountability and discussion…[, and 
it] focuses on the communicative processes of opinion and will-formation that precede voting. 
Accountability replaces consent as the conceptual core of legitimacy. A legitimate political 
order is one that could be justified to all those living under its laws. Thus, accountability is 
primarily understood in terms of “giving an account” of something[;] that is, publicly 
articulating, explaining, and most importantly justifying public policy. (2003:308) 
 
Similarly, Dahlberg and Siapera argue that the related “political community is therefore based 
upon communicative reason: the critical reflexive process of coming to the most reasonable 
solution (consensus) to a common problem, in contrast to the pre-deliberative, individual-
strategic reasoning of liberalism” (2007:8). This echoes Bohman who asserts that “rather than 
simple compromise or bargaining equilibrium, the goal of deliberation is consensus[:] the 
agreement of all those affected by a decision” (1998:400). Thus, the focus on consensus, the 
idea that the government should represent the “will of the people,” the importance of 
argumentation, and the ideas of reason, are some of the major features of this form of 
democracy (Barber 1984; Habermas 1979). A form of democracy which Bohman defines as 
“the public deliberation of free and equal citizens as the core of legitimate decision making 
and self-government” (1998:401). And Cohen and Fung (2004) add to this definition when 
they assert that deliberative democracy points toward the infusion of “government decision 
making with reasoned discussion and the collective judgment of citizens,” in a way that 
connects “participation in public decision making to the practice of deliberation” (cited in 
Nabatchi 2010:384).  
 As mentioned above, the concept of deliberative democracy has been principally 
connected to and developed by two schools of thought, associated respectively with the work 
of John Rawls and that of Jürgen Habermas. In his article “The Idea of Public Reason 
Revisited” (1997), John Rawls sets out a theory of deliberation. Focusing on solving problems 
of legitimacy, he promotes the idea of public reason as central to deliberation, arguing that, as 
a result of plurality, “citizens realize that they cannot reach agreement or even approach 
mutual understanding on the basis of their irreconcilable comprehensive doctrines.” Public 
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reason therefore refers to the reasons that may reasonably be given when “fundamental 
political questions are at stake.” Accordingly, he proposes that, “in public reason[,] 
comprehensive doctrines of truth or right [are] replaced by an idea of the politically 
reasonable addressed to citizens as citizens.” Thus, for Rawls, “the definitive idea for 
deliberative democracy is the idea of deliberation itself,” and he asserts that “when citizens 
deliberate, they exchange views and debate their supporting reasons concerning public 
political questions”. Consequently, they must “suppose that their political opinions may be 
revised by discussion with other citizens; and therefore these opinions are not simply a fixed 
outcome of their existing private or non-political interests.” It is at this point, he argues, that 
“public reason is crucial, for it characterises such citizens’ reasoning concerning 
constitutional essentials and matters of basic justice.” Through this, he highlights three core 
elements of deliberative democracy, namely public reason, a constitutional framework, and 
the principle that citizens are willing to recognize the importance and realize the ideal of 
public reason (1999:132, 139, 570, 574, 579-580). While public reason is important because it 
helps to establish the common principle for deliberation, a constitutional framework helps to 
create essential supervisory institutions, that, in turn, facilitate citizens’ acceptance of the 
ideas of public reason, in a way that helps to build a foundation of commonality and harmony 
within pluralistic communities (Bantas 2010:2).   
Initially Rawls’s ideas of public reason are often understood as being “characteristic of 
a democratic people” (1993:213). However, it soon becomes apparent that as a well-known 
proponent of liberal thought, Rawls “sees it as applying in particular to a more narrowly 
circumscribed set of issues and group of actors” (Saward 2002:2). That is, Rawls sees 
deliberative democracy as something that only certain people need to get involved in. As 
such, his idea of deliberative democracy indicates that the process of deliberation need only to 
be applied to problems of a constitutional nature or of political importance, thereby restricting 
the process to “citizens who are involved in constitutional or governmental matters” ‒ such as 
judges, politicians, or government officials (Saward 2002:2, Bantas 2010:1). Consequently, 
citizenship, for the majority of people in Rawls’s deliberative democracy, is still a largely 
passive affair.
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 In this regard, Chambers goes on to argue that although Rawls joined the 
deliberative turn in 1999, and although his conception of public reason is often discussed in 
relation to deliberative democracy, his theory is not necessarily a theory of deliberative 
democracy in the strict sense of the term (2003). And Cooke elaborates on this idea when he 
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This issue has been expanded upon by various scholars, including Chambers (2003), Cooke (2000), Saward 
(2002) and Bohman (1998). 
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suggests that the deliberative features of Rawls’s political theory are not always obvious, and 
do not tie up with the notion of deliberation “as the free exchange of arguments involving 
practical reasoning and always potentially leading to a transformation of preferences” 
(2000:958). Instead, Rawls’s conception of deliberation can be viewed as fundamentally 
“monological,” involving a “private process in which citizens work out for themselves 
whether the advocated political principles are reasonable[,] in the sense of capable of being 
reasonably accepted by all” (2000:985). In relation to this, Saward notes Rawls’s argument 
that  
 
reasonable and rational people, aware of pluralism[,] will find certain principles/ideals 
acceptable to them[,] therefore they will endorse a constitution which embodies these 
principles/ideals. If political power is exercised in accordance with this constitution then 
political power is exercised legitimately. (2002:3) 
 
In many respects, this highlights Rawls’s perception of public reason as a “solitary, inward 
looking, thoughtful matter…done by individuals thinking…[or] ‘reasoning’ alone, not 
together (2002:3). Thus, despite Rawls’s presentation of public reason as a vital ingredient of 
deliberative democracy, the link between these two ideas is somewhat tenuous, because 
“public reason and deliberation are quite different things” (Saward 2002:1). Another theorist 
who has more closely (and successfully) been associated with the idea of deliberative 
democracy is Jürgen Habermas. Like Rawls, Habermas uses a liberal framework, 
constitutionalism, and the rule of law for his theory of deliberative democracy. However, 
unlike Rawls, his conceptions of constitutionalism and law are based on communicative 
reason – “which can be generally understood to consist of inclusive, equalitarian, reflexive, 
reasoned and reciprocal argument aimed at mutual understanding and agreement resulting in 
rational public opinion” – rather than public reason (cited in Dahlberg 2007b:129).55 
Furthermore, his theory is grounded on a more inclusive notion of deliberative democracy, 
where both the private and public sphere are involved in political processes, and where 
restrictions are not made in preference of the political elite. For Habermas, deliberative 
democracy “articulates [a] conception of popular sovereignty according to which the ultimate 
grounds of legitimacy are the collective deliberations of the public,” even if such 
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 According to Habermas, “there is no pure reason,” rather, reason “is of its nature always an incarnate reason 
imbedded in complexities of communicative action and in structures of the lived in world” (1985:374). In terms 
of this, Habermas sees human beings as automatically connected via their use of language, and he consequently 
views reason in its communicative form, arguing that communication ‒ via the structures of speech ‒ connects 
people to each other and facilitates a practice of solidarity which contributes toward deliberative democracy. 
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“deliberations…are conceived in terms of a somewhat idealised set of procedures” (Fairfield 
2008:35).   
That is, in his book Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory 
of Law and Democracy, Habermas considers a “two-track theory of democracy in which 
representative institutions exist alongside and contend with a vibrant and free public sphere 
and civil society of associations, social movements and citizens’ initiatives” (Benhabib 
1997:725). Consequently, he argues that this two-track approach should replace the leftist 
critique of existing democracies, since it can be applied to all aspects and spheres of social life 
(Habermas 1996:306). In order to strengthen democracy through public participation, 
Habermas argues that politics needs to be seen as a form of public conversation that is 
governed by reason and legitimizing procedures. And in this regard, he suggests that 
“democratic will-formation draws its legitimating force…from the communicative 
presuppositions that allow better arguments to come into play in various forms of deliberation 
and from procedures that secure fair bargaining processes” (cited in Kapoor 2002:461-462). 
These ‘fair’ processes, Habermas explains, can be found within the ‘ideal speech situation’: a 
situation in which public conversation is inclusive (no one is excluded from participating), 
free of coercion (no participant in the conversation or dialogue is dominant over the other), 
and open (any participant can initiate or question the discussion on a relevant topic) 
(Habermas 1990:88-89). For Habermas, laws sanctioning these ‘fair’ processes can help to 
organize deliberative democratic practices and politics. According to Thomassen, Habermas’s 
idea of deliberative democracy thus “links the idea of public use of reason to a theory of law 
and democracy where…public deliberation, and hence the quality of the public sphere…gives 
the laws their legitimacy” (2010:111). In terms of such deliberation, Habermas sees the 
process as one of ‘ideal role-taking,’ in which participants are encouraged to contemplate 
what could count as a good reason for all others involved in, or affected by, the decisions 
under discussion (1996:147-148). Good reason, Habermas insists, “cannot be autonomous, 
insulated from society and imposing its will without accountability.” Instead, as Kapoor 
notes, “it must be a dialogical or ‘communicative’ rationality through which participants 
advance arguments and counterarguments” (2002:462). Subsequently, “consensual decisions 
are reached only by the (unforced) ‘force of the better argument,’ so that at the end of the 
deliberative processes, all concerned are convinced by the decisions reached and accept them 
as reasonable” (2002:462). In this way, Habermas sees public deliberations as having a 
cognitive dimension, insofar as they “are concerned with finding the best way of regulating 
matters of public concern, whereby the ‘best way’ is judged according to standards of 
rationality that have a certain objectivity” (1996:147, 151, cited in Cooke 2000:952). In order 
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for this deliberation to be considered rational, participation in democratic decision-making 
needs to be “orientated not egoistically or strategically but by impartial processes of collective 
‘opinion formation’ and ‘will formation’ that are generalizable in nature” (cited in Fairfield 
2008:36). To this end, Habermas maintains that consensus on political issues needs to be 
reached through un-coercive methods of participation and deliberation in the public sphere.
56
  
However, although such deliberative democracy, as a conception of radical 
democracy, has gained significant support, criticisms of Habermas’s ideas have also emerged. 
In their book Why Deliberative Democracy? Gutmann and Thompson point out two major 
problems related to his deliberative democracy. Firstly, they assert that such “deliberative 
democracy does not provide a natural way to come to a definite conclusion short of 
consensus” (2004:18). Consequently, such deliberative politics cannot be adopted on their 
own and need to be accompanied by alternative decision-making measures. That is, since it is 
important for deliberation to end in a final decision, the inability of deliberative democracy to 
stipulate a single process for reaching a final decision, results in a reliance on additional non-
deliberative procedures such as voting. Secondly, they assert that his “deliberative conception 
relies on explicitly moral principles rather than the seemingly neutral ones of aggregative 
conceptions.” Indeed, “reciprocity is an explicitly moral principle, and deliberation therefore 
invokes substantive moral claims that may be independent of the preferences citizens put 
forward” (Gutmann and Thompson 2004:18). Against this, though, Dahlberg asserts that 
Habermas’s notion of the public sphere and deliberative democracy remains radically 
democratic for two reasons. Firstly, its decision-making processes are connected to the public 
opinion and rational deliberations of everyone who is affected by these processes. Thus, 
instead of being confined to the economic, political, and administrative elite, democratic 
power is placed in the hands of the “communicative rationality of ordinary citizens” 
(2007b:129). Secondly, the ideas of public power, public opinion, and the public sphere, are 
extended to all situations in which people engage in deliberation.  
In short, as a result of the ideas of Rawls and Habermas, the dimensions of 
deliberative democracy have emerged as one of the most extensively debated issues of 
democracy in the contemporary era. And although the concept of deliberative democracy 
forms part of the broader theoretical ambit of participatory democracy, it is generally agreed 
upon that it is unique in its aspiration toward 
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 For Habermas, the public sphere can be seen as “a discursive space distinct and separate from the economy 
and state, in which citizens participate and act through dialogue and debate” (Kapoor 2002:461). See Habermas, 
J. 1989. Structural Transformations of the Public Sphere. Massachusetts: MIT Press; and Calhoun, C. 1992. 
Habermas and the Public Sphere. MIT Press. 
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a form of government in which free and equal citizens (and their representatives), justify 
decisions in a process in which they give one another reasons that are mutually acceptable, with 
the aim of reaching conclusions that are binding in the present on all citizens but open to 
challenge in the future. (Gutmann and Thompson 2004:7) 
 
In recent years, related concepts of deliberative democracy have begun to emerge in the realm 
of online politics and e-democracy. For example, Hands asserts that since deliberative 
democracy is predicated on the principle of reciprocity, it can be seen as “an attractive 
prospect in any theory of radical e-democracy, as it enshrines imperatives of justice, 
openness, recognition and autonomy as fundamental norms of all interaction” (2007:97). 
Viewed in relation to its possibilities for the extension of rational communication, scholars 
have begun to study the internet as a potential online deliberative public sphere. In particular, 
Fung and Kedl (2000), Gimmler (2001), and Janssen and Kies (2005), have examined the 
scope and value of rational online deliberation, especially in relation to “claims that the 
Internet’s two-way, relatively low cost, semi-decentralized and global communications, 
combined with evolving interactive software and moderation techniques, offer the ideal basis 
for rational deliberation” (Dahlberg 2007c:48). Accordingly, websites that promote a form of 
online deliberation are seen as constituting “a rational public sphere in which private 
individuals are transformed into publicly oriented democratic subjects interested in the 
‘common good’” (Dahlberg 2011:860). Similarly, for Gimmler, the internet offers the 
opportunity for strengthening deliberative democracy, because “over the web, information can 
be utilized more effectively; it is easily obtained by users and can be made available at very 
low cost.” Thus, when it comes to deliberation, he argues that on 
 
the local, regional and national level, moderated discourses, public forums, and a round-table 
style of discussion can be established [online], all of which give citizens the opportunity to be 
active participants in the process of decision-making. Decisions over planning, in particular, can 
be arrived at collectively by on-line conferences and discussion forums. (2001:32) 
 
In addition to its importance within traditional politics, Gimmler also highlights the use of the 
internet by civil organizations and NGOs, when he examines the benefits that the internet 
offers as a relatively free ‘public platform’ (2001:33). His sentiments in this regard are also 
supported by Downey, who argues that the internet and new information and communication 
technologies comprise conduits for radical democracy through their promotion of a more 
transnational, participatory and deliberative form of politics (2007:109). A form of politics 
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that aims to produce critical public opinion which “can scrutinize and guide official decision 
making processes” (Dahlberg 2011:860). Indeed, despite their earlier concerns over the 
unreflective, uncritical and self-involved uses of such media, Schlosberg and his colleagues 
also argue that the internet can and should be used as a community platform which 
encourages discussion, reasoning, participation and engagement with social, political and 
environmental issues. This use, they insist, will allow participants to “make proposals, attempt 
to persuade others, listen to the responses of those others and determine the best outcomes and 
policies based on the arguments and reasons fleshed out in public discourse” (Schlosberg et 
al. 2006:216).
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Many examples of websites, blogs and social networks that support a deliberative 
democratic agenda can be found online, including, E-Democracy (www.e-democracy.org), 
the Deliberative Democracy Consortium (www.deliberative-democracy.net), the Public 
Sphere Project (www.publicsphereproject.org), the Hansard Society 
(www.hansardsociety.org.uk), the Electronic Commons (www.ecommons.net), and 
Australia’s National Forum (www.nationalforum.com.au). These sites offer users the 
opportunity to participate in conversations relating to issues affecting their communities and 
societies, and actively encourage citizens to get involved in the democratic decision-making 
process. According to their website, e-democracy.org “builds [an] online public space in the 
heart of real democracy and community” (2013), and their mission is to “harness the power of 
online tools to support participation in public life, strengthen communities, and build 
democracy” (2013). Originating in Minnesota in 1994, e-democracy.org now has over fifteen 
thousand participants and is connected to over fifty local forums related to issues in the 
United States, the United Kingdom and New Zealand. This online platform offers the 
opportunity for the creation of community forums where local issues can be discussed and 
information can be shared. Accordingly, political dialogues and deliberations between ‘real’ 
people (users have to register and use their real names in order to participate) and facilitated 
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 In terms of this, they pay particular attention to the concept of environmental citizenship and online 
rulemaking in the United States. Exploring the growing possibilities for citizen comment and deliberation on 
proposed government regulation through websites such as regulations.gov, Schlosberg and his colleagues. 
examine the potential deliberative benefits of online rulemaking and electronic participation, and argue that 
“participation in Web-based decision making may make for more involved citizens” (2006:230). An example of 
this form of public online participation and deliberation can be seen in the US Department of Agriculture’s use 
of the internet to allow public comment on issues related to the National Organic Program. The openness and 
transparency achieved in this discursive practice allowed for deliberation on the organic rules to be implemented, 
and resulted in some of the most democratic rulemaking in the history of the agency (Schlosberg et al. 
2006:218). 
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by local organizers, are also encouraged. In another example, the Deliberative Democracy 
Consortium (DDC) provides a platform for researchers and practitioners to come together and 
promote the institutionalization of deliberative democracy within governance in the United 
States in particular, and around the world in general. Their general philosophy is related to the 
view that “democratic deliberation is a powerful, transformational experience for everyone 
involved – citizens and leaders alike – which can result in attitudinal shifts toward the 
institutions and practice of democracy overall” (Torres 2013). The DDC runs the website 
deliberative-democracy.net, a blog, an eBulletin and a wiki to enable collaborative 
communications across its global network. And according to the Online Deliberative 
Democracy Consortium website, “much of the Consortium’s online activities are carried out 
through the Online Deliberative Democracy Workgroup (ODDC)” (2013). This network, 
which is made up of some of the leading voices on online deliberation, meet once a month to 
discuss recent developments in the field, and to “develop strategies to bolster online 
deliberation efforts in the U.S. and around the world” (Torres 2013). Similar to e-
democracy.org, the Hansard society – a UK-based independent political research and 
education charity – aims to reinforce the importance of parliamentary democracy and attempts 
to inspire a renewed interest among citizens in political deliberation. Of particular recent 
importance, the Public Sphere Project offers an arena for online deliberation and aims to “help 
create and support equitable and effective public spheres all over the world” (2013). Through 
their openDCN (deliberative community networks) software environment, the Public Sphere 
Project provides an online platform and various online tools, which assist in the formation of 
community and deliberation spaces, thereby supporting participation and online deliberation. 
A further example is that of the non-profit Electronic Commons project, which is based in 
Toronto, Canada, and which provides a support mechanism for the development of online 
communities, civic engagement, and democratic cultures of deliberation. This website and its 
connected blogs encourage citizen engagement and participation in decision-making, and 
offer various online workshops on expanding deliberative democracy. Finally, the National 
Forum is a non-profit website, or ‘virtual town square,’ which acts as a free and open space 
for citizen deliberation, and promotes the internet as a site for deliberative democracy in 
Australia. Already in their first year of operation, the nationalforum.com.au aimed at building 
an online community through their online opinion forum, ‘iparliment,’ and online domain, 
which offer a space for online conversations. Recognizing the importance of the participation 
and engagement of everyone in civil and political society, this group has enlisted various 
institutions, including “the Brisbane Institute, QUT, the Local Government Association of 
Queensland, Australian Manufacturing Workers Union, Australians for a Constitutional 
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Monarchy and Oxfam Community Aid Abroad, as well as prominent individuals and 
parliamentarians” (2013). 
These examples, among many others, draw attention to the potential of the internet to 
offer a platform for the expansion of deliberative forms of radical democracy. That is, 
notwithstanding concerns surrounding the assimilation of such online sites into the mass of 
liberal-consumer-orientated websites, their ability to provide a place for real deliberation, 
between real people, with the intention of influencing regulatory change at local and national 
levels, arguably points toward the internet’s potential to function as a site for online 
deliberative radical democracy.  
   
2.4.2 Autonomous democracy 
 
Atkins explains that autonomous democracy is “generally understood as self-determination: 
the freedom to pursue one’s perception of the good life, just as long as it does not impinge 
upon another’s identical freedom” (2000:74).58 Stemming from the tradition of Marxist 
critical theory, which seeks to realize the promises of the French Revolution − liberty, 
equality and unity − the autonomist conception of radical democracy is most notably 
connected to autonomous community formation and organization. In this regard, the 
autonomous strand of radical democracy focuses on the community as ‘pure power,’ and 
democracy is accordingly understood as a form of self-organization that is free from 
centralized systems of power. Responding to the crisis of the left, which emerged in reaction 
to the concomitant failure of socialism and rise of neoliberalism,
59
 autonomists reject the 
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 This echoes John Stuart Mill’s argument in “On Liberty,” where he examines the idea of autonomy as being 
one of the essential “elements of well-being” (1975:37).  
59
 As already indicated, the 1980s expansion of neoliberalism was coterminous with two equally important 
historical events, namely the fall of the Soviet Union and China’s conversion to authoritarian capitalism. Indeed, 
while neoliberal policies were being implemented by Thatcher and Reagan in Britain and America, respectively, 
Baltic States on the periphery of the Soviet Union were beginning to rise up and demand autonomy from the 
socialist union (Gupta 2010:44). Following the 1980s uprisings in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, and after 
growing political and economic instability, unrest in the Soviet Union ultimately resulted in its complete collapse 
in 1991 ‒ an event which signaled the end of the Cold War (Gupta 2010:66). Although leaders of the Soviet 
Union initially refused to adopt all of the economic reforms suggested by the increasingly neoliberal West, 
China’s Deng Xiaoping recognized the importance of making economic reforms and initiated a movement away 
from socialist economics in 1978, which engendered a conversion to authoritarian capitalism. In terms of this, 
foreign investment, privatized industry and the decollectivisation of agriculture were introduced and encouraged 
(Naughton 1995:144).   
70 
 
power of capital and highlight the community – or ‘the multitude’ – as intricately plural and 
the agent of constituent power.
60
 That is, driven by a new self-consciousness of civil society, 
autonomists argue that profound structural change is only possible through the mass 
participation in, and contribution toward, community by all concerned. In terms of this, 
autonomists actively encourage a continuous critique of capitalism and the institutions that 
support it, and they argue that autonomist change cannot be achieved through the mere 
extension or reform of liberal democracy. Rather, they seek the “formation of an entirely new 
democratic society – a ‘commons-based’ socio-economic arrangement as the foundation for 
democratic community” (Dahlberg 2011:863). According to Negri (2008:66–67), “the 
commons consists of the sum of everything produced independently of capital,” and it is the 
totality of autonomous production that will bring about radical democracy. 
Yet, despite their rejection of liberal democratic capitalism, autonomists’ ideas of 
plurality and community power evince their continued support of the democratic principles of 
liberty and equality, and therefore situate them within the radical democratic framework. 
According to Flores, autonomous communities tend to focus on 
“interdependence[,]…intersubjectivity, expansiveness[,]…participatory democracy, and the 
notion of accompaniment as opposed to activist support” (cited in McLaren 2001).61  That is, 
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 According to Panitch and Leys, “the collapse of the post-war settlement in the late 1960s was a critical turning 
point in the history of the capitalist countries of the west. The response of the ‘new right’ was to call for the 
removal of restrictions on private capital accumulation and capitalist culture, and as far as possible to replace 
collective decision-making by the operation of markets” (2001:1). From these initial transformations, the growth 
of late/advanced or neoliberal capitalism in the 1980s – as discussed in Chapter One – became a largely 
uncontested element of contemporary politico-economic discourse. However, a rejection of related forms of 
acquiescent politics is the project of autonomous democracy.  
61
 In relation to Flores’s characterization of autonomous communities, the ideas of interdependence, 
intersubjectivity, expansiveness, participatory democracy, and accompaniment, need to be clarified. With regard 
to the notion of autonomous communities being interdependent, Flores argues that members of autonomous 
communities struggle to survive collectively, because all the material, spiritual, cultural, and psychological 
elements of life are necessarily interconnected and interdependent.  The notion of intersubjectivity emerges here 
in relation to the inclusiveness of autonomous groups, because all members are seen as equal, and as equally 
contributing to the collective group of their community. Flores asserts that autonomous communities thus tend to 
be asset based, meaning that they recognize the strengths of their communities, encourage collective awareness 
of these strengths, and build on them. The next characteristic Flores elaborates upon is that autonomous 
communities are expansive. For him, the autonomous “process consciously offers a micromodel, an archetype of 
a different type of national state system,” insofar as autonomous communities offer an alternative system to that 
of the current status quo. Next, Flores highlights the importance of equal participation in autonomous 
communities, noting the intercultural and pluriethnic elements of these communities, and highlighting their 
acknowledgement and welcoming of difference. Finally, in terms of the idea of accompaniment, Flores 
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defined as interdependent groups of individuals and community members, autonomist 
organizations seek to establish “the right amount and right type of independence and 
dependence” (Tojolabales cited in McLaren 2001). Thus, although the equality of all people is 
at the forefront of this political conception, the importance of individual difference is 
concomitantly recognized.  
The idea of autonomous radical democracy has been most closely linked to the works 
of Cornelius Castoriadis and the collaborative efforts of Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri. In 
his book Philosophy, Politics, Autonomy, Castoriadis attempts to interpret the ideas of 
democracy and philosophy in terms of his central concept of autonomy. On the one hand, he 
views individual autonomy as the ability of individuals to make their own laws based on the 
recognition of their individual wants and desires. On the other hand, he sees social autonomy 
as society’s ability to advance its own laws, while at the same time recognizing itself as the 
foundation of its norms (Fotopoulos 1997). Widely known for his reflections on the 
consequences of a lack of autonomy in the contemporary world, Castoriadis is also often 
identified with his 
 
call for Western thought to embrace the reality of creation in a radical sense, and…for his 
[defense] of an ethics and politics based on autonomy, or giving the law to oneself, which is 
never the autonomy of an isolated being but always involves beings who relate to others and 
[who] are aided by institutional supports. (Garner 2011) 
 
That is, politics in contemporary society is largely based on parliamentary and representative 
democracy (Kornberg and Clarke 1992; Urbinati 2008). Yet, what Castoriadis highlights are 
the deficiencies of these democracies, particularly when he notes their lack of autonomy and 
their inability to accommodate the practicalities of radical democracy. And for Castoriadis, 
while a lack of autonomy means that the opportunity for equal participation in decision-
making is negated, this lack of participation, in turn, ultimately results in a lack of freedom, 
and correlatively a lack of equality. Comparing contemporary politics to those of classical 
Greece, he highlights the autonomous role of citizens in early practices of direct democracy, 
and examines how societies, over time, began to delegate this role to selected groups, who 
would then be tasked with making decisions on their behalf.
62
 On the basis of this, Castoriadis 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
emphasizes autonomous communities’ recognition of the impacts and influence of globalization, and he 
maintains that these communities use the idea of globalization as a means to encourage the global community to 
work together against neoliberalism (Flores, cited in McLaren 2001). 
62
 Direct democracy refers to a type of democracy that is said to be by and for the people. This means that, 
instead of leaving the decision-making process up to elected representatives, the people make their own 
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argues that, unlike in classical Greece, where the citizens were constantly able to deliberate on 
certain issues and to make collective decisions, contemporary society is only able to make 
autonomous decisions once every four years – through the process of voting in an election. In 
contrast, Castoriadis argues that classical Greek states were based on openness and autonomy, 
and the adoption of direct democracy allowed every autonomous citizen to partake in the 
democratic decision-making process continuously. This is because laws and rules were 
established in an open practice of creation, and citizens were encouraged to actively seek out 
the meaning and validity of these institutions.
63
 Rendtorff elaborates on this idea when he 
explains that, for Castoriadis,  
 
democratic society emerges as an auto-institutionalization of the norms of society. In a 
democratic society citizens [should] contribute collectively to make their own laws. They 
[should] engage in the process for the sake of justice and the common good and to bring order 
in the existing chaos. In the Greek city-state the people (demos) were considered as the absolute 
sovereign and this creates an autonomous political space, the public space that is the basis for 
the institutionalization of the laws in society. (2008) 
 
Understandably, against this backdrop, Castoriadis sees current liberal-representative 
democracies as ‘liberal oligarchies,’ where only a few people are involved in the decision-
making process, and where the rest remain acquiescent to capitalistic politico-economic 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
decisions related to the laws and policies that govern them. Mautner explains the idea well when he argues that, 
in direct democracy, “decisions should be made by all members of the community, and only by members of the 
particular community that is affected” (1992:2).  
63
 By 460 B.C., this classical notion of Greek ‘direct democracy,’ under the leadership of Pericles, was 
transformed into something akin to an aristocracy (Gill 2013). According to the ancient historian Thucydides, 
“Pericles…by his rank, ability, and known integrity, was enabled to exercise an independent control over the 
Demos – in short, to lead them[,] instead of being led by them” (Thuc. 2.65.8-9 cited in Blackwell 2003:6). His 
recognition as an elected general gave him the platform to address the Demos, and his ability as a speaker 
allowed him to convince the Demos to accept his ideas. Following the failed 415 B.C. invasion of Sicily, certain 
citizens began to question the effectiveness of the radical democracy of the people.  According to Blackwell, 
citizens began to “work through constitutional channels, to establish a small body of Preliminary Councilors, 
who would limit the topics that could be addressed by the more democratic Council and Assembly” (Thuc. 8.1.3-
4 cited in Blackwell 2003:6). Shortly thereafter, in 411 B.C., the Athenians brought an end to their democracy 
and instituted an oligarchy of commissioners, councilors and presidents (Blackwell 2003:6). Since the fall of 
Athenian classical democracy, new versions of democracy (representative, parliamentary, popular) have 
emerged, and are still in play in contemporary society. These versions of democracy are, however, a far cry from 
the citizen participation and political involvement of the autonomous radical politics of ancient Greece, which 
Castoriadis insists, should be restored (Raaflaub et al. 2006:11). 
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institutions (1991:221). Furthermore, he argues that “Western liberal democracies 
are…oligarchic [and] totalitarian-capitalist societies,” which “tend to collapse the 
public…into private, bureaucratic, capitalist companies,” thereby encouraging the 
engenderment of non-autonomous societies. In other words, societies “who do not know the 
law and therefore cannot question it or institute it for themselves” (cited in Garner 2011). 
Consequently, Castoriadis calls for a return to the ‘original’ meaning of democracy, and in 
this regard, he argues that  
 
democracy does not mean human rights, does not mean lack of censorship, does not mean 
elections of any kind. All this is very nice, but it’s just second…or third-degree consequences of 
democracy. Democracy means the power (kratos) of the people (demos)…Democracy is or 
wants to be a regime aspiring to social and personal autonomy. (Castoriadis 1997:18-35) 
 
For Castoriadis, this return would result in a society committed to autonomy, and one in 
which there would occur a “downgrade in the pursuit of wealth and power, so [as] to avoid 
the instrumentalization of its core values” (Rafael and Sternberg 2002:152); something which 
would amount to a movement away from a reliance on capitalism.  
Yet, Castoriadis’s calls for a radical return to the original conception of democracy, 
and his corresponding theory of autonomist democracy, has received sizeable criticism. In this 
regard, two major critiques of Castoriadis’s work concerns its Eurocentrism, and its myopic 
eclecticism. Firstly, his theory of democracy and autonomy has been viewed by Wolfenstein, 
among others, as profoundly Eurocentric,
64
 because it valorizes “ancient Greece and Modern 
Europe, celebrating their openness and autonomy, while casting all other societies into the 
dark night of closure and heteronomy” (Wolfenstein 1996:726 cited in Crews 2010:10). 
Secondly, his promotion of the return to a democracy based on that of classical Greece, has 
been criticized for its failure to recall the fact that only certain males were granted citizenship 
in ancient Greek societies, while slaves and women were not included in the political 
decision-making process (Crews 2010:20).  
While debate over the value of such criticism continues, the case for autonomous 
democracy does not rest on the outcome, because Castoriadis is by no means the only voice 
expounding this form of radical democracy. In addition to his work, one of the most 
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 Eurocentrism concerns the idea that “the West has some unique historical advantage, some special quality of 
race or culture or environment or mind or spirit, which gave this human community a permanent superiority over 
all other communities” (Blaut 1993:1). Seen as an ideology which views history from a primarily European point 
of view, many critics argue that Eurocentrism implicitly advances the superiority of Western culture in shaping 
world history, when it does not do so explicitly (Marks 2007:8). 
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influential perspectives on the autonomist position has emerged through Michael Hardt and 
Antonio Negri’s idea of ‘Empire,’ which, to a certain extent, addresses some of the above 
concerns. Written in reaction to the anti-globalization protests and demonstrations in Seattle, 
Quebec, Genoa and Prague,
65
 Hardt and Negri’s Empire (2000) – which some have called the 
‘Communist Manifesto of the twenty-first century’ – provides a re-articulation of autonomist 
ideas of democracy. And because of its blending together of the notions of postmodernism, 
post-colonialism, autonomism, Marxism, anarchism and syndicalism, Empire has become a 
popular point of reference for much of contemporary radical thought.
66
 Focusing on the topic 
of globalization, Hardt and Negri argue that “although nation-state-based systems of power 
are rapidly unravelling in the force-fields of world capitalism…[, f]ar from withering away, 
regulations today proliferate and interlock to form an acephelous supranational order,” which 
they “choose to call ‘Empire’” (Balakrishnan and Aronowitz 2003). According to Thompson, 
Empire is thus the “label given to the new global order and form of sovereignty over the 
global political economy that…succeeded imperialism and the nation state” (2005:73). 
Analyzing contemporary capitalism as a biased mode of economic development, Hardt and 
Negri argue that the ability of capital to operate “without reliance on a transcendent centre of 
power,” has resulted in “power becoming administered through an infinite number of de-
territorialised societies of control” (cited in Tonder and Thomassen 2005:210).67 Balakrishnan 
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 In the late 1990s and early 2000s, numerous ‘anti-globalization’ demonstrations and protests were held against 
the World Bank and International Monetary Fund’s global promotion of neoliberalism and corporate capitalist 
interests. 
66
 Syndicalism, also referred to as ‘anarcho-syndicalism’ and ‘revolutionary syndicalism,’ is a political 
movement that advocates the replacement of capitalism with a confederation of labor unions. Calling for direct 
action by the working class, syndicalism argues for the overthrow of the capitalist order (including the state), and 
the creation of a social order of workers’ unions. According to Kay, “Revolutionary Syndicalism has its roots in 
the anarchist movement, and can be traced back to the libertarian tendency in the First International 
Workingmen’s Association, when prominent Russian anarchist Mikhail Bakunin argued that…future social 
organization must be made solely from the bottom up, by the free association or federation of workers, firstly in 
their unions, then in the communes, regions, nations and finally in a great federation, international and universal” 
(Kay 2009). 
67
 The idea of de-territorialized societies of control, is deeply indebted to Deleuze’s ideas of ‘deterritorialization’ 
and ‘control society.’ The concept of deterritorialization, which refers to the process by which reasonably 
stabilized forces (spaces or bodies) are destabilized, or escape, from a given territory, was thematized by Deleuze 
in Anti-Oedipus (1972), which he wrote in collaboration with Felix Guattari. According to Engel, Deleuze and 
Guattari “provide an alternative to thinking of territories as bounded entities.” Instead “a territory…is seen as a 
continuously changing configuration of various interrelated assemblages.” These “assemblages form…a 
historically specific territory, which may then become the surface where deterritorializations” break up “an 
75 
 
and Aronowits corroborate this point when they assert that Empire “refers not to a system in 
which tribute flows from peripheries to great capital cities, but to a more Foucauldian figure – 
a diffuse, anonymous network of all-englobing power” (2003:xi). Similarly, Thompson 
argues that Empire’s “apparatus of rule is decentred and de-territorialised, yet capable of 
incorporating all activities within its domain, managing hybrid identities and ﬂexible 
hierarchies through its own ﬂuid networks of command” (2005:74).  
Yet, despite the immense power of Empire and its relation to the consumer world 
order, Hardt and Negri argue that a form of counter-power – one which undermines the power 
of Empire and encourages a form of counter-globalization – is emerging (2000:56). This 
counter-power, they insist, can be found in ‘the multitude.’ Connected to Foucault’s analysis 
of ‘the resistance internal to power,’68 and Deleuze and Guattari’s notion of rhizomatic 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
established configuration…and build a new assemblage” (2009). Arguably, capital’s ability to operate and 
spread through processes of deterritorialization and reterritorialization is at the heart of Hardt and Negri’s 
criticism of Empire. Furthermore, in relation to the above, and following on from Foucault’s Discipline and 
Punish, Deleuze insists that the growth of neoliberal capitalism and information technology have resulted in 
disciplinary societies being transformed into ‘societies of control,’ where continuous digital surveillance shapes 
people into coded economic data or ‘dividuals’ (Deleuze 1995:182). The discussion of control societies, which 
can be found in Deleuze’s “Control and Becoming” and “Postscript on Control Societies,” examines the 
difference between disciplinary societies, which tend to be based on confinement and enclosure (i.e. institutions), 
and control societies, in which these confinements are being broken down or deterritorialized, to the extent that 
dividuals are now being controlled through the global flows of digital information. In this regard, Deleuze 
suggests that “we're moving toward control societies that no longer operate by confining people[,] but through 
continuous control and instant communication” (1995:174). This account of societies of control in the age of 
neoliberal capitalism and the internet can be directly linked to the power of Empire, thematized by Hardt and 
Negri. 
68
 In his book, The History of Sexuality: The Will to Knowledge, Foucault advances the idea that power is all-
embracing, and that everybody and everything is a source of power. In this regard, firstly, he suggests that power 
is not a ‘thing’ but is rather something that is constantly being exercised. Secondly, he argues that power is not 
merely applied externally to relationships of knowledge, sex, or economics, but is rather inside of these 
relationships. Thirdly, he insists that power is not always applied in a ‘top down’ method, but rather power 
relationships can emerge at any level of society. Fourthly, he states that, despite the existence of designs and 
strategies in power relations, there are no single subjects responsible for exercising this power. Finally, he argues 
that resistance is accordingly part of power relations – internal and not external to them – and that this resistance 
is not stable, but rather emerges in a variety of places at different times. This fifth idea of resistance as internal to 
power has been related to the ‘multitude’ spoken of by Hardt and Negri, insofar as the resistance of the multitude 
is dynamic, can emerge in every area of society, is not related to a specific leader, and is constantly being 
exercised (1978:94-96). 
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networks,
69 the multitude can best be explained as a “postmodern update of the proletariat” 
(Dyer-Witheford 2007:199). In terms of this, Hale and Slaughter maintain that 
 
the multitude is not “the people,” but rather many peoples acting in networked concert. Because 
of its plurality, its “innumerable internal differences,” the multitude contains the genus of true 
democracy. At the same time, the multitude’s ability to communicate and collaborate – often 
through the very capitalist networks that oppress it – allows it to produce a common body of 
knowledge and ideas (“the common”) that can serve as a platform for democratic resistance to 
Empire. (2005) 
 
In relation to this idea, Hardt and Negri insist that society needs to commit itself to a political 
revolution which overthrows the power of capitalist desire, and replaces it with the alternative 
desire of the multitude. Consequently, they assert that “the multitude, in its will to be against 
and its desire for liberation, must push through Empire to come out the other side” (Hardt and 
Negri 2000:218). Moving on from the ideas of earlier autonomist notions of ‘labor power,’ 
Hardt and Negri view the multitude in terms of ‘biopower.’70 Defined as “a form of power 
that regulates social life from the interior,” Hardt and Negri see biopower as functioning to 
give power active control over every element of a person’s life (2000:23). And they argue that 
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 In their book A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, Deleuze and Guattari define their concept 
of the rhizome and rhizomatic networks. According to them, “a rhizome ceaselessly establishes connections 
between semiotic chains, organizations of power, and circumstances relative to the arts, sciences, and social 
struggles” (1987:7). This rhizome, they suggest, can be distinguished by six principles. The first two principles 
are “connection and heterogeneity.” These two principles suggest that any point of a rhizome can and must 
connect to any other point. That is, there is no hierarchical structure that needs to be followed because all points 
connect (1987:7). The third and fourth principles are “multiplicity” and “asignifying rupture.” In terms of 
multiplicity, they argue that “there are no points or positions in a rhizome, such as those found in a structure, 
tree, or root. There are only lines” that make connections (1987:8). The principle of asignifying rupture, in turn, 
points to the concept that a rhizome may be “shattered at a given spot, but will start up again on one of its old 
lines, or on new lines” (1987:9). The fifth and sixth principles of the rhizome are those of “cartography” and 
“decalcomania.” These principles suggest that the rhizome is not a “tracing mechanism, but…a map with 
multiple entry points.” To summarize these principles, Deleuze and Guattari assert that “the rhizome is an 
accentered, nonhierarchical, nonsignifying system without a General and without an organizing memory or 
central automation, defined solely by a circulation of states” (1987:21). This idea of the rhizome has been 
connected to the idea of Hardt and Negri’s multitude, in that the multitude also calls for non-hierarchical 
connections to be made between a multiplicity of struggles, in pursuit of a shared solution. 
70
 Hardt and Negri borrow this concept of biopower from Michel Foucault, who coined the term in the first 
volume of The History of Sexuality, namely, The Will to Knowledge. According to Foucault, the idea of 
biopower refers to “an explosion of numerous and diverse techniques for achieving the subjugations of bodies 
and the control of populations” (1978:140). 
77 
 
“the paradox of this new power is that while it unifies every element of social life, it leads to 
resistance no longer being marginal as it becomes active in the very center of a society that 
opens up in networks” (cited in Munck 2001). Unlike Castoriadis, who has been accused of 
being Eurocentric, Hardt and Negri’s inventory of such resistance goes well beyond the 
parameters of Greek (and Roman) politics, and includes “Los Angeles 1992, [Tiananmen] 
Square 1989, Chiapas 1994, France 1995, [and] the Palestinian Intifada,” along with “the 
struggles of refugees and ‘nomadic’ immigrant labor to constitute a vision of contestation on a 
truly world-scale” (Dyer-Witheford 2007:199). Based on this premise, it is important to 
remember that the arguments advanced in Empire not only support the idea of anti-
globalization, but also, more importantly, attempt to provide a manifesto for the formulation 
of a counter-globalization movement of the left – a movement that takes hold of opportunities 
made available by an interconnected, networked, globalized world. 
Four years after the publication of Empire, Hardt and Negri, in their second book 
Multitude, further thematized their ideas in relation to capitalism and democracy. In 
particular, they call for the creation of a left that is “restructured and reformed…on the basis 
of new practices, new forms of organization, and new concepts” (2004:220). And they argue 
that “democracy can no longer be evaluated in the liberal manner as limits of equality[,] or in 
the socialist way as a limit of freedom,” but must rather “strive towards a radicalization of 
both freedom and equality” (2004:220). However, while these notions of equality and 
freedom point toward their affiliation with radical democracy, Hardt and Negri’s theories do 
not involve a radicalization of the current system of liberal democracy, but rather concern the 
formation of a radical system that is incompatible with the capitalist market. That is, they see 
the autonomous ability of post-industrial societies to self-organize as a threat to capitalist 
power, and, as such, they argue that capital is endangered by the “democracy of the 
multitude” (2004:328).  
Written in relation to the rise of internet technologies and new media networks, Hardt 
and Negri see communication as vital to Empire.
71
 Yet, although digital networks give capital 
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 Again, a resonance exists between this perspective and Deleuze’s idea of the role of information and 
communication in what he calls control societies. For Hardt and Negri, communication is a deterritorialized 
mechanism of control, and they argue that “the contemporary systems of communication are not subordinated to 
sovereignty; on the contrary, sovereignty seems to be subordinated to communication – or actually, sovereignty 
is articulated through communications systems” (2000:346). Accordingly, they see communication as a 
deterritorialized function of power, and hence they view Empire as being “very much attuned to the 
dividualizing initiatives of neoliberal ideologies where communication systems function as deterritorialized 
mechanisms of control” (Ruffolo 2008).  
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the opportunity to wield power, they argue that these same networks offer numerous 
opportunities for counter-power.
72
 In this regard, they suggest that immaterial labor’s 
connection to and use of ICTs may offer opportunities for the multitude’s ultimate defeat of 
capitalism,
73
 and they point to specific examples of these types of digitally enhanced counter-
globalization movements. Paying particular attention to cyber-activism (as seen in the 
Zapatistas’ use of the internet),74 independent media centers (for example, Indymedia),75 and 
the electronic civil disobediences of the late 1990s and early 2000s (among others, the Battle 
for Seattle),
76
 they thematize the use of the internet as a key tool in counter-globalization 
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 Again, in an adumbration of Hardt and Negri’s assertions in Multitude, Deleuze earlier alluded to the 
possibility of establishing opposition to the information of control society, through forms of what he called 
“counter-information,” which involves “act[s] of resistance” that are “effective” within this context (Deleuze 
1998:18). 
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 In their examination of the possibilities for counter-globalization, Hardt and Negri advance the importance of 
‘immaterial labor.’ Immaterial labor is connected to the period in which the processes of production are directly 
connected to the use of information and communications technologies (Lazzarato and Negri 1991:86, cited in 
Dyer-Witheford 2007:200), and for Hardt and Negri, this reliance on computers and digital networks is one of 
the major elements that biopower capital aims to commandeer today. 
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 The Zapatista Army of National Liberation (EZLN) is an indigenous liberation movement situated in the 
Chiapas region of Mexico. The Zapatista uprising in 1994 against the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA), and its subsequent success in assembling an international support network over the internet, is one of 
the most popular case studies of networked or digital activism.  
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 Indymedia was established during the 1999 anti-globalization protests as a means to offer alternative, 
grassroots coverage of the protests against the World Trade Organization. Indymedia is a global network of 
collectively run, participatory media outlets, and encourages a ‘radical’ and ‘accurate’ reporting on social and 
political issues. Closely connected to the global justice movement (alter-globalization), Indymedia is critical of 
neoliberalism and the institutions that support it. According to their website, “Indymedia is a collective of 
independent media organizations and hundreds of journalists offering grassroots, non-corporate coverage. 
Indymedia is a democratic media outlet for the creation of radical, accurate, and passionate tellings of truth” 
(2014). 
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 On 30 November 1999, approximately seventy-five thousand people affiliated to anti-capitalist movements, 
environmentalists, opponents of the WTO, and NGOs, gathered outside the Washington State Convention and 
Trade Centre in a demonstration popularly named the ‘Battle of Seattle.’ This gathering constituted a response to 
the on-going World Trade Organizations Ministerial Conference, which aimed to launch a new round of global 
trade negotiations. Despite the largely peaceful protests, police responded to the demonstrations with tear gas 
and rubber bullets, arresting over six hundred protesters and charging them with civil disobedience. According to 
Engler, “the Seattle round of trade negotiations deadlocked when developing nations, bolstered by grassroots 
resistance, rejected US and European demands” (2007:152). This popular rejection of WTO policies and trade 
suggestions points toward the growing impact of the alter-globalization movement (or ‘anti-globalization 
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mobilizations.
77
 They add to this notion in the third book of their Empire trilogy, 
Commonwealth, which was published in 2009. In this book they call for the creation of an 
alternative world in which the multitude is involved in instituting a world of common wealth. 
They explain this idea of common wealth in the following way: 
 
First of all, the common wealth of the material world – the air, the water, the fruits of the soil, 
and all nature’s bounty – which in classic European political texts is often claimed to be the 
inheritance of humanity as a whole, [is] to be shared together. We consider the common also 
and more significantly those results of social production that are necessary for social interaction 
and further production, such as knowledges, languages, codes, information, affects, and so 
forth. (2009:viii) 
 
The internet, they insist, offers an opportunity for the realization of such common wealth. 
Indeed they assert that “by addressing their own needs…contemporary capitalist 
production…is opening up the possibility of and creating the bases for a social and economic 
order grounded in the common” (2009:x). In this regard, they insist that “innovation in 
Internet technologies, for example, depends directly on access to common code and 
information resources as well as the ability to connect and interact with others in unrestricted 
networks.” And since “all forms of production in decentralized networks…demand freedom 
and access to the common,” the online environment may provide a stepping stone toward a 
realization of common wealth.  
Yet, notwithstanding their promotion of digital networks and communication as 
potential weapons in the fight against Empire and for counter-globalization, some critics 
argue that the contradictions surrounding these ideas have undermined the applicability of 
Hardt and Negri’s theoretical conceptions to the contemporary era. These contradictions 
emerge in the light of their inconsistent assertions that, while, on the one hand, 
communication is an essential part of counter-globalization, on the other hand, despite 
numerous global communication networks and new media technologies, the various struggles 
of the multitude “are exceedingly difficult to articulate.” In this regard, Hardt and Negri 
advance that “in our much celebrated age of communication, struggles have become all but 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
movement’ as it was initially called), and highlights the potential political influence of the movement on a global 
scale. 
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 In their most recent collaboration, Declaration, which was released as a kindle e-book in 2012, Hardt and 
Negri respond to the mass mobilisations of the Occupy movement, and examine ways in which the internet and 
social media can be used as “vehicles of experimentation with democratic and multitudinary governance” 
(2012). 
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incommunicable[,]…blocked from travelling horizontally in the form of a cycle,” they “are 
forced instead to leap vertically and touch immediately on the global level” (2000:54-55). But 
for many, their idea of ‘incommunicado’ is contradicted by years of previous autonomous 
communication practices related to the ‘circulation of struggles,’ and is negated by numerous 
dynamic examples of communication within and between social movements.
78
  
Criticism of this idea, and other elements of Hardt and Negri’s theory of Empire, have 
become quite prevalent, and consequently, despite the popularity of Empire – even among 
internet-activist groups – it has been criticized as “neither a robust guide to the realities and 
challenges of global governance, nor to the potential for social challenge and change” 
(Thompson 2005:92). Thompson further asserts that “neither the book’s analysis of regimes 
of global governance and the hidden abode of production, nor its articulation of a potential 
agency of resistance – the multitude – are convincing” (2005:72). In turn, Davis and others 
criticize Negri for his tendency toward “hyperbole, for…[his] frequent failures to take 
adequate account of working-class divisions and segmentations (particularly those related to 
gender),” and for his “emphasis on new struggles at the expense of old resistances” (Davis et 
al. 1997:199). In addition, further criticism of Empire has emerged in relation to the authors’ 
lack of economic analysis, and their pessimistic view that the politics of civil society is 
‘dead.’ That is, despite the theory of Empire being grounded in Marxism, many feel that 
relatively little attention is given to global political economics, and even less to the notion of 
competition. Moreover, Hardt and Negri’s negative appraisal of civil society as being 
‘absorbed within Empire,’ has been condemned by Rugman (2000), among others, who notes 
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 Dyer-Witheford similarly maintains that Hardt and Negri’s conception of ‘incommunicado’ is “not just a 
neglect of concrete examples of inter and intra-movement communication, but also a major failure of theoretical 
conception” (2007:201). The concept of the ‘circulation of struggles’ comes from the autonomist tradition, and it 
was developed as a result of a class struggle reading of Karl Marx’s idea of a ‘circulation of capital,’ in his book 
Capital. Here Marx notes that capitalism, which is “a system for the accumulation of surplus value, operates on a 
circuit. Capital transubstantiates from commodity into money which commands the acquisitions of further 
resources to be transformed into more commodities” (Thorburn 2012). The circuit of capital is thus expressed as 
Money — Commodities…Production…Commodities — Money (M – C…P…C – M). But this circuit of capital, 
Cleaver and Bell argue, is also the circulation of struggle. “Shining lights on the fissures that appear at every 
node, at every moment in the circulation of capital[,] each space between a letter (the dash between M and C, the 
dots between C and P) indicate[s] that the ‘circulation process is interrupted’ and provide possible moments of 
breakdown” of the capitalist system. This ‘circulation of struggles,’ they explain, allows the “circuit of capital [to 
be] operationalized as resistance” (Cleaver and Bell 2002, cited in Thorburn 2012).  
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that civil society and NGOs have been instrumental in stimulating and re-shaping public 
policy.
79
  
 Nevertheless, although Castoriadis, along with Hardt and Negri, have received their 
fair share of censure, internet-led promotions of autonomist versions of democracy continue 
to emerge. In terms of related autonomist theorists’ respective conceptions of democracy 
(Berardi 2009; Coté and Pybus 2007; Kidd 2003; Terranova 2004; and Dyer-Witheford 
2002), digital communication networks are seen as “enabling a radically democratic politics 
in the sense of self-organized and inclusive participation in common productive activities that 
bypass centralized state and capitalist systems” (Dahlberg 2011:863). That is, since 
autonomist democratic decision-making is decentralized and collaborative, autonomists view 
digital media networks as allowing for the extension of the ‘commons.’ Consequently, 
democracy is understood as a form of self-organization that is autonomous from integrated 
systems of power. This is because online autonomous decision-making is “seen to take place 
organically (and rhizomically) through the collaborative, decentralized productivity of peer-
to-peer networking” (Dahlberg 2011:863). And the subjects involved in this collective, 
networked decision-making process reflect Hardt and Negri’s conception of the multitude, 
where the idea of a “community of singularities” highlights the intricate pluralities that exist 
within these networks (Negri 2008:67, 71). Within this context, instead of focusing on 
political resistance and protest, challenges to non-democratic regimes are undertaken through 
the development of alternative forms of progressive networking, evinced through the 
numerous examples of autonomous forms of online communication. Often seen in relation to 
“‘dematerialized’ open source cultural production and distribution, this communication 
involves a range of software (for example, Linux), publishing (for example, wikis, 
Indymedia), and music (including ‘piracy’)” (Dahlberg 2011:863). To elaborate, Linux is a 
computer operating model that offers free, open source software to anyone, anywhere. 
Focusing on community, sharing, flexibility, and openness, Linux allows for the free use, 
distribution and modification of its software over the internet (Siever et al. 2003:1). In terms 
of publishing, wikis – which Glaser and his colleagues define as “web-based software that 
allow…all viewers of a page to change the content by editing the pages online in a browser” 
(2008:12) – allow for open access collaboration and cooperative work. Similarly, as 
mentioned earlier, Indymedia (Independent Media Centers) allow for collaborative and 
autonomous publishing over the internet. Kidd, in her examination of this autonomous 
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Routledge. 
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alternative media center, highlights its use of the internet as an alternative platform for the 
anti-corporate globalization movement. Similarly, Indymedia is described by one of its co-
founders, Jeff Perlstien, as an “‘experiment in media democracy,’ in which local crews 
operating autonomously and collaboratively enable...‘actual’ community newsrooms with 
‘virtual online counterparts’ as spaces for organizing, participatory media-making and 
circulation” (cited in Kidd 2003). Indymedia, and analogous autonomous uses of the internet, 
have thus been construed as offering an opportunity for the expression of a “plurality of 
perspectives,” and for the formation of a radically democratic community whose 
‘autonomous’ existence contests the needs for capitalist organization of society (Kidd 
2003:2). Related to this, in his article “United Yet Autonomous: Indymedia and the Struggle 
to Sustain a Radical Democratic Network,” Pickard argues that Indymedia is a prime example 
of activists’ increasing reliance on the internet strategies defined by Castells (1996), the 
participatory practices referred to by Polletta (2002), and the social network structures put 
forward by Diani (2003) (2006:316).
80
 Pickard goes on to explain that Indymedia is made up 
of “simultaneously interactive grassroots news websites, nodes within a rapidly expanding 
global network, and activist institutions deeply rooted in the social movements for global 
justice and media democracy.” Focused on empowering the marginalized and excluded, 
Indymedia thereby bypasses deliberative democracies’ calls for a “greater voice in 
policymaking” or “a seat at the table,” and instead “seeks active re-appropriation and 
redistribution of space, technology, and other resources to democratize society” (2006:19, 23). 
Indeed, using various websites, social networks and listserves to share information, mobilize 
communities and “co-ordinate collective action” (Melucci 1996; Tarrow 1998), Indymedia 
offers a non-hierarchical platform for autonomous, radically democratic communications, 
which focus on the values of diversity, inclusiveness, transparency, openness, co-operation, 
and collective decision-making. 
This type of collaboration and sharing can also be seen in illegal, yet increasingly 
popular, online piracy. The sharing of music, e-books, and films via file-sharing networks can 
constitute another example of ‘dematerialized’ autonomous communication, and an example 
of this form of ‘piracy’ is the Pirate Bay’s call for an online movement of copyright 
infringements. The Pirate Bay (TPB) is a file sharing website based in Sweden, which uses a 
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BitTorrent protocol to enable online peer-to-peer content sharing.
81
 Drawing on autonomist 
thought, TBP launched a ‘Piracy Manifesto,’ which encourages the “freedom of infringing 
copyright…[and] the freedom of sharing information” (Manetas 2009).82 Referring to this 
‘global piracy movement’ as a new form of ‘commons,’ TPB calls for the ‘pirates of the 
internet’ (or the multitude) to unite and mobilize an online democratic revolution.  
Based on these and other examples, the internet and the networks it provides are often 
recognized by supporters of autonomous democracy for their radical democratic 
communication possibilities, and their consequent ability to help usher into existence a new 
democratic society. 
 
2.5 Conclusion 
 
From the above discussion, it becomes increasingly apparent that despite the propensity for 
online politics to become absorbed within both the liberal-consumer model of e-democracy 
and its associated forms, alternatives to competitively individualistic and atomistic uses of 
new media technologies do exist. Indeed, deliberative democracy websites, blogs, and social 
networks, as well as radical democratic autonomous online movements, continue to grow in 
stature and gain momentum, in a way that contributes to the contestation of the currently 
dominant neoliberal democratic paradigm. 
However, while deliberative democracy through its calls for greater participation 
within the neoliberal democratic framework, resides at one end of a continuum, autonomous 
democracy operates on the opposite end, insofar as it calls for a total rejection of capitalism 
and the institutions that support it. Yet, as mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, a third 
approach, namely agonism, attempts to situate radical democracy somewhere between these 
two poles. This agonistic approach to radical democracy ‒ which supports and rejects various 
elements of deliberative and autonomous democratic ideas ‒ focuses on the radicalization of 
the liberal democratic principles of liberty and equality, through emphasizing the importance 
of difference and conflict in sustaining democracy. And it is to this intriguing position and the 
democratic possibilities that it promotes, that we now turn. 
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Chapter Three: The Theory of Agonistic Radical Democracy 
 
3.1 Introduction  
 
As discussed in the previous chapter, the internet has been used as a means of engendering 
variants of radical democracy by the proponents of both deliberative and autonomous 
democracy. However, concerns over the limited ‘real world’ successes of these online 
endeavors have resulted in continued cynicism on the part of various critics in relation to the 
political efficacy of this medium.
83
 Yet, more recent use of the internet and online social 
media by, in particular, new social movements, as a means of sharing information, 
communicating, organizing, and subsequently mobilizing and coordinating protests and 
demonstrations offline (i.e. in the real world), have also provided greater evidence of the 
political potential of such media. But, although often associated with deliberative and 
autonomous approaches to democracy, these new social movements’ use of the internet ‒ 
upon closer inspection ‒ emerges as more closely connected to the theory of political 
agonism, and the accompanying conception of agonistic radical democracy, than with 
deliberative or autonomous ideas. 
With a view to exploring the above, this chapter commences with a brief discussion of 
the overall conception of agonistic radical democracy, before an in-depth analysis of the 
related theorizations of Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe ‒ as reflected primarily in their 
book Hegemony and Socialist Strategy ‒ is undertaken. That is, this chapter will commence 
with a brief discussion of the various ideas of agonistic democracy that have been advanced 
by, among others, William Connolly, James Tully, Bonnie Honig, and David Owen, who 
argue respectively for the ideas of difference, identity, contestation, and conflict within the 
agonistic political paradigm. After this, Laclau and Mouffe’s Hegemony and Socialist 
Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics, as well as their individual conceptions of 
agonistic democracy, will be thematized and elaborated upon. In short, stressing the 
overarching presence of antagonisms and differences in contemporary politics, Laclau and 
Mouffe argue that democracy should not be about achieving consensus, but should rather be 
concerned with providing a platform for the confrontation of inevitable differences, and the 
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and ineffective. 
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constant renegotiation of issues based on these conflicts. Moreover, related to the ideas of 
equivalence and plurality, they assert that previously unconnected or dissimilar groups should 
endeavor to recognize the similarities in their progressive struggles or ideas, and come 
together to support the radically democratic cause of extending liberty and equality to all. 
Understandably, because of its emphasis on plurality and multiplicity, such agonistic radical 
democracy stands to have a strong resonance with the dynamics of interaction made possible 
by online communications technologies, and the general and specific online reflections of 
agonism will be discussed subsequently, in Chapter Four.  
 
3.2 Agonistic democracy 
 
The idea of agonistic politics in modern society is often attributed to the philosopher Hannah 
Arendt, and her 1950s work The Human Condition, in which she thematized the politics that 
formed part of the ancient Greek tradition. Examining how the politics of ancient Greece were 
based on communication and direct participation, Arendt suggests that “to be political” in that 
time, was “to live in a polis…[where] everything was decided through words and persuasion 
and not through force or violence” (1958:24). Following on from Arendt, agonistic scholars, 
including William Connolly, James Tully, Bonnie Honig and David Owen, Ernesto Laclau 
and Chantal Mouffe, have tended to be deeply critical of the ideas of consensus which 
underpin deliberative democracy, and in contrast, argue that democratic contest or 
disagreement is an essential element in the regulation of political life. This is because social 
relations, they insist, are always radically unstable and predominantly antagonistic.  
Accordingly, different people, all forming part of different communities and holding 
attachments to the identity, values, and ideologies of those communities, should not be forced 
to give up on those attachments. Instead, agonistic democratic theorists see social relations as 
‘radically contingent,’ with different people occupying different socially organized subject 
positions, which are constantly in a process of kaleidoscopic transformation. As such, instead 
of being construed as unitary or purely rational agents, within the compass of agonistic theory 
communities are seen as plural and replete with antagonisms, and this state is understood as 
interminable. Thus agonistic politics explores the symbolic ordering of social relations, not in 
terms of the reasonable pluralism of values and worldviews, advanced by Rawls,
84
 but rather 
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in relation to a pluralism which “recognises the impossibility of ever adjudicating without 
contest and without residue among competing visions of the good, of justice, and of the 
political” (Benhabib 1996:8). Indeed, despite their slightly different areas of focus, for the 
most part agonistic scholars tend to agree that democracy within pluralistic societies needs to 
allow for the recognition of difference, that it should highlight the importance of conflict, and 
that it needs to take cognizance of the fact that there is no one truth, but only ever contingent 
truths.  
To begin with, an important scholar in this regard is William Connolly, whose theory 
of agonistic democracy is inspired by the works of Friedrich Nietzsche and Foucault ‒ in 
particular, Nietzsche’s advancement of the importance of rediscovering the agon, and 
Foucault’s emphasis of the role of agonism in facilitating freedom.85 Accordingly, Connolly 
focuses on the way in which contingent identities and differences ultimately produce and 
strengthen each other, insofar as he argues that “to confess a particular identity is also to 
belong to difference,” and “to come to terms affirmatively with the complexity of that 
connection is to support an ethos of identity and difference suitable to a democratic culture of 
deep pluralism” (1991:xiv). For him, this ability to accept the pluralisms found within society 
comprises ‘agonistic respect,’ and it is this respect and subsequent recognition and acceptance 
of difference that is at the forefront of Connolly’s conception of agonistic democracy. A 
democracy which, on the one hand, is vital to “the recognition and inclusion of identity 
difference,” and on the other hand, functions as “a means by which identity can be colonised, 
formalised and politically legitimised” (Connolly 1991:x). Connolly thus argues for a new 
ideal of democracy, namely expressive agonism, which can “transform established terms 
of…debate and allow alternative ideas to surface,” and which is “based on the idea of 
‘agonistic respect’ as a new way of negotiating the politics of identity and its problematic 
relationship to difference” (Allegritti 2006:1, 7).  
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 In his book, Homer’s Contest, Nietzsche provides a classical definition of the agon as “an ongoing productive 
activity of contest, struggle, and resistance between opposing forces” (cited in Gogröf-Voorhees 2003). Here he 
highlights the superiority of the Greek notion of contest in its political, physical and rhetorical sense, and 
promotes the Greeks’ recognition of “the nature of the agon neither to render its participants mute nor to attain 
the conquering finality of telos” (Lungstrum and Sauer 1997:25). Furthermore, he sees this agon as being 
rediscovered or reoccurring in the future. Similarly, in his essay “The Subject and Power,” Foucault highlights 
the connection between agonism and freedom when he maintains that, “rather than speaking of an essential 
antagonism, it would be better to speak of an ‘agonism’ – of a relationship which is at the same time mutual 
incitement and struggle; less of a face-to-face confrontation that paralyses both sides than a permanent 
provocation” (1994:342). 
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Connected to such ideas of identity and difference, James Tully advances the concept 
of constitutional agonism, through which he recognizes that the “struggle over the 
fundamental values and structures of political life are essential to democratic practice.” 
However, at the same time he insists “that this struggle can and should take place within a 
framework which encourages mutual respect for and meaningful communication between 
different values and identities” (cited in Wingenbach 2011:54). Again, drawing on the ideas 
of Arendt, Tully explores the connections that can be found between participation, citizenship, 
and freedom, and he argues that citizen participation – which can be seen as the act of 
citizenship – characterizes the practice of freedom (1999:170). However, although without 
participation there can be no freedom, Tully argues that in contemporary society this 
participation is often restricted to those of the dominant group, and cultural minorities are 
often relegated to the realm of ‘subjects’ rather than citizens (2000:217). Against this, Tully 
promotes an idea of agonistic democracy that entails the implementation of a form of mutual 
respect in “an ongoing game of contestation...through participation in dialogues with others” 
(2000:228). For him, mutual respect relates to mutual recognition and the subsequent support 
of various groups’ cultural differences (2002:166). Admittedly, this mutual respect differs 
from Connolly’s conception of agonistic respect, which “builds links between disparate and 
contending individuals who do not necessarily seek institutional support for the 
accommodation of their differences” (Allegritti 2006:7). In contrast, Tully insists that 
agonism must be recognised through a framework of activity which facilitates contestation, in 
a way that realizes democratic freedom. Nevertheless, like Connolly, the realization of this 
freedom “does not rest on its approximation to some ideal consensus, but rather on the mutual 
relationship between the prevailing rules of law and the democratic and judicial practices of 
ongoing disagreement, negotiation, amendment, implementations and review” (Tully 
2002:209).
86
  
In certain respects, Bonnie Honig offers a similar conception of agonistic politics. 
Rejecting the idea of consensus in politics, Honig acknowledges the democratic potential of 
contestation and difference, and argues that to “take difference…seriously in democratic 
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theory is to affirm the inescapability of conflict and the ineradicability of resistance to the 
political and moral projects of ordering subjects, institutions, and value” (1996:258). 
Accordingly, drawing on the works of Arendt and Nietzsche, Honig develops an agonistic 
model of democracy that focuses on the difference between the notions of virtue and virtù. In 
terms of this, she explains virtue as “theories that displace conflict…[and] identify politics 
with administration and treat juridical settlement as the task of politics and political theory.” 
And she contrasts this to the conception of virtù, which she maintains “see[s] politics as a 
disruptive practice that resists the consolidations and closures of administrative and juridical 
settlement for the sake of perpetuity of political contest” (1993:2). In short, her agonistic 
theory focuses on the importance of political contestation together with the disruption of 
settled political practices. However, she differs somewhat from Connolly and Tully insofar as, 
while she highlights the importance of contestatory politics, she notes that agonism is not 
“inherently contestational,” but simply “anticipates resistance to all efforts to institute and 
maintain equality and justice” (Pearce and Honig 2013). 
To some degree, David Owen expands on this idea of contestation, in relation to the 
realization of equality and self-government. Similarly influenced by Nietzsche and the 
associated valorization of the agonistic virtues of contestation and competition, Owen 
maintains that democratic politics should fundamentally be seen as “specifying the medium 
through which…[the] activity of working out the terms of our association and one’s relations 
to one’s fellow citizen is accomplished (2009:71). Furthermore, Owen suggests that agonistic 
democracy should use “the public sphere to allow citizens to generate and develop 
conceptions of the good and virtuous life” against the backdrop “of temporary, contestable 
public standards, the meaning of which is continuously at stake” (cited in Fossen 2008:392). 
In this regard, according to Schaap, Owen “defends an expressivist conception of political 
agonism.” This is because “he argues against distinguishing agonistic politics as different in 
kind from ordinary politics on the basis that the former involves contest over rules[,] whereas 
the latter is a contest within those rules, to which all parties already assent” (2009:4). Thus, 
Schaap highlights Owen’s idea that, “in a constitutional democracy, political agonism refers 
to the struggle to work out the terms of political association between free, equal and plural 
citizens,” via “a practical orientation to the abstract and critical norms of popular sovereignty 
and the rule of law” (2009:4).  
Jacques Rancière’s theory of democracy is linked to the above mentioned agonistic 
theories on account of his ideas concerning difference and conflict, and his rejection of 
deliberative democracy. That is, Rancière views democracy not as a form of government, but 
rather as a “sporadic” break in the current order (1999:61), through disagreements that arise 
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via “the enactment of equality by a group of people who were not considered to be equal” 
(Ruitenberg 2010:43). He argues that politics is thus “primarily conflict over the existence of 
a common stage and over the existence and status of those present on it” (Rancière 1999:26-
27). Since he sees politics as being primarily about conflict, and since he sees the concept of 
consensus as “erasing the contestatory, conflictual nature of the very givens of common life,” 
he rejects the idea of deliberative democracy, insofar as it cannot recognize democracy’s 
constitutive nature of disagreement (Rancière 2004:7). According to Ruitenberg, Rancière 
sees disagreement not as “a detached exchange of rational arguments but rather [as] a dispute 
that has emotional force because a fundamental value is being violated” (2010:44). This 
fundamental value, Rancière argues, is equality, and when this equality is denied, political 
disagreements arise.
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The above theorists have contributed significantly to the formulation of agonistic 
political thought and related conceptions of radical democracy. However, arguably, the most 
succinct and cogent articulation of the role of difference and conflict within emancipatory and 
hegemonic projects of the left ‒ and in relation to new social movement politics ‒ occurs in 
the agonistic political theory of Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe.  
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 Lyotard’s conception of agonistics stands out as complimentary here, in that he views it not as a philosophical 
doctrine or social theory, but rather as a practice. In The Postmodern Condition (1979), he explores the concept 
of agonistics in relation to language games. In this regard, he notes that “to speak is to fight, in the sense of 
playing, and speech acts will fall within the domain of agonistics” (1984:10). Focusing on the issues of conflict, 
pleasure, and language, Lyotard examines the everyday implications of speech acts on social relations. 
Similarities between Lyotard, Rancière and Laclau and Moufee (discussed below), can be seen in their support 
of conflict and agonistic difference. Indeed, Lyotard protests against “the reduction of the political into theories 
of democracy premised on the elimination of conflict as the goal of social justice” (Ziarek 2001:84), and instead 
calls for a rejection of deliberative versions of consensus and the embrace of dissensus. Browning notes 
Lyotard’s support of dissensus when he asserts that, “for Lyotard dissensus is to be valued because it harmonises 
with an incommensurability which is fundamental to the constitution of social practice. The mentality of 
agonistic practice he commends is designed to intensify differences, and so register the possibilities latent within 
the social bond” (Browning in Sawyer 2014:77). Since meaning in language is made through different forms of 
phrasing, Lyotard insists that different perspectives are disconnected and, as such, cannot be expressed in the 
same way. Thus, he argues that “the urge to accept or work for consensus is not only problematic but also 
politically unjust because it denies a voice to those whose standpoint is denied in phrasing” (Browning 2011:58). 
Consequently, he proposes “dissensus as the appropriate way of responding to a political world in which there 
are radical differences between perspectives” (Browning 2011:58).   
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3.3 Laclau and Mouffe’s agonistic conception of radical democracy 
 
Largely recognized for their interest in the workings of populisms during the twentieth 
century,
88
 Laclau and Mouffe’s position on radical democracy, needs to be understood by 
examining, firstly, their critical relationship with classical Marxism; secondly, their related 
disavowal of the deliberative democratic pursuit of consensus; thirdly, their problems with 
autonomous radical democracy; fourthly, their argument for a new political strategy of left-
wing radical democracy; and fifthly, the various critiques of their theory.  
To begin with, Laclau and Mouffe distance themselves from the centralization of 
power around ideas of consensus, and the related class logic of classical Marxism. Instead, 
drawing on Antonio Gramsci’s notion of hegemony,89 Laclau and Mouffe advance the idea of 
a radical and plural democracy, in terms of which the “multiplication of political spaces and 
the preventing of the concentration of power in one point are [seen as]…preconditions of 
every truly democratic transformation of society” (2001:178). For them, democracy is not 
about consensus – which can all too easily camouflage the oppressive hegemony identified by 
Gramsci – but is rather about allowing for the creation of an arena where differences can be 
challenged and conflict can be discussed. Accordingly, despite their roots being firmly based 
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 Mudde and his colleagues define populism as “a thin-centred ideology that considers society to be ultimately 
separated into two homogenous and antagonistic groups, ‘the pure people’ and ‘the corrupt elites,’ and which 
argues that politics should be an expression of the volonté générale (general will) of the people” (2004:543). 
Based on this definition it has been argued that populism includes three core concepts, namely, the elite, the 
people, and the general will, as well as two direct opposites: elitism and pluralism. While Laclau and Mouffe’s 
Hegemony and Socialist Strategy investigates the political populisms of the twentieth century, more recently 
they have called for a form of left-wing populism against neoliberalism, which Mouffe explains in the following 
way: “If I speak of left-wing populism, it’s not just one model. What is at stake here is the creation of a 
collective will from the articulations of different population sectors. A kind of popular project for different social 
factions, where different sectors of the population can identify themselves and create what I call ‘a chain of 
equivalents of democratic demands and transformation,’ of radicalization, of democratic institutions” (cited in 
Hackl 2014).  
89
 Gramsci’s idea of hegemony highlights the way in which certain social classes, within post-1870 industrial 
western European nations, accepted and consented to their domination and control by the ruling or dominant 
class. That is, instead of being violently coerced into accepting an inferior position, these classes were 
progressively inculcated with the requisite values, so that they came to view their subordination as ‘natural,’ the 
result of ‘common sense,’ and hence incontestable (Gramsci 1971). In this regard, Eagleton explains the 
Gramscian view of hegemony when he asserts that “to win hegemony is to establish moral, political and 
intellectual leadership in social life by diffusing one’s own world view throughout the fabric of society as a 
whole, thus equating one’s own interests with the interests of society at large” (1991:116).  
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in Marxism, problems with classical Marxism, including “the authoritarianism of Soviet-
styled socialism [and] the failure of revolutionary movements in the West,” led to Laclau and 
Mouffe’s interest in post-Marxism. In this regard, notwithstanding the general recognition of 
Gramsci as a Marxist theoretician, he is also often specifically identified as having 
contributed to post-Marxism. And Laclau and Mouffe ‒ who saw his work as veering away 
from economist perspectives toward political and cultural identity formation processes ‒ have 
employed his idea of hegemony as the foundation of their democratic argument. To this end, 
they saw Gramsci’s concept of hegemony – involving “a political project that can assume 
leadership of society based on [a] carefully forged set of alliances among various groups” – as 
the future of leftist strategy. A strategy that focuses on creating a form of democracy that is 
less exclusionary and more expansive. Against this backdrop, Laclau and Mouffe also 
criticize the failure of the class logic of classical Marxism, and advance instead the idea that 
“capitalist societies show…increasingly complex and variegated social configurations” and 
identities (cited in Dyer-Witheford 2007:193). That is, although they agree that society is 
driven by conflict (antagonisms), they argue that the problem with traditional socialist thought 
is that it absorbs all conflict under the auspices of class struggle and does not allow for the 
understanding of conflicts not necessarily related to capitalism. Mouffe, in fact, insists that 
“there are forms of antagonism which cannot be understood purely as an effect of a capitalist 
system” (Mouffe, cited in Castle 1998). These relate to social identities (gender, class 
position, ethnicity) which, she and Laclau argue, are “far from being a mere reflex of 
economic position,” and are instead “symbolic constructions generated by [a] contested play 
of meaning” (Dyer-Witheford 2007:193). A good example of this is sexism, which “cannot be 
reduced to being simply a product of capitalism,” because “the origin of sexism is not in 
capitalism.” Consequently, one cannot “solve the question of sexism by transforming or even 
by ending the capitalist system. The same is true for racism” (Mouffe, cited in Castle 1998). 
For Laclau and Mouffe, then, “a person’s subject-position depends, like the meaning of a 
word, on how it is inserted in chains of signification.” That is, “what it means to be a 
‘woman,’ a ‘worker,’ a ‘white,’ a ‘citizen,’ a ‘consumer’ or a ‘commoner,’ is constantly being 
redefined, and this definition in turn depends on every other identity” (Dyer-Witheford 
2007:193). In relation to this, they advance that political movements or struggles do not 
necessarily depend on class logic, but rather on the creation of, on the one hand, antagonisms, 
in which certain identities oppose one another, and on the other hand, equivalences, whereby 
identities are articulated on a cooperative front. Thus, responding to the twentieth-century 
disillusionment with the Marxist project, Laclau and Mouffe do not privilege the class 
struggle, and argue instead against the traditional Marxist idea that there is one dynamic that 
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dominates social life (Laclau and Mouffe 2001:190). Indeed, in an interview with Castle, 
Laclau maintained that the history of socialism shows that “radical political movements have 
only emerged through an ‘alliance’ of many different struggles – nationalist, anti-imperialist, 
civil rights and religious alongside the workers’ struggle” (Laclau, cited in Castle 1998). 
Furthermore, in response to the rise of new social movements in the twentieth century, Laclau 
and Mouffe question the ability of Marxism to recognize or understand the differences in the 
oppression, resistance, and struggles of feminism, the anti-racist struggle, and for that matter, 
the environmental movement, along with struggles of other new social movements. 
Correlatively, they argue that, as a result of the plurality of social movement objectives and 
agendas, obstacles to consensus between such groups will almost always emerge,
90
 and these 
cannot simply be wished away or obscured with a blanket of over-arching ideology. On the 
contrary, failure to take cognizance of these differences frequently results in the fragmentation 
of the leftist struggle, and these tensions prevent the formation of a strategy which can 
effectively challenge the current ubiquitous neoliberal concepts of democracy.
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Secondly, Laclau and Mouffe are similarly critical of the deliberative democratic idea 
of consensus, with Mouffe insisting that the possibility for the creation of an un-coercive 
deliberative sphere is ‘unfounded.’ This is because the formation of agreements between 
different communities, and between people with different discourses, is not the product of 
reason, but rather a result of ‘power play’ and ‘astute rhetoric.’ Mouffe elaborates on this 
when she asserts that “the domain of ‘the political’…is understood as primarily antagonistic, 
leading to ‘politics’…being characterised by dissent and division” (Mouffe 2000, cited in 
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 Laclau and Mouffe’s recognition of the relationship between power and discourse is important here. In 
particular, Mouffe argues that a relation of inclusion/exclusion or inside/outside emerges as an inherent part of 
the logic of discourse (Mouffe 2000), the consequence of which, is that tensions or struggles for power, cultural 
domination, hegemony, etcetera, between those inside of, and those outside of, the dominant discourse will 
always develop. And this struggle leads to divisions between the dominant discourses – that achieve power or 
hegemony – and the marginalized discourses that are correlatively excluded. As a result, any attempt to achieve 
consensus always involves power relations and struggles for hegemony, involving the domination, or at least the 
co-optation, of one group by another. Thus, for Mouffe, “any consensus is always at least partially a result of 
hegemony” understood as “a stabilization of meaning aided by cultural domination and exclusion,” which cannot 
but emerge as a source of antagonism (Dahlberg 2007a:836). 
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 In relation to neoliberalism, Laclau and Mouffe also argue against the anti-democratic influence of neo-
conservatism. Smith highlights their criticism of this form of politics when he states that, “although neo-
conservatives equate the growth of the capitalist ‘free’ market with freedom, equality and democracy, the 
evidence suggests that capitalist formations depend on exploitation and coercion, foster inequality, and either 
neutralize democracy or tolerate fundamentally anti-democratic conditions” (1998:18). Laclau and Mouffe are 
accordingly equally critical of the anti-democratic influences of neoliberalism and neo-conservatism. 
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Dahlberg and Siapera 2007:9).
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 Because of this dissent and division, she maintains, 
agreements will always be contingent, and “achieving a fully inclusive rational consensus” – 
like that promoted by deliberative democracy – is impossible (2000:5). Of course Mouffe 
does indicate that “compromises are possible,” and indeed, “part of the process of politics” 
(1999b:755). However, she nevertheless insists that they should only offer momentary breaks 
in the process of confrontation (Mouffe 1999b:755). Consequently, Mouffe criticizes 
Habermas’s notion of deliberative democracy in two ways. Firstly, she questions Habermas’s 
Eurocentric and liberal understanding of rational consensus, arguing that such consensus is 
based on the liberal positions of individual human rights and the rule of law, which often tend 
to exclude ‘a priori’ groups and individuals who may not identify with such liberal principles. 
These groups, she asserts, are therefore repeatedly deemed ‘irrational’ or ‘premodern,’ and 
frequently react antagonistically toward obligations imposed on them by liberal consensus 
(2000:46). Related to this, as indicated above, she advances that any form of apparent public 
consensus is the product of clever rhetoric or power politics, rather than an accurate reflection 
of existing states of affairs. Secondly, Mouffe criticizes Habermas’s notion of the ‘ideal 
speech situation,’ which he sees as allowing public dialogue to be inclusive, open and un-
coerced. Drawing on the work of Jacques Derrida, Mouffe highlights the ‘conceptual 
impossibility’ of Habermas’s notion of a ‘coercion-free’ deliberative sphere. And she argues 
that, “far from being merely empirical, or epistemological, the obstacles to [the realization of 
the ideal speech situation] are ontological” (2000:98). This is because “the free and 
unconstrained public deliberation of all on matters of common concern is a conceptual 
impossibility” (2000:98), on account of the way in which the symbolic field is made up of 
“free-floating signifiers, rendering the establishment of any discourse authoritarian” 
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 Mouffe’s ideas on the political, at least to some extent, approximate those of Rancière, who argues that “the 
essence of the political is dissensus; but dissensus is not the opposition of interests and opinions. It is a gap in the 
sensible: the political persists as long as there is a dissensus about the givens of a particular situation, of what is 
seen and what might be said, on the question of who is qualified to see or say what is given” (Rancière and 
Panagia 2000:124).  As such, Rancière’s focus on disagreement and dissensus as primary elements of the 
political, can be related to Mouffe’s focus on disagreement and conflict. That is, Mouffe’s idea of the political as 
“the dimension of antagonism that is inherent in human relations” (2000:15) and “constitutive of human 
societies” (2005:9). Yet, despite this similarity, Rancière questions the notion, supported by Mouffe, that 
democratic change should be allowed to take place within the institutions and discourses of politics.  
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(2000:98). Thus “meaning can happen only by advancing a master signifier, at the expense 
and exclusion of other signifiers” (Kapoor 2002:464).93  
Thirdly, Mouffe is equally skeptical of the feasibility of the autonomous radical 
democracy espoused by Hardt and Negri, and rejects their theory for four reasons. Firstly, she 
disagrees with their anti-institutional view, which argues that all forms of institutions are 
fascistic, and that the multitude should reject all forms of belonging. This disagreement 
emerges in relation to Mouffe’s idea that democratic change should be allowed to happen 
inside and via the discourses and institutions of contemporary politics. Secondly, she sees 
Hardt and Negri’s argument as being theoretically inadequate, since they do not take 
cognizance of the importance of what she calls ‘passions’ for collective political identities. In 
this regard, her conception of ‘passions’ can be linked to what Freud calls ‘libidinal 
investment,’ that is, an “attachment of strong, intense emotional energies to an issue, person 
or concept,” which is “mobilized in the creation of local, regional or national forms of 
identities” (Mouffe, cited in Miessen 2011:111). Accordingly, Mouffe argues that “the lesson 
to be drawn from Freud...is that, even in societies which have become very individualistic, the 
need for collective identification will never disappear since it is constitutive of the mode of 
existence of human beings” (2005:28). In relation to this, she highlights Jacques Lacan’s 
development of Freud’s theory through his concept of jouissance (enjoyment), and 
emphasizes its “importance for exploring the role of affect in politics” (2005:27). In 
particular, Mouffe thematizes Stavrakakis’s observation that the experience of Lacanian 
jouissance is in fact the reason behind socio-political forms of identification. He maintains 
that “the problematic of enjoyment helps us answer in a concrete way what is at stake in 
socio-political identification and identity formation,” and suggests “that support of social 
fantasies is partially routed in the jouissance of the body” (Stavrakakis 2007:196). Thus, 
“what is at stake in these fields, according to Lacanian theory, is not only symbolic coherence 
and discursive closure but also enjoyment, the jouissance animating human desire” 
(Stavrakakis 2007:196). In support of this, Mouffe also relates Slavoj Žižek’s articulation of 
this issue, when he draws a connection between Lacan’s theory of enjoyment and political 
nationalism. For Žižek, “the element which holds together a particular community cannot be 
reduced to the point of symbolic identification” because “the bond linking together its 
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 Derrida highlights this idea when he points toward the violence inherent in any arbitrary binary opposition. He 
notes that such binary oppositions will always have a ‘violent hierarchy,’ in which one of the terms governs over 
or has power over the other ‒ for example male/female, good/evil, and black/white. Thus, “in a traditional 
philosophical opposition we have not a peaceful coexistence of a vis-à-vis, but rather…a violent hierarchy. One 
of the two terms governs the other (axiologically, logically, etc.), or has the upper hand” (1982:41). 
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members always implies a shared relation towards a Thing, toward Enjoyment incarnated” 
(1993:201). Thirdly, she argues that Hardt and Negri’s theory is largely a ‘reformulation’ of 
Second International Marxism. That is, for her, Hardt and Negri advance “the same type of 
determinism in which we basically don’t have to do anything, just wait for the moment in 
which the contradiction of Empire will bring about the reign of the multitude” (Mouffe, cited 
in Miessen 2011:112).
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 Finally, she insists that her main disagreement is with Hardt and 
Negri’s idea of an absolute democracy, one that is outside of any forms of institution. In 
relation to this, she criticizes their view that “it is possible to reach a perfect democracy in 
which there will no longer be any relation of power – no more conflict, no more antagonism” 
(Mouffe, cited in Miessen 2011:111) for the reasons indicated earlier.  
Fourthly, and in contrast to all of the above, Laclau and Mouffe advance a new 
political strategy of hegemonic left-wing radical democracy. That is, for them, politics is not 
about the realization of the classical Marxist agenda, nor is it about Habermas’s idea of the 
creation of a rational consensus, nor is it akin to Hardt and Negri’s conception of the 
multitude. Rather, it concerns agonistic pluralism, and accordingly it is advanced that politics 
and democracy should provide an arena where conflicts and differences can be confronted. To 
be sure, subtle differences exist between Mouffe and Laclau’s respective approaches to this 
issue. In short, Mouffe’s agonistic pluralism identifies democracy as a product of conflict 
(Mouffe 2000:53), and she even argues that absolute democracy ‒ where conflict no longer 
exists ‒ will ultimately lead to the end of democracy (Mouffe, cited in Miessen 2007). This is, 
of course, related to the idea of the ‘democratic paradox,’ whereby the ultimate realization of 
democracy results in its concomitant elimination. More specifically though, for Mouffe, the 
heart of the democratic paradox can be found in the struggle between liberalism  
(liberty and the protection of rights) and democracy (collective sovereignty and equality). And 
she argues that since these two ideas can never be perfectly reconciled, perfect liberty and 
equality will never be possible. However, while Carl Schmitt viewed this inability to 
reconcile as leading to the failure of liberal democracy (1976),
95
 Mouffe suggests, on the 
contrary, that it is exactly the conflict that exists between liberalism and democracy which 
allows political society to exist. In this regard, she asserts that “what we need to do is 
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 This connection to Second International Marxism can be seen in relation to its claims that capitalism will 
inexorably result in its own demise (Bevir 2010:865). 
95
 Schmitt insists that there is an irreconcilable opposition between “liberal individualism, with its moral 
discourse centered around the individual, and the democratic ideal, which is essentially political, and aims at 
creating identity based on homogeneity” (Mouffe 1999a:40), and because of this, for him, liberal democracy is 
not viable. 
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precisely what Schmitt does not do: once we have recognized that the unity of the people is 
the result of a political construction, we need to explore all the logical possibilities that a 
political articulation entails” (2000:55-6). That is, although Schmitt sees the demos as a given, 
already realized entity, Mouffe argues that there is never an absolute, fully formed demos, and 
that instead the demos is constantly struggling to create itself. This is because democratic 
politics does not consist in “the moment when a fully constituted people exercise its rule” 
(2000:55-56). Rather, she states that “the moment of rule is indissociable from the very 
struggle about the definition of the people, about the constitution of its identity” (2000:56). 
Liberal democracy, she maintains, is “precisely the recognition of this constitutive gap 
between the people and its various identifications” (2000:56). And because the demos can 
never be fully realized, it is imperative that a space for contestation and conflict should 
always be available for such struggles to occur.  
Laclau and Mouffe’s move away from traditional socialist politics, and their 
concomitant connections to the post-structuralist thought of Derrida (and Lacan), is thus 
evident. This connection can be seen, in particular, in relation to their reinterpretation of 
Derrida’s conception of ‘democracy to come.’ In Spectres of Marx (1994), Politics of 
Friendship (1997b), and Rogues: Two Essays on Reason (2005), Derrida’s deconstructive 
politics are brought to the fore in his reference to the idea of democracy as always ‘to come.’ 
According to Rebentisch, “Derrida locates his notion of an impending democracy neither in 
the realm of the constitutive (as in Plato) nor in that of the regulative (as in Kant).” Instead he 
locates it “in the mode of what he calls différance; that is to say, democracy only exists in the 
mode of differing from itself and this alone can keep it open to the yet to come” (2005:928-
929). Importantly, this idea of a ‘democracy to come’ does not relate either to an ‘idea’ or a 
‘future possibility,’ but rather points toward the “transformative and disruptive potential at the 
heart of democracy, it points to a promise of change in the here and now” (Matthews 2013). 
In this regard, Derrida states: “when I speak of democracy to come…this does not mean that 
tomorrow democracy will be realized, and it does not refer to a future democracy.” Instead, he 
argues, “it means that there is an engagement with regard to democracy which consists…[of] 
recognizing the irreducibility of the promise..[that] ‘it can come’” (1996:83).  Fritsch 
elaborates on this idea when he explains that “the ‘always’ here already indicates that we are 
no longer at the empirical level of promises made by identifiable subjects, but at an 
‘ontological’ or, as Derrida prefers to call it, ‘hauntological’ or ‘quasi-transcendental’ level;” 
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that is, “we are talking about the being-promise of a promise” (Fritsch 2002:578).96 Similarly, 
for Mouffe, radical democracy can be seen as a promise, something in the distance that should 
always be reached for, but something that ultimately can never fully be realized. Instead, 
because agonistic radical democracy involves constant disagreement and conflict, it offers the 
possibility of interminable democratic reinvention and renewal.    
One of the key features of such reinvention and renewal thematized by Laclau and 
Mouffe is the formation of coalitions, and in this regard ‒ even more than Mouffe ‒ Laclau 
situates himself against autonomous democracy by offering one of the most scathing critiques 
of Hardt and Negri’s work. In short, he challenges the conviction expressed by Hardt and 
Negri in Empire that anti-capitalism is the only form of political coordination needed to bring 
about the counter-globalization of the multitude. For Laclau, their assertion fails to recognize 
the wide array of social factors that link people together, and hence he argues that their idea of 
Empire lacks a “theory of articulation, without which politics are unthinkable” (2004:26-30). 
In other words, for Laclau, Hardt and Negri cannot adequately explain the multitude’s 
politicization, and the subsequent circumstances that allow political action to take place. And 
he argues that, “if we have an internally divided society, the will of the community as a whole 
has to be politically constructed out of a primary – constitutive – diversity.” Consequently, 
“any ‘multitude’ is constructed through political action – which presupposes antagonism and 
hegemony” (2004:30). Instead, Hardt and Negri argue that groups in the multitude do not 
need to be linked on a horizontal level in order to challenge Empire, but rather should go 
vertically, straight to the power of Empire – thereby increasing the capacity of their 
subversion. This perspective stands in stark contrast to Laclau and Mouffe’s assertion that 
coalitions need to be created between differing groups, in order to construct a cooperative 
front against the status quo. Although Laclau is seemingly more critical of Hardt and Negri, 
he has also attacked the deliberative democratic ideal of consensus, in particular Habermas’s 
conception of rational consensus. Like Mouffe, he argues that exclusion and coercion are 
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 This idea of ‘democracy to come’ can be closely related to the Messianic elements of Derrida’s 
deconstruction, and the emphasis it places on the future. That is, drawing on Judaic beliefs of the coming of the 
Messiah, Derrida (and for that matter, John Caputo) stress the importance of the ‘to come.’ Just as democracy 
would become lifeless if it was ever to be fully realized, they argue that if the Messiah “were ever to show up in 
the flesh [, w]ere his coming ever taken to be an occurrence in historical time, something that could be picked up 
on a video camera, that would be a disaster. The effect would be to shut down the very structure of time and 
history, to close off the structure of hope, desire, expectation, promise, in short the future” (Derrida 1997a:163). 
Therefore, just as the Messiah will always be a promise of something to come, so too democracy must always be 
something to come.  
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inherent to rational consensus, insofar as consensus can only be reached through the force of 
‘a better argument.’ Thus, Laclau insists, unless “the ‘grounds’ on which what counts for a 
‘better argument’ are themselves transcendentally given, some alternatives must have been 
excluded on less than absolute or rational grounds” (Laclau 1991, cited in Hansen 2008:7). In 
relation to this, he argues that the “undecidability of any decision will never be complete and 
social coherence will only be achieved at the cost of repressing something that negates it.” 
And because of this, “any consensus[,]…any objective and differential system of rule implies, 
as its most essential possibility, a dimension of coercion” (Laclau 1990:172).97 Thus, although 
Laclau concedes that “Habermas addresses all of the important issues of contemporary theory 
and politics,” he insists that Habermas “gives them answers, which are to a large extent...the 
antipodes of those which...[he is] searching for” (cited in Bowman 1999:22).  
In relation to these critiques, Laclau and Mouffe argue that a new political strategy – a 
left-wing radicalization of democracy – which is based on an idea of equivalence rather than 
agreement, and which can effectively oppose the current near-hegemony of neoliberalism, 
needs to be established, and they call this radical democracy. In terms of equivalence, Laclau 
and Mouffe advance that “the strengthening of specific democratic struggles requires…the 
expansion of chains of equivalence which extend to other struggles” (2001:182). That is, the 
demands and successes of various groups and struggles need to be viewed as equal to, and 
dependent upon, each other, to the extent that the rights of one group cannot be realized at the 
expense of the rights of another. Yet, importantly, they do not suggest that one group should 
submit to the will of another, or that smaller groups should be adopted or incorporated into 
others. Instead, they suggest that all progressive struggles – no matter the size or vision – 
should be able to come together, while respecting and protecting their differences, so that the 
radical democracy thereby engendered continues to grow in terms of its plurality. 
Consequently, it is only when, for example, the rights and demands of the worker’s struggle, 
are achieved in the “context of respect” for the right of women’s or immigrants’ groups, that 
“struggles against power become truly democratic” (Laclau and Mouffe 2001:184). In his 
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According to Stäheli, “Laclau develops a theory of decision based on [Derrida’s notion of] undecidability” 
(2003:2). Undecidability, for Laclau, “is the pre-condition for any ‘true’ decision, otherwise the decision would 
be a result of the logic inherent in a previously constituted terrain” (Laclau 1996:53). That is, “in an undecidable 
situation one cannot determine the dividing line between two possibilities,” and as such, one possibility is almost 
always left out (Stäheli 2003:4). Similarly, Mouffe maintains that, “without taking a rigorous account of 
undecidability, it is impossible to think the concepts of political decision and ethical responsibility.” Thus, she 
argues that “undecidability is not a moment to be traversed or overcome” and that “conflicts of duty are 
interminable,” because one can “never be completely satisfied that...[one has] made a good choice since a 
decision in favor of one alternative is always to the detriment of another” (1996:9). 
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book On Populist Reason, Laclau provides the following figure as a visual example of the 
concept of a chain of equivalence, and he explains his example of chains of equivalence in the 
following way: “The example I had in mind was that of an oppressive regime,” for example 
Tsarism (Ts), which is “separated by a political frontier from the demands of most sectors of 
society (D1, D2, D3,…etc.).” And while “each of these demands, in its particularity, is 
different from all the others…[a]ll of them…are equivalent to each other in their common 
opposition to the oppressive regime” (2005:131-132). 
  
Figure 1: Chains of Equivalence (Laclau 2005:131-132) 
 
Laclau and Mouffe see the ultimate consequence of this logic of equivalence as implying 
 
the dissolution of the autonomy of the spaces in which each one of these struggles is 
constituted; not necessarily because any of them become subordinate to others, but because they 
have all become, strictly speaking, equivalent symbols of a unique and indivisible struggle. The 
antagonism would thus have achieved the conditions of total transparency, to the extent that all 
unevenness had been eliminated, and the differential specificity of the spaces in which each of 
the democratic struggles was constituted had been dissolved. (2001:182) 
 
To oppose the threat of neoliberal hegemony, they promote this new strategy ‒ or hegemonic 
project ‒ as consisting of a combination of ‘radical,’ ‘plural’ and ‘hegemonic’ democratic 
ideals. The ‘radical’ component entails the above mentioned advancement of an ‘equivalence’ 
between different groups, which can facilitate not a temporary alliance between them, but 
rather the formation of permanent coalitions, within which the success of the agenda of each 
is understood as inextricably intertwined with the success of the agendas of all the others 
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(2001:186). In turn, this radical democracy is also ‘plural,’ in the sense that democratic rights 
and involvement are extended beyond citizenship and public political spaces, to include not 
only the private realm, but also both existing marginal subjectivities, and any new composite 
subjectivities which may emerge in the future.
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 This form of democracy is therefore ‘plural’ 
in the sense that it “broaden[s] the domain of the exercise of democratic rights beyond the 
limited traditional field of ‘citizenship’” (Laclau and Mouffe 2001:185). And through this it 
facilitates the “proliferation of radically new and different political spaces…[, together with] 
the emergence of a plurality of subjects” (Laclau and Mouffe 2001:181). However, the 
effective establishment of such radical and plural democracy, they argue, is indissociable 
from the progressive establishment of left-wing hegemony. Through this, hegemony ‒ instead 
of operating as a tool of the neoliberal status quo that undermines the efficacy of social 
movements ‒ would become a “fundamental tool” for political analysis and action on the part 
of the left (Laclau and Mouffe 2001:193). That is, instead of seeing hegemony as something 
that deprives the left of its political efficacy, Laclau and Mouffe insist that  
 
it is only when the open, unsutured character of the social is fully accepted, [and] when the 
essentialism of the totality and of the elements is rejected, that…‘hegemony’ can come to 
constitute a fundamental tool for political analysis on the left. These conditions arise originally 
in the field of…‘democratic revolution,’ but they are only maximized in all their deconstructive 
effects in the project for a radical democracy, or, in other words, in a form of politics which is 
founded not upon dogmatic postulation of any ‘essence of the social,’ but, on the contrary, on 
affirmation of the contingency and ambiguity of every ‘essence,’ and on the constitutive 
character of social division and antagonism. (2001:192-193) 
 
Thus, they argue that hegemony, although usually viewed in negative terms, can emerge and 
grow as a progressive force of the left, which includes everyone in a productive space of 
dissensus rather than consensus. And such a hegemonic project, they assert, could facilitate 
the creation of a radical and plural democracy. In relation to the idea of democratic revolution, 
Mouffe argues that “the objective of the left should be the extension of the democratic 
revolution initiated two hundred years ago” (1992:1). However, the democratic revolution, 
Laclau and Mouffe maintain, is much more than a series of events, and should rather be seen 
as “the very possibility of the radicalization of social resistance” (Smith 1998:6). Drawing on 
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 This plurality is connected to the notion of ‘pluralism’ which refers to a discursive and open society, where 
multiple social identities and values exist together. This pluralism, Mouffe insists, can be seen as the “defining 
feature of modern democracy” and, as such, is imperative to the “symbolic ordering of social relations” (cited in 
Kapoor 2002:465). 
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the work of Foucault, Laclau and Mouffe support the idea that “wherever there is power, there 
is resistance.” Yet, they also recognize that “the forms of resistance may be extremely varied” 
(2001:152), and that “only in certain cases do these forms of resistance take on a political 
character and become struggles directed toward putting an end to the relations of 
subordination” (2001:152-153). In short, Laclau and Mouffe effectively call for the creation 
of a hegemonic politics, in which diverse struggles and demands are articulated into a 
movement of ‘radical democrats,’ capable of challenging current neoliberal discourses and 
systems that limit democracy (Dahlberg 2013). A movement whose adversarial power to do 
so derives from “hegemony,” or a coalition “between different struggles that are constructed 
as equivalent, which can then extend the meaning of equality and liberty to a wider range of 
social relations” (Dahlberg and Siapera 2007:9). It is through these hegemonic struggles or 
projects that the radical or agonistic democratic culture called for by Laclau and Mouffe, 
which involves the progressive extension of freedom and equality, and which is always open 
to confrontation, can come into being.  
For many, such political development is crucial today, because in a culture of limited 
political participation, there is a need for the “formation of a politically active citizenry” 
brought “into being through successful democratic political activism;” a citizenry which 
recognizes their actions as contributing to their own self-constitution, as well as the self-
constitution of society in general (Dahlberg 2013). And for Laclau and Mouffe, this political 
activism can only be effectively achieved through hegemonic projects and politics which fight 
(in a non-violent sense) for democracy. These hegemonic projects, they assert, help to 
politicize society by opening up spaces for a variety of divergent democratic struggles to 
come together, and to challenge existing ‘anti-democratic’ discourses. Accordingly, these 
struggles, which attempt to transform society rather than seize power, focus on the normative 
elements of democracy, through the process of which liberty, equality, and contestation – 
rather than an antagonistic politics of ‘destroying the other’ – are embraced. To this end, 
Laclau and Mouffe argue that such hegemonic struggles allow for the development of an 
agonistic democratic culture, which will help usher in the progressive institutionalization of 
radical democracy. 
In this regard, democratic discourses and institutions which encourage political 
confrontation and conflict between different individual and group identities need to be 
established (Caperchi 2011). This is because the resultant ability to share “symbolic spaces” 
and democratic institutions, will allow people the room to exercise their democratic rights, 
thereby transforming antagonisms into agonistic confrontations – confrontations between 
adversaries not enemies (Caperchi 2011). Such adversaries, for Mouffe, constitute “a 
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legitimate enemy, an enemy with whom we have in common a shared adhesion to the ethico-
political principles of democracy,” an enemy who cannot be persuaded through deliberation, 
but who can be converted to accept the adversary through antagonisms (Mouffe 1999b:755). 
In relation to this idea of adversaries, Mouffe asserts that since these ‘friendly enemies’ have 
something in common and ‘share a symbolic space,’ a ‘conflictual consensus’ may exist 
between them. Importantly though, this is not the deliberative democratic conception of 
rational consensus, but rather a consensus whereby people “agree on the ethico-political 
principles that inform the political association, but they disagree on the interpretation of these 
principles.” For example, Mouffe suggests that “if we take these principles to be liberty and 
equality for all, it is clear that they can be understood in many different, conflicting ways, 
which will lead to conflicts that can never be rationally resolved” (Mouffe, cited in Miessen 
2011:109). However, the aim of her radical politics is to  
 
construct the “them” in such a way that it is no longer perceived as an enemy to be destroyed, 
but [as] an “adversary,” i.e. somebody whose ideas we combat but whose right to defend those 
ideas we do not put into question. This is the real meaning of liberal democratic tolerance, 
which does not entail condoning ideas that we oppose or being indifferent to standpoints that 
we disagree with, but treating those who defend them as legitimate opponents.
99
 (Mouffe 
2000:15) 
 
Accordingly, despite an array of differences and disagreements which make up the field of the 
social, Laclau and Mouffe maintain that every group must recognize the importance of 
agonisms – “spirited clashes of democratic positions” – in the establishment of left-wing 
hegemony; clashes which will also by no means dissolve in the subsequent practice of radical 
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 Mouffe developed her distinction between enemy and adversary in relation to Carl Schmitt’s thesis that 
political identities are made up of certain we/they or friend/enemy relations, which can emerge in diverse social 
situations. According to Mouffe, Schmitt’s friend/enemy conception “deals with the formation of a ‘we’ as 
opposed to a ‘they,’ and is always concerned with collective forms of identification; it has to do with conflict and 
antagonism and is therefore the realm of decision, not discussion” (2005:11). In his book The Concept of the 
Political, Schmitt argues that the political “can be understood only in the context of the friend/enemy grouping, 
regardless of the aspects which this possibility implies for morality, aesthetics and economics” (1976:35). This 
distinction between friend and enemy means that any political consensus will always be based on an element of 
exclusion, and, as such, Schmitt rejects any notion of a fully inclusive rational consensus. Although Schmitt’s 
ideas were originally published in 1932, Mouffe argues that certain of his ideas are still relevant for the 
contemporary era, and she maintains that “Schmitt’s emphasis on the ever present possibility of the friend/enemy 
distinction and the conflictual nature of politics constitutes the necessary starting point for envisaging the aims of 
democratic politics” (2005:14). 
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democracy. Rather, what will progressively dissolve is the political atomism (and apathy) of 
neoliberalism, through the transformation of “the consciousness of individual groups in 
society so that they see that their interests are [increasingly] tied up with the interests of other 
groups” (Mouffe, cited in Castle 1998). 
Importantly, since the ideals of liberty and equality are already found within the 
discourse of the modern capitalist system, Laclau and Mouffe do not call for a radical break 
from current social constructions, but rather for a radicalization of concepts and morals that 
are already present within, yet unsatisfied by, liberal democracy. Thus, although each project 
of radical democracy will have a socialist dimension (as a means of challenging capitalist 
relations of production), socialism is not the major component, but rather only one element of 
radical democratic strategy (2001:178). Consequently, unlike the arguments of Hardt and 
Negri, Laclau and Mouffe advance that “the task of the Left…cannot be to renounce liberal-
democratic ideology, but on the contrary, to deepen and expand it in the direction of a radical 
and plural democracy” (2001:176). And in terms of this they argue that radical democrats 
should appropriate “insights from liberal democratic and socialist thought and combine them 
together to construct a new approach to democracy” (Smith 1998:18). Something which 
includes the creation of institutions that take on an agonistic form, thereby allowing conflict, 
when it emerges, to be expressed in a constructively adversarial, confrontation, rather than as 
a destructive antagonistic conflict between enemies (Dahlberg 2013). 
However, fifthly, despite the immense influence that Laclau and Mouffe have had on 
contemporary radical democratic thought, together with the widespread recognition they have 
received as two of the most important post-Marxist theorists, their ideas and politics 
expressed in Hegemony and Socialist Strategy, and their related individual works, have by no 
means been exempt from criticism. Indeed, following the publication of Hegemony and 
Socialist Strategy, post-Marxism as a combination of Marxism and post-structuralism came 
under significant scrutiny, and was viewed by some as “calculated ambiguity” (Boucher 
2008:82), “politics as therapy” (Cloud 1994), an “opiate of the intellectuals” (McGee 
1997:201), and an “intellectual sickness” (Geras 1988:40), and by others ‒ ironically ‒ as too 
Marxist.  
That is, on the one hand, Laclau and Mouffe’s work was denounced by Marxists as 
being a repudiation of the class struggle, a promotion of “ex-Marxism without substance,” 
and as “symptomatic of an intellectual malaise” (Geras 1988:42). It was similarly criticized as 
being “‘beautifully pragmatic’ of the ‘retreat of class’ by a disillusioned section of the 
Western Left” (Wood 1998:40). In this regard, Wood also criticizes Laclau and Mouffe’s 
notion that “socialism is a moment internal to the democratic revolution” (1998:69), and he 
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argued that “the class struggles of capitalism are not…simply reflexes of liberal-democratic 
discourse and its ‘discursive construction’ of class relations as oppressive and illegitimate.” 
Rather, democratic discourse is something “constituted by class conflict” (Wood 1998:69). 
Moreover, Bertram accused Laclau and Mouffe of a “fetishisation of dislocation,” of 
contributing to the further dispersal of subjectivity in late capitalism (1995:110), and argued 
that their “new antagonisms are best suited for the postindustrial society in which there is not 
opposition to the dominant system (1995:85). Analogously, Osborne suggested that although 
Laclau and Mouffe’s theory of identity “looks sophisticated,” it only really “operates on one 
level,” negating the “tension between the irreducible dimension of extra-discursive 
determinacy in the object and the plurality of its possible discursive constructions” (1991:210-
219). Although a supporter of Laclau and Mouffe in some respects, Žižek’s criticism of their 
ideas of hegemony and antagonism has also gained significant credence. He argues that the 
agonistic politics put forward by Laclau and Mouffe are unable to challenge the status quo, 
and as such, will simply result in a continuation of liberal democracy in its current state. 
Moreover, he takes issue with their idea of antagonisms within society, and questions the 
ability of Laclau and Mouffe’s ideas to bring about real, radical change. In fact, he goes so far 
as to assert that,  
 
for all of their emphasis on the openness and contingency of signification, the way the 
underlying antagonism of society is never to be resolved, nothing is really contemplated 
happening in their work; no fundamental alteration can actually take place. There is a kind of 
“resignation” in advance at the possibility of truly effecting radical change, a Kantian 
imperative that we cannot go too far, cannot definitively fill the void of the master-signifier, 
cannot know the conditions of political possibility, without losing all freedom. (2000:316-317) 
 
Yet, while Žižek criticizes Laclau and Mouffe for their ‘mere radicalization’ of the liberal 
democratic imaginary (2000:325), he does not himself provide an alternative to either the 
market economy, or the socialist political imaginary. Ironically, on the other hand, despite 
their movement toward post-Marxism, Laclau and Mouffe have also been accused by Barrett 
of being “too Marxist” (1991:76), insofar as they analyze “social situations...from a 
recognizably Marxist paradigm” (Boucher 2008:83). 
In relation to the concept of agonistic democracy, Crowder (2006) and Erman (2009) 
have argued that Mouffe’s ideas lack insight into the structures and procedures needed in 
order to facilitate the realization of agonistic democracy. Moreover, Crowder (2006) and 
Dryzek (2005, 2009) have criticized agonistic democracy for its dependence on irrational 
decision-making. This criticism emerged in relation to Mouffe’s position that since passion 
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plays an important role in agonistic exchanges between citizens, some decisions are 
emotionally based and not the product of rational arguments. Olson (2009) adds to this 
criticism when he argues that “agonism’s encouragement of passionate exchanges among 
citizens would lead to greater societal conflict…particularly in divided societies in which 
extremism and zealotry are present” (Pinto 2012:16). Dryzek (2005) and Erman (2009) go on 
to argue that Laclau and Mouff’s lack of support for consensus is unproductive, and that at 
least with consensus “decisions get made” (Dryzek 2009:221). In addition to this, Crowder 
questions how radical agonistic democracy really is. While it is clear that agonistic 
democracy “opposes the dominant liberal-democratic paradigm,” Crowder insists that 
although Mouffe criticizes “various aspects of liberalism and deliberative democracy[,]…at 
the same time she denies that liberalism is the enemy and claims to be working within a 
liberal-democratic framework” (2006:10). In this regard he argues that agonistic democracy 
“seems indistinguishable from liberal-democratic orthodoxy” (2006:10). 
While there is some merit to certain aspects of these critisisms, it is important to note 
that although some scholars have argued that the concept of agonistic democracy lacks 
specificity, empirical investigations into specific approaches to instituting Laclau and 
Mouffe’s agonistic democratic practices are beginning to emerge (See: Pløger 2004; Goi 
2005; Bäcklund and Mäntysalo 2010). In addition to this, while Dryzek may see passion as 
fruitless, uncivil, and chaotic, Mouffe’s position that passions play an important role in 
political decisions has also been supported by an increasing number of theorists, including 
Gilbert (1995, 1999, 2001), Thien (2007), Carozza (2007), and Ruitenberg (2009). 
Furthermore, although Laclau and Mouffe’s rejection of consensus has been criticized for not 
allowing final decisions to be made, such criticism overlooks Mouffe’s notion of “conflictual 
consensus” or compromise, which does in fact allow for decisions to be made, if only on a 
temporary basis (Mouffe, cited in Miessen 2007:6). 
 
3.4 Conclusion 
 
Thus, despite the abovementioned instances of theoretical opposition to their ideas, Laclau 
and Mouffe’s theory of radical democracy, and their concepts related to agonism, hegemonic 
politics, and conflict, continue to glow intriguingly as a possible heuristic device through 
which a better understanding of recent popular online political developments can be 
approximated. In terms of this, recent political and social movement activism and protest, in 
which divergent groups with previously unarticulated demands have come together around 
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calls for justice and democracy, may point toward the possibility of the realization of the type 
of hegemonic politics suggested by Laclau and Mouffe. And because the internet and social 
media have had an increasingly important influence on the creation of such connections, the 
role of the internet and new media technologies in the facilitation of such a realization needs 
to be considered. 
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Chapter Four: A Global Perspective on Online Agonism 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
The discussions of the previous chapter drew attention to the ideas of Connelly, Tully, Honig, 
Owen, Laclau and Mouffe, and their related theoretical support of the agonistic approach to 
radical democracy. In particular, the significance of Laclau and Mouffe’s conception of 
radical democracy for social movement politics and activism was considered, and the 
potential for their idea of left-wing hegemony to effectively challenge the contemporary 
dominant neoliberal discourse emerged as important. In relation to this, compelling arguments 
have been made for the role of the internet and new media technologies as contentious, yet 
innovative, spaces for the facilitation of such left-wing hegemony, through the instigation of 
agonistic radical democratic practices (Rahimi 2011:173). That is, construed as a site of 
discursive struggle, the internet and online media tend to be viewed by agonists as supportive 
of both dominant and marginalized voices. On the one hand, the internet has been recognized 
as being responsible for the reproduction of dominant discourses, especially via corporate and 
government promotion of neoliberal ideas and practices. Yet, on the other hand, research into 
the agonistic use of the internet to advance radicalized conceptions of democracy has also 
revealed how this medium is contributing to the effective development of counter-discourses, 
and to the correlative contestation of the discursive strictures of dominant discourse.  
With a view to exploring the latter potential of the internet and new media 
technologies ‒ to facilitate the development and implementation of agonistic democratic 
practices ‒ this chapter commences with an examination of current general theorizations 
surrounding emergent online agonism. That is, firstly, in relation to the works of Richard 
Kahn and Douglas Kellner (2005), Babak Rahimi (2011), Bart Cammaerts (2008), Joss Hands 
(2007), and Lincoln Dahlberg (2007a, 2007b, 2007c), among others, theorizations of the 
agonistic use of the internet in recent social movement politics will be discussed. Secondly, 
after such general theoretical discussion, specific examples of the agonistic use of online 
media by some proponents of recent social movements, namely, the Zapatista, the 
Revolutionary Association of Women of Afghanistan, the alter-globalization movement, and 
the Occupy movement, will be explored. In each case, both the extent to which the use of the 
internet and new media technologies has played a role in the development of their respective 
struggles, and the corresponding isomorphism that has emerged between such online 
communications and their ensuing offline political dynamics, will be thematized. Finally, the 
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importance of such consideration, which draws attention to the potential value of Laclau and 
Mouffe’s theoretical perspectives as a hermeneutic key through which the popular political 
dynamics of the present era can begin to be understood, will be addressed.  
Admittedly, the agonistic potential of this media use is not beyond contestation, 
because the specific political orientation of these social movements cannot be defined as 
absolutely agonistic. This is because both deliberative and autonomous elements are also – in 
different ways and to various degrees – reflected in their respective communicative dynamics. 
But, arguably, this is only to be expected, because these social movements comprise organic 
political processes which have grown out of an array of existing political discourses, some of 
which are orientated around non-agonistic concepts. Consequently, it is unreasonable to 
expect strict ‘agonistic orthodoxy’ among such social movements; they are, after all, messy 
practical affairs grounded in realpolitik, rather than pristine theoretical works composed in 
any ideal academic setting. Yet, a solid case can nevertheless be made for their strong 
progression toward a primarily agonistic orientation. A progression which is moreover 
indissociable from their use of the internet and new media technologies that stands to 
gradually adjust the respective movements’ radical offline dynamics in accordance with their 
online agonistic approaches.  
This idea can be related, to some extent, to Marshall McLuhan’s “medium is the 
message” theorization. Central to his idea is that more than the message content, it is the 
medium of the message that is responsible for shaping and controlling “the scale and form of 
human consciousness and action” (1964:9). McLuhan saw the media as “extensions” or 
“amputations” of the human body or senses and argued that “all media, from the phonetic 
alphabet to the computer are extensions of man that cause deep and lasting changes in him 
and his environment” (1964:54). In this regard, he saw the media as possessing the ability to 
either extend or limit human processes or senses (1964:7). Furthermore, he posited that 
“technology and media cause and determine the changes and directions of human activity, be 
it social, political or economic” (Siapera 2012:7).  
While McLuhan’s ideas were initially dismissed by anti-determinist arguments from 
figures such as Raymond Williams,
100
 his argument that the medium is at least as important as 
the message it conveys, soon initiated an important strand of related theorizations. Indeed, in 
the opening lines of his book Gramophone, Film, Typewriter (1999), Friedrich Kittler 
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 In his book Television: Technology and Cultural Form, Williams criticizes McLuhan’s conception that the 
medium is the message, and argues that “the physical fact of instant transmission, as a technical possibility, has 
been uncritically raised to a social fact, without any pause to notice that virtually all such transmission is at once 
elected and controlled by existing social authorities” (1974:128).  
109 
 
reiterates McLuhan’s “the medium is the message” when he insists that “the media determines 
our situation” (1999:xxxix). In this regard, he argues that “the dominant information 
technologies of the day control all understanding and illusions” (1999:xi). Adapting 
McLuhan’s theory to the digital age, Kittler examines how the material structures of 
computers and networks create cultural and social change, and insists that in order to 
“understand our present condition, we must take into account the ways in which…information 
is processed and stored…in discourse networks” (Siapera 2012:9). Bernard Stiegler offers 
another angle on McLuhan’s and Kittler’s shared perspective concerning the relationship 
between media technologies and society. That is, while McLuhan and Kittler offer a 
determinist approach, (i.e. society is determined by its media), Stiegler “argues that 
technology and humanity are coeval or co-originary,” insofar as, instead of technology 
occupying a primary position, “humans and technology are inextricably bound,” belonging 
together and co-determined by each other (Siapera 2012:11).
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These theorizations suggest that “change in communication technology inevitably 
produces changes in both culture and social order” (Baran and Davis 2009:219). That is, 
changes in media technologies can ultimately result in the changing and reshaping of users’ 
subjectivity in particular, and their society in general. Based on this logic, it is plausible to 
suggest that such changes or development in political communication mediums may, albeit 
unintentionally, lead to related developments or changes in users’ politics. Thus, while certain 
social movements may initially have emerged as proponents of strictly deliberative or 
autonomous forms of radical democracy, their exposure to, and use of, new media 
technologies may inadvertently lead them toward alternative forms of political approaches 
that are more agonistic in orientation.  
  
4.2 General theorizations of emergent online agonism 
 
Much of the literature pertaining to the “interplay between the internet and social movements” 
has been influenced by the ideas of radical democracy and related dissident social movements 
(Vromen 2008:107). In this regard, in their article “Oppositional Politics and the Internet: A 
Critical/Reconstructive Approach,” Kahn and Kellner examine how increasingly popular 
information and communication technologies have “facilitated oppositional cultural and 
political movements and provided possibilities for...progressive socio-political change and 
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Epimetheus. Stanford: Stanford University Press.  
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struggle” (2005:703). By exploring the rise of internet activism, the organizational role of the 
internet in various movements, and the use made of this medium by previously marginalized 
groups, they not only highlight how interactive new media technologies ‒ such as blogs, 
wikis, and social networks ‒ have become popular communication tools. In addition, they also 
show how such technologies have opened up “radical possibilities for a greater range of 
opinion, novel modes of virtual and actual political communities, and original forms of direct 
political action” (2005:717). Based on their findings, they argue that the internet offers a vital 
form of oppositional space, where a diversity of groups and individuals can come together to 
use these technologies as instruments of political struggle, and for the correlative creation of 
radical democratic political possibilities. Kellner, in particular, draws attention to the impact 
of the internet on radical politics when he states that “radical democratic politics can use new 
technologies to intervene within the global restructuring of capitalism to promote 
democratic…social movements,” to foster “globalization-from-below aiming at radical social 
transformation,” and to achieve “workers and human rights, environmental protection, the 
reconstruction of education, social justice and a diverse range of issues intending to help 
create a better world” (2004). Correlatively, in her article “Digitalising and Globalising 
Indigenous Voices,” Kowal draws attention to the “rise of the internet as a democratic 
communication technology” (2002:106). She moreover argues that the internet has not only 
allowed for the globalization of “otherwise local voices,” but has also created a “digitalized 
‘counterpublic’ that serves as a collective voice of people from diverse regions, cultures, and 
classes connected electronically” (2002:106). Consequently, she assert that the “potential of 
the internet as a forum for community organization and political activism, is magnified by the 
democratic nature of the technology with its ability to disseminate information to a global 
audience almost instantaneously” (2002:110). Similarly, Downey and Fenton advance that 
“the internet has been hailed as the saviour of alternative or radical…politics,” and is 
“perfectly matched for the widely-dispersed resistance…[of] culture jammers and radical 
political protesters” (2003:195). In terms of this, they argue that the internet allows groups to 
create ‘counter-public’ spheres which can contribute significantly to the activities and 
organization of their offline presence. Furthermore, they suggest that the internet offers an 
online area where previously marginalized groups can, on the one hand, “communicate with 
supporters,” and on the other hand, “reach out beyond the ‘radical ghetto’ both directly 
(disintermediation) and indirectly, through influencing the mass media” (2003:198). In this 
regard, they find support in Moghadam’s insistence that “the internet has become a prime 
vehicle for the transmission of information about [social] movement strategies, the 
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mobilization of resources, and the exchange of ideas across borders, boundaries and barriers” 
(2013:209).  
Interestingly, upon closer consideration, an overwhelming number of examples of 
specifically agonistic online communications readily emerge. In his study of the use of social 
media in post-electoral Iran, Rahimi examines online social media as “agonistic arenas where 
information, ideas, values, and subjectivities are contested” (2011:158). And in this 
investigation, he highlights how “the key to understanding the Internet’s political propensity” 
lies with comprehending cyberspace’s provision of an agonistic arena where divergent groups 
can compete, as adversaries, in a variety of “confrontational games” (2011:164). Moreover, 
apart from such acknowledgment of the internet as a platform for the recognition of the 
conflict and confrontation so essential to agonistic democracy, increasing focus has also fallen 
on how these online confrontations can lead to the creation and articulation of related 
radically democratic groups and movements. In particular, Langman’s exploration of the 
emergence of internetworked social movements, and the vital role that new media 
technologies are playing in the organization and mobilization of diverse yet interconnected 
struggles, is important. In her article “From Virtual Public Spheres to Global Justice: A 
Critical Theory of Internetworked Social Movements,” she not only explores how “diffuse 
and unstructured” new social movements have “forged unlikely coalitions of labor, 
environmentalists, feminists, peace and global social justice activists,” who are “collectively 
critical of the adversities of neo-liberal globalization and its associated militarism” (2005:42). 
In addition, she also asserts that the internet and new media technologies have “enabled the 
emergence of tens of thousands of interconnected transnational NGOs, INGOs, advocacy 
networks, democratic grass root organizations and globally oriented social movements,” 
which, in turn, has “led to episodic mass mobilizations of resistance” (2005:55). Furthermore, 
she insists that cyber-activism has created a platform for the formation of coalitions between 
various progressive (and often marginalized) groups and organizations, insofar as it has 
allowed large numbers of “interconnected, progressive mobilizing structures, flowing across 
extremely complex networks of communications, to inform widely dispersed constituencies 
and coordinate activist endeavours” (2005:62). 
In relation to the above, Vromen argues that “utilising ideas based on agonistic, radical 
democracy derived from the theory of Chantal Mouffe it is eas[y] to interpret the internet as a 
space for protest and disruption that challenges existing power relations” (2008:107). 
Cammaerts not only supports this idea when he insists that “Mouffe’s concept of agonistic 
public spaces as ‘places for the expression of dissensus, for bringing to the floor what forces 
attempt to keep concealed’” (cited in Carpentier and Cammaerts, 2006:973-974), adequately 
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encompasses “the multiplicity of expressions and voices present online” (2008:339-340). In 
addition, he also argues that Mouffe’s conception of an agonistic public space, which is 
“inherently conflictual and where (productive) power is constitutive of the political,” offers a 
sensible theory through which to understand the online environment (2008:373). Furthermore, 
connections between the internet and Laclau and Mouffe’s conception of radical democracy 
are reflected in Joss Hands’s admission that one can “without much controversy…claim 
that…the Internet…lend[s]  itself to expanding the ‘chains of equivalents’ between the 
different struggles against oppression,” suggested by Laclau and Mouffe (2007:91). This is 
because, as an environment replete with a heterogeneous array of texts, images, and practices, 
which “allow…for a semi-decentralised…means of organization and communication,” the 
internet provides a user friendly ‘arena’ for the construction of networks between previously 
disassociated social movements and activist groups. In this regard, Hands maintains that the 
advantages of an agonistic form of online politics – or the effect of Mouffe’s idea of agonistic 
pluralism on radical online democracy – can be seen in four main areas. Firstly, she argues 
that it offers “a way of understanding and guiding our thought in the struggle for a radical 
democratic practice on and through the NET – a hegemonic strategy.” This is because the 
structure of the internet, with its possibilities for the hyper-linking of websites and 
interlinking of networks, offers numerous opportunities for connections and associations to be 
made, and thereby lends itself to online hegemonic strategizations. Secondly, she maintains 
that agonistic pluralism recognizes “the value of the autonomy of online struggles and 
discourses while resisting domination and oppression” (2007:91). In short, since the internet 
is seen as an open, interactive, diverse, many-to-many, and relatively inexpensive tool for the 
realization of hegemonic strategies, its promotion of a ‘free’ environment ‒ where the 
autonomy and equivalence of various struggles are respected (rather than absorbed by others) 
‒ points toward its connections to agonistic politics. Thirdly, for her, “the appeal to and 
inclusion of certain social movements into the nexus of radical politics previously disregarded 
by older discourses,” is now a regular occurrence, because of the capacity of the internet to 
extend the radical democratic process “to a whole new series of social relations” (Laclau and 
Mouffe 2001:159, cited in Hands 2007:91). Furthermore, new social movements are seen as 
particularly important to this conception of radical democracy, and the ability of the internet 
to bring these movements together – while simultaneously enhancing their autonomy – is 
construed as an integral element of online agonistic democracy. Fourthly, Hands argues that 
agonistic pluralism allows for “the possibility of including a substantive agenda of economic 
justice,” by allowing for the “generation of resistance to capital’s exploitation,” through “the 
opening up of technology for the construction of resistant identities” (2007:92). Such resistant 
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identities stand to give rise to “new kinds of community and the designation of the oppressive 
nature of cyberspace as a domain of colonisation by capital” (2007:92).  
In particular, Lincoln Dahlberg’s examination and conceptualization of the re-
radicalization of an agonistic public sphere (2007c), which takes much of the above agonistic 
theorizations into account, comprises an important framework through which to consider the 
capacity of the internet to support radical forms of democratic activism. As discussed in the 
previous chapter, Mouffe is highly critical of Habermas’s deliberative idea of rational 
consensus. However, one element of Habermas’s theory that she does endorse is the notion of 
the public sphere ‒ or ‘public space’ as she prefers to call it ‒ as an important concept when 
discussing radical democracy (Mouffe 2005).
102
 Drawing heavily on the radical democratic 
ideas of Laclau and Mouffe, and their valorization of discursive contestation, Dahlberg 
similarly calls for a movement away from deliberative conceptions of the public sphere. 
Instead, he argues for a re-radicalization of public sphere theory along more agonistic lines, 
which, he insists, will enable a movement away from rationalist consensus readings of the 
idea (2007a:835). That is, he argues that instead of the public sphere being used to provide 
spaces for the realization of consensus, a form of discursive contestation ‒ in which consensus 
and hegemony are constantly questioned ‒ needs to be established. This discursive 
contestation, he insists, is a “normative requirement for advancing the [radical] public sphere” 
(2007a:836). As mentioned in the previous chapter, Laclau and Mouffe argue that political 
success is a product of linking disjointed struggles via ‘chains of equivalence,’ so that 
solidarity – based on a shared identification with various democratic ideas – can be 
established. This articulation of disparate identities, they argue, results in the creation of 
‘counter-discourses’ and ‘counter-hegemonic fronts,’ which are necessary for effective 
opposition to dominant discourses.
103
 That is, counter-discourses create safe spaces for the 
nurturing of marginalized voices, and help to build “alternative visions of life” that challenge 
the hegemony of dominant discourse (Dahlberg 2007a:837). In relation to this, Dahlberg’s 
notion of a re-radicalized agonistic public space, based on discursive contestation, “expands 
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 As a result of its connection to the ideas of Laclau and Mouffe, Mouffe’s term ‘space’ will be used in place of 
the term ‘sphere’ for the remainder of this thesis.  
103
 Dahlberg explains that the use of the word “counter” here does not refer to an “explicit contestation,” but can 
rather be understood as referring to discourses that are outside of, and in opposition to, dominant discourses 
(2007a:837). In addition to this, it is important to note that ‘dominant discourses’ are not necessarily deemed 
‘bad,’ and ‘counter-discourses’ are not necessarily ‘good.’ Rather, the differentiation here is focused upon “the 
democratic role of the contestation that develops from out of discursively constituted exclusions from 
mainstream public spheres” (2007b:142).  
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the space for the effective participation in politics of different and marginal voices, while 
accounting for power and inter-subjectivity” (2007a:837). 
 Arguably, one of the key spaces that have allowed for this form of discursive 
contestation to take place is the internet. Based on this premise, Dahlberg draws attention to 
the extent to which the internet, as a form of agonistic public space, can be used to facilitate 
the development and expansion of, on the one hand, counter-discourses, and on the other 
hand, contestation between discourses. He maintains that, according to the agonistic 
argument, in order to advance democracy online public spaces should: (a) provide 
communicative spaces for “the development of counter-publics where marginalized or 
oppositional discourses can be reflexively fostered;” (b) allow for “the articulation of these 
counter-discourses to enable the formation of strong oppositional identities and meta-
discourses;” and (c) allow for the “counter-public contestation of dominant discourses” 
(2007b:141). These three uses support the popular argument that the internet is allowing for 
the creation of alternative arenas, where different and dispersed people and groups can come 
together, recognize shared identities, and build and reinforce “counter-public networks and 
coalitions (or articulations) of radical discourses.” Radical discourses which are in opposition 
to, and which encourage the contestation of, mainstream dominant discourses (Dahlberg 
2007c:56). Thus, on the one hand, agonistic use of the internet can be seen to involve “spheres 
of strife (protest) and hegemony (power), wherein claims to information, ideas, values, and 
identities are contested and ruptured.” Yet, on the other hand, cyberspace also comprises an 
arena where counter-hegemonic groups can come together and build alternative discourses. 
And through such means, new or social media allow for “perpetual confrontation between 
conflicting forces that bring instability to political order,” in a way that provides the context 
for radically “new ways of doing politics” in the future (Rahimi 2011:161).  
However, it is not sufficient to leave matters at such a general level; rather, evidence 
of the role of agonism as the modus operandi of such social movements’ online practices 
must be examined.  
 
4.3 Emergent online agonism 
 
With a view to exploring the specific dynamics of the agonistic democratic use of the internet 
and social media by recent prominent social movements, in what follows an examination of 
the online activity of the Zapatista, the Revolutionary Association of Women of Afghanistan 
(RAWA), the alter-globalization movement, and the Occupy movement, will be undertaken. 
In each case, following a brief historical contextualization of the movement in question, their 
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offline developments which rendered them open to agonism will be highlighted, before their 
online connections to agonistic democracy are elaborated upon and discussed. In the latter 
regard, the movements’ respective approximations of the online agonistic public space 
framework detailed by Dahlberg, will be thematized. Such discussion, firstly, will concern the 
various movements’ use the internet as a communicative space through which counter-publics 
can be formed and oppositional discourses can be nurtured. Secondly, it will focus on the 
degree of each movement’s use of the internet to link up with politically diverse and disparate 
groups and networks, with a view to articulating their respective oppositional discourses in 
the development of strategically effective ‘counter-discursive fronts.’ And thirdly, 
consideration will be given to the scope of the various movements’ use of the internet and 
social media to support the counter-public contestation of mainstream dominant discourses, 
along with the real-world effects of such agonistic use of the internet on the political 
orientation of the movements themselves. 
 
4.3.1 The Zapatista Army of National Liberation 
 
On the same day that the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) came into 
effect,
104
 thousands of Mayan Indians connected to the Zapatista Army of National Liberation 
(EZLN), an indigenous liberation movement situated in Chiapas (the most southern and 
poorest region of Mexico), launched a two-week campaign of armed clashes against the 
Mexican military (Hayden 2002:11). Occupying various government buildings in protest 
against a long history of exploitation and discrimination, the Zapatista denounced the 
neoliberal hegemony of the local and national elite, and called for the realization of eleven 
demands related to “work, land, housing, food, health care, education, independence, liberty, 
democracy, justice and peace” (Harvey and Halverson 2000:151).105 The implementation of 
further neoliberal policies, as well as NAFTA’s cancellation of Article twenty-seven of 
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 NAFTA – a trade agreement signed between America, Canada and Mexico on 1 January 1994 – aimed at 
eliminating the majority of trade and investment controls previously in place between the three nations. At the 
time of its implementation, it was widely understood that NAFTA would function to instill neoliberal ideals and 
principles into Mexican law. As such, the rights of corporations were to be placed above those of the indigenous 
Mexican people, citizens in general, and democracy tout court (MacArther 2000, Cameron and Tomlin 2002). 
105
 Since the Zapatista reject all forms of neoliberalism and directly oppose the negative impact that capitalism 
has had on the already significant poverty of their people, their adoption of a strict anti-capitalist stance is 
evident. Drawing on various elements of Marxist, anarchist, and liberal socialist ideologies, the Zapatista view 
capital as “a corrupting influence,” and in this sense their anti-capitalist autonomous agenda is evident (Greebon 
2008:73). 
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Mexico’s constitution – which protected communal Indian land from sale or privatization – 
appears to have been the final straw that resulted in the Zapatista’s calls for action (Mize and 
Swords 2010:196 ). Yet, despite its initial violent start, under pressure from international civil 
society a ceasefire was soon called, and the Zapatista entered into dialogue with the Mexican 
government. This dialogue ended in 1996 with the signing of the San Andres Accords, which 
granted autonomy, self-determination, and rights to cultural pluralism, to the indigenous 
groups in Mexico (Hayden 2002:13). Following this agreement, the Zapatista extended their 
influence not only to the army (EZLN), but also to numerous indigenous supporters, “who 
non-violently retook land in 38 municipalities” (Hayden 2005), creating thousands of 
autonomous communities that grew to include more than 500 000 people (Flood 1999, cited 
in Greebon 2008:72). However, notwithstanding the government’s acceptance of the San 
Andres Accords, their subsequent refusal to make the required institutional changes – together 
with the continued presence of thousands of government military troops in Chiapas – resulted 
in persistent tensions, and ultimately led to the Zapatista ‘opting out’ of the national system. 
After doing so, the Zapatista created their own local system, the corollary of which was the 
adoption of an autonomous policy of non-engagement with the Mexican state (Chandler 
2004). By 2003, the EZLN announced that they would be implementing the San Andres 
Accords directly through newly created ‘Good Governance Councils,’ which were to be set 
up throughout the autonomous municipalities, and they soon began to put their “autonomy 
into practice by resisting government interventions, refusing government programs and 
services, and building their own infrastructure” (Greebon 2008:73). In relation to this, Flood 
highlights that through their creation of autonomous municipalities, the Zapatista have 
attempted to build “a system of direct democracy,” and create “a political space where 
everyone...[can] participate;” ultimately transforming the movement from “a marginal group 
of revolutionaries to a radical social movement” (Flood 1999, cited in Greebon 2008:72).  
However, by 2005/2006, following years of global activism both online and offline, 
the Zapatista commenced the La Otra Campana (The Other Campaign), and their strictly 
autonomous orientation seemed to undergo a significant transformation.
106
 That is, in the 6
th
 
Declaration of the Selva Lacandona, the Zapatista revealed a development in their program of 
struggle insofar as they insisted, on the one hand, that they are not necessarily against politics 
in general, and on the other hand, that they do not necessarily agree with the specifically 
autonomous idea that politics “serves no purpose” (Marcos 2005). Instead, they simply 
                                                          
106
 The Zapatista’s ‘Other Campaign’ was started in 2005 and was “designed to link nonpartisan anti-capitalist 
national liberation struggles around the country” (Mora 2007:64).  
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asserted that they are against the dynamics of current neoliberal politics. Arguably, this 
development in their political orientation emerged as a correlate of their widespread use of the 
internet and subsequent exposure to, and concomitant progressive openness toward, 
alternative democratic approaches. That is, while at a grassroots level within the Chiapas 
region, the orientation of the movement remains significantly influenced by the autonomous 
approach to radical democracy, such a development arguably points toward their growing 
receptiveness to the ideas of democratic agonism.
107
 And this openness can specifically be 
seen within the online communications and activism of this social movement. In this regard, 
the Zapatista’s success in spreading their message and gaining support has largely been 
attributed to their use of the internet. Indeed, Cleaver argues that no “catalyst for growth in 
electronic NGO networks has been more important than the 1994 indigenous Zapatista 
rebellion” (1998:622). In short, the internet has played a significant role in the communication 
and growth of this struggle, and has arguably been used to function as something akin to an 
online agonistic public space in three interrelated ways. 
Firstly, various communicative spaces have been used by the Zapatista and their 
supporters to form counter-publics and to develop counter-discourses. In fact, by 2001, there 
were over forty-five thousand websites related to the Zapatista struggle in over twenty-six 
countries around the world (Hayden 2002:120). And from websites and email distribution 
lists, to blogs and social media sites, numerous online spaces have emerged in which the 
Zapatista and their supporters have been free to form counter-publics and develop discourses 
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 In addition to autonomous democratic ideas, the Zapatista have also been connected to deliberative 
democracy especially through their implementation of Good Governance Councils or ‘Juntas.’ Via these Juntas, 
the Zapatista have implemented a form of participatory democracy which follows the mandate of “mando 
obedeciendo” (lead by obeying), where power is established at grassroots community level, and major political 
decisions are made by community assemblies (consultas), consisting of all community members over the age of 
twelve years. These assemblies follow a specific decision-making structure in which consensus is the ultimate 
goal. In a translation of a struggle archive from the Nicolas Ruiz community in Chiapas, Lopez highlights the 
Zapatista’s adoption of the idea of consensus, when they advance that “in our community there is a decision-
making structure in place, whose highest authority resides in the assembly, and…only by consensus of this 
assembly do we take action on any given issue” (2000). Even a cursory engagement with such arguments does 
seem to indicate that, since the concept of consensus functions so centrally within the organizational and 
decision-making structure of Zapatista politics, they are strongly informed by a deliberative democratic position. 
However, although the internal decision-making component of the movement has been connected to the 
deliberative idea of consensus, Higgins argues that because of the Zapatista’s “recognition of the diversity of the 
Mexican populace,” and their appreciation of the “multiplicity of socio-political identities” existing within the 
movement, they “do not look for complete political consensus” (2004:188). And it is through this that their 
connection to alternative conceptions of agonistic radical democracy becomes apparent. 
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and identities in opposition to neoliberalism. Kowal supports this assertion when he notes that 
through their use of “websites, email exchanges and other pluralistic discursive practices,” the 
Zapatista’s online presence has come to “constitute…[a] ‘distinct counter-public sphere.’” He 
also goes on to assert that the Zapatista have used the internet to “carve…out a space to 
question the motives of neoliberal policies…and even experiment with alternative political 
structures” (2002:199).  
Secondly, the Zapatista’s online activity, reach, and communication, have arguably 
played vital roles, on the one hand, in allowing divergent people and groups to come together 
to articulate collective identities and discourses, and on the other hand, in maintaining and 
strengthening the resultant oppositional identities. In relation to this, through email and 
website communications, the Zapatista have been able to make connections with other 
progressive groups from around the world, to network and strengthen their counter-
discourses. Moreover, they have been able to articulate their identities in line with an array of 
anti-neoliberal agendas, in a way that has both strengthened the movement’s discourse, and 
ignited the growth of anti-neoliberal sentiment around the world. In this regard, Ronfeldt and 
his colleagues maintain that “what began as a violent insurgency in an isolated region” soon 
transformed, with the help of the internet, “into a nonviolent though no less disruptive ‘social 
netwar’ that engaged activists from far and wide” (1998:xi). And the continuation of such 
online connections can be seen in websites and blogs of, for example, the ‘Zapatista Solidarity 
Group – Essex’ (http://zapatistaessex.blogspot.com/), the ‘London Mexico Solidarity Group’ 
(http://londonmexicosolidarity.org/), the ‘UK Zapatista Solidarity Network’ 
(http://ukzapatistas.wordpress.com/), and the ‘Edinburgh Chiapas Solidarity Group’ 
(http://edinchiapas.org.uk/) ‒ all of which express support and solidarity with the Zapatista 
and the struggles in Chiapas.
108
 As, Hands suggests, “this interlinking and global perspective” 
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 The Essex group which stands in “solidarity with the Zapatista movement in Mexico and its peoples’ struggle 
for dignity, land, education, human rights and [an] end [to]…exploitation” (2014), claims that the Zapatista’s  
enemies are their enemies, and they use their active blog to connect with other solidarity groups, to raise 
awareness – both online and through the organization of offline events – and to fundraise for the communities in 
Chiapas. The London-based group claims to “facilitate…the exchange between…London and Mexico activist 
communities,” by building “relationships of mutual respect and support with groups resisting neo-liberalism,” in 
the interest of “building another world for all” (2014). This group provides up-to-date information on the current 
situation in Chiapas, and draws attention to upcoming events, meetings, and mobilizations, via its “What’s up” 
link. For example, in October 2013, the site uploaded information related to a “day of Protest, Exchanges  and 
Celebration of Resistance,” to be held in London. This upload provided the date of the event, and presented a 
timeline of activities, including “12h00 -- 14h00 Vigil in Trafalgar Square, 15h00 -- 18h00 Workshops SOAS, 
19h00 -- 23h00 Cultural Event SOAS” (2014). Similarly, the UK Zapatista Solidarity Network aims to “raise 
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offered by the internet allows “different groups to recognise” their commonalities, and 
thereby “construct a sense of shared humanity and identity – something of great significance 
in building movements” (2011:145). Another powerful example of such use of the internet to 
link disparate and diverse groups was seen during the ‘Worldwide Echo Campaign,’ which 
developed in reaction to renewed attacks on the Zapatista by the Mexican government. 
Responding to these attacks, activists from around the world, including the UK-based 
National Campaign against Fees & Cuts, Filipinas for Rights and Empowerment (FiRE), and 
GABRIELA USA in New York,
 109
 used the internet to connect with each other and to declare 
solidarity with, and support for, the Zapatista’s continued struggle. Much of this support was 
expressed online, with powerful written and video messages being added to the campaign.
110
 
This coming together of a variety of disparate and even antagonistic groups, including trade 
unions, indigenous movements, women’s rights activists, human rights activists, gay and 
lesbian activists, environmental activists, and so forth, around calls for democracy (Mora 
2007:65-66), has arguably been facilitated by the Zapatista’s use of the internet, and 
highlights the opportunities that this media has to connect divergent struggles and articulate 
collective identities around criticisms of neoliberalism.  
Thirdly, the Zapatista’s use the internet and new media technologies to contest 
dominant discourses both online and offline has emerged as increasingly significant, and has 
highlighted the capacity of such technology to provide a space for the practice of agonistic 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
awareness about the Zapatista’s ‘other’ politics, from below and from the Left,” while at the same time 
maintaining partnerships with Zapatista communities, and disseminating information not only via their blog, but 
also through offline action. In turn, the Edinburgh Chiapas Solidarity Group aims to “raise awareness of the 
Zapatista struggle and to give practical help wherever possible.” They do this by “organising talks, film 
showings, benefit gigs, street stalls and direct actions as well as publishing articles” (2014). Their active blog 
also provides news on the latest attacks on the Zapatista and the people of Chiapas, and provides information on 
protests and how people can get involved. 
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 GABRIELA is a Filipino “grassroots-based national and international alliance of 250 organizations, 
institutions, desks, and programs” (2014). Campaigning against issues that adversely affect women, GABRIELA 
is named after Gabriala Silang, a Filipino woman who led a regional revolt against Spanish colonizers. Focusing 
on issues such as “landlessness, militarization, the foreign debt crisis and the IMF-WB impositions, GATT-
WTO, anti-people development projects, the denial of women’s health rights, violence against women and 
children, prostitution, trafficking in women and migration,” and so forth, GABRIELA USA struggles for the 
liberation of oppressed Filipino women.  
110
 Another poignant example of such virtual linkages and support was that of the South African social 
movement Abahlali baseMjondolo’s (the Shack Dwellers Movement) YouTube video message, in which two 
organizers stated that “the government wants to create fear in the community. You must be strong…Injustice 
anywhere is injustice everywhere. Your struggle is our struggle” (Davies 2012). 
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conflict and counter-public contestation. Instances of such online contestation that are often 
referred to include the various ‘hacktivist’ techniques used by movement supporters to bring 
attention to the plight of the Mexican indigenous movement. For example, the ‘Electronic 
Disturbance Theatre’ used a number of electronic civil disobedience actions, including 
electronic trespass and blockade, to contest the activities of the Mexican government. 
Furthermore, it “engaged its FloodNet software and invited participation to an international 
set of artists, digerati, and political activists to make an [online] ‘symbolic gesture’ in support 
of Mexico’s Zapatista” (Wray 2003). These politically motivated online acts of disturbance 
illustrate the movement’s use of such media to contest the hegemonic discourses they deem 
undemocratic. Similarly, the movement has used the internet to provide information and to 
coordinate offline protests and activism. Indeed, during the recent Worldwide Echo 
Campaign, online resources, including the campaign’s blog 
(http://sanmarcosavilesen.wordpress.com/), provided multilingual (ten language) access to an 
organizing toolbox through which information, posters, fliers, multimedia resources, and so 
forth, were made available for use by supporters in their online and offline activism. A further 
example of the Zapatista’s online instigation of offline activism can also be seen in their use 
of the internet to assist the contestation of dominant discourses through the support of offline 
protests and actions, both inside Mexico and outside Mexican consulates and embassies 
around the world. While the international protests sparked by the 1997 Acteal massacre are a 
prime example of this (Richardson 2003:100),
111
 further examples would be the 1994 physical 
and electronic “swarm” of civil society and social movement activists from “the United 
States, Canada, and elsewhere into Mexico City and Chiapas” (Ronfeldt et al. 1998:xi),112 the 
London Mexico Solidarity group’s presentation of the Zapatista’s message to the Mexican 
Embassy in London on 27 February 2014, along with the 7 March 2013 handing of a letter to 
the Mexican Embassy in Madrid, Spain, demanding an end to violence and a guarantee of 
human rights in Chiapas, Mexico.
113
 Apart from such online civil disobedience and the related 
online instigation of offline action, the internet has also been used as a site of online 
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 On the 22
nd
 of December 1997, forty-five Tzotzil Indians, including twenty-one women, fifteen children, and 
nine men, were “brutally assassinated by paramilitary forces linked to the official party,” in the town of Acteal in 
the Chenalho district of Mexico (Castillo 2001:11, McLaren 2000:59).  
112
 Once physically in Mexico, these activists met up with other supportive groups, voiced “solidarity with the 
EZLN’s demands,” and called for “non-violent change” (Ronfeldt et al. 1998:xi). 
113
 For more examples of protests in support of the Zapatista, see: Worldwide Campaign. 2014.  
“Worldwide Echo in Support of the Zapatistas.” URL (consulted on 21 November 2014): 
http://sanmarcosavilesen.wordpress.com/worldwide-campaign/. 
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discursive contestation of neoliberal hegemony and undemocratic practices. That is, the use of 
numerous websites (http://www.ezln.org.mx/), blogs 
(https://floweroftheword.wordpress.com/), social network sites 
(https://www.facebook.com/pages/EZLN/), forums (http://www.revleft.com/vb/zapatista-
forum), and so forth, to debate and contest issues related to neoliberalism, democracy, social 
justice and globalization, has not only allowed the Zapatista to share their views with other 
activist groups and movements. In addition, it has also facilitated the progressive engendering 
of “anti-globalist consciousness and activism” around the world (Dahlberg 2007b:137). 
Arguably such evidence of the Zapatista’s use of the internet and social media as a 
space for the creation of counter-publics, the strengthening of oppositional discourses, and the 
contestation of dominant neoliberal discourses, draws attention to the agonistic potential of 
online media, and their ability to function as an online agonistic public space in the 
facilitation of something akin to radical democracy. Moreover, the effect of the use of this 
online agonistic public space on Zapatista offline political orientation can also be discerned. 
Consequently, despite the continuing prevalence of an autonomous approach to democracy at 
the grassroots level of the Zapatista organization, their online approximation of the agonistic 
public space framework alluded to by Dahlberg, highlights their connection to the ideals of 
agonistic democracy ‒ a connection which is becoming increasingly indissociable from the 
movement’s political modus operandi.  
 
4.3.2 Revolutionary Association of Women of Afghanistan (RAWA) 
 
Established in 1977 as an independent social movement of Afghan women, the Revolutionary 
Association of Women of Afghanistan (RAWA) focuses on furthering human rights, social 
justice, and democracy in Afghanistan. Founded by a young student activist named Meena, 
RAWA was initially created as a movement striving for women’s rights and freedom. 
However, in 1978, one year after its formation, the Soviet Union occupied Afghanistan, which 
led to RAWA’s evolution into a movement fighting for women’s and national emancipation 
(Chavis 2003:70), and during the ensuing ten-year occupation, RAWA participated in various 
forms of non-violent protest against the Soviet regime. However, because RAWA’s resistance 
was seen as a threat to the authority of both the Soviet occupiers and Afghan religious 
fundamentalist groups, in 1987 Meena was assassinated, in a collaborative effort between the 
Soviet controlled Afghan secret police and the Islamist fundamentalist group Gulbuddin 
Hekmatyar. Yet, despite the assassination of its leader, and RAWA’s subsequent movement 
underground, the organization did not dissolve but rather continued to grow. Indeed, in “late 
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1996, as the Taliban were taking hold of the majority of Afghanistan and instituting brutal 
reforms,” which included, among other things, “bans on technology and the removal of 
women from all aspects of public life[,]…RAWA entered cyberspace” with their website 
www.rawa.org (Fluri 2006:96).  
Just as the Zapatista have been connected to autonomous democracy, so too, RAWA 
has been connected to the deliberative approach to radical democracy. In this regard, the Oslo 
Centre for Peace and Human Rights maintains that the principles of consensus-based 
decision-making – linked to the idea of deliberative democracy – have been in place for 
centuries in Afghanistan, where they have been practiced through the traditional political 
decision-making structure known as the Jirga (2012).
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 These Jirga have “operated as 
important mechanisms of conflict resolution and have contributed to the maintenance of 
social order in Afghan society” (Westendorp and Wolleswinkel 2005:87). Unfortunately, the 
maintenance of this social order has relegated women and other marginalized groups to the 
periphery of political, economic, social, and cultural life in the country, and it is as a result of 
this marginalization and exclusion that RAWA, as an independent women’s organization, 
emerged. Although the Jirga practice cannot be entirely connected to the idea of deliberative 
democracy ‒ especially in the Habermasian sense of the term ‒ according to which all people 
affected by the decision in question should be involved in the decision-making process ‒ it 
can to some extent be connected to the Rawlsian notion of deliberative democracy. As 
discussed in Chapter Two, this entails the idea that only certain people need to be involved in 
the deliberation process. Yet, notwithstanding RAWA’s isolation, and their general exclusion 
from everyday Afghan life, they too seem to have adopted variants of the historically 
significant Jirga practices. That is, within their organizational activities, they use collective 
discussion and consensus-based decision-making in relation to issues such as movement 
activities, fundraising, conflict resolution, and so forth (Carrington and Griffin 2011:237). 
And it is in this sense, at least, that RAWA can be understood as being informed by 
deliberative democratic ideals. Yet, despite their internal organization around traditional 
deliberative ideas of consensus, further consideration reveals how certain developments in the 
movement’s approach to dealing with prejudice have precipitated increasing openness to the 
ideas of agonism, and this openness is arguably indissociable from their growing use of the 
internet. That is, the movement’s transition into the online arena in the mid-1990s effectively 
opened them up to alternative conceptions of radical democracy, and RAWA’s subsequent 
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 The Jirga comprises of a selected “council of male elders, usually religious scholars or landowners chosen for 
their charismatic characters or their background of social influence” (Westendorp and Wolleswinkel 2005:87).  
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use of the internet and social media to function as something akin to the online agonistic 
public space proposed by Dahlberg, is indicative of their progression toward the democratic 
ideas of agonism. In this regard, RAWA can be connected to the agonistic public space 
framework in three interrelated ways.  
Firstly, to a large extent, RAWA has used the internet as a communicative space 
through which counter-publics can be established and counter-discourses can be fostered. To 
be sure, this women’s and human rights movement has largely been marginalized within 
Afghanistan. However, their website, Facebook page, Twitter account, and affiliated websites 
and blogs ‒ among other online media ‒ have nevertheless provided crucial communication 
spaces for debate and discussion, and the subsequent development of alternative identities and 
oppositional discourses though which to resist the oppressive hegemony of dominant Afghani 
discourses. Thus, although the movement’s physical presence is limited by the police, 
religious authorities, and the government of Afghanistan, the internet has in many ways come 
to comprise a crucial virtual domain for the formation of counter-publics and oppositional 
discourses. 
Secondly, the use of the internet by RAWA, on the one hand, to develop and 
strengthen oppositional discourses, and on the other hand, to support the articulation of 
diverse and dispersed groups into progressive democratic struggles, points toward their 
agonistic use of this medium (Dahlberg 2007b). In relation to this, despite their limited 
physical presence, their localized agenda, and their female-only membership,
115
 RAWA have 
to some extent embraced the internet and social media’s interactivity and reach as a means to 
make connections with other activist groups.
116
 Not only has their internet presence and 
communication allowed for linkages to be made between RAWA and the “pro-democracy and 
progressive forces of Iran, Palestine, Kashmir, Kurdistan, Sudan and other fettered peoples of 
Asia, Africa and Latin America” (RAWA 1998, in Kolhatkar 2006). In addition, various 
local, national and international groups have also self-identified with RAWA through their 
internet and social media presence (Skaine 2002:80). For example, movements such as 
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 Since men are not permitted to be members of RAWA, the plurality of this movement is significantly limited.  
116
 The RAWA website guestbook includes messages of support, and frequently asked questions about the 
movement, from people all over the world, including such diverse places as Colombia, Italy, Uruguay, Australia, 
Mexico, the United States, Belgium, and many others, all of which collectively indicate a coming together of 
different people and groups to support RAWA and their demands for freedom. The “recent post by others” link 
on RAWA’s Facebook page also provides examples of different people coming together to instigate change 
(https://www.facebook.com/RAWA.Afghanistan?fref=ts), in a way that allows for an expansion and elaboration 
on issues of concern. 
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Friends of RAWA in Japan, RAWA Supporters in Santa Barbara, Italy, the United Kingdom, 
Australia, the United States, France, and Germany, along with both the Afghan Women’s 
Mission and FemAid, have all helped to expand RAWA’s counter-discourse to an 
increasingly wide range of social relations. Consequently, their use of the internet has not 
only opened RAWA up to international recognition and support, but it has also given strength 
to the marginalized and previously isolated voices associated with the movement. 
Thirdly, RAWA’s use of the internet, and more recently social media, as a key 
platform for the counter-public contestation of dominant discourses, together with the 
communication and mobilization of movement messages and activism ‒ both online and 
offline ‒ is a further indication of the movement’s connection to the agonistic approach to 
radical democracy. In fact, RAWA’s use of the internet has even been lauded by some as one 
of the “most exciting and significant examples of web activism,” and it has been 
acknowledged for making comprehensive use of the potential of new global media 
technologies (Karatzogianni 2009:65). In particular, Dartnell maintains that “RAWA’s web 
activism [is] an important…venue for criticizing and resisting totalitarian ideology,” and he 
insists that RAWA “embodies the promise of electronic politics,” through its “articulation of a 
counter-discourse to a savage regime, an appeal to global civil society, the ability to witness 
and to resist…and cross-organizational…[and] cross-ideological appeal” (2006:71). An 
important tool in this regard is RAWA’s active website. According to Shabana, a RAWA 
member, the movement’s website “is being visited by hundreds of people daily who use it as 
a base reference: of critical information about women, reports, photos, movie clips etc.,” all 
“from fundamentalist-blighted Afghanistan.” She moreover explains that the website has been 
“nominated and [has] received several prizes for its valuable contents” (cited in Skaine 
2002:80). The movement is also active on their Facebook page 
(https://www.facebook.com/RAWA.Afghanistan ) – RAWA: The Voice of the Voiceless in 
Afghanistan, with over 7402 ‘likes’ (December 2014), and present on the micro-blogging site, 
Twitter (see https://twitter.com/RAWA77 ). Against the backdrop of the above, Fluri 
maintains that cyberspace has emerged as a key space “for RAWA to counter prevailing 
and/or dominant discourses and actions about Afghan women, geopolitics, and governance in 
the emerging Afghan state” (2006:101). This can be seen in RAWA’s online use of emails, 
reports, images, documentation, and videos, to bring attention to the atrocities against women 
committed by the Afghan government, women’s hardships within the country, and to the 
related illegitimacy of US hegemony. Examples of this form of contestation on RAWA’s 
Facebook page are many, and include titles such as the following: “Afghanistan: Child 
Marriage, Domestic Violence Harm Progress,” “In Kabul, Trading Women Like Cattle,” 
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“Former Warlord a Contender in Afghanistan Elections,” and “NATO Air Strike Killed Nine 
Civilians in Afghanistan, including Women, Children.” In this way, RAWA’s use of the 
internet allows them to be actively involved in up-to-date online contestations of dominant 
discourses, the promotion of alternative voices and cultural identities, and the establishment 
of connections with other progressive struggles, all of which serves to encourage new 
knowledge development and advance women’s rights in Afghanistan, and indeed around the 
world. In relation to this, their use of the internet and social media has not only succeeded in 
relaying information and news stories about the injustices experienced in Afghan society to a 
wider global audience. It has also thematized their cause to such an extent that news stories 
related to the counter-discourse and plight of RAWA have appeared in mainstream 
newspapers, news websites, and radio discussions, including The Guardian, The Daily News, 
The Commune, The Boston Globe, The Canberra Times, www.democracynow.org, ABC 
radio, and Uprising radio, among many others.
117
 In addition to such online discursive 
contestation, RAWA has also used the internet to mobilize and organize offline contestations 
in the form of ‘real-world’ protests, meetings, and marches. Examples of such online 
instigation of offline action can be seen on the ‘events’ link of the movement’s Facebook 
page, and on the Home page of the RAWA website.  
Arguably, RAWA’s use of the internet and social media to function as something akin 
to an online agonistic public space is evident in the above examples. As such, notwithstanding 
their grassroots connection to the deliberative ideas of consensus, and despite the presence of 
some non-agonistic features within the movement, the movement’s progression toward a 
greater approximation of the ideas of agonism can be seen in their adoption of various online 
democratic practices. As alluded to earlier, such a progression may be connected, to some 
extent, to McLuhan’s idea that the ‘medium is the message.’ That is, the more RAWA’s use 
of online media opens them up to alternative ideas, the more the reshaping of their socio-
political agenda in the direction of agonism seems to be taking place.   
 
4.3.3 The alter-globalization movement  
 
Although consisting of a wide variety of groups, each with their own agenda and related 
demands, the alter-globalization movement stands together in its criticism of the economic 
policies of neoliberalism ‒ or ‘corporate globalization’ ‒ which have influenced international 
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 For more examples of RAWA representations and articulations in the mass media, see RAWA. 2014. 
“RAWA in the World Media.” URL (consulted 21 November 2014): www.rawa.org/media.htm. 
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trade and development since the latter part of the twentieth century (Maeckelbergh 2009; 
Pleyers 2010). Arguing that the policies of neoliberal globalization have resulted in an 
intensification of poverty, inequality, and anti-democratic practices around the world, the 
alter-globalization movement has played a significant role in shifting the debate surrounding 
the operation of international institutions in trade and development (Smith 2002:207). It has 
also frequently been associated with the 1999 Seattle World Trade Organization (WTO) 
protests – popularly referred to as the ‘Battle of Seattle’ in the mainstream media. In this 
regard, on 30 November 1999, approximately seventy-five thousand people affiliated to anti-
capitalist movements, environmental organizations and NGOs opposed to the WTO, gathered 
outside the Washington State Convention and Trade Centre in Seattle, in response to the on-
going World Trade Organization’s Ministerial Conference, which aimed to launch a new 
round of global trade negotiations. According to Engler, “the Seattle round of trade 
negotiations deadlocked when developing nations, bolstered by grassroots resistance, rejected 
U.S. and European demands” (2007:152). This subversion of WTO policies and trade 
suggestions pointed toward the power of the alter-globalization movement, and highlighted 
the growing influence of the movement on a global scale. And this influence became 
increasingly apparent during the demonstrations in 2000 held against the World Bank and 
International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) promotion of neoliberalism, in Washington D.C. and in 
Prague, respectively. Since then, various meetings, social forums, mobilizations, and protests 
against the negative impact that neoliberal globalization has had on societies around the 
globe, have arisen.  
Inspired to some degree by both the online and offline activities of the Zapatista, the 
alter-globalization movement emerged as a global resistance movement connected to a broad 
array of causes, and has been connected in varying degrees to deliberative, autonomous, and 
agonistic conceptions of radical democracy. However, while the alter-globalization movement 
has been linked to deliberative democracy, insofar as it has been associated with a consensus-
based decision-making process, Maeckelbergh insists that although the movement “makes 
decisions by consensus, at least in principle…complete agreement is rarely the aim” 
(2013:31). This is because the alter-globalization movement has not been created on the basis 
of “a harmonious coming together of diﬀerent political actors,” but is rather founded on the 
understanding that conflict and disagreement are unavoidable (Maeckelbergh 2013:29). For 
her, the alter-globalization movement is instead committed to “creating conﬂictive spaces…in 
which consensus does not imply universal agreement among all participants.” And what this 
entails, she suggests, is the creation of “a decision-making process that actively and 
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continuously challenges hierarchies and power inequalities as they arise” (2013:31).118 Thus, 
although at grassroots level the alter-globalization movement may appear to adopt consensus 
as a form of decision-making, it has been argued that this consensus is by no means the 
‘rational’ consensus pursued through deliberative democracy. Rather, it amounts to something 
more akin to the idea of a “conflictual consensus,” in which, at best, a “common aim” is 
reached for (Mouffe, cited in Miessen 2007:6). An aim orientated around global social justice, 
democracy, and the acceptance of difference. Arguably, it is through such increasing adoption 
of a more agonistic form of ‘conflictual consensus’ that the movement has been rendered ever 
more open to the ideals and practices of agonistic democracy.
119
 In addition to this, since the 
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 In relation to this, in her study of the alter-globalization movement’s politics, Maeckelbergh found that by 
“acknowledging that liberty is linked to the ability to express diﬀerence,” the movement has come to “embrace 
conﬂict as an essential step in resisting the oppressive power of unity.” That is, according to her, viewing the 
idea of unity or complete consensus as a mask for repression and exclusion, the alter-globalization movement 
has adopted an alternative idea of consensus – explicitly linked to the idea of conflict. And in this regard, she 
argues that the fostering of conflict within the movement aims to achieve two objectives. Firstly, “to resist the 
exclusion created by a perceived need for homogeneity,” insofar as the alter-globalization movement actively 
ensures that “within the ‘open spaces’ they create, no requirement of ideological conformity develops.” 
Secondly, to “create conﬂictive spaces to ensure that they remain continuously open to new ideas, new places, 
new practices, as well as open to the development of new movement goals as part of a perpetual learning 
process” (2013:30). Consequently, under the ‘consensus’ of the alter-globalization movement, “diﬀerences in 
opinion are not resolved through deliberation to ﬁnd the one best solution, nor is the aim to achieve universal 
agreement through lengthy discussion.” Instead, a non-deliberative approach to conﬂict has been adopted by the 
movement; that is, an “idea that conﬂict does not necessarily need to be resolved and that, at times, it is better to 
leave conﬂict unresolved” (Maeckelbergh 2013:32). Correlatively, Maeckelbergh asserts that, “for most 
movement actors conflict is not something to be avoided, but something to be desired for its constructive 
potential” (2009), because it is seen as a necessary prerequisite for the movement’s engendering of diversity and 
plurality. 
119
 In addition to its connection to the ideas of deliberative democracy, the movement has also been associated 
with the autonomous democracy expounded by Hardt and Negri (Pleyers 2010; Sparke 2012). Yet, despite many 
of its affiliates’ criticism of neoliberalism, and their subsequent suspicion of institutions which propagate 
dominant neoliberal discourses, autonomy is by no means the only political dynamic at play. Rather, concerns 
related to ethnic subordination, minority rights, environmental degradation, and social justice, among other 
things (Miller 2013:516), continue to provide impetus for the emergence of an array of strategies, many of which 
are orientated around forming coalitions with progressive civic, political, and institutional entities. To be sure, 
while autonomy remains an important focus of many of the groups within the movement, Ponniah (2005) insists 
that “plenty of alter-globalization activists view alliances with progressive political leaders on strategic issues 
favourably” (cited in Pleyers 2010:248). Perhaps the best example of the alter-globalization movement’s 
openness to the positive role that institutions can play, can be seen in its participation in the World Social Forum, 
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emergence of the alter-globalization movement coincided, in many respects, with the public’s 
growing access to the internet and the numerous communication opportunities that it offered, 
their widespread use of the medium as a site of discursive struggle in support of the 
marginalized further highlights the movement’s connection to ideas of online democratic 
agonism. In particular, the internet’s support of such agonistic democratic politics can be seen 
in three distinct ways.  
Firstly, the internet has been used by the alter-globalization movement to provide 
communicative spaces through which counter-publics can be nurtured and formed. In this 
regard, websites, blogs, mailing lists, and so forth, have enabled the discussions and debates 
necessary for oppositional discourses to develop and for counter-publics to emerge. For 
example, the ‘StopWTO’ online distribution list, which supplied vast numbers of people with 
detailed information on the different problematic aspects of the WTO (George 2000:2), was a 
major rallying point for the movement. This list, as well as other alternative websites and 
mailing lists, have not only opened up opportunities for information transfer and the spread of 
movement news, but have also encouraged open participation through interactive features that 
facilitate the formation of counter-discourses and counter-public identities (Downey and 
Fenton 2003; Langman 2005; Dahlberg 2007b).
120
 Another example of the use of cyberspace 
to establish and connect online cyber-publics, can be seen in alter-globalization movement 
groups’ use of ‘shared communication’ tactics (comunicação compartilhada) during the first 
World Social Forum (WSF) in Brazil. That is, in order to allow participants of the WSF to 
freely share information and content with groups and people not physically present at the 
Forum, Brazilian and other Latin American activists created a publishing website called 
Ciranda (www.ciranda.net). Ciranda not only allowed independent media centers to gain 
access to the event proceedings and information, but also allowed “activists from different 
parts of the world to come together, creating spaces of sociality that encouraged dialogue and 
a sense of common purpose” (Stephansen 2012). These shared communicative spaces, 
Stephansen maintains, allowed for the subsequent “development of permanent activist 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
an annual meeting of civil society organizations aimed at strengthening the counter-hegemony of the alter-
globalization struggle. 
120
 For example, Indymedia ‒ an online independent media center established just before the 1999 WTO protests 
in Seattle  ‒ offers activists an ‘open’ and ‘participatory’ online media platform which is distanced from 
corporate and mainstream media representations (Pickerill 2007:2669). Viewing media production as a ‘many-
to-many’ process, indymedia.org emerged as “a critical resource for [alter-globalization] activists and audiences 
around the world, providing an extraordinary bounty of news reports and commentaries, first-person narratives, 
longer analyses, links to activist resources, and interactive discussion opportunities from around the world” 
(Kidd 2003:50).   
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networks and the idea of a politics and practice of shared communication” (2012). In short, 
this shared communication site ‒ as well as others such as www.wsftv.net (an online video 
platform) and www.forosocialradios.org (an online radio platform) ‒ on the one hand, 
facilitated online communication between movement groups and supporters. On the other 
hand, they also offered opportunities for “activists from different movement backgrounds to 
exchange knowledge and experience, and construct relations of solidarity,” and through such 
means form counter-public identities (Stephansen 2012).  
Secondly, websites such as Ciranda have allowed previously unconnected groups to 
develop articulations of such collective identities in opposition to the current extension of 
globalization.
121
 Van Laer and Van Aelst elaborate on this idea when they posit that, as a 
result of “the open network of the Internet, a diverse range of activists, groups and social 
movement organizations…[have] loosely knit[ted] together and coalesce[d] in coordinated 
actions against the WTO summit both offline, in the streets, as well as online, in cyberspace” 
(2010:1147). And Dahlgren argues similarly that the internet “has helped facilitate the growth 
of massive, coordinated digital networks of activists,” of which the alter-globalization 
movement is perhaps the most salient manifestation (2003:6). In this regard, websites and 
social media pages connected to campaigns such as the Alternative International and the 
People’s Assemblies network, among many others, have all provided opportunities for online 
communication and interaction, and the subsequent articulation of the respective discourses of 
previously unconnected human rights activists, environmentalists, anti-capitalists, social 
justice movements, animal rights activists, and many other progressive struggles (Downey 
and Fenton 2003; Langman 2005; Dahlberg 2007b). That is, on the one hand, Alternatives 
International (http://www.alterinter.org/) is made up of “social and political movements 
struggling against social injustices, neoliberalism, imperialism and war,” and aims to build 
“solidarity between social movements at the local, national and international level” (2013). 
On the other hand, the People’s Assemblies Network (www.peoplesassemblies.org) provides 
an “informative and resource platform to support the ongoing democracy protests and open, 
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 Despite the array of differences that exist between the alter-globalization movement groups, instances of 
agonism emerge when the rights, wants, and demands of, for example, an environmental group, are seen as equal 
and inextricably linked to, the rights, wants, and demands of every other group in the movement, be they 
workers’ groups, anti-capitalist groups, or feminist groups. Thus, although the various groups have a diverse list 
of objectives and agendas, they have largely been able to accept each other as ‘friendly’ adversaries in a broader 
fight against neoliberal globalization, and for social justice and democracy. According to Bennett, this diversity 
has largely been “facilitated and afforded by the use of new communication technologies that enable activists to 
exchange information and coordinate actions across geographical and ideological divides” (2003:24). 
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democratic assemblies in the UK, Europe and throughout the world” (2014). Campaigning for 
‘real democracy,’ the People’s Assemblies Network thus offers opportunities for collaboration 
on issues related to: closures, evictions, and job losses; democracy and rights; climate change; 
opposing war and the secret state; struggles against racism and attacks on minority 
communities; building links with movements internationally; and creating a new democratic 
society through a transfer of economic and political power. 
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Thirdly, apart from encouraging and facilitating the articulation of a variety of 
divergent democratic groups and the strengthening of oppositional discourses, the internet has 
also emerged as a space for the counter-public contestation of dominant discourses (Dahlberg 
2007b:135). Indeed, the alter-globalization movement’s use of the internet to develop 
conflictual online spaces designed, on the one hand, to discursively contest the hegemony of 
neoliberal globalization, and on the other hand, to instigate offline challenges and protests in 
real time and space, provide further examples of the radically democratic dynamics of its 
online media use. To begin with, a good example of their online discursive contestation and 
activism is, of course, the ‘denial of service’ (DOS) action implemented by the Electrohippies 
Collective during the WTO ministerial conference in 1999. By hosting a ‘virtual sit in,’ this 
collective was able to jam the WTO internet network by flooding it with requests (Dyer-
Witheford 2002:152). According to the Electrohippies, approximately 450 000 people 
participated in the action over five days, and together they succeeded in disrupting, slowing 
down, and even halting the WTO conference network (Electrohippies 2000; Jordan and 
Taylor 2004). In addition to this, Dyer-Witheford highlights how “other activists constructed 
a bogus WTO site – www.gatt.org…mimicking its logos and typeface, but announcing [that] 
‘The WTO’s purpose is to broaden and enforce their will against democratic governments’” 
(2002:152). In a similar example of such online contestation, an anti-World Trade 
Organization group attempted to hijack traffic away from the original WTO website, 
www.wtoseattle.org, by creating a similar www.seattlewto.org site, which led to significant 
confusion among would-be delegates. And this confusion was compounded by a group known 
as the ‘Critical Arts Ensemble,’ which “introduce[d] electronic viruses, worms and [email] 
bombs into various data banks and programs in institutional networks” (Stewart et al. 
2012:167). Additionally, protest websites, alternative media sites (such as Indymedia), and 
other petition sites, all provided online opportunities for contestation and activism, which 
sought ‒ often through affective statements ‒ to compound the above confusion, and thereby 
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 More recent examples of such online articulations, and correlative formations of counter-hegemonic fronts, 
can be seen in the latest waves of alter-globalization affiliated protests (Nail 2013:21), including the Arab Spring 
uprisings and the 15M or Spanish Indignados movement. 
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derail the economistic logic upon which the conference rested. And such online civil 
disobedience has been deemed democratically legitimate by proponents of agonistic online 
thought, on account of its aim to contest the discursive hegemony of neoliberal globalization.  
Apart from such online discursive contestation and politically motivated electronic 
civil disobedience, the internet and new media technologies have also been used by the alter-
globalization movement to communicate, coordinate, and mobilize offline protests and 
actions. The powerful effects of such mobilizations were evinced, for example, in April 2001, 
when tens of thousands of people rallied in Quebec, Canada, against the creation of a Free 
Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA). Similarly, in July 2001, some three hundred thousand 
protesters gathered for an anti-neoliberal demonstration outside of the G8 meetings in Genoa, 
Italy, while the same number met in Barcelona, in March 2002, at the European summit. 
Further examples include the one million activists who gathered in Florence to mark the 
closing of the first European Social Forum, and the approximately twelve million people in 
over five hundred cities across the world who protested on 15 February 2003, in reaction to 
the impending US invasion of Iraq (Pleyers 2010:8).
123
 In this regard, in his article “Net-
activism and the Emergence of Global Civic Cultures,” (2003) Dahlgren draws attention to 
ATTAC (www.attac.org) and its role in the online instigation and facilitation of offline alter-
globalization action. Active from the original protests in Seattle onward, ATTAC 
continuously draws attention to the alter-globalization movement’s message that ‘Another 
World is Possible,’ and focuses on creating worldwide activism against a variety of issues. 
These include international campaigns for a Europe-wide coordinated levy on wealth, 
campaigns related to the closing down of casino economies, campaigns for social and 
democratic rights in Europe, and campaigns for fiscal and economic unions. Using their main 
website www.attac.org, as well as the virtual domains of other regionally-and nationally-
based chapters virtual domains (e.g. www.attac.at, www.attac.es), ATTAC provides 
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 The positive impact of the alter-globalization movement’s demonstrations outside of international financial 
institutions on the cohesion of disparate groups around a common cause, has received significant thematization. 
However, according to Engler, these are “only the most highly publicized manifestations of a much broader body 
of action taking place at the local and national levels” (2007:152). Some of these mobilizations include the mass 
organization of civil society in Argentina, following the country’s economic breakdown in 2001, the fight 
against development of hydroelectric dams in India in 1991, the strikes by unions in South Korea in 1996, 
Indonesian protests following the 1997 Asian financial crisis, the struggle against water privatization in Bolivia 
in 2000 and in South Africa in 2002, African struggles to gain access to low-cost generic AIDS drugs in 2003, 
demonstrations in Central America against the implementation of trade agreements with the United States in the 
early 1990s, and the actions of the landless farmers movement (MST) in Brazil between 1995 and 1999, among 
others (Engler 2007:152). 
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information related to their various campaigns, and explanations on how people can get 
involved, along with links to the thirty-eight ATTAC groups situated around the world. These 
sites also provide protest material, including flyers, posters, legal documents, and news 
related to the various protests (2014).  
 From the above examination it becomes evident that the alter-globalization 
movement’s use of the internet and social media can largely be connected to the ideas of the 
agonistic public space framework highlighted by Dahlberg, and, as such, offers intriguing 
insight into the potential of such media to facilitate the practical implementation of Laclau 
and Mouffe’s radical democratic theory. Admittedly, since the movement is largely 
conflictual and accepting of difference, it is inevitable that at a grassroots, ‘real-world’ level, 
it will entail a combination of deliberative, autonomous, and agonistic democratic approaches. 
However, since their use of the internet can largely be considered agonistic, due to its 
functioning as an online agonistic public space, and because ‒ as McLuhan insists ‒ new 
technologies can reshape and alter our cultural and socio-political lives, it is plausible that 
through recourse to such cyber-means the alter-globalization movement is progressively 
becoming more open to the ideas and dynamics of agonism. 
 
4.3.4 The Occupy movement 
 
In September 2011, inspired by an online call from Adbusters to ‘Occupy Wall Street,’ a few 
thousand people gathered unexpectedly in Zuccotti Park, New York, to protest against the 
unflagging social and economic inequality experienced around the world today.
124
 Under the 
slogan ‘We are the 99%,’ the activists staged non-violent protests to highlight the unhealthy 
relationship between politics and Wall Street, along with the one-sided capitalist economic 
structure, whereby the concentration of the America’s wealth can be found among the top 1% 
of society ‒ leaving the remaining 99% at a disadvantage. Following the online call to action, 
an encampment was set up in the park with hundreds of people occupying the public space 
and demonstrating for democracy. Partly inspired by the various protests, demonstrations, and 
revolutions that had recently occurred in North Africa, the Middle East, and Europe, Occupy 
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 On 13 July 2011 Adbusters, a Canadian cultural journal, called for citizens to “Occupy Wall Street” in a 
peaceful protest against corporate influence on democracy. Their website stated that “on September 17, we want 
to see 20,000 people flood into lower Manhattan, set up tents, kitchens, peaceful barricades and occupy Wall 
Street for a few months. Once there, we shall incessantly repeat one simple demand in a plurality of 
voices…DEMOCRACY NOT CORPORATOCRACY” (Adbusters 2011). For the original Adbusters call to 
action, see: https://www.adbusters.org/blogs/adbusters-blog/occupywallstreet.html.  
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Wall Street ‒ which rapidly spread to over five hundred US cities ‒ went viral through social 
networks such as Facebook and Twitter, and the Occupy movement was born. Consequently, 
by October 2011, Occupy had already become a global movement, reaching nearly every 
continent, and inspiring citizens in over 1500 cities to take to the streets to voice their 
discontent with the inequality produced by unregulated global neoliberal capitalism (Jackson 
2012:xv). 
As one of the most recent manifestations of mass political protests and social 
movement activism, the Occupy movement and its connected political practices have emerged 
as a topic of deep interest to scholars of deliberative, autonomous, and agonistic radical 
democracy. Accordingly, some theorists have linked the Occupy movement to a deliberative 
form of radical democracy (Lang and Levitsky 2012; Kegley and Skowronski 2013), on 
account of its relation to the issue of consensus. However, recent research has revealed that 
the large majority of the movement’s members have advanced only a modified and partial 
form of consensus as a goal worth pursuing. This has resulted from the recognition that due to 
the plurality of the groups involved, and the significant differences between them, complete 
consensus is neither achievable nor even desirable (Castells 2012:181). In relation to this, 
Caperchi notes that consensus within the movement is more likened to a “temporary 
collective decision” (2011). And evidence of this agonistic form of decision-making can be 
seen in the movement’s general assemblies (GA), and working groups – or groups of people 
working on projects related to different topics (for example food, sanitation, women’s issues, 
etc.). Similar to the Zapatista and alter-globalization movements’ internal organization, the 
Occupy movement established ‘general assemblies’ as decision-making bodies for on-site 
communication and contestation. In short, a general assembly is an open meeting usually held 
once a day, where issues related to the movement are discussed and debated. Everyone 
present at the GA can participate, make proposals, suggest actions, or confront certain issues. 
These assemblies can be “very confrontational,” since “their participants hail from disparate 
political positions on the ideological spectrum, from the liberal to the anarchist” (Caperchi 
2011). Consequently, the Occupy movement’s decision-making process has been more 
closely linked to the agonistic conception of ‘conflictual consensus,’ in which the attainment 
of consensus forms part of the political process only insofar as it is “seen as [a] temporary 
respite in an ongoing confrontation” (Mouffe 1999b:755).125 In this way, the movement “does 
not seek to absorb different political identities into a rational consensus” – as in deliberative 
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 Caperchi also notes that the conflictual consensus, or compromise, that has often been reached in the GAs of 
the Occupy movement, is therefore “a contingent one: the product of temporary and negotiated discursive 
articulations and the child of an open, egalitarian and participatory democratic procedure” (2011). 
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democracy – but instead endeavors to “accommodate difference 
temporarily…through...confrontation” (Caperchi 2011). Importantly, possibly because the 
Occupy movement was essentially started on the internet, openness to agonistic ‘conflictual 
consensus’ is similarly seen in the online versions of such general assemblies. In particular, 
http://www.nycga.net ‒ the official website of the New York City General Assembly (NYGA) 
‒ is a prime example of this.126  
In addition, the Occupy movement has also been occasionally linked to the 
autonomous democratic approach, because as an anti-capitalist movement, it has been 
understood as adopting an autonomous anti-institutional and anti-political stance. However, 
although largely supportive of calls for a rejection of the neoliberal agendas which promote 
the status quo, the Occupy movement is made up of a variety of different people and groups, 
many of whom do not support thoroughly autonomous politics. According to Singhem, for 
example, the more liberal members of the movement are not totally against 
institutionalization, and instead see the Occupy movement as offering a possibility to achieve 
“progressive legislation, either by pressuring politicians to pass reforms or by electing 
Democrats or independent candidates to office” (2011).127 Thus, although the movement has 
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 According to the ‘About’ section of the NYGA website, the site is responsible for “organiz[ing] and set[ting] 
the vision for the #occupywallstreet movement” (2014a). Moreover, minutes of the general assembly meetings 
were posted online at nycga.net and meetings were also livestreamed, allowing participants from around the 
world to track the meetings in real time. Some meetings were also “archived online in audio and video formats” 
(Massey and Snyder 2012), while some “congregants also livetweeted the assemblies under Twitter handles such 
as @DiceyTroop and @LibertySqGA.” These accounts, Massey and Snyder maintain, “attracted thousands of 
followers, many of whom responded to live events, adding a layer of online conversation that augmented the 
face-to-face assemblies” (2012). Similarly, working group information can also be found online at NYCGA, 
because “nearly every working group had a page with a blog, activity wall, shared documents and event 
calendar, and discussion forum involving members who had never attended the face-to-face meetings” (Massey 
and Snyder 2012). 
127
 Another example of this can be seen in the movement’s demand to revoke the Citizens United Supreme Court 
verdict (Schwartz 2011:4), which “gave corporations the right to provide political parties with campaign support 
without creating an obligation for either party to disclose this support” (Owsley 2012:20). Accordingly some 
authors maintain that “occupiers contested that this precedent created the potential for conflicts of interest among 
politicians receiving support from corporate interests, thus providing wealthy business interests with a potential 
mechanism through which to manipulate policy” (Owsley 2012:20). In relation to this demand, House 
Representative, Ted Deutch (2011) introduced the OCCUPIED amendment (Outlawing Corporate Cash 
Undermining the Public Interest in our Elections and Democracy), which states that “the rights protected by the 
Constitution of the United States are the rights of natural persons and do not extend to for-profit corporations, 
limited liability companies, or other private entities established for business purposes,” thereby cancelling the 
Citizens United ruling (Deutch 2011).  
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been connected to the autonomous ideas of anti-institutionalism, various scholars have also 
drawn attention to its increasing focus on the promotion of new forms of international 
institutions to “regulate international law, trade, environmental protection, and real 
development” (Jackson 2012:158). Correlatively, they have also highlighted the movement’s 
increasing non-adherence to autonomous democratic principles. Furthermore, Owsley’s 
assertion that “occupiers claim to be embodying the set of alternative institutions that they 
wish to see implanted in place of that system which they reject” (2012:16), indicates the 
dynamic democratic orientation of the movement. As such, although deliberative and 
autonomous elements will no doubt continue within the grassroots politics of the Occupy 
movement, growing evidence of its increasing openness to alternative, more agonistic ideas of 
democracy, continues to emerge. Such connection to, and increasing progression toward, 
agonistic democracy can most clearly be seen within the online communications of the 
movement. Indeed, the Occupy movement’s use of the internet to function as something akin 
to an online agonistic public space, is evinced by their approximation of Dahlberg’s threefold 
framework.  
Firstly, through operating in various online domains, the Occupy movement has 
succeeded in creating multiple communicative spaces in which debate and discussion can 
occur, and through which counter-publics and oppositional discourses can be formed. In 
relation to this, Massey and Snyder maintain that the Occupy movement managed to establish 
“online presences unmatched in the history of social action, leveraging multiple online spaces 
to…generate distinctive counter-public[s] and alternative policy” (2012). In particular, 
various websites, social networking sites, video and photo sharing sites, online chat rooms, 
forums, and wiki-coding sites, all opened up opportunities for discussions and debates 
surrounding issues important to the movement. Indeed, websites such as Occupywallst.org, in 
addition to NYCGA.net discussed earlier, emerged as important communicative spaces for the 
movement. Occupywallst.org was created as one of the initial Occupy movement websites in 
July 2011. Calling for people to fight “back against the corrosive power of major banks and 
multinational corporations over the democratic process” (Occupy Wall Street 2014b), the 
website provides access to the latest news concerning Occupy actions and events, and 
encourages communication and discussion via its open forum and chat features. Similarly, 
Facebook ‒ one of the largest and most popular public online spaces ‒ emerged as a 
significant platform for the Occupy movement, and spread the movement’s ideas and 
discourse throughout user-generated social networks. In this regard, the Facebook profile 
https://www.facebook.com/OccupyWallSt, currently has over 667 372 ‘likes,’ while 
https://www.facebook.com/OccupyTogether, has over 263 167 ‘likes’ (December 2014), and 
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hence arguably provide a platform for counter-publics to emerge and counter-discourses to 
develop.
128
 
Secondly, in addition to harnessing the internet’s ability to provide multiple spaces for 
counter-public expansion and counter-discourse development, the Occupy movement has also 
embraced the internet and social media’s ability to function as a platform for the networking 
and articulation of diverse, dispersed, and often conflictual, identities and discourses. “These 
virtual spaces, even more than city parks,” became “points of encounter where previously 
unrelated individuals aggregated to form popular assemblies” (Massey and Snyder 2012). In 
particular, InterOccupy, an online platform dedicated to fostering “communication between 
individuals, Working Groups and local General Assemblies, across the movement” 
(InterOccupy 2014a), has helped to connect divergent activists from around the world, and 
engendered conversations between a variety of different yet connected movements, including 
anarchists, environmentalists, trade unions, LGBT groups, labor unions, and feminist 
movements, to name but a few.
129
 Focused on “linking up working groups across the 
movement and coordinating direct actions,” InterOccupy facilitates the development of 
numerous articulations between various groups, and in this way allows for the strengthening 
of often marginalized oppositional voices.
130
 Indeed, according to their website, this network 
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 Another online space which added to the communicative abilities of the movement was the microblogging 
site Twitter. According to Juris, Twitter emerged as a particularly important online public space, “especially 
during #Occupy’s initial mobilisation phase” (2012:261). And in relation to the occupation of Wall Street’s 
Liberty Plaza, Massey and Snyder insist that Twitter’s “instantaneous syndication” played a valuable role in 
communicating “time-sensitive news,” with its “140-character message limit…well suited to the mobile devices 
that predominated in Liberty Plaza” (2012).  
129
 From anarchists to unionists, socialists to liberal leftists, and students to the unemployed (Janda et al. 
2014:29), differences between the divergent groups in terms of ideologies, agendas, and objectives are 
understood as inherent and inescapable. These differences are, however, not seen to be restrictive or 
undermining, but have rather been embraced as an important part of the movement’s democratic process. 
Maeckelbergh corroborates this idea when she advances that “diversity is not [seen as] a problem that needs to 
be resolved,” but is instead “treated as a desirable characteristic for the polity, one that should be embraced and 
encouraged” (2012). 
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 These connections are achieved in three ways. Firstly, InterOccupy encourages the development of local 
working group ‘committees of correspondence’ and provides free and easy access to the contact details of all 
such committees (e.g. Austin, TX – interocc@occupyaustin.org – (956) 655-8551). Secondly, their Occupy 
Directory provides an online digital map of the various Occupy movements around the world. By moving one’s 
cursor/mouse over the town or country that one would like to connect with, and selecting the link, one is able to 
access contact details, addresses, and online resources. For example, by hovering over and thereby selecting the 
Occupy Colombo link on the map, the user is given access to the Occupation website, the email address, the 
Twitter account, and the Facebook account. Finally, InterOccupy provides access to various InterOccupy Hubs. 
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allows for the development of “coalitions,” and connects “occupiers on a wide range of social 
problems from anti-war, college debt, internet freedom, [and] the foreclosure crisis, to getting 
money out of politics, among many other issues” (2014a). In another example, 
Occupytogether.org focuses on the idea that ‘we find commonality within our diversity,’ and 
is made up of a collection of independent activist groups and movements, all of whom give 
advice on how to connect with other activists, get involved, mobilize, and spread the word of 
the Occupy movement. This site provides access to a variety of spaces and places on the 
internet where people are connecting, chatting, holding meetings, debating, and ultimately 
strengthening the discursive momentum of the movement. Similarly, other forums such as the 
Occupy Wall Street Open Forum (http://occupywallst.org/forum/), Occupy Café 
(http://www.occupycafe.org/), and the Hip Forum’s Occupy movement thread 
(http://www.hipforums.com/newforums/forumdisplay.php?f=633), also provide spaces for the 
articulation of a range of diverse people and groups, who come together to discuss movement 
objectives, actions and organization, and to participate in strengthening counter-discourses 
and oppositional identities. In this regard, discussions range from issues related to democracy 
and capitalism, to climate change concerns, and hundreds of people are active on the sites 
each day. The Occupy Wall Street Forum is particularly active, with some posts receiving 
over five hundred comments.
131
 Online live streaming sites, such as occupystreams.org, have 
also allowed for connections to be made by live streaming video from offline occupations, 
camps, protests, and so forth. Occupystreams.org provided access to over two hundred live 
video streams, with some examples including: Global Revolution 
(http://occupystreams.org/channels/globalrevolution/) with 70.69 million total views, Live-
Action-Spilno-TV (http://occupystreams.org/channels/live-action-spilno-tv/) with 2.01  
                                                                                                                                                                                     
These hubs “allow anyone to use a set of organizing tools for coordinating large-scale projects easily for [the] 
greatest impact and reach” (2014b). These hubs are related to a number of topics including action 
(@occupytheeconomy), issues (@OccupyHomes), regional (@Occupy Middle East), and projects (@Reclaim).  
131
 This activity, it can be argued, is indicative of significant dialogue and contestation taking place on the site. 
Under the discussion titles ‘The Alternative to Capitalism,’ participants debate the impact of capitalism and 
contest various alternatives to the current economic order (http://occupywallst.org/forum/the-alternative-to-
capitalism/ 2014). In another example, 528 comments have been made on the discussion titled ‘Climate Change 
Is Happening Now – A Carbon Price Must Follow,’ in which issues related to carbon taxes, deforestation, 
alternative energy and the impact of all of the above on the consumer and the 99% are debated.
 
Occupy Talk 
(http://occupytalk.org) is another example of an online voice chat room, which uses the open source Mumble 
application to allow people from around the world to connect, chat, and hold meetings related to the movement’s 
activities and organization. 
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million views, and Occupy Israel (http://occupystreams.org/channels/occupyisrael/) with over 
32 600 views. This live streaming occurred in collaboration with live chat feeds connected to 
the videos, which enabled participants viewing the streams to communicate and interact 
‘virtually’ with those on the ground.  
Thirdly, since the Occupy movement grew as a movement representative of the 99% 
who are suffering under the neoliberal hegemony of the 1%, online communications and 
activity tended to criticize and call into question current dominant discourses related to 
corporate economic power, and its influence on politics. This use of the internet and social 
media to confront dominant discourses can be seen in the online activism of email discussions 
and lists (e.g. Occupy Boston mailing list), blogs (e.g. occupytogether.org/blog, 
http://pmarcuse.wordpress.com http://wearethe99percent.tumblr.com/), social networks (e.g. 
https://www.facebook.com/OccupyWallSt, https://www.facebook.com/InterOccupy?fref=ts, 
#occupy on Twitter), and alternative media (e.g. http://citybeat.com, villagevoice.com, 
http://americanindependent.com/,  austinchronicle.com). For example, contestation of various 
dominant discourses can be found on the Occupy Wall Street’s Open Forum. Discussion titles 
such as “The Case Against Capitalism,” and “The Stealthy, Ugly Growth of Corporatized 
Medicine,” among many others, are indicative of a rejection of current neoliberal dynamics, 
and a call for alternative ways of life. Social networking sites such as Facebook have also 
been used to discuss and contest various ideas related to neoliberalism, including, for 
example, issues surrounding minimum wage, corporatization, debt, housing and land 
ownership, genetically modified foods, and environmental degradation. In addition to this 
online discursive contestation, the internet has also been used for the online instigation of 
offline action. Indeed, since the initial online call from Adbusters to Occupy Wall Street, the 
Occupy movement has continued to use the internet and new media technologies to initiate, 
organize, and coordinate offline contestations. This can be seen in the communications and 
mobilizations of various offline protests and marches in cities around the world, from Albany, 
Atlanta, and Bristol, to Cape Town, Cairo, and Lisbon, among thousands more. At the same 
time, the use of social media and the internet resulted in the generation of specific types of 
social and political interaction, which stimulated the “aggregation of large numbers of 
individuals in concrete physical places” (Juris 2012:266). And this resulted in the numerous 
sit-ins and encampments in Zucotti Park, Taksim Gezi Park, outside St Paul’s Cathedral in 
London, in Ngaba, Tibet, and in other cities around the world.
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 This online instigation of 
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 Poignant examples of this online instigation of action are also evident in the variety of online organized 
offline protests that have emerged around the world, including Occupy Wall Street (667 372 Facebook 
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offline opposition remains a key characteristic of the Occupy movement, and their effective 
use of social media ‒ in particular social networking ‒ to gather vast amounts of people to 
protest in particular places, is indicative of the movement’s use of the internet to strengthen 
and grow counter-public presences and reach. Moreover, the movement’s widespread use of 
the internet and social media to spread their message resulted in months of mainstream media 
coverage of their related events, protests, ideas, and actions, which has drawn significant 
attention to, and engendered further support for, the movement. 
Based on the above discussion it becomes apparent that the Occupy movement, 
although partially reflective of both deliberative and autonomous democratic ideas, is neither 
primarily deliberative nor autonomous in orientation. Rather, as a result of their online 
instigation of debate, counter-public articulation, discursive contestation and democratic 
participation, they have used the internet to function as something akin to an online agonistic 
public space. And through doing so, they have indicated the potential of their internet use to 
help realize a version of Laclau and Mouffe’s conception of radical democracy. 
 
4.4 Conclusion  
 
Agonistic radical democracy evidently resonates strongly with the politics underlying much 
of the above protests and activisms, and an agonistic approach is particularly evident in the 
various movements’ use of the internet and social media as sites for communication, 
contestation, and mobilization. Indeed, as illustrated above, the internet has been used as 
something akin to an online agonistic public space, in which, firstly, counter-publics can be 
created and counter-discourses can be nurtured, secondly, politically diverse groups can come 
together to network and develop articulations of effective oppositional discourses, and thirdly, 
the contestation of dominant discourses and anti-democratic hegemonies can occur. And since 
these three dynamics resonate strongly with Laclau and Mouffe’s radical democratic ideas, 
related arguments concerning the potential of such internet use to promote agonistic ideas of 
radical democracy and left-wing hegemony, are compelling. Admittedly, the influence of 
deliberative and autonomous forms of radical democracy within these social movements’ 
grassroots political organization can often be detected. But, at the same time, evidence exists 
of their progression toward a primarily agonistic approach via their respective uses of the 
internet as a space for agonistic forms of communication, organization and contestation. In 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
members), Occupy Germany (37 848 Facebook members), and Occupy Gezi (64 609 Facebook members) 
(December 2014). 
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this regard, the examples discussed above illustrate the promising effectiveness of cumulative 
connections, and point toward the immense potential of online agonistic public spaces to 
contribute toward the creation of what Laclau and Mouffe would call left-wing hegemony. 
This is all the more so because, while the primacy of agonism in online expressions of radical 
democracy has emerged, as discussed, there is also an increasing isomorphism between this 
online agonism and offline agonistic challenges to the status quo. However, it is important to 
note that although online spaces of discussion and debate have provided these movements 
with opportunities to connect to each other, organize protest, and confront dominant 
discourses, it has also become evident that the extension of online conversations into real-
world public debate is imperative, in order to solidify and strengthen the hegemony of the 
leftist struggle. 
Recent research into the agonistic use of the internet has, of course, not been oblivious 
to the role that this medium plays in “facilitating administrative power, flows of capital, 
liberal-consumer logics,” and the promotion and propagation of dominant discourses, which 
“shut down” and exclude alternative and oppositional counter-public voices (Dahlberg 
2007b:143). Furthermore, issues related to power, inequality, and discursive hegemony in the 
online area have likewise materialized. Examples of this can be seen in concerns related to the 
replication of offline power inequalities online, which have led to questions over the value of 
the internet to support the development of radical democracy. In this regard, Murdock and 
Golding argue that irregularities connected to offline socio-cultural and economic elements 
result in the creation of disparity online (2004:253). And the problems with this inequality are 
not simply related to individual access and skills – as a result of the digital divide – but also, 
more importantly, relate to how such inequalities in access determine how discourses are 
nurtured online.
133
 In a similar vein, questions surrounding the effectiveness of counter-
discourse development and discursive contestation within online spaces that have been 
structured by corporations supportive of dominant discourses ‒ for example, Facebook and 
Twitter ‒ have also emerged. Thus, problems related to how marginalized discourses are 
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 According to Dahlberg, since ideas related to overcoming the digital divide are “often part of the dominant 
discourse of capitalist consumer relations and liberal-individualist politics” (2007a:838), calls for the provision 
of universal internet access may ultimately act to support dominant discourses by encouraging individual need 
satisfaction, by “facilitating economic and political market transaction,”  and by “attracting people into spaces of 
liberal capitalist practice while obscuring…[the] structuring of online space, the associated asymmetries of 
power and the lack of any significant institutional change” (2007a:838). As such, rather than simply focusing on 
a lack of access or skills as the reason for limited political activity or discursive contestation, issues related to the 
extent to which resource inequality impacts on online discourse development, also need to be considered. 
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being nurtured online, and whether or not these ‘counter-discourses’ are being ‘re-
marginalized’ by dominant capitalist online discourses, have brought overly optimistic views 
of the radical democratic value of the internet into question. Consequently, although evidence 
that the internet can play a significant role in the development and support of counter-
discourses and left-wing hegemonic strategies does exist, and although it is clear that 
dominant discourses are being challenged online (e.g. Downing 2001; Gallo 2003; 
McCaughey and Ayers 2003; Meikle 2002; Salazer 2003; Van de Donk et al. 2004), the 
effectiveness of these online contestations in the destabilization of the boundaries of dominant 
discourses, and the subsequent movement toward more radical forms of democracy – in real 
time and space – remains an issue of debate.  
In this regard, despite an array of literature examining the global use of the internet 
and social media in political practice, and its implications for the extension of both online and 
offline deliberative, autonomous and agonistic radical democratic practices, little, if any, 
attention has been given to such use of the internet and social media in South African politics. 
In particular, the radical democratic use of the internet and social media by South African 
civil society and new social movements has remained largely undocumented. Some would 
argue that the low penetration of the internet in South Africa has resulted in limited general, 
and even more limited political, use of this medium. However, with growing access to 
telecommunications infrastructure and mobile web capabilities, the number of South African 
internet users is rising exponentially. Consequently, with a view to exploring this issue, the 
focus of the following chapter will fall on investigating the potential of the internet, and social 
media in particular, to function as an online agonistic public space, in support of, firstly, 
counter-public and counter-discourse development, secondly, the articulation of strategically 
effective counter-discursive fronts, and thirdly, the facilitation of discursive contestations of 
dominant discourses ‒ and correlatively the promotion of a variant of Laclau and Mouffe’s 
agonistic version of radical democracy ‒ in South Africa. 
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Chapter Five: Online Agonism in South Africa 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
As illustrated in the previous chapter, there is significant evidence to suggest that some of the 
recent major new social movements’ online politics and activism are primarily orientated 
around agonistic radical democratic ideas. That is, although elements of both deliberative and 
autonomous radical democracy can be found within the grassroots political orientation of 
movements such as the Zapatista, RAWA, the alter-globalization movement, and the Occupy 
movement, evidence of their growing progression toward a primarily agonistic approach can 
be seen in the orientation of their online politics. Within this digital world, the conception of 
the internet as an online agonistic public space has accordingly gained significant attention, 
with Dahlberg highlighting the growing translation of Laclau and Mouffe’s agonistic 
strategies of discursive contestation into the online environment. Of course, questions 
concerning the effectiveness of such online participation in the instigation of real-world 
radical democratic change continue to be raised – particularly in relation to the use of such 
media by exponents of extremely marginalized discourses, the restrictions of the digital 
divide, and the overarching influence of dominant discourses online. And these questions are 
valuable insofar as they guard against the adoption of naïve wholesale optimism concerning 
the revolutionary potential of digital media. However, notwithstanding the related concerns, 
the evidence explored in the previous chapters strongly indicates that the internet has, in many 
cases, succeeded in providing communicative spaces for the formulation of counter-
discourses, and for the development of the type of contestation associated with agonistic 
radical democratic practice. And against this backdrop, the question of the relevance of such 
evidence for South Africa ‒ a country still in the throws of transition, with a plethora of new 
social movements and rapidly expanding digital connectivity – is important. 
 In the interest of examining this issue, this chapter will explore the extent to which 
some major South African new social movements have adopted online political practices that 
resonate with the primarily agonistic dynamics of the online political practices of those 
movements discussed in the previous chapter. This will be done with a view to determining 
the potential of the internet and social media to function as an online agonistic public space in 
the support of local counter-discourse development, in the facilitation of local contestation of 
dominant discourses, and in the consequent promotion of agonistic radical democracy in the 
country.  
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To begin with, a brief overview will be given of the recent South African political 
landscape, and important developments leading up to the 1994 transition to democracy, 
including the activism of the anti-apartheid social movement, along with the ensuing 
neoliberal turn which the country took after 1994. Hereafter, the emergence of a new set of 
social movements, which developed as a critical reaction to continuing inequality and poverty 
in the country, will be detailed. In this regard, three overlapping types of struggles, namely 
those connected to the ideas of (a) the right to life, (b) the right to a better life, and (c) the 
right to a better life for all, will be considered. And in each case, their use of the internet and 
social media as an online agonistic public space which can contribute to the facilitation of 
left-wing hegemony in the country, will be investigated. That is, following a brief discussion 
of the South African new media landscape, the above mentioned new social movements’ 
online activity will be explored with a view to rendering conspicuous, firstly, the extent of 
their respective digital connectivity evinced by their use of the internet and social media; 
secondly, their respective proximity to the radically democratic ideals of agonistic democracy; 
and thirdly, both the current possibilities for ‒ and the limitations to ‒ their use of this media 
(i) to support counter-public formation, (ii) to allow diverse groups and people to network and 
articulate collective identities and discourses, and (iii) to facilitate contestations of dominant 
discourses. In short, drawing on popular agonistic arguments that the internet allows for the 
creation of alternative political arenas/spaces, where different and dispersed people and 
groups can come together, recognize shared identities, and build and reinforce “counter-public 
networks and coalitions (or articulations) of radical discourses” (Dahlberg 2007c:56), the 
focus of this chapter will fall on various South African new social movements’ approximation 
of the online agonistic activity highlighted in Chapter Four. In terms of this framework,
134
 the 
internet is viewed, firstly, as providing communicative spaces for groups “associated with 
marginalized discourses…to develop counter-publics.” Secondly, it is seen as assisting 
“politically diverse and geographically dispersed counter-publics [to] network and develop 
articulations of collective identities and discourses,” thereby allowing for “the formation of 
stronger and more effective oppositional strategies.” And thirdly, it is regarded as “supporting 
counter-public contestation...of dominant discourses” online (Dahlberg 2007b:134, 137, 
139).
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 As indicated in the previous chapter, Dahlberg has drawn significantly on the discursive contestation theory 
of Laclau and Mouffe in the formulation of this framework. 
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 In relation to this, the internet is seen as assisting in online discursive contestation, in the spread of 
information, and in the organization and co-ordination of physical protests on local, national, and international 
levels. Furthermore, the internet and new media technologies are understood as allowing for alternative 
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Importantly, this study is undertaken with a view to identifying current local network 
deficits in the above three areas, with the ultimate aim of strategizing the formation of greater 
online agonistic constellations. Constellations which can increasingly facilitate the 
approximation of left-wing hegemony within South Africa. 
 
5.2 The South African political context 
 
South Africa has a tempestuous political history. Following the Anglo-Boer War of 1899-
1902, the marginalization of indigenous people in South Africa – including Blacks, Coloreds 
and Indians intensified, and by the time the Union of South Africa was established in 1910, 
the ideas of white domination and white supremacy were already firmly entrenched in the 
politico-economic dynamics of the country. And following this, throughout the early 1900s, 
the power of the white minority was progressively strengthened through various policies and 
laws which sought to restrict the rights of ‘non-whites’ in the country.136 In reaction to this 
growing repression, opposition to British authoritarianism began to rise, and in 1912 the 
South African Native National Congress (SANNC) was created as a resistance organization 
focused on protesting against racial discrimination and inequality (Zander 1999:121). 
Changing its name to the African National Congress (ANC) in 1923, the organization 
continued with its campaign of passive resistance against racial prejudice and minority rule in 
the country (Elphick and Davenport 1997:215).  
                                                                                                                                                                                     
representations of counter-public protest to emerge alongside those dominant discursive representations 
propagated by the mass media.  
136
 One of the most important pieces of legislation in this regard was the Native’s Land Act (1913), which 
“limited African land ownership rights to African reserves constituting…about 7% of the Union’s total land 
area” (Beck 2000:113). According to Hamilton and his colleagues, “the first and most severe consequence of this 
act was to evict hundreds and thousands of African dwellers on white-owned land, without any compensatory 
measures” (2001:35). Another example of segregationist legislation included the Native Administration Act of 
1927 (later called the Bantu Administration Act), which, according to Christopher, “made the proclaimed Black 
areas subject to a separate political regime from the remainder of the country, ultimately subject only to rule by 
proclamation, not parliament” (2001:65). In relation to this, Rich asserts that “the central imperative behind the 
Act was to establish a strong enough system of national ‘native administration’ to contain the political pressures 
that were likely to result from the legislative measures necessary for the implementation of territorial 
segregation” (1996:33). Furthermore, opposition to the Act was made very difficult by the accompanying clause, 
which stated that “any person who utters any words or does any other act or thing…with intent to promote any 
feeling of hostility between Natives and Europeans, shall be guilty of an offence and liable on conviction to 
imprisonment not exceeding one year or to a fine of one hundred pounds or both” (Section 29 Act no.38 of 1927, 
cited in du Toit 2010:107). 
145 
 
However, following the National Party’s (NP) election victory in 1948, and their 
subsequent implementation of harsh apartheid laws, passive resistance progressed into 
intensive civil disobedience, and mass defiance campaigns were undertaken by the ANC to 
end racial discrimination in South Africa, and to “repeal…the pass laws, the Group Areas 
Act...and the Separate representation of Voters Act” (Okoth 2006:175). Initiated in 1952, the 
defiance campaign, as Albert Luthuli explained, called on people “to disobey these 
laws…[and] suffer…arrests, assault and penalty if needed, without violence” (cited in Okoth 
2006:176). Notwithstanding the initial limited impact of such defiance, similar peaceful 
protests against the repression and racism of the apartheid government grew during the latter 
part of the 1950s and throughout the 1960s.  
Yet, the events of the 1960 Sharpeville Massacre,
137
 and the subsequent banning of 
resistance movements ‒ including the ANC ‒ steered such resistance in a new direction; that 
is, away from peaceful non-violent resistance, and toward armed struggle.
138
 Indeed, in 
reaction to Nelson Mandela’s statement that “the state has given us no alternative to violence” 
(1996:88), the 1960s and 1970s saw unprecedented waves of black political mobilizations, 
with labor strikes, township protests, and acts of sabotage by the militant resistance wings, all 
of which intensified the mass struggle against apartheid. Ironically, as Falola and Oyebade 
assert, it was “the failure of peaceful protests to bring about change to the oppressive and 
racist South African system” that resulted in a “new generation of black leaders,” who grew in 
prominence through adopting “a more militant anti-apartheid campaign” (2010:116). The 
armed struggle was further energized by the apartheid government’s violent repression of 
protest marches in 1976, when thousands of Soweto school children non-violently protested 
against the use of Afrikaans as a primary medium of instruction for some secondary school 
subjects (Pieterse 2001:17). The government’s brutal reaction “sparked days-long violent riots 
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 During the Sharpeville Massacre, sixty-nine people were killed and 180 were injured, many of whom were 
shot in the back while fleeing, when police opened fire on a group of people protesting against Pass Laws in the 
Vaal Triangle (Dreyer 2006:186) 
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 Following the Sharpeville Massacre, and the banning of all resistance movements, the ANC and Pan African 
Congress (PAC) “declared that there was no longer any legal space for them to organize non-violent resistance to 
apartheid,” and consequently, they established armed wings, respectively, Umkhonto we Sizwe (Spear of the 
Nation) – popularly known as MK ‒ and Poqo (Pure) (Cherry 2011:14). Launching its armed struggle on 16 
December 1961, with a series of sabotage attacks on symbolic apartheid infrastructure, Nelson Mandela 
described MK as “the fighting arm of the people against the government and its policies of race oppression” 
(1990:123). In turn, the PAC’s Poqo became the first black political organization in South Africa to openly 
accept the taking of human life as part of its strategy,” which derived from the fact that “the PAC 
was…manifestly more militant than the ANC” (Maharaj 2014). 
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in Soweto and neighbouring black townships, and trouble ensued for the remainder of the year 
throughout South Africa” (Mikaberidze 2013:608).139 Accordingly, the “Soweto Uprising was 
an historic watershed in South African politics” because “many young people, politicised by 
the…uprising and school boycotts,” opted “for the armed struggle and…[fled] the country to 
join the ANC’s [military] training camps” (Pieterse 2001:17). Urban unrest and rioting also 
continued throughout the 1980s, largely under the organization of the United Democratic 
Front (UDF). The UDF comprised of a variety of organizations “that shared a total rejection 
of apartheid and a willingness to take to the streets in demonstration” (Kessel 2000:2). Indeed, 
between 1983 and 1989 the UDF emerged as one of the most prominent anti-apartheid 
movements (or coalitions) in South Africa, with more than six hundred affiliated 
organizations, including youth movements, civic associations, student movements, trade 
unions, church groups, and sports groups (Zukas 2007:118).
140
 Operating as a movement in 
opposition to the hegemony of the apartheid government, the UDF can arguably be viewed as 
an example of the type of left-wing hegemonic project Laclau and Mouffe propose in order 
for radical democracy to emerge. That is, with an articulation of over six hundred divergent 
movements, the UDF succeeded in spreading something akin to the ‘chains of equivalence’ 
suggested by Laclau and Mouffe. And drawing on Laclau’s visual representation of such 
chains of equivalence ‒ provided in the previous chapter ‒ the following diagram is 
illustrative of the UDF’s role in the extension of such chains of equivalence:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: UDF chains of equivalence (adapted from Laclau 2005) 
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 For a detailed account of the Soweto Riots, see: Ndlovu, S. 2006. “The Soweto Uprising.” In The South 
African Education Trust. The Road to Democracy in South Africa: 1970 – 1980. (Vol. 2). Johannesburg: Unisa 
Press. 
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 The UDF adopted the Freedom Charter as part of its policy, and by linking itself directly to the banned ANC 
“played a vital role in bringing the…ANC back to centre stage of South African politics, thus paving the way for 
its unbanning and for the subsequent stage of negotiating and power sharing” (Kessel 2000:2). Once the ANC 
was unbanned, the UDF relinquished its political position and disbanded in 1991.   
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By the middle of 1984, public opposition to the government intensified and “the townships 
again erupt[ed]…in a wave of protest” (Wood 2000:4). Rioting, protests, marches, and 
sabotage continued to escalate, and by 1986 the apartheid government declared a nationwide 
“state of emergency,” and arrested thousands of activists connected to the enduring resistance 
movements (Griffiths 1994:192). In addition to ongoing domestic resistance, increasing 
international sanctions on South Africa, growing international anti-apartheid solidarity, as 
well as support for anti-apartheid resistance from recently independent neighboring countries, 
all put pressure on the National Party government to abandon its policy of apartheid, and to 
consider a transition to democracy. Finally, succumbing to this collective pressure, in 1990 
the South African government under the NP leadership of F.W. de Klerk, agreed to release 
“all political prisoners, legalize all opposition parties, and begin genuine negotiations” for a 
peaceful transition to democracy (Jung and Shapiro 2003:99).  
This entailed the NP entering into talks with the ANC and various other political 
parties, including the Pan African Congress (PAC), the South African Communist Party 
(SACP), the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP), and the Conservative Party (CP), among others.
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After years of difficult negotiations, deadlocks, and political and economic compromises, and 
following increasing pressure from civil society and international supporters, agreements were 
finally reached, and South Africa’s first democratic elections were held on 27 April 1994 – 
paving the way for  the country’s transition to democratic rule, under the leadership of the 
ANC and the presidency of Nelson Mandela.  
 
5.3 The role of civil society in South Africa’s democratic transition 
 
As mentioned above, during the transition period of 1990 to 1994, the popular UDF 
disbanded, and an array of non-union national associations ‒ including the South African 
National Civics Organization (SANCO),
142
 the Women’s National Coalition (WNC),143 and 
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 The ANC first met with the NP in May 1990, with the ultimate aim of ending white minority rule, and 
transforming the regime from a “totalitarian one to a democratic one” (Wa Muiu 2008:133). During this first 
meeting, the Groote Schuur Minute, which “linked the renunciation of the ANC’s armed struggle with the 
granting of political freedoms, the return of exiles, and the release of all political prisoners” by 30 April 1991, 
was signed by both parties (Buntman 2003:43; McGann 2010:109). Furthermore, the pact made “non-racial 
democracy in a united South Africa the official goal of negotiation” (McGann 2010:109).  
142
 Established in 1992, SANCO aimed to secure an independent voice for civil society during the negotiated 
transition period. Engaging in an “informal alliance with the ANC” (Zuern 2011:109), SANCO played both a 
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the National Youth Development Forum (NYDF),
144
 were established in an attempt to ensure 
“the continuity of an autonomous and institutionalised voice of grassroots movements” 
(Papadakis 2006:18). These movements, it has been argued, played a significant role in the 
mobilizations of action in support of democratic changes, and “proved to be crucial not only 
in the peaceful transition to democracy but to transition tout court” (Papadakis 2006:20). In 
particular, many saw the involvement of such civic groups in the reconstruction and 
development process as pointing toward the new government’s openness toward participatory 
politics. This willingness to work with civil society was expressed, on the one hand, in the 
ANC’s Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP 1994) policy, in which it was 
stated that  
 
without undermining the authority and responsibilities of elected representative bodies…the 
democratic order that we envisage must foster a wide range of institutions of participatory 
democracy in partnership with civil society on the basis of informed and empowered 
citizens…[to] facilitate direct democracy. (RDP 1994 para. 5.2.6, cited in Papadakis 2006:21) 
 
On the other hand, various pieces of legislation, policies, and local programs, all similarly 
advanced the importance of a cooperative approach between government and civil society 
(e.g. Labour Relations Act, National Employment Skills Act, housing and public works 
services, etc.). According to Papadakis, “all the pieces of legislation, programmes and devices 
institutionalised an active role for civil society actors…in the design and implementation of 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
passive and active role in South Africa’s transition to democracy. More specifically, SANCO was passively 
involved in rejections of “direct negotiations” which threatened the unity of the mass anti-apartheid movement, 
and actively involved in both their electoral alliance with the ANC, SACP, and COSATU, and in their 
subsequent involvement with drafting the Reconstruction and Development Programme policy (Papadakis 
2006:18).  
143
 Bringing together approximately seventy women’s organizations, and “bridging divisions of race, class, 
ethnicity, ideology, religion, party and rural-urban rifts” (Hawkesworth 2006:94), the WNC ‒ which was 
developed by feminists in the ANC ‒ launched an eighteen-month campaign to try and uncover what women 
expected from the new state. Following hundreds of focus groups and questionnaires, the WNC generated the 
‘Women’s Charter,’ which focused on issues such as gender equality in the workplace and home, reproductive 
and sexual rights, childcare, and pension benefits, among other things (Hawkesworth 2006:94). In 1994 this 
charter was handed to the new president, Nelson Mandela, “with a view to [it] forming part of the overall 
documentation which determined the final constitution of South Africa” (Papadakis 2006:19). 
144
 The NYDF was established in 1992 in an attempt to unify the youth of the country. However, following 
various problems related to a lack of “clear programmes” and “vague mandates,” the forum collapsed in 1995 
(Papadakis 2006:19).  
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their respective objectives.” And Swilling and Russell (2001) similarly insist that they were 
seen collectively as an “integral element of the public space” (cited in Papadakis 2006:22). 
Consequently, such active involvement raised many hopes about the future role of civil 
society in the new democracy (Baccaro and Papadakis 2004).  
However, after the 1994 elections, the extent of such cooperation soon diminished. 
That is, despite initial opportunities for participation, and healthy non-profit sector finances, 
many civil society organizations began to experience a ‘survival crisis’ of sorts. This crisis, it 
has been suggested, was largely due to three core issues. Firstly, although possibilities for 
financial assistance existed in the non-profit sector, many funders modified their funding 
initiatives, and tended to redirect focus toward development related concerns, thus rendering 
their funding incompatible with civil society objectives. Secondly, the large-scale migration 
of civil society leaders to state and business sectors left many organizations severely depleted 
and without effective leadership. And thirdly, civil society’s lack of technical skills often left 
them unable to participate in emerging developmental initiatives (Marais 2001; Cawthra et al. 
2001).  
In addition to these obstacles, changes in the socio-economic policy of the new 
government between 1994 and 1996, as well as the changing attitudes of the political elite, 
further weakened the influence of civil society in post-apartheid South Africa. Thus, despite 
the RDP’s promise of a ‘people-driven process,’ it was not long before the new government 
conceded to pressure from dominant market-driven agendas (Marais 2001, Mattes and Thiel 
1998), and began to follow an increasingly neoliberal path ‒ a path largely incompatible with 
civil society involvement.  
 
5.4 The neoliberal turn of the ANC 
 
As already mentioned, prior to the 1994 elections, the ANC launched the RDP (which was 
developed in conjunction with the COSATU, SACP, and civil society) as its major policy 
platform.
145
 As an essential political directive of the elected ANC, the RDP focused on 
meeting basic needs, limiting the country’s reliance on international finance, and attesting to 
the ANC’s mandate that “South Africa can afford to feed, house, educate and provide health 
care for all of its citizens” (ANC 1994:2.1.3, cited in Bond 2000:52). This policy of “growth 
through redistribution” (Terreblanche 2003:89) not only promised to meet the basic needs of 
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 The Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) and the South African Communist Party (SACP) 
joined with the ANC to form the tripartite alliance. 
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all people in South Africa. In addition, according to Marais, it also provided an ideological 
substrate that would ensure the continuity of the ideals of the Freedom Charter into the post-
apartheid era (2001:239).
146
  
Initially drafted in February 1994, the RDP drew on the Keynesian paradigm, insofar 
as it, firstly, “proposed growth and development through reconstruction and redistribution,” 
secondly, “sought a leading and enabling role for government in guiding the mixed economy 
through reconstruction and development,” and thirdly, “argued for a living wage as a pre-
requisite for achieving the required level of economic growth” (Adelzadeh 1996:66). 
However, following various problems related to the practicalities surrounding the 
programme’s implementation, and accusations that the policy was a “wish list for too many 
people” (Heymans 1995:61-63; Meyer 2000:2; Terreblanche 2003:109), by the time the final 
economic framework was presented in the September 1994 RDP White Paper, profound 
changes had already been made (Taylor 2001:74). In short, as Hart points out, despite 
accommodating a wider group of constituents, it correlatively acted to redefine “key 
redistributive principles laid out in the Base Document, and replaced Keynesian thrust with 
neoliberal trickle down” (2002:18).147 That is, abandoning Keynesian ideas in favor of a more 
neoliberal framework, the initial goals of redistribution were dropped, and the influence of the 
government was reduced to a managerial role. These changes led to mounting suspicion that 
“the RDP was viewed by the ANC leadership as just a mobilising tool for election purposes” 
(Padayachee 1998:440). In addition to the changes which the RDP underwent, further 
economic policy concessions were soon made in an attempt to “calm domestic capital and 
foreign currency markets” (Visser 2004:8). These concessions ultimately led to the adoption 
of more stringent policy changes, and to the introduction of a conservative macro-economic 
strategy, called the Growth Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) programme.
148
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 According to the ANC website, the Freedom Charter “was the statement of core principles of the South 
African Congress Alliance, which consisted of the African National Congress and its allies the South African 
Indian Congress, the South African Congress of Democrats and the Coloured People’s Congress. It is 
characterized by its opening demand: The People Shall Govern!” (2014). 
147
 The RDP White Paper aimed to provide a strategy for the new Government of National Unity to implement 
the RDP, and according to its preface, it  included submissions from “different offices of government, parastatal 
agencies, multiparty forums, development institutions, organizations of civil society, business organizations, and 
individuals” (Hart 2002:18).  
148
 According to Decoteau, GEAR “stipulates measures for liberalizing trade and enhancing export; it advocates 
fiscal austerity to service national debt, tax incentives for big business, the privatization of ‘non-essential’ state 
enterprises and state-run utilities, cuts in social spending, and the introduction of wage restraints and ‘regulated 
flexibility’ in the labour market” (2013:10). 
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Despite its “neoliberal character” (Marais 2001:163), GEAR was initially promoted as 
“a continuation of the RDP” (Taylor 2001:82). However, since the RDP is in fact only 
mentioned four times in the GEAR policy document, and since the policy explicitly acts to 
position redistribution as a “by-product” of growth, instead of the basis for growth (Taylor 
2001:82), the two policies were from the outset clearly contradictory. According to 
Terreblanche, 
 
perhaps the most important difference between the RDP and GEAR was that, while the former 
expected the state to conduct a people-orientated developmental policy, the latter saw South 
Africa’s economic “salvation” in a high economic growth rate that would result from a sharp 
increase in private capital accumulation in an unbridled capitalistic system. The government’s 
task in this was to refrain from economic intervention and to concentrate on the necessary 
adjustments that would create an optimal climate for private investment. (Terreblanche 1999:5) 
 
This new version of development, Narsiah explains, “began a movement from social 
heterodoxy to neoliberal orthodoxy” (2002:5). And in this regard, the adoption of GEAR as 
the new national policy, together with its promotion of fiscal austerity, privatization, 
monetary discipline, and export-orientated development, illustrated the country’s full-scale 
shift toward a neoliberal, free-market economic framework.
149
  
In relation to the above shift, Duncan points out that South Africa’s “path to 
neoliberalism did not involve brute force,” as was the case in Chile (discussed in Chapter 
One), nor was it “domesticated largely by consent,” as seen in the United States and the 
United Kingdom (Harvey, 2005: 39-63, in Duncan 2013).
150
 Instead it has been argued that 
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 Since GEAR was a combination of standard IMF and World Bank stabilization and structural adjustment 
policies, many have insisted that GEAR is simply a home-grown example of structural adjustment.  
150
 While the implementation of neoliberalism in South Africa did not proceed from the military imperatives of 
an authoritarian dictatorship (as was the case in Pinochet’s Chile), since the early 2000s the ANC-led 
government has begun to reintroduce a process of militarisation in the country. According to Duncan, the first 
instance of this police militarisation process was the “reintroduction of a military ranking system that existed 
under apartheid” (2013). More recently, the facilitative approach toward protest policing is being increasingly 
replaced by “more militarised responses,” and paramilitary units have begun to be deployed to “protest 
‘hotspots’” (Duncan 2013). In addition to this, the military has also become a supplementary to domestic 
policing, and Duncan asserts that “both the military and the police…[are] supported by intelligence agencies 
which began to characterise protestors as criminals and threats to national security and stability” (2013). A tragic 
example of this occurred during the 2012 Marikana Massacre, in which 34 striking mineworkers ‒ who engaged 
in an unprotected strike against the multinational mining corporation Lonmin PLC ‒ were killed by members of 
the South African Police Service. Such adoption of an increasingly militaristic stance in order to quieten voices 
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the country’s neoliberal path was self-imposed, firstly through the ANC government’s 
acceptance of the Apartheid regime’s debt and their subsequent acceptance of an International 
Monitory Fund loan, and secondly through their implementation of GEAR (Duncan 2013; 
Satgar 2012:43).  
However, the ANC’s adoption of neoliberalism, evinced through its implementation of 
GEAR, did not go uncontested; on the contrary, it sparked “immediate resistance and drew 
considerable international attention” (Decoteau 2013:10). Indeed, GEAR was criticized for 
being “openly Thatcherite in content and tone” (Terreblanche 2003:115), and for violating 
“the promise of ‘A Better Life for All’” (Van der Walt 2000:75).151 Moreover, critics insisted 
that it was “geared to service the respective prerogatives of domestic and international capital 
and the aspirations of the black bourgeoisie,” all “at the expense of the impoverished 
majority’s hopes for a less iniquitous social and economic order” (Visser 2004:10). While 
GEAR promised to help stabilize the country’s economy, the result was far from favorable. 
As Duncan notes, “unemployment levels increased, especially amongst youth, many of whom 
faced a lifetime of joblessness as part of a growing surplus population…and while poverty 
levels decreased, inequality increased” (2013). In particular, in 1996, Adelzadeh questioned 
GEAR’s ability to “increase the growth rate of the economy…reverse unemployment…[and] 
yield sufficient progress towards an equitable distribution of income and wealth” (1996:92). 
And by 1999, the answer to many of these questions was clear. Bond (1999) and Adelzadeh 
(1999) found that between 1996 and 1998, most of GEAR’s targets were missed; that is, 
annual GDP growth declined from 3.2% in 1996 to 0.1% in 1998, per capita income 
decreased by 2.6%, and formal sector unemployment increased, with job losses growing from 
Seventy-one thousand in 1996 to 186 000 in 1998. This was in stark contrast to the expected 
employment gains of 246 000 predicted by GEAR. In addition to this, although private sector 
investment was set to increase by 9.3%, investment fell from 6.1% to negative 0.7% in 1998 
(Meyer 2000). Consequently, despite promises of economic growth and widespread poverty 
alleviation, the neoliberal orientation of GEAR not only undermined the initial objectives set 
out by the new government in the 1994 RDP policy.  
In addition to this, “in an attempt to cut public spending, local governments were 
forced into financial self-sufficiency; yet, at the same time, they were being expected to 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
opposing the neoliberal underpinnings of the country’s economy, points toward an increasingly repressive shift 
in the type of neoliberalism being practiced in South Africa.   
151
 GEAR’s emergence as a neoliberal program was confirmed at the policy’s launch when the then deputy 
President Thabo Mbeki confirmed his neoliberal intentions with his revealing statement: “Just call me a 
Thacherite” (cited in Gumede 2007:107). 
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extend services like water, electricity and sanitation” (Duncan 2013). This continues to lead to 
massive service delivery problems. It has also resulted in the creation of class polarizations 
between the relatively few elite, who were prospering from the new policies, and the majority 
of the South African population, who were not. The consequence of this has been the 
emergence of an array of new social movements. 
  
5.5 The emergence of post-apartheid new social movements  
 
Following the shift from RDP to GEAR in 1996, and the concomitant inauguration of South 
Africa into the largely neoliberal Southern African Development Community (SADC),
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tensions surrounding the continuity of widespread poverty and inequality in the country began 
to surface. And as the ANC entered its second term in office, a variety of ‘new’ social 
movements began to emerge. These new social movements ‒ which were ‘new’ in relation to 
their lack of connection to previous anti-apartheid social movements and civil society 
organizations ‒ supported a range of struggles related to growing neoliberal economic 
policies, and the correlative problems associated with housing distribution, education and 
basic services (Ballard et al. 2006:2).
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According to Dawson and Setsemedi, “many of the post-apartheid social movements 
were born out of struggles against the commodification of basic services, [and] the inability to 
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 South Africa joined SADC in the early 1990s and signed the SADC treaty, which laid the groundwork for the 
adoption of various objectives; among others, to “achieve development, peace and security, and economic 
growth, to alleviate poverty, enhance the standard and quality of life of the peoples of Southern Africa, and 
support the socially disadvantaged through regional integration, built on democratic principles and equitable and 
sustainable development” (SADC 2014). In order to achieve these objectives, a variety of neoliberal policies 
were accepted by the member countries and a Free Trade Agreement was signed. According to McKinley, free 
trade, “as  a core plank of that neoliberal agenda…has taken centre stage with the main message being that if 
developing nations fail to ‘integrate’ into the global economy the result will be perpetual political, social and 
economic marginalisation and stagnation” (2011:2). Consequently, an FTA agreement was signed by the SADC 
community. However, despite this agreement, the majority of the member states remain in a severe state of 
under-development and poverty. Consequently, McKinley argues that, “given such a reality, the adoption of a 
FTA undergirded as it is by the completely contradictory foundations of a neoliberal development paradigm and 
assumptions of mutually equitable, beneficial and fair trade, simply deepens and expands already existing 
macro-economic deficiencies and disparities”(2011:2). 
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 This initial new generation of social movements included, among others, The Treatment Action Campaign 
(1998), the Concerned Citizens Forum (1999), the Anti-Eviction Campaign (2001), the Anti-Privatization Forum 
(2000), the Soweto Electricity Crisis Committee (2000), the Landless People’s Movement, the Coalition of 
South Africans for the Basic Income Grant (2001), and the Education Rights Project (2002). In addition to these, 
numerous small-scale and transient struggles continue to emerge in the country.  
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access housing and/or healthcare” along with a “range of other injustices that were felt most 
acutely by the poor” (2014). In short, these new struggles responded “to particular 
manifestations of exclusion, poverty and marginality” (Ballard 2005:80), insofar as they 
emerged as direct, “local,” “pragmatic,” and “logical” reactions to everyday adversities and 
strife (Desai 2003; Egan and Wafer 2004). Although McKinley and Naidoo agree with 
Ballard that these new social movements were initially concerned with specific issues, such as 
electricity cut-offs, evictions, and privatization (2004:11), Flacks insists that such concerns 
over specific issues soon developed into a vehicle “for achieving broader ideological 
objectives” (cited in Egan and Wafer 2004). That is, for many of South Africa’s new social 
movements, ideological objectives soon paved the way for nascent counter-hegemonic 
projects opposed to the ANC and their neoliberal economic politics (Ballard 2005:79).
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Gibson supports this, arguing that the post-1994 emergence of new social movements resulted 
in clear challenges to the growing hegemony of the ANC’s increasingly neoliberal state 
(2006), while Desai draws attention to the connection between these movements and their 
rejection of the hegemony of the state system: 
 
The rise of these movements based in particular communities and evincing particular, mainly 
defensive demands, was not merely a natural result of poverty or marginality but a direct 
response to state policy. The state’s inability or unwillingness to be a provider of public services 
and the guarantor of the conditions of collective consumption has been a spark for a plethora of 
community movements [and] the general nature of the neo-liberal emergency concentrates and 
aims these demands towards the state. (2002:418) 
 
Yet, importantly, many of the new struggles did not take on an explicitly anti-ANC or anti-
neoliberal stance, nor did they reject out of hand state policy, or call for a socialist alternative 
to the current democracy. Instead, many of the new social movements focused squarely on 
local and issue-specific struggles (Ballard 2005:80), often operated “without any ideology” 
(Desai 2003), and sought to challenge state power via methods other than overthrowing the 
state, or “replacing one set of relations of domination with another” (Greenstein 2004:16, 
cited in Ballard 2005:93). That is, most aimed to achieve “direct relief for marginalized” 
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 Notwithstanding some movements’ adoption of a counter-hegemonic stance, it is important to note that these 
new social movements do not “collectively share a counter-hegemonic political project with a focus on state 
capture” (Ballard et al. 2006:400). Instead, a diverse range of movements exists with diverse ideologies, some of 
which have taken on a largely counter-hegemonic position, while others remain focused largely on rights-based 
opposition.  
155 
 
groups, and refrained from focusing “primarily on opposing the state’s economic path” 
(Ballard 2005:80).  
Although these movements experienced rapid growth in the latter part of the 1990s, 
from the middle-to-late 2000s, various fragmentations led to the effectiveness of the 
movements falling into question. In addition to political infighting ‒ particularly within the 
Social Movements Indaba (SMI)
155
 ‒ and various discursive tensions, allegiances to the ANC 
led to the movements being divided into two opposing camps: those who opposed the ANC’s 
neoliberal politico-economic policies, and those who were critical of, yet loyal to, the ANC’s 
politics. ANC concessions also played a role in the weakening of opposing discourses; as 
Sinwell notes, “while at face value there have been important challenges to neoliberal 
orthodoxy, many movements die out at the faintest sign of a state concession” (2011:68). That 
is, he argues that once the demands of the movements have been met on a localized level, 
even extremely militant anti-government groups tend to become complacent and support the 
ANC. Thus, South African new social movement struggles have often been criticized for 
being fragmented, localized, and divided (Sinwell 2010),
156
 and recent reliance on precarious 
international funding has left some of these movements on the brink of dissolution.
157
 Yet, 
despite these challenges, new social movements continue to occupy an important space in the 
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 The SMI was formed in 2002, in reaction to the World Summit on Sustainable Development held in 
Johannesburg that year. On 31 August 2002, under the banner of the Social Movement Indaba, the largest ever 
post-apartheid mass demonstration – outside of the Congress aligned alliance – was held. In terms of this, 
approximately twenty thousand people marched in opposition to the policies of the World Bank, from the streets 
of Alexandria through to the summit meeting in Sandton. In fact, this march overshadowed the ANC/COSATU-
arranged march, which could only muster approximately five thousand supporters (Jones and Stokke 2005; 
Hlatshwayo 2006; Papadakis 2006). This protest action, under the leadership of the SMI, illustrated the growing 
influence of social movement resistance during that time. Yet, notwithstanding this initial success and cohesion, 
SMI members’ subsequent attempts to work together on political, theoretical, and practical levels, were 
undermined by political disagreements and resource constraints.  
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 More recently, the sustainability of local social movements and civil society organizations has been bought 
into question, especially in relation to the lack of donors funding South African civil society, as well as the 
related movements’ and organizations’ failure to offer practical alternatives to current social issues facing 
everyday South Africans. Indeed, O’ Riordan, in a recent article, notes that “South African civil society is losing 
funding because it is failing to compete and more importantly for the average South African fundamentally 
failing to develop or attract funding for an ambitious vision on how to deliver social justice” (2014). This lack of 
funding, together with the above mentioned divisions, has serious implications for South African new social 
movements, civil society, and democracy at large.  
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 In this regard, a recent decision by the Department of International Development to withdraw its funding from 
the Treatment Action Campaign (TAC), has left the future of this new social movement in question. 
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South African political environment ‒ especially in relation to access to demands for basic 
services, such as water, electricity, sanitation, refuse removal, and health services, which 
remain a daily struggle for millions of South Africans. In short, new social movements 
“demand that the state put its money where its mouth is” (Ballard 2005:88),158 and the extent 
to which the internet and social media can be used to transform these fragmented demands 
into the collective roar of a left-wing hegemony, forms the focus of the next part of this 
chapter. 
 
5.6 The South African new media landscape 
 
Although a range of new social movements have emerged in post-apartheid South Africa, and 
continue to operate twenty years into the country’s democracy, they do so in divergent, rather 
than increasingly cohesive and coherent, ways. To ensure the continuity of their agendas over 
the years, various forms of media have been used by the respective movements to 
communicate their campaigns, and to entice activists to support their specific causes. And 
since these movements often receive “limited access to formal media at a national level,” 
alternative media have often played a significant role in their struggles (Willems 2011:492). 
According to Willems, these new social movements often have “little access to the South 
Africa Broadcasting Corporation (SABC) and influential national newspapers such as The 
Star, The Sunday Times, Mail and Guardian and Business Day.” Also “mainstream 
broadcasting and print media often delegitimize…the new social movements and 
frame…their actions in terms of ‘conflict,’ ‘troublemakers,’ or the ‘ultra-left’” (2011:492). 
Consequently, ‘old’ media, including t-shirts, posters, pamphlets, protest marches, and songs, 
continue to occupy an important space in social movement communication. But in addition, 
‘new’ media ‒ including the internet, video, and cell phones ‒  have emerged as “crucial in 
advancing the struggles of social movements in post-apartheid South Africa” (Willems 
2011:492).   
As one of the leading media players in Africa, the South African media industry 
stands out for its vibrancy and dynamism. Although severely hampered by government 
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 In relation to this, a March 2012 South African Research Chair in Social Change report – on protests and 
police statistics – revealed that over eleven thousand “crowd management incidents” occurred over a one-year 
period (Alexander 2012:1). This amounts to approximately thirty protests per day. Based on the number of 
protests and the continuation of social discontent in the country, the current role, influence, and tactics of new 
social movements in the initiation and securing of radical democratic change in South Africa, have emerged as 
increasingly important considerations (Ballard et al. 2006; Polet 2007; Robins 2010). 
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censorship during the apartheid era, post-1994 saw the implementation of a new constitution 
which included a Bill of Rights that guaranteed the protection of freedom of expression, 
speech, and the press. Indeed, following the political transition in the country from white 
minority rule to democracy, the transformation of the South African media environment was 
lauded for its shift toward self-regulation, in the interests of guaranteeing freedom of 
expression and constitutional protection  (Hyde-Clarke 2011:22).  Along with the significant 
changes to broadcast and print media, the elected democratic government simultaneously 
recognized the growing role of the internet as an important area for access to information and 
communication, and subsequently implemented the 1996 Telecommunication Act, which 
highlighted the importance of affordable and universal telecommunications and ICT services 
in the country. Since then, South Africa’s provision of internet access has been on the rise, 
with the government highlighting its commitment to a national ICT development plan, which 
focuses on broadband, digital migration, and e-skill development (Tredger 2013).  
Yet, despite continuing developments in the growth and expansion of such media, 
South Africa’s level of digital connectivity still remains relatively low. This is a consequence 
of, among other things, resource and skills inequalities, commonly known as the ‘digital 
divide.’  In a recent New Wave Report, de Lanerolle has drawn attention to the negative 
effects of the digital divide in South Africa, highlighting various problems related to 
capabilities, access, knowledge, network effects, and socio-economic factors – all of which 
derive from limited connectivity in the country. However, despite the ever-present problem of 
the digital divide in South Africa, the country has the most developed telecommunications 
network in Africa, and improvements in infrastructure and wireless capabilities have opened 
up access considerably. Indeed, recent statistics related to South African internet use indicate 
promising growth in accessibility, with the numbers of those who are digitally connected 
continuing to grow exponentially. In this regard, notwithstanding the above mentioned 
aspects of her report on the current status of the digital divide in South Africa, de Lanerolle’s 
study is not entirely pessimistic. On the contrary, she also asserts that the use of the internet 
“has risen dramatically over the last four years,” and that if this use continues at the same rate, 
“then more than half of adults in South Africa will be Internet users by 2014” (2012). 
Furthermore, her findings that “the majority of Internet users are now young, black and live 
on less than R1500 a month,” point toward the broadening reach of this technology. What is 
more, a December 2013 World Internet Stats report highlights that the current number of 
people in South Africa who have daily access to the internet has reached 48.9% of the 
population (2014), while the South African Digital Media and Marketing Association 
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estimates the number of South African internet users at around fourteen million people (Nevil 
2013).  
Importantly, de Lanerolle also maintains that social media, including social 
networking, has emerged as one of the most popular uses of the internet in South Africa, with 
more people creating social network accounts than opening email addresses (2012). In 
relation to the use of social media, the contributors to the World Wide Worx South African 
Social Media Landscape 2014 Report, insist that social media use in South Africa is not only 
on the rise, but also increasingly crossing the urban/rural divide. In particular, their findings 
indicate that Facebook has emerged as the biggest social network in South Africa, growing 
exponentially from 6.8 million users in 2012, to 9.4 million active users in 2013. Twitter, they 
argue, has seen the highest percentage growth, increasing by 129%, from 2.4 million to 5.5 
million users over twelve months. And the previous market leader in instant messaging and 
social media, Mxit, has “remained stable,” with just over 6 million users (World Wide Worx 
and Fuseware 2014). According to Arthur Goldstuck, the Managing Director of World Wide 
Worx, “the most significant finding, aside from the growth itself, was the extent to which 
social networks are being used on phones in South Africa,” with “no less than 87% of 
Facebook users and 85% of Twitter users…accessing these tools on their phones” (cited in 
World Wide Worx and Fuseware 2014). 
According to the recent research by Deloitte, South Africa currently has 66.1 million 
active mobile phone connections (BusinessTech 2013), and Wasserman asserts that the rapid 
growth in access to mobile communications and the internet has not only allowed for greater 
consumer-orientated access. In addition, it has also opened up possibilities for new political 
actors, allowing increased opportunities for access to content, participation, and 
mobilizations, and providing correlative possibilities for ‘e-democracy’ (2007). Indeed, many 
have viewed these social media platforms as a “participatory tool” which allows the public to 
“engage politically with each other” (Steenkamp and Hyde-Clarke 2012:92). This is not least 
because they offer audiences “the ability to form…online communit[ies]…and enable 
conversation,” making “it possible for people to gather online, share information, knowledge 
and opinions” (Jensen 1998; Safko and Brake 2009; cited in Steenkamp and Hyde-Clarke 
2012:92). Building on this idea, Hyde-Clarke advances that “social media networks such as 
Twitter and Facebook have become platforms for the mobilization of social and political 
forces, allowing the previously disenfranchised to voice their concerns and aspirations” 
(2012). And in support of this observation, Wasserman argues that such dynamics can be seen 
within the online and mobile practices of new social movements in South Africa (2007).  
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5.7 The ‘right to life,’ the ‘right to a better life,’ and the ‘right to a better life 
for all’ online 
 
Many of South Africa’s new social movements have made “extensive and flexible use of the 
discourse of rights to add legitimacy to their activities” (Greenstein 2004, cited in Ballard 
2005:80). That is, since the new South African political, economic, and social order has been 
underwritten by a constitution which protects both first and second generation human 
rights,
159
 new social movements – even those that are vehemently anti-ANC or anti-neoliberal 
– have been quick to use the language of human rights in the defense and advancement of 
their campaigns (Ballard 2005:88). Accordingly, Greenstein notes that by couching their 
claims in terms of ‘rights,’ even illegal tactics such as electricity reconnections and 
occupation of property, can be imbued with a degree of legitimacy as a “fight to assert legal 
rights” (2004:113). Indeed, in many cases, it is only via claims to various human rights, and 
the right to a better life, that the “marginalized are able to challenge the state and thereby shift 
relations of power, particularly when combined with popular mobilisations” (Greenstein 
2004:21, cited in Ballard 2005:88). However, despite their various connections to rights 
discourse, South African new social movements continue to be largely fragmented, and they 
tend to operate in divergent and divided, rather than cohesive and coherent, ways. In 
particular, instead of articulating themselves as ‘equivalent struggles for rights,’ they have 
arguably advanced themselves in such a way that they can be categorized into three 
distinctive groups: those who pursue the ‘right to life,’ those who pursue the ‘right to a better 
life,’ and those who pursue the ‘right to a better life for all.’160  
In relation to this, and for the purpose of this project, the potential that growing access 
to new media technologies, and in particular social media, may have to effectively bring these 
three divergent groups together, in the interest of strengthening their largely fragmented 
oppositional strategies, emerges as an important point for consideration. But this potential 
needs to be explored in relation to, on the one hand, the extent to which new social 
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 First generation human rights are related to civil and political rights, while second generation human rights 
refer to socio-economic rights (Viljoen 2012:80).  
160
 While the first and second categories of new social movements have couched their strategies in terms of first 
and second generation rights, respectively, the latter group ‒ concerned as they are with environmental issues ‒ 
have couched their struggles more in terms of third, and even fourth, generation rights. While third generation 
rights involve the right to “economic and social development,” as well as “the right to a healthy environment” 
(Claude and Weston 2006:279), Evans asserts that fourth generation rights entail a “focus on environmental or 
ecological rights” (1999:19). 
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movements in South Africa are currently using this media, and, on the other hand, how such 
use can be augmented so that it approximates an online agonistic public space, through which 
articulations of collective identities can be established, and the radical democratic practice of 
left-wing hegemony can be promoted. As such, the analysis to follow will explore how such 
media are being used by new social movements in South Africa, firstly, to develop counter-
publics and nurture counter-discourses; secondly, to bring divergent and dispersed people and 
groups together to network and articulate collective identities, thus strengthening oppositional 
discourses; and thirdly, to facilitate counter-public contestation of dominant discourses. 
Beyond this, in the following chapter, what online measures will be required to further realize 
the radical democratic potential of this media in future, will be considered.  
 
5.7.1 The ‘right to life’ movements  
 
Social movements that fall under the ‘right to life’ category are primarily concerned with the 
South African Constitution’s declaration that “Everyone has the right to life” (South African 
Constitution 1996:6). Additionally, those social movements that fight for the right to adequate 
healthcare, as endorsed by Section 27 of the Bill of Rights ‒ which states that “everyone has 
the right to have access to…health care services” (1996:11) ‒ also fall under this category. 
Perhaps the best-known South African social movement in the above regard is the Treatment 
Action Campaign (TAC), a movement that campaigns for the ‘right to life’ through access to 
lifesaving healthcare. The TAC was launched on 10 December 1998, and has since achieved 
considerable national, regional and international success. Noted as the most successful South 
African social movement, the TAC “campaigns for greater access to treatment for all South 
Africans, by raising public awareness and understanding about issues surrounding the 
availability, affordability and use of HIV treatment” (Senghor and Poku 2007:270). The 
movement’s demonstrations, protests, and online communications, have effectively 
“pressured international pharmaceutical firms into abandoning court action seeking to prevent 
the government from importing cheaper generic medicines” (TAC 2001, cited in Ballard et al. 
2006:23). Moreover, after much pressure by the TAC, the South African government even 
agreed to freely distribute anti-retroviral medications to people living with HIV/AIDS (TAC 
News Service 2003, cited in Friedman and Mottiar 2006:23).  
Starting their campaign within the ambit of the National Association of People With 
AIDS (NAPWA), the TAC brought attention to the need for “comprehensive and affordable” 
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treatment options, the need for the provision of “AZT to HIV positive pregnant women,”161 
and the problem of a lack of access to drugs as a result of extremely high prices (Geffen 
2010:49). Initially, the TAC targeted those pharmaceutical companies that were locked in a 
court case aimed at preventing changes to the Medicines Act ‒ changes that would drastically 
reduce the prices of HIV drugs.
162
 After years of campaigning against corporations such as 
Pfizer, GlaxoSmithKline, Boehringer Ingelheim, and Bristol Myers Squibb, among others, the 
TAC’s efforts were partly responsible for the reduction of ARV treatment costs, from 
thousands of rands per month in 1997 to R93 per month in 2013 (Bendix 2013).  
In addition to campaigns against various pharmaceutical companies, the TAC was 
concomitantly critical of the elected ANC government’s stance toward the HIV pandemic. 
Launched during the presidency of Nelson Mandela, the TAC did not start out as a movement 
challenging the government; however, the subsequent failure of the government to provide for 
the needs of poor people living with HIV and AIDS, together with growing AIDS denialism 
within the ranks of the ANC elite, led to the TAC adopting a conflictual relationship with the 
ruling party. This conflict was particularly evident during the TAC’s 2003 civil disobedience 
campaign, which responded to the government’s refusal to sign into effect an AIDS treatment 
plan.
163
 Acting non-violently, and prepared to accept the consequences of defying prevailing 
laws (Jones and Stokke 2005:26), the TAC succeeded in influencing the cabinet to ‘roll out’ 
ARVs. Although this civil disobedience campaign illustrated the TAC’s willingness to 
challenge the government on certain issues, the relationship of the movement with the ANC is 
                                                          
161
 By limiting access to AZT, a drug which is used to prevent mother to child transmission of HIV (Mbali 
2013:125), pharmaceutical companies and the SA government were effectively seen as negating citizens’ 
constitutional right to life. According to Growen and his colleagues, the TAC argued that by restricting access to 
such drugs, the government was “violating the right to life, dignity and equality of HIV-positive pregnant 
women and their children” (2006:225).  
162
 On 25 November 1997, president Nelson Mandela signed into law the Medicines and Related Substances 
Control Amendment Act, No. 90 of 1997 (Medicines Act), thereby ensuring affordable access to drugs for all 
citizens of South Africa. Subsequently, in February 1998, the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association (PMA) 
and forty supporting multinational drug companies, attempted to prevent the Act from coming into force by 
taking the South African government to court. However, with support from the TAC, the government defended 
the Act, and in 2001 the PMA withdrew its legal challenge (Heywood 2001:17).    
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 As alluded to earlier, new social movement strategies are often defined by their connection to in-system 
tactics or extra-institutional tactics. While the TAC can be most closely connected to in-system tactics, they have 
not been afraid to adopt extra-institutional tactics when the rights of citizens are seen to be grievously ignored. In 
relation to this, Ballard and his colleagues highlight that although “movements with an explicit rights based 
agenda would be at the in-system pole of the continuum,” they often resort to “practicing a mix of strategies 
where extra-institutional action is often used to supplement in-system strategies” (2005:407).  
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not entirely antagonistic. On the contrary, Friedman and Mottair insist that the TAC’s 
approach to government involves “a more complicated relationship in which cooperation and 
conflict are enjoyed together” (cited in Jones and Stokke 2005:27). In other words, although 
the movement’s core goal is not to help the government, but to ensure the treatment of people 
with HIV, they realize that in order to achieve this goal there needs to be alignment, as well as 
robust debate, with government. In this regard, they have committed to using “justiciable 
socio-economic rights to influence government policy” (Jones and Stokke 2005:31). For 
example, the TAC has used the constitutional right to health, to establish HIV/AIDS treatment 
as a human right to life. And according to Heywood, the movement has thereby not only 
“demonstrate[d] that human rights can be invoked to provide a moral legitimacy for 
advocacy,” but has also shown “that strategic and political use of the Bill of Rights opens up 
space for contesting policies and practices of both government and the private sector” (cited 
in Jones and Stokke 2005:31). In addition to working in both collaborative and contestatory 
ways with the ruling ANC, the TAC has also sought numerous “alliances as a means of 
pursuing its strategic agenda” (Friedman and Mottiar 2005:555). These alliances have been 
formed with movements and groups which support HIV/AIDS projects, and include 
SECTION 27,
164
 Doctors without Borders (MSF),
165
 and Sonke Gender Justice,
166
 along with 
many other divergent campaigns. 
For Friedman, “a key feature of [the] TAC’s campaign is the use of the internet.” In 
this regard, he asserts that “the opportunities offered by advances in communications 
technology make co-ordinated cross-national campaigns for justice far more effective by 
creating new openings for pressure on power-holders” (cited in Oshry 2007:32). Gibson 
supports this assertion when he argues that the internet and its networks enable a fast and 
effective means of information and ideas transfer for potential lobbying (2006:17). In addition 
to this, in an exploration of the online activities of the TAC, Wasserman emphasized their use 
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 Established in 2010, SECTION27 is “a public interest law center that seeks to influence, develop and use the 
law to protect, promote and advance human rights” (SECTION27 2014). 
165
 Doctors without Borders/Medecins Sans Frontieres (MSF) South Africa, is a South African chapter of the 
international humanitarian organization. MSF provides “medical aid to people whose survival is threatened by 
conflict, epidemics, natural and man-made disasters,” and speaks out “about the plight of the populations” they 
assist. According to their website, “MSF offers assistance to people based only on need and irrespective of race, 
religion, gender or political affiliation” (MSF 2014). 
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 Sonke Gender Justice “works across Africa to strengthen government, civil society and citizen capacity to 
promote gender equality, prevent domestic and sexual violence, and reduce the spread and impact of HIV and 
AIDS,” thereby contributing to the increasing realization of a more “just and democratic” society (Sonke Gender 
Justice2014). 
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of the internet in the dissemination of alternative news, their creation of virtual public spheres, 
and their organization of collective political action, and he highlighted the role of such new 
media technologies in the “extension of existing methods of mobilisation” within the 
movement (2007:126). Loudon also builds on this research through her examination of the 
TAC’s use of the internet and ICTs, as an ‘opportunity structure.’ In this regard, she argues 
that the use of ICTs by the TAC serves two different but equally important functions. Firstly, 
it has strengthened “existing organizational channels of communication, mobilising structures 
and framing processes,” and secondly, it has extended “the reach of the organization so that it 
is able to connect to HIV infected and affected people for whom traditional membership is not 
feasible” (2010:1092). Moreover, she draws attention to the possibilities of mobile 
technologies offering new gateways to increasing participation with the movement in future. 
In addition to the above mentioned general descriptions of how the TAC has used the 
internet as an integral part of its ‘right to life’ campaign, the extent to which its current use 
can be viewed specifically as functioning akin to an online agonistic public space ‒ which 
offers opportunities for the promotion and development of a form of left-wing hegemony in 
South Africa ‒ remains an interesting question. In the interest of exploring this issue, in what 
follows, the degree to which their online presence is used, firstly, to develop counter-publics 
and counter-discourses, secondly to offer a space for the coming together of diverse 
movements and groups to articulate collective identities and strengthen oppositional 
strategies, and thirdly, to promote the contestation of dominant discourses, will be considered.  
 Firstly, the TAC has been active in the online arena since the launch of its official 
website (www.tac.org) in 1998, and to a significant extent it has used the internet and the 
communicative spaces that it offers to nurture and develop counter-publics. Comprising of a 
number of pages dedicated to ‘News,’ ‘Campaigns,’ ‘Publications,’ ‘Blogs,’ and ‘Resources,’ 
among other matters, the TAC website offers users a range of information and updates on the 
movement’s campaign, its organization, and its various activities. It also provides users with 
numerous opportunities to connect and communicate with the movement,
167
 as well as gain 
access to additional information and details on how to support the movement.
168
 Although 
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 For example, the ‘Contact’ link provides a contact email and telephone number, as well as access to an 
‘online enquiry form,’ which allows any visitor to the site to have direct contact with the movement. 
168
 The “Donate” link is indicative of this and encourages users to support TAC and “save lives,” by donating 
financially to the movement. Moreover, various subscription options, which can be accessed directly from the 
TAC home page, including the online newsletter, magazine (Equal Treatment) and the National Strategic Plan 
Review, allow users to stay up to date with the campaign, its projects and accomplishments (Treatment Action 
Campaign 2014c). 
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anyone visiting the webpage address can access and view the website, in order to actively 
participate and interact with others visiting the site, users need to create an account via the 
‘User Login’ link. However, in order for such an account to be created, the user’s 
‘application’ needs to be approved by the website administrator. That is, instead of simply 
applying for a username, and receiving automatic login details via email, users have to wait 
for confirmation and approval from the movement, something which apparently can take 
several months and which is not guaranteed.
169 
However, in principle, once an account is 
created, the user is able to log-in and interact directly by viewing comments made on news 
articles and updates, as well as by making their own relevant comments. Admittedly though, 
what this means is that despite their presence online, and the fact that possibilities for the 
creation of counter-discourses do exist, since users are either not guaranteed access to the 
interactive elements of the site, or must face lengthy delays before they are allowed to 
participate, in this respect, the TAC website is particularly limited in its potential to offer a 
communicative space for the formation of counter-publics. Yet, while only registered users 
are able to view and make comments on articles, any visitor to the website is able to share 
news articles and updates on other media platforms. That is, at the bottom of each article in 
the ‘News’ section of the site, a ‘Sharing is Caring’ link connects users to a variety of sharing 
methods. For example, the recent TAC news article entitled “Free State Health System in 
Collapse – Lives are Being Lost Urgent & Immediate Intervention from Minister of Health 
Needed” (Clayton 2014), can be effortlessly shared via a user’s Facebook profile, Twitter 
account, Google+ account, Pinterest board, email, and through many other online platforms, 
by simply clicking the link.
170
 Arguably, this sharing option fosters opportunities for the 
dissemination and promotion of information related to marginalized and oppositional 
discourses. And this facilitation of the dissemination of counter-discursive ideas in a 
multiplicity of online communicative spaces goes some way toward ameliorating the above 
mentioned participatory deficits.
171
 This is because, notwithstanding the structurally 
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 While some of the international movement websites discussed in the previous chapter have a similar log-in 
procedure, this function tends to be automated and users are generally sent an immediate email with log-in 
details. As an interested person, I applied to create my own account on the TAC website; however, seven months 
later, I am still waiting for the TAC website administrator to approve my request. 
170
 Other sharing options available on the TAC website include: Delicious, Reddit, Google Mail, Google 
Bookmarks, LinkedIn, Yahoo Bookmarks, Digg, StumbleUpon, Evernote, Bebo, and Tumblr. 
171
 Some articles that highlight discourses in opposition to neoliberalism and the influence of corporate power 
include, for example, “Hands Off the Market Inquiry into Private Health Care!” “Hundreds March to 
Khayelitsha Hospital to Demand Urgently Improved Services” and “Leaked PharmaGate Emails Prove Big 
Pharma Involvement in Scandal” (Treatment Action Campaign 2014a). 
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restrictive website, the TAC’s ‘Sharing is Caring’ option opens up an array of online spaces 
for discussion and debate, and in doing so, broadens prospects for the development of 
counter-publics, and the fostering of counter-discourses. Wasserman supports this idea when 
he notes that such media, along with the movement’s “web links and e-mail addresses create 
the potential for the TAC to extend its influence across geographical and sociocultural 
boundaries,” in a way that provides “the opportunity for interactivity and participation in a 
virtual public sphere in which alternative debates can develop outside of the parameters set by 
government and the corporate sector” (2007:120). In addition to their website, such 
capabilities have also been made available by the movement’s social media presence on the 
social networking site, Facebook, and the micro-blogging site, Twitter.  
Secondly, to a significant extent, the TAC’s current use of the internet also supports 
the coming together of divergent people and groups to articulate collective identities and 
strengthen oppositional discourses. To begin with, coupled with providing information, news, 
sharing options, and so forth, the movement’s website also highlights their connections to, 
and support of, other social movements and groups in South Africa, and indeed around the 
world. Importantly, the internet has played a central role in allowing these connections to 
emerge and develop. Digital connectivity has not only facilitated the quick and easy spread of 
ideas and information from one person or group to another, but also allowed solidarity and 
coalitions to be built ‒ and sustained ‒ with relatively modest resources (Friedman and 
Mottiar 2007:35). In this regard, although the TAC’s website does not have a specific page 
dedicated to listing and linking up with all of their partners, their connections to other groups 
and movements, along with their recognition of the importance of other activist networks, can 
be found in the links at the bottom of each page, and are moreover alluded to in the ‘News’ 
section of the website.
172
 Additional online articles and statements have highlighted the 
TAC’s connections to movements and groups, such as the Coalitions Against Discrimination, 
LGEP,
173
 the Rural Network, the Social Justice Coalition, the Unemployed People’s 
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 In particular, the TAC’s connection to groups such as SECTION27, MSF, and Sonke Gender Justice, are 
illustrated through articles, such as one entitled “TAC, SECTION27 & Sonke Gender Justice Support the 
Striking Marikana Miners” (Matsolo 2014). In many ways, this article provides a succinct example of the 
articulation of collective identities between these divergent, yet interconnected, movements and groups. Another 
example of an articulation of collective identities can be seen in the article entitled “Over 70 Organisations 
Demand Minister Davies Finalises the IP Policy” (Matsolo 2014). This article highlights a very broad range of 
divergent movements’ support of the TAC’s calls for the South African Intellectual Property Policy to be 
finalized, which affects the availability of affordable life saving medication in the country. 
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 LGEP, or Lesbian and Gay Equality Project, is “a non-profit, non-governmental organization that works 
toward achieving full legal and social equality for lesbian, transgender, gay and bisexual (LGBT) people in 
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Movement, and the Anti-Eviction Campaign, among others. However, while such connections 
are readily expressed and thematized in their online communications, opportunities for these 
groups to come together online to discuss and contest pertinent issues, with a view to 
strengthening oppositional identities, are admittedly restricted by the approval-based user log-
in function described earlier. Yet, this does not mean that no such opportunities exist. On the 
contrary, links to a variety of ‘supporter’ sites ‒ found at the bottom of each page of the 
website ‒ provide evidence of opportunities for communication and interaction between the 
movement, its members, supporters, and other activist groups. Some of the supporter sites 
which can be accessed directly from the TAC website include: ‘TB online,’174 ‘Fix the Patent 
Laws,’175 and ‘Quackdown.’176 Although the TAC’s degree of connection to these movements 
vary ‒ with some fostering strong associations, and others simply stating support in relation to 
certain common issues ‒ their online communication and connectivity does provide evidence 
of the movement’s use of the internet to foster connections with other movements, groups and 
organizations.
177
 And these examples resonate with Hands’s assertion that hyperlinking 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
South Africa” (2010). The LGEP calls for “a just and democratic South Africa, free from all forms of social 
oppression, discrimination and exclusion; one in which there is full social liberation, full equality; in which all 
citizens claim their citizenship and rights in full; in which there is vibrant and self-sustaining popular and 
participatory democracy” (2010). 
174
 TB Online (www.tbonline.info) is an online forum for “activists, patients, health workers and researchers” 
which encourages people to “learn more about TB so that…[they] can work to alleviate and ultimately end the 
worldwide epidemic” (2014). This forum also provides visitors with connections to supporting organizations, 
including the Community Media Trust, South Africa Development Fund, Treatment Action Group, European 
AIDS Treatment Group, and HIV i-Base. 
175The ‘Fix the Patent Laws’ link (www.fixthepatentlaws.org) connects users with the TAC campaign blog 
which aims to “highlight how amending South Africa’s Patents Act 57 of 1978 will reduce the cost of medicines, 
improving the health and saving the lives of millions of South Africans” (2014). This blog allows for user 
comment and sharing on social media. 
176
 Quackdown (www.quackdown.info) is a website started by the TAC and Community Media Trust, that 
identifies disreputable products or service providers, and aims to provide information which will enable people 
to make “informed choices about health care” (2014). Although this website offers opportunities for user input 
and interactivity, it has had no activity since May 2013.  
177
 In this regard, Friedman and Mottair argue that for the TAC, “alliance politics is not simply a matter of 
gratefully accepting the support of those who happen to agree.” Instead, “it requires, firstly, rejection of a purism 
which insists on working only with natural allies,” and it “assumes that common ground can and should be found 
with those who differ as well as those who agree” (2006:33). Thus, although many of the TAC’s alliances and 
connections are with groups and movements that operate in different terrains, and which differ with the TAC on 
many issues, democratic compromises – as part of ongoing coalition formation ‒ regularly occur and form an 
important element of their alliance politics. Arguably, this situates them very closely to the political dynamics of 
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capabilities may have the potential to facilitate the formation of counter-public oppositional 
strategies between divergent groups in a way that points toward their agonistic potential 
(2007:91). Additionally, links to social media platforms, including the movement’s Facebook, 
Twitter, and YouTube accounts, encourage users to connect with a wide variety of people and 
groups within the online arena ‒ thereby offering further opportunities for the formation of 
online articulations between divergent groups and movements. For example, a March 2014 
post on their Facebook page thematizes a protest action led by the TAC, Doctors Without 
Borders (MSF), SECTION27 and “activists from 13 [other] organizations” (Treatment Action 
Campaign 2014b). And in May 2014, further connections were highlighted when the TAC 
updated their Facebook profile with the statement that, “Yesterday 25 leaders from the 
Treatment Action Campaign, SECTION27, Sonke Gender Justice, and Awethu travelled to 
Marikana to stand in solidarity with the striking mineworkers” (2014b). These types of 
updates, as well as messages of support from other movements and groups, including the 
Association of Mineworkers and Construction Union (AMCU), Delft Community Advisory 
Board, Practical Initiatives Network, and Reachers Philanthropy, indicate the significant 
possibilities that such social networking sites may have to facilitate connections between, and 
the articulation of, divergent democratic struggles. Moreover, because social network sites not 
only enable citizens to exchange ideas and opinions, but also provide an “expansion of the 
space within which expressions of…diversity and difference innate to vibrant political life can 
be communicated” (Steenkamp and Hyde-Clarke 2012:92), the TAC’s use of social media 
arguably provides a multiplicity of communicative spaces for the movement to network, 
develop an articulation of collective identities, and effectively strengthen counter-discourses 
and oppositional strategies. Indeed, in addition to Facebook, the TAC also has a presence on 
the microblogging site, Twitter. The TAC Twitter account has approximately 2 734 followers 
(December 2014), and is largely used for information transfer, updates on actions and 
protests, and as a means to express support for other movements connected to their cause. The 
TAC Twitter account is also used to ‘retweet’ activities and updates of other groups and 
movements, thereby spreading awareness of ‘right to life’ related discourses, and drawing 
attention to its ‘alliance’ politics. Yet, while such tweets and retweets, as well as Facebook 
posts stating support, provide evidence of connections between divergent groups and people, 
these online connections seem to be limited to sharing each other’s posts. That is, very few 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
agonistic democracy. In particular, their conception of alliance politics resonates deeply with Mouffe’s idea of 
agonistic pluralism, in which ‘enemies’ are converted into ‘adversaries,’ and antagonisms are converted into 
agonisms, thereby allowing for a recognition of common ground between different and often competing groups. 
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examples of direct communication between the various movements can be seen in the 
commenting and posting functions of the sites.   
Thirdly, the TAC has used the internet and social media as a means to contest 
dominant discourses, and highlight issues related to ‘right to life’ struggles in South Africa. 
Not only does their website news link provide an array of literature that draws attention to, 
and contests, government and corporate policies and actions concerning HIV treatment, TB, 
and a variety of health related issues. In addition, they have also used this media to highlight 
their offline activism, and to draw attention to events and protests that people and groups can 
support and get involved in. However, while examples of the TAC’s online contestation of 
dominant discourses can be seen in their discursive contestation of various issues related to 
their cause, the level of interactive communication that takes place through such channels is 
relatively low. In particular, the TAC, which has been active on the social networking site 
Facebook since 2011, has used this platform primarily as a means of information transfer ‒ 
usually by sharing links from the TAC website ‒ and secondarily as a space to draw attention 
both to the illegitimacy of certain dominant discourses, and to related upcoming debates and 
TAC events and activism. Yet, despite the high level of virtual infrastructural connectivity, 
the TAC Facebook page, by December 2014, had only 2 341 ‘likes.’ And although it does 
provide space for the development of counter-publics ‒ as already discussed ‒ and 
correlatively the contestation of dominant discourses,
178
 the level of connectivity and 
interactivity on the site is quite limited in comparison to the Facebook pages of those 
international movements elaborated upon in the previous chapter.
179
 As such, although the 
TAC’s Facebook page is regularly updated, interactivity between the movement, its members, 
and its supporters, remains relatively low, with few updates and posts receiving significant 
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 An example of such counter-discourse development can be seen in the Facebook update in which the TAC 
declares support for, and shows solidarity with, Marikana miners who are striking against low wages offered by 
neoliberal mining conglomerates. Their statement that “this is a real front line for equality and dignity,” indicates 
their support of groups promoting oppositional and counter-discourses. In addition to this, an example of the 
movement’s online contestation of dominant discourses can be seen in the post contesting the continuation of 
intellectual property rights, which benefit multinational neoliberal ‘Big Pharma’ organizations, at the expense of 
the poor (Treatment Action Campaign 2014b). 
179
 For example, on the Occupy Wall Street Facebook page, a post contesting the relationship between bankers 
and politicians received 1 416 ‘likes,’ over twenty-five comments, and 793 shares. Similarly, a post related to the 
harmful effects of fracking on the environment generated 1 013 ‘likes,’ 109 comments, and 526 shares. 
Additionally, a post comparing border control activities in the USA and Europe drew significant attention, with 
155 315 ‘likes,’ 21 950 shares, and 3 509 comments debating and contesting the type of control currently 
dominating neoliberal societies.  
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‘likes,’ ‘shares’ or ‘comments.’180 Moreover, there appears to be little effort, on the part of the 
movement, to use this platform to spark and encourage debate and discussion surrounding 
campaign related issues. In fact, there was no evidence of debate or collaborative contestation 
on this social networking platform between January and July 2014.
181
 And much the same can 
be said of their use of Twitter. The TAC is fairly active on their Twitter site, and uses it to 
provide news updates on their activism and information important to their current agendas. 
And their statuses and retweets are often retweeted, thereby drawing further attention to their 
cause.
182
 However, although their activity on this platform matches that of some international 
movements, such as RAWA ‒ and even exceeds them at times183 ‒ their activity is still 
relatively low in comparison to that of movements such as Occupy, whose Occupy Wall 
Street Twitter account’s last two posts have received 301 and 558 retweets respectively 
(December 2014).
184
  
Arguably, in view of the above, it becomes apparent that the TAC, which falls under 
the ‘right to life’ category of new social movement activism in South Africa, is significantly 
digitally connected, both via their website and through various social media platforms. And, 
on the one hand, evidence does exist that their use of the internet, and social media in 
particular, has the potential to function as something akin to an online agonistic public space, 
                                                          
180
 In 2014, a 1 December TAC post related to the movement’s World AIDS Day fundraising effort received 
forty-six ‘likes.’ This is the highest total of ‘likes’ for this year (December 2014). The largest amount of 
comments, namely twenty-six, can be found on a post relating to the death of Mduduzi Yende, a member and 
provincial organizer of the TAC. And the update with the most shares to date, namely forty-five, was related to 
their post responding to media reports that the movement was facing closure, and the sharing of the related 
article entitled, “Funding Crisis Places Future of the TAC in Balance - But Reassures Supporters ‘We Will Do 
All We Can to Keep TAC Alive”’ (Treatment Action Campaign 2014b).  
181
 Recent developments related to the TAC’s future sustainability have resulted in a significant increase in the 
number of people visiting and ‘liking’ their Facebook page, and subsequently, the possibility for increased 
participation has emerged. This increase in interactivity has, however, only emerged in response to fears that the 
movement may soon have to disband, and not necessarily in relation to their social movement campaign and 
agenda.  
182
 For example, the tweet “@RediTlhabi have you seen @mailandguardian reports on appalling conditions in 
Free State #FSHealthCrisis? http://bit.ly/1lEkVjF  #FireBenny,” which was posted on 4 July 2014, was 
retweeted seven times (July 2014). 
183
 RAWA’s past five updates on Twitter have only received three retweets between them (December 2014).  
184
While their Twitter activity draws attention to the possibilities that this social media has for new social 
movement activism, the TAC’s use of the popular video sharing site YouTube leaves a lot to be desired. That is, 
although users of their website are also directed to view the TAC’s YouTube account, this video sharing site is 
largely inactive, with the last post having been made in 2010.  
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in which counter-publics can emerge, counter-discourses can be strengthened, and the 
contestation of dominant discourses can occur. Yet, on the other hand, because the extent of 
participation in contestation and reciprocal engagement through these online sites remains 
relatively low, it would appear that such agonistic potential has yet to be realized more fully. 
 
5.7.2 The ‘right to a better life’ movements  
 
Under the ‘right to a better life’ category fall new social movements that focus on securing 
basic services for the poor and marginalized. Framing their “campaigns in…counter-
hegemonic terms,” it has been argued that these movements campaign for access to basic 
services, the provision of which they insist is being limited by privatization, cost recovery, 
and government neoliberal policies. In this regard, these movements not only protest for 
greater ‘service delivery,’ but also focus on opposing the state’s current neoliberal economic 
path (Ballard et al. 2006:399-400). Yet, notwithstanding their ideological position that 
collaboration with the state is largely pointless, they remain willing to use the legal argument 
of constitutional and human rights in an attempt to further their cause (Madlingozi 2014; 
Ballard et al. 2006). Abahlali baseMjondolo (AbM), which forms part of the Poor People’s 
Alliance, is a well-known examples of this type of movement.
185
  
AbM, with over ten thousand members in over sixty shack settlements, is one of the 
largest and most strongly supported new social movements in post-apartheid South Africa 
(AbM 2011, cited in Harley 2014:6). Formed in Durban in 2005, in reaction to a lack of 
formal housing and land, AbM “campaign[s] against evictions, and for public housing,” and 
struggles for “a world in which human dignity comes before private profit[,] and land, cities, 
wealth and power are shared fairly” (Zikode 2013).186 Since its launch, AbM has experienced 
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 In 2006, AbM (based in both Durban and the Western Cape) and the Anti-Eviction Campaign (based in the 
Western Cape) joined forces to form the ‘Action Alliance.’ This alliance was soon expanded to “include the 
Landless Peoples Movement (Gauteng province) and the Rural Network (KwaZulu-Natal) and was renamed the 
Poor People’s Alliance” in 2008 (Dawson and Setsmedi 2014). Defining themselves as “a network of democratic 
and radical poor people’s movements that are committed to self organised social transformation from below and 
from the left” (cited in Dawson and Setsmedi 2014), the Poor People’s Alliance represents calls from 
impoverished and marginalized groups for a better life. 
186
 With regard to the movement’s origins, it is important to note that, early in 2005, the Kennedy Road 
settlement in Durban was set to benefit from the recently initiated ‘Slums Clearance Project,’ which was 
developed in reaction to severe housing shortages in the KwaZulu-Natal area. Setting aside R200 million for the 
delivery of fourteen thousand houses (Grimmet 2004), the eThekwini Municipality’s project aimed at “providing 
quality living environments and integrating the poor into the fabric of urban life through spacial improvement” 
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severe threats and constraints from the state, including “disparagement, prohibition of protest 
marches, unlawful arrests, torture, and other physical attacks” (Madlingozi 2014:114). 
Despite this, however, this new social movement has succeeded in achieving some victories 
for shack dwellers, and has consequently been lauded as “the most successful local, ‘counter-
hegemonic’ movement” in South Africa (Madlingozi 2014:115).187 According to Vartak, 
although “the movement’s key demand is for ‘Land [and] Housing in the City,’” it has also 
been successful in politicizing and fighting for “an end to forced removals and for access to 
education and the provision of water, electricity, sanitation, health care and refuse removal, as 
well as bottom up popular democracy” (2006).188  
                                                                                                                                                                                     
(United Nations Human Settlements Programme 2007). And the Kennedy Road community was promised access 
to vacant land, and formal housing on a plot of land next to their settlement. However, when the government 
reneged on this promise by renting this vacant land to a brick manufacturer, approximately 750 community 
members ‒ under the leadership of the Kennedy Road Development Committee (a founding affiliate of AbM) ‒ 
blockaded a major part of Elf Road, in protest against the government’s failure to honor its housing 
commitments (Zikode 2006). Not surprisingly, the protestors were met with hostility from the police and 
fourteen activists were arrested. Later that year, following further protests and violent clashes with police, the 
Kennedy Road Development Committee joined forces with several other shack dwellers movements, and 
officially formed Abahlali baseMjondolo (Harley 2014:6; Madlingozi 2014:116). 
187
 For example, the AbM has successfully “developed a sustained voice for shack dwellers in subaltern and elite 
publics and occupied and marched on the offices of local councillors, police stations, municipal offices, 
newspaper offices and the City Hall in actions that have put thousands of people on the streets.” Furthermore, the 
movement has “organised a highly contentious but very successful boycott of the March 2006 local government 
elections under the slogan ‘No Land, No House, No Vote.’” In addition, AbM has so far “democratised the 
governance of many settlements, stopped evictions in a number of settlements, won access to schools, stopped 
the industrial development of the land promised to Kennedy Road, forced numerous government officials, 
offices and projects to ‘come down to the people’ and mounted vigorous challenges to the uncritical assumption 
of a right to lead the local struggles of the poor in the name of a privileged access to the ‘global’ (i.e. Northern 
donors, academics and NGOs) that remains typical of most of the NGO based left” (Abahlali baseMjondolo 
2006).  
188
 Although not initially framed in the discourse of human rights, AbM’s collective action soon moved from a 
‘demands’ discourse to a ‘rights’ discourse. That is, following numerous prohibitions of AbM marches and 
protests, the movement recognized the need to draw attention to the rights of shack dwellers; in particular, their 
socio-economic rights, as well as their civil and political right to protest (Madlingozi 2014:116). Furthermore, 
after gaining support from various human rights organization (e.g. Freedom of Expression Institute) and 
numerous constitutional lawyers, the movement began to accept the role that legal action ‒ even as a last resort ‒ 
can play in securing land and housing for the poor. Yet, it is important to note that even though the movement is 
willing to adopt a ‘rights’ framework when necessary, it does so in an attempt to legitimize demands made from 
a counter-hegemonic standpoint. In order to illustrate their unwillingness to rely on rights-based arguments 
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In many respects, AbM, and other movements which similarly campaign for the ‘right 
to a better life,’ provide communities with an array of communicative spaces in which 
demands for rights ‒ which they maintain are currently being ignored in terms of the 
government’s macro-economic policy ‒ can be made. Indeed, it has been argued that these 
movements have “created [various] spaces of resistance for the average citizen to protect their 
livelihoods and demonstrates a form of bottom-up active citizenship” (Chiumba 2012:197). 
However, the role of the internet in providing such a communicative space remains a 
contentious issue. Resources among ‘right to better life’ movements are generally low, and 
the extent of digital connectivity of these movements varies. Apart from socio-economic and 
infrastructural constraints, socio-cultural factors ‒ including illiteracy and language 
limitations ‒ have also emerged as significant obstacles that impact negatively on their levels 
of connectivity (Wasserman and De Beer 2004). However, despite these restrictions, 
Wasserman insists that “in the context of political participation and social activism, fewer 
connections do not necessarily translate into limited political impact,” especially if the 
connections that are present “are used effectively and creatively” (2007:114).189 That is, in 
spite of limited resources, and although ‘right to a better life’ movements may not have 
widespread, direct access to the internet and social media technologies, it does not necessarily 
follow that such media have not and cannot be used as a means of strengthening their 
movement’s activism. On the contrary, it has been argued that the internet, video, and cell 
phones have been “crucial in advancing struggles of social movements in post-apartheid 
South Africa,” including those of the AbM (Willems 2011:494). And although relatively few 
members of ‘right to a better life’ movements have direct and constant access to the internet, 
their presence online, via websites and social media, has succeeded in “increas[ing 
the]…national and international visibility” of their struggles (Willems 2011:494), in a 
comparable manner to the Zapatista’s use of such technology. In particular, their use of cell 
phones, and the mobile technologies that they offer, has emerged as pivotal in ensuring the 
success of their communication and organization. In South Africa, access to mobile internet 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
alone, movement member Zodwa Nsibande has made it clear that “to support our legal action we go to the 
streets and demonstrate and show the establishment that the power is with the people” (cited in Vartak 2009).  
189
 Evidence of the political influence of social media, regardless of limited access and connection, emerged 
during the 2010/2011 Arab Spring. Despite limited access in some of the countries, the internet was used by a 
“core number of activists who then mobilized wider networks through other platforms or through traditional real-
life networks of strong ties.” For example, although Egypt had a relatively low digital penetration rate of 5.5% at 
the time of the uprisings, due to its large population this percentage “translates into around 6 million Facebook 
users, who in turn are connected to a much larger number of social contacts who can be influenced by 
information from those with Facebook accounts” (Dubai School of Government 2011:5). 
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technology far outweighs fixed line internet access (Cupido and Van Belle 2012:159), with 
mobile handsets offering connection possibilities to the majority of South Africans, especially 
the poor.
190
 Indeed, a recent report by infoDev highlighted that “although half the 50 million 
people in South Africa live below the poverty line, more than 75% among those in low-
income groups who are 15 years or older own a mobile phone” (cited in Peyper 2013). In this 
regard, they maintain that “mobile ownership…[in] households with an income of less than 
R432 per month per household member…is relatively high compared to other African 
countries” (cited in Peyper 2013). Although the use of data applications among this group of 
people is quite low, the drastic reduction of costs that came along with the introduction of 
social networking platforms such as Mxit and Facebook (Willems 2011:494), has increased 
access in this area ‒ with other social media platforms such as Twitter also gaining in 
popularity (Peyper 2013). Thus, notwithstanding the relative lack of resources in terms of 
these social movements’ fixed landline communication abilities, the way in which mobile 
technologies are increasing internet access for the poor and marginalized cannot be dismissed. 
In relation to this, it is not surprising that mobile phones and their related web capabilities are 
increasingly being used by social movement activists to communicate with and “mobilise 
[their] constituencies effectively” (Willems 2011:494).191 In what follows, the extent to which 
AbM uses the internet and social media, firstly, to open up communicative spaces in which 
counter-publics and counter-discourses can be developed, secondly, to provide a space for a 
range of divergent and dispersed movements to come together, network, and develop 
articulations of collective identities, and thirdly, to promote counter-public contestation of 
dominant discourses, will be considered.  
                                                          
190According to Skuse and Cousins (2005, 2008),  since “insecure housing tenure and lack of a postal address in 
many townships means that many people cannot apply for ﬁxed landlines from the two ﬁxed line providers – 
Telkom and Neotel,” interest in mobile phones has been “quite high with almost every household owning a 
mobile handset” (cited in Chiumba 2012:198). 
191
 As Chiumbu confirms, “social justice movements in South Africa, often marginalized by mainstream 
communication systems, are increasingly using mobile phones to coordinate actions, mobilize and create 
networks despite the fact that most of these movements have their origins among deprived communities.” In her 
study of the use of mobile phones by the Western Cape Anti-Eviction Campaign, she noted that new media 
technologies have been used by the movement to facilitate three related processes, namely “organisation 
efficiency, accessing the…[internet] by movement members and strengthening collective identities among 
members” (2012:202-203). Consequently, despite the obvious implications of the digital divide in South Africa, 
strong evidence that the internet and social media are increasingly being used, not only for individual consumer 
purposes, but also within the political sphere, is beginning to emerge. 
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Firstly, AbM has developed quite a striking online presence, and it is not only the 
largest and most supported component of the PPA, but also the most digitally connected. That 
is, AbM has an active website which can be found at www.abahlali.org, and which has a 
multiplicity of links that allow users to explore and navigate the digital media and 
communicative spaces of, and connect to, this shack dwellers movement. Similar to the 
TAC’s website, in order for users to actively participate in and comment on the site, they need 
to log-in, via the ‘User login’ link found on the home page. However, since there is no option 
for a general visitor to ‘create an account,’ it appears that only movement members are able to 
log-in to the site. This means that, while all visitors to the home page are able to view the 
movement’s latest news, along with information related to new and ongoing activities and 
mobilizations, only logged-in users are granted full access to see the comments made, and to 
comment on the articles themselves. Thus, interactivity and participation on the site is largely 
limited to movement members, and accordingly, opportunities for the development of 
counter-publics in this online space remain somewhat restricted. In relation to this, while the 
‘Contact’ link, which provides both an online email contact form, as well as other relevant 
contact details, provides users with direct access to the movement, the statement that “you can 
leave an email message using the contact form below, but the best way to reach Abahlali is 
via telephone, fax or snail mail,” draws significant attention to the fact that the movement 
may not always have direct access to the internet. It also highlights further the limitations of 
their website to provide sufficient online space for debate and discussion through which 
counter-publics can emerge. Yet, despite these limitations, the link titled ‘University of 
AbM,’ arguably provides some agonistic possibilities, via its role in building, spreading, and 
strengthening the movement’s counter-discursive ideas. In particular, it provides information 
on the movement’s principles and orientation, along with an array of digital material in the 
form of articles, pamphlets, press statements, and so forth. Moreover, while their website 
might not be very conducive to the creation of counter-publics, their presence on the social 
media site Facebook does provide a platform for debate and discussions relating to the 
movement’s discourse and campaigns. 
Secondly, with regard to their use of the internet’s interactivity and reach to allow 
diverse people and groups to network and form articulations of collective identities, thereby 
leading to stronger and more effective oppositional strategies, AbM’s website ‘Support’ link 
draws attention to the movement’s supporters and its donor policy. From the list of 
supporters, it becomes apparent that AbM has succeeded in facilitating an articulation of 
diverse groups and movements, despite their core focus on poor people’s issues and 
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problems.
192
 Moreover, not only are their connections to divergent and geographically 
dispersed groups listed on the ‘support’ page. In addition, hyper-links to each of these 
movements are also provided on the website. In this way, AbM has not only used the internet 
and social media as a means to spread both their own message and activism, along with 
information related to the campaigns of other PPA movements and affiliated movements. In 
terms of this, apart from the above mentioned links, a ‘Solidarity’ link indicates the 
movement’s connections to other South African poor people’s movements, namely the 
Unemployed People’s Movement, and the Rural Network. And it provides direct links to 
news articles and information related to these movements and their activities, despite 
differences in approach between them and AbM. The importance of this should not be 
overlooked.
193
 As mentioned earlier, not all of the ‘right to a better life’ movements have 
access to the internet, with the consequence that the inclusion of these links on the AbM 
website highlights their commitment to supporting these other movements, and ensuring that 
they too have an online presence.
194
 Also, the fact that AbM has not encroached upon the 
autonomy of any of these other poor people’s movements, further highlights their tentative 
connection to online agonistic ideas of democracy.  
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 In particular, movements, organizations, and groups, including Entraide et Fraternité, The Church Land 
Programme, X-Y, The South Africa Development Fund, Anarchist Black Cross, War on Want, Amnesty 
International, Mute Magazine, People’s House, and the Onyx Foundation, Friends of Workers’ Education in 
South Africa, Gift of the Givers, St. Elizabeth’s Church (New Jersey, USA), Bishop Rubin Philip, the Ota Benga 
Alliance, The Freedom of Expression Institute, the Open Democracy Advice Centre and the Centre on Housing 
Rights & Evictions, the Legal Resources Centre, goundWork, the Centre for Applied Legal Studies, the Paulo 
Freire Institute, and the Socio-Economic Rights Institute of South Africa (SERI), are highlighted as movements 
in support of AbM and their fight for the ‘right to a better life’ for shack dwellers and poor people in South 
Africa. 
193
 For example, an article on the Unemployed People’s Movement, entitled “UPM: Election 2014: Our 
Position,” highlights the UPM’s stance in relation to the ‘No Vote’ policy of many of the ‘right to a better life’ 
movements, despite the UPM’s disagreement with AbM on this issue. It is important to note this, because even 
though the UPM disagreed with the AbM Durban branch’s decision to vote for the Democratic Alliance, the 
AbM did not refrain from including the UPM’s statement on their website. This draws further attention to the 
connection that the movement has with agonistic democracy, in that the right of the UPM to differ in its opinions 
and policy is respected and accepted by AbM.  
194
 It could even be argued that AbM’s use of their online media to bring attention to the plight of other poor 
people’s movements, not only highlights their growing involvement with alliance politics, but also draws 
attention to their realization that, in today’s globalized and digitally-mediated world, having a presence online 
can mean the difference between widespread recognition and success, and disempowering obscurity.  
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In relation to social media, as already indicated, AbM is connected to both the social 
networking site Facebook and the microblogging site Twitter, and the movement has a direct 
link to their Facebook page on the home page of their website. That is, under the ‘Find us on 
Facebook’ heading, users are encouraged to ‘like’ the AbM page, or go directly to the 
Facebook account. Their Facebook page, which focuses on sharing information, news, and 
updates on movement events and activism, has over 2 497 ‘likes’ (December 2014).195 AbM 
have also used their Facebook page to ‘like,’ and thereby tentatively show support for, other 
groups and movements, including the Mandela Park Backyarders, Coalition of Immokalee 
Workers, Take Back Vacant Land – Philadelphia, Right to the City Alliance, Zapatista, Socio-
economic Right Initiative of South Africa, Institute for Women, Religion and Globalization, 
among many others.
196
 This virtual show of support for a range of divergent movements and 
groups, not only highlights AbM’s tentative use of this media to connect and articulate a 
range of movements and groups, but also indicates their use of this media to provide 
opportunities for the strengthening of marginal voices who are often rendered vulnerable 
through isolation.
197
 Updated almost daily, the movement is very active on this platform and 
thereby offers its users a communicative space in which a variety of divergent groups can 
come together to discuss, debate, and contest the movement’s issues and objectives, thereby 
opening up opportunities for the articulation of counter-discourses, and the strengthening of 
oppositional strategies. Lax (2000) and Lister (2003) support this idea, when they insist that 
social media such as Facebook can “act as the foundation through which discussion and 
opinion flows, in ways that can achieve and sustain common and collective [counter]-
discourse and action” (cited in Steenkamp and Hyde-Clarke 2012:92). Yet, while updates are 
regularly made on the AbM Facebook page, little evidence exists of interaction between the 
                                                          
195
 Some examples of striking updates and information include press statements entitled “The Local ANC 
Disrupted an Abahlali Meeting in Madlala Village Yesterday,” “Abahlali Launches a Branch in Silver City 
(Umlazi),” and images with the headline “Aftermath of the Attack on the Marikana Land Occupation, Cato 
Crest, By the eThekwini Municipality, 22 June 2014” (Abahlali baseMjondolo 2014c). 
196
 Since this movement is largely anti-state and anti-capitalist, they tend to assume a largely autonomous 
democratic position. However, their willingness to work within institutions (law courts), even as a last resort, as 
well as their willingness to work with a variety of movements, even those not committed to anti-capitalism, 
highlight their possible ‒ if somewhat nascent ‒ connection to the ideas of agonistic democracy. 
197
 In addition to these connections, online statements such as “an injury to one is an injury to all,” which was 
made by AbM to express solidarity with dismissed Commercial, Stevedoring, Agricultural and Allied Workers 
Union (CSAAWU) farmworkers, indicates their connection to agonistic pluralism, and the notion that the rights 
and activism of one group are of equal importance to, and dependent on, the realization of the rights and activism 
of all connected causes. 
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movement and its followers, supporters, and other groups or movements. Thus, although 
opportunities for communication, debate, and networking exist, they are not being utilized, 
and instead, their social networking site effectively functions as a platform for information 
transfer. In addition to their presence on Facebook, AbM can also be found on Twitter under 
the name @abahliali_abm. Yet, although the movement joined this microblogging site in May 
2012, there is still no reference or link to its Twitter account on the movement’s official 
website. Also, a simple search online for ‘Abahlali baseMjondolo on Twitter’ does not 
provide a direct link to the site, but rather only provides links to other people’s tweets about 
the movement.
198
 Moreover, with only 587 followers as of December 2014, their connectivity 
on this platform is significantly smaller than on their Facebook page. And while their Twitter 
account has evidence of AbM updates and links to news related to the movement, there is 
little indication of connection with, or support of, other groups via this platform. Furthermore, 
with only six of the first twenty posts receiving a retweet from another user, the current reach 
and impact of this platform, to develop and strengthen the discourse and agenda of this ‘right 
to a better life’ movement, remains very limited. Consequently, while their tentative 
connections to divergent and dispersed movements are expressed online, the extent to which 
the AbM movement is actually using this media to interact and network with such 
movements, seems negligible.  
Thirdly, despite their somewhat intermittent online connectivity and interactivity, 
AbM has used their online presence to contest dominant discourses, as well as to instigate 
offline contestation and action. In this regard, recent 2014 Facebook posts have been largely 
focused on the movement’s occupations of land, and re-occupation of land following 
evictions, along with illegal evictions, and the demolition of shacks carried out by 
government. All of these posts serve to highlight the plight of the shack dwellers in South 
Africa, and at the same time, to contest the dominant discourses surrounding the 
government’s macro-economic and housing policies. In relation to this, users are able to 
comment on, ‘like,’ and share all posts, as well as make their own posts to the AbM page. 
And in addition to such online discursive contestation, the events page of the movement’s 
Facebook page has also been used as a space for the online instigation of offline action.
199
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 For example, after an online search, the first Twitter link is that of the ‘Right to Know’ campaign and their 
tweet “Abahlali baseMjondolo’s Bandile Mdalose is being held by police for ‘Public violence.’ Police violence 
and... http://fb.me/1xK3FVNeB.” 
199
 For example, an April 2014 post to its Facebook ‘Events’ page stated that “Abahlali will be hosting its annual 
Unfreedom Day Rally. All welcome to attend” (2014d). This call for attendance emerges as an example of the 
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Arguably, such use of this media resonates with Vromen’s assertion that new media and the 
internet can be used as a space for social movements to challenge existing relations of power 
(2008:107). However, again, despite such opportunities, little advantage has been taken of this 
communicative space, and interactivity on the platform remains relatively low. In this regard, 
although most posts are ‘liked’ by a number of users, very few comments have been made, 
and little to no debate or contestation is evident in relation to the highlighted issues. And 
while active participation is lacking on the ‘wall’ of the page, the ‘Posts to Page’ link, which 
provides further opportunities for users to access posts made from a diverse group of people 
and organizations, both in support of and against AbM’s actions and politics, is also under-
utilized. From questions surrounding their decision to break their ‘No Land! No House! No 
Vote!’ policy,200 to statements of encouragement, and calls for support from other 
movements,
201
 the ‘Posts to Page’ link offers significant opportunities for debate, discussion, 
and contestation to develop. Yet, notwithstanding these opportunities, examination of the 
posts reveals that only two of the latest ten posts made to the page have received comments 
(December 2014). Furthermore, of these comments, none of the posts received a comment 
from the movement itself. Consequently, despite the opportunities for participation offered by 
such social networking platforms, interactivity and engagement are lacking on this Facebook 
page.
202
 Thus, despite AbM’s structural connectivity via this social media platform, the extent 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
online instigation of offline contestation needed in order for social media to function as an online agonistic 
public space. 
200
 The already mentioned, ‘No Land! No House! No Vote!’ campaign was initiated in 2004 by the Landless 
People’s Movement, and was adopted by the Poor People’s Alliance in 2008. This campaign focuses on 
encouraging a boycott of national elections and an overall rejection of party politics, thereby highlighting these 
‘right to a better life’ movements connections to autonomous democracy. In the run-up to the 2014 general 
elections, AbM’s Durban branch decided to forgo this policy/campaign and encouraged its members to vote for 
the Democratic Alliance (DA) – the official opposition to the ANC (Abahlali baseMjondolo 2014b). This 
decision was met with various negative comments and criticisms, with much of the left lambasting them for 
compromising their efforts toward progressive social change. Yet, while criticized by some, this development in 
the movement’s politics highlights their increasing openness to working within political institutions, and as such, 
could indicate their tentative inclination toward a more agonistic approach.  
201
 Examples of such communication are: “Excellent initiative, indeed, the people should rule, the dog wag the 
tail and not the tail wag the dog” (2013), and “Please join us in our struggle ag[ai]nst the criminalization of 
homeless people in Hungary!” (Abahlali BaseMjondolo 2014a). 
202
 This lack of participation and engagement on the part of AbM may be related to the fact that movement 
leaders themselves may not be running the movement’s social media. That is, movement supporters or 
volunteers may be updating the site on behalf of the movement. If this is the case, those in charge of running the 
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of interactive communication is fairly low when compared to the Facebook page of, for 
example, the Zapatista (EZLN), whose most recent post received 198 ‘likes’ and thirty-nine 
shares.  
As already indicated, a lack of resources and issues relating to the digital divide, have 
resulted in the majority of poor people’s movements in South Africa having limited access to, 
and presence on, the internet. Admittedly, Abahlali baseMjondolo does seem to be the 
exception in this regard, especially in relation to their high level of digital connectivity in 
comparison to other ‘right to a better life’ movements, and their active presence online via 
their website and social media pages. However, despite their structural presence in a variety 
of online spaces, and the concomitant opportunities for this media to be used to facilitate the 
promotion of radical democratic practices, the current use being made of this media lacks the 
level of interactivity, discussion, and debate required for it to function as something akin to an 
online agonistic public space ‒ as advanced by Dahlberg, and as called for by Mouffe.  
 
5.7.3 The ‘right to a better life for all’ movements 
 
Thus far, new social movements that campaign for rights to health, land, housing, and 
affordable basic services in South Africa, have been discussed. But in addition to these, a 
range of other movements have also begun to highlight the need for environmental and social 
justice in the country. According to Hallowes and Butler, environmental justice exists when 
“relations between people, within and between groups of people, and between people and 
their environments are fair and equal,” so that all are able “to define and achieve their 
aspirations without imposing unfair, excessive or irreparable burdens or externalities on 
others or their environments, now and in the future” (2004:15). During the apartheid era, 
environmental concerns tended toward the conservation of endangered plants, animals and 
wildlife areas. And this led to environmental needs, including “urban, health, labour and 
development issues” (Cock 1991), being neglected (Beinart and Coates 1995; Kahn 1990; 
Mittelman 1998). However, the ideas of environmental justice that have been thematized in 
the post-apartheid era, indicate a movement away from the above mentioned conservation 
approach, toward an ever greater emphasis on ‘social justice,’ as “an all-encompassing notion 
that affirms the…value of…all forms of life, against the interests of wealth, power and 
technology” (Castells 1997:132). It is in relation to this conception of environmental justice 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
social media may not have the authority, or even the knowledge, to comment on behalf of the movement, thus 
impeding chances for vibrant discussion and participation at a national or even international level.  
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that “a new phase of struggle for a better life for all” has emerged in the country [my italics] 
(Hallowes and Butler 2004:71). In short, ‘right to a better life for all’ movements are 
concerned with environmental and social justice, and “empower[ing] people in relations of 
solidarity and equity with each other and in non-degrading and positive relationships with 
their environments” (Hallowes and Butler 2004:15). And in this regard, the Environmental 
Justice Movement affiliate, groundWork, is perhaps one of the best-known examples of a 
‘right to a better life for all’ movement in South Africa.  
GroundWork, a non-profit environmental justice and development organization, 
founded in 1999, aims to “improve the quality of life of vulnerable people in South Africa,” 
and “places particular emphasis on assisting vulnerable and previously disadvantaged people 
who are most affected by environmental injustices” (groundWork 2014c).203 And through 
representing Friends of the Earth South Africa, a national branch of Friends of the Earth 
International (FoEI), groundWork challenges “the current model of economic and corporate 
globalization,” and promotes “solutions that will help to create environmentally sustainable 
and socially just societies” (Friends of the Earth International 2014). By providing support to 
a number of community-based organizations, groundWork has succeeded in redirecting “the 
Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism’s strategy for pollution control;204 gaining  
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 In addition to groundWork, other key nodes in the Environmental Justice Movement include the 
Environmental Justice Networking Forum (EJNF) ‒ a movement “which seeks to advance the interrelatedness of 
social, economic, environmental and political issues to reverse and prevent environmental injustices affecting the 
poor and working class” (Madihlapa 2003, cited in Cock 2006:207). Although the EJNF has played a role in 
reconfiguring environmentalist discourse in South Africa, the significant lull in its activities since the mid-2000s 
has brought its continued effectiveness into question (McDonald 2002:103). Earthlife Africa (ELA) has been 
recognized as another important node in the Environmental Justice Movement. According to Cock, ELA “is a 
loose, nationwide alliance of volunteer activists, grouped into local branches” (2006:208), all dedicated to five 
core areas including toxics, nuclear, zero waste, animal action and climate change. ELA is one of the most 
prominent environmental justice movements in South Africa. In addition to these two important groups, other 
significant organizations have also been linked to the movement, including the Environmental Monitoring Group 
(EMG), and the Group for Environmental Monitoring (GEM).  
204
 According to Roemer-Mahler, prior to 2005, “the legislative framework governing air quality management in 
South Africa was the Atmospheric Air Pollution and Prevention Act (APPA) of 1965.” This legislation, he 
asserts “was based on a top-down regulatory approach in which emission permits were granted without the 
requirement of ambient air quality assessments considering local meteorological and topographical conditions.” 
This meant that “local authorities did not have any jurisdiction over air quality management.” However, in 2005, 
the Air Quality Act was passed by the South African government. This Act places “strong emphasis on the 
subsidiarity principle and encourages public participation in policy making through consultative processes” 
(Roemer-Mahler 2013:1). groundWork played an important role in promoting the approval of this Act.  
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“publicity for community issues;” providing “community access to decision makers, and 
combining “science and policy work with action” (Cock 2006:208). In addition to this, they 
have been involved in mobilizing “support through public events, the media and a network of 
national and international [civil society] partner” organizations, and in “lobbying the 
government, engaging directly with industry, and monitoring” injustice on the ground 
(Roemer-Mahler 2013:1). In the latter regard, through the organizational vehicle of 
“Groundwork…activists have been able to mobilize various resources to sustain local 
mobilizations and put pressure on national government and multinational corporations” 
(Barnett and Scott 2007:12). Additionally, groundWork assists in “making connections 
between sites and actors and helping to establish at least temporary political identities 
between them” (McAdam et al. 2001, 142-3, cited in Barnett and Scott 2007:12). 
Section 24 of the South African Constitution’s Bill of Rights, states that “Everyone 
has the right to (a) an environment that is not harmful to their health or well-being; (b) to have 
the environment protected, for the benefit of present and future generations, through 
reasonable legislative and other measures that ‒ (i) prevent pollution and ecological 
degradation; (ii) promote conservation; and (iii) secure ecologically sustainable development 
and use of natural resources while promoting justifiable economic and social development” 
(South African Human Rights Commission 2010:323). Guided by this, ‘right to a better life 
for all’ movements focus on securing and realizing these rights. That is, since the Bill of 
Rights “speak[s] to the experience of environmental injustice and…formally protects people’s 
rights to organise and mobilise in defence of…[those] rights,” ‘right to a better life for all’ 
movements, such as groundWork, “have recognised the important role that rights discourse 
can play in environmental movement campaigns” (Hallowes and Butler 2004:74). Cock 
concurs with this, stating that at “the core of the notion of environmental justice as a powerful 
mobilising force lies…the notion of rights – rights to access to natural resources and to 
decision making” (2006:206). Correlatively, since the language of rights is often used to 
legitimize movement demands and activism (Madlingozi 2014:113), Cock points toward the 
counter-hegemonic potential of the environmental justice movement ‒ in particular, groups 
such as groundWork ‒ in “the challenge to power relations that this notion of rights implies” 
(2006:206).
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 As mentioned earlier, environmental justice movements are often tasked with attempting to find alternatives 
to the current hegemony of neoliberal capitalism. In this regard, these movements often suggest that people’s 
rights will not be fully realized until an alternative to “contemporary industrial capitalism and the neoliberal 
state” are found (Hallowes and Butler 2004:67). Admittedly, this argument can be closely connected to the ideas 
of autonomous democracy. However, since these movements are not militant in their calls for alternatives to the 
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As thematized in the previous discussions, the internet and new media technologies 
have succeeded in facilitating the expansion of both online and offline new social movement 
networking. In terms of this, the internet offers opportunities for a diversity of groups and 
movements to come together and organize collective action at a relatively low cost, while at 
the same time allowing movements and groups to bypass traditional and often restrictive 
mainstream media. In relation to ‘right to a better life for all’ movements, Castells insists that 
“the internet has become a major organising and mobilising tool for environmentalists around 
the world,” both for “raising people’s consciousness about alternative ways of living, and 
[for] building the political force to make it happen” (2001:280). Kutner similarly argues that 
“the use of internet-based technologies by environmental justice activists has already 
been…demonstrated to be effective for access, use, dissemination and creation of information 
resources” (2000:7). Accordingly, environmental justice movements in South Africa are 
making significant use of the internet to “coordinate their activity and give visibility to their 
issues” (Cock 2006:216-217). But whether or not such use entails this media functioning as a 
form of online agonistic public space, in the promotion of something akin to radical 
democracy, is a matter of debate. In the interest of contributing to this debate, in what follows, 
groundWork’s online presence, and the degree to which this presence contributes toward the 
creation of counter-publics, the development of counter-discourses, and the promotion of 
discussion, debate and contestation of dominant discourses, will be considered. 
 Firstly, groundWork’s use of the internet and new media technologies to provide 
communicative spaces for the establishment of counter-publics and the development of 
counter-discourses, is encouraging. To begin with, groundWork has a well-established online 
presence, especially via their website, www.groundwork.org.za, the home page of which 
consists of a number of links that direct users to various communicative spaces. In addition to 
the links ‒ and a number of latest news headlines ‒ the home page also provides direct links to 
the organization’s social media pages on Facebook and Twitter, as well as that of their parent 
organization, Friends of the Earth International.
206
 Unlike the websites of ‘right to life’ and 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
current neoliberal system, and since they are actively involved in promoting institutional reforms, their politics 
can also be connected closely to the agonistic radical democracy advanced by Laclau and Mouffe. That is, while 
they support the importance of working within the realm of institutions (courts of law) ‒ in an attempt to reform 
government and capitalist environmental policies, they also concomitantly advance a discourse which challenges 
the legitimacy of neoliberal hegemony in the country. 
206
 According to their website, Friends of the Earth International “campaign[s] on today’s most urgent 
environmental and social issues,” insofar as they “challenge the current model of economic and corporate 
globalization, and promote solutions that will help to create environmentally sustainable and socially just 
societies” (Friends of the Earth International 2014). 
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‘right to a better life’ movements explored earlier, groundWork’s website does not require 
users to log-in via a user log-in link. Consequently, any visitor to the site is able to access all 
of the information available on the site. Yet, this lack of a log-in facility means that no 
opportunity is given to anyone to interact or engage with the movement through commenting 
on news articles or website updates. And this means that there is no opportunity for debate 
and discussion, and consequently, limited possibilities for this media to nurture and foster 
counter-publics and oppositional discourses. However, this does not mean that no such 
participatory function exists. On the contrary, users are provided with opportunities to 
participate and interact with the organization via the commenting function on its Facebook 
page, and via its blog, ‘Smokestack,’ which focuses on climate justice, energy, waste, and 
environmental health. Yet, while Smokestack provides a communicative space through which 
counter-publics could be established, there has been no activity on the blog since March 2013 
(December 2014). As such, although online communicative spaces currently do exist, 
indications are that at present they are not all conducive to the development of counter-publics 
and the nurturing of ‘right to a better life for all’ counter-discourses.  
Secondly, the extent to which groundWork has used the internet and social media as 
interactive spaces through which diverse people and groups can connect, network and 
articulate collective identities and oppositional strategies, emerges as important. In addition to 
providing updates on the movement, the news section of the groundWork website also 
highlights their association and affiliation with other movements connected to the pursuit of 
environmental justice in South Africa. For example, in the article entitled “Eskom’s 
Application for Increased Air Pollution from Its Kriel Power Station Refused” (GroundWork 
2014c), groundWork’s affiliation with Earthlife Africa,207 along with the Centre for 
Environmental Rights,
208
 is brought to the fore. At the same time, the ‘Links’ and ‘Partners’ 
links also provide evidence of groundWork’s connections to other movements, pointing to its 
possible connection to online agonistic practices. Indeed, the ‘Links’ page provides users with 
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 According to Earthlife Africa’s website, they “seek…a better life for all people without exploiting other 
people or degrading their environment,” and their “aim is to encourage and support individuals, businesses and 
industries to reduce pollution, minimise waste and protect…natural resources” (2014). 
208
 The Centre for Environmental Rights (CER) “was established in October 2009 by eight civil society 
organizations (CSOs) in South Africa’s environmental and environmental justice sector[,] to provide legal and 
related support to environmental CSOs and communities.” The Centre’s mission is to “advance the realization of 
environmental rights as guaranteed in the South African Constitution by providing support and legal 
representation to civil society organisations and communities who wish to protect their environmental rights, and 
by engaging in legal research, advocacy and litigation to achieve strategic change” (Centre for Environmental 
Rights 2014).  
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a considerable list of links to movements and organizations that groundWork have formed 
connections and articulations with.
209
 This not only highlights groundWork’s connection to 
other ‘right to a better life for all’ groups, but also draws attention to their support of 
movements and organizations that do not necessarily advance the groundWork agenda of 
environmental justice. For example, groundWork has indicated its ‘support’ of Abahlali 
baseMjondolo, which is connected to the ‘right to a better life’ movements, discussed 
earlier.
210
 Arguably, their inclusion of direct links to these movements on their website opens 
up opportunities for the articulation of progressive democratic struggles and concomitant 
strengthening of oppositional discourses and strategies.
211
 Furthermore, their ‘Partners’ page 
provides direct links to their partner movements and organizations, and even groups which 
have stated solidarity or formed some type of coalition with groundWork. According to their 
website, “these organizations are diverse in a variety of ways and provide critical support to 
groundWork’s work.” And they insist that, “together with the support of these organizations 
[they]…have built significant connections and a stronger environmental justice movement in 
South Africa, regionally and globally” (GroundWork 2014e).212 Thus, since groundWork 
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 In this regard, links to the South African government (Department of Energy, South African Parliament), 
South African organizations (Abahlali baseMjondolo, Greenpeace Africa, Earthlife Africa, Treasure the Karoo 
Action Group), international NGOs (350.org, Corpwatch, Healthcare Without Harm, Women in Informal 
Employment), international treaties, conventions and bodies (United Nations Environment Programme and the 
United States Environmental Protection Agency), are all provided. 
210
 Moreover, evidence from groundWork’s online communications highlights their openness to working with, 
and facilitating collaboration between, varieties of divergent movements. In particular, their promotion of 
Abahlali baseMjondolo on their website indicates their existing affiliations with ‘right to a better life’ 
movements. In addition to online evidence of such connection and support, collaboration between groundWork 
and AbM can also be seen in the offline environment. For example, in 2008, AbM joined a groundWork-
supported march for waste pickers’ rights in Durban. That is, both groundWork and AbM are supportive of the 
plight of waste pickers ‒ who also tend to be shack dwellers ‒ and marched in solidarity with these impoverished 
people (Hans 2008). 
211
 While evidence of agonistic use of the internet can be seen in ‘right to a better life for all’ movements’ online 
activity, the political orientation of these organizations is particularly dynamic. That is, on the one hand, they are 
often involved in consensual deliberations (i.e. via participation in Environmental Impact Assessment 
deliberations), and, on the other hand, they tend to adopt something akin to an agonistic stance via their 
adversarial activism (i.e. legal challenges and protest) and formulation of oppositional strategies (Barnnet and 
Scott 2007). At the same time, ‘right to better life for all’ movements also adopt a counter-hegemonic agenda 
which stands in direct opposition to the neoliberal macro-economic policy currently being implemented in South 
Africa (Hallowes and Butler 2004). 
212
 These movements, organizations, and groups  include the Centre for Environmental Rights, Earthlife Africa, 
Friends of the Earth International, Health Care Without Harm, the Global Anti-Incinerator Alliance, Oilwatch 
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provides links to each of these partner organization websites, thereby opening up 
opportunities for multiple connections to be made between a plurality of organizations and 
movements, in a variety of online communicative spaces, their use of this media arguably 
does increase opportunities for the development and strengthening of counter-discursive 
strategies. Furthermore, their connection to and/or support of other movements and 
organizations is illustrated via the ‘likes’ link on their Facebook page. This link highlights the 
variety of movements and organizations that groundWork has ‘liked’ on this social 
networking platform, which includes the World Wildlife Fund South Africa, Earthlife Africa, 
the Right to Know Campaign, the Coalition for a Living Wage and Good Working Conditions 
for Farmworkers, Greenpeace Africa, and the eWaste Association of South Africa, among 
many others. Arguably, these ‘likes’ provide evidence of attempts to make connections with, 
and to support (or at least recognize) these groups, and points toward groundWork’s tentative 
use of this media as a means to create connections between divergent and dispersed people 
and groups. Another opportunity for groups and movements to connect and network with 
groundWork is the ability of users to make direct posts to the movement’s Facebook page. 
Yet, despite the use of this function by a number of individuals and groups, groundWork is 
yet to actively engage with ‒ or even acknowledge ‒ these posts, and this lack of online 
engagement acts to stifle opportunity for discussion or debate. Consequently, possibilities for 
connections and articulations to be developed in this online space are simultaneously 
constrained. However, at the very least, since the organization exhibits online support for a 
multiplicity of politically, economically, and geographically diverse organizations, its use of 
this social media can be seen to contribute, albeit incrementally, toward the instigation of a 
development of articulations of divergent progressive struggles, as promoted by both Hands 
(2007) and Dahlberg (2007b).  
Thirdly, the movement’s use of the interactivity of the internet and social media to 
support counter-public contestation of dominant discourses, is quite significant. In this regard, 
groundWork has frequently used their online presence to contest issues related to their four 
core campaign areas, namely climate and energy justice, coal, waste, and environmental 
health. In relation to this contestation, some of the news articles on the movement’s website 
support a form of online discursive contestation, by encouraging users to “make some noise” 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
International, the South African Waste Pickers’ Association (SAWPA), the Southern Cape Land Committee, the 
South Durban Community Environmental Alliance, the Vaal Environmental Justice Alliance, Women in 
Informal Employments: Globalising and Organising, and the Zero Mercury Working Group. 
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and share the issues or topic being discussed via social media.
213
 In addition to this, a variety 
of new articles on the site encourage users to sign online petitions related to various 
environmental causes. As mentioned earlier, in addition to their website, groundWork is also 
present on the social media sites Facebook and Twitter. With 575 ‘likes’ as of December 
2014, their Facebook page is largely used to bring attention to, and to contest, issues related to 
environmental justice in South Africa, and around the world. In particular, recent posts have 
engaged with issues related to fracking, coal pollution, corporate greed, and recycling.
214
 
Although the information in groundWork posts relates to their own agenda, the movement 
also regularly reposts links from partner and affiliated movements or groups. For example, in 
July 2014, they shared Greenpeace Africa’s link on Eskom (16 July), the Centre for 
Environmental Rights link related to coal mining (15 July), and 350.org’s post on climate 
change (21 June).
215
 In addition to such online discursive contestation, groundWork’s online 
media have also been used to bring attention to offline activism and contestation. For 
example, their ‘Events’ link on their Facebook page has been used to encourage users of the 
site to join offline sit-ins and activism related to environmental justice.
216
 Apart from 
Facebook, groundWork joined Twitter in February 2012, and currently has 456 followers 
(December 2014). The organization’s Twitter feed is also fairly active, with tweets and re-
tweets that relate to pollution, electricity, the impacts of coal mining on people’s health, and 
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 For example, in relation to the article on the groundWork-backed report “Honest Accounts? The True Story 
of Africa’s Billion Dollar Losses,” users are asked to “make some noise” and ‘tweet’ a variety of statements to 
Twitter. Some of these statements include, “Africa loses almost 6.5x the amount of money it receives in aid each 
year. We demand #honestaccounts of our finances,” and “There is a story politicians like to tell about aid to 
Africa. It’s not the right one. Give us #honestaccounts,” among others (GroundWork 2014d). 
214
 Many of their posts attempt to introduce counter-discursive ideas. For example, the Facebook post entitled 
“We cannot commodify nature!” emphasizes groundWork’s rejection of the widespread privatization promoted 
by neoliberal-capitalism (2014f). Examples of the movement’s online contestation of dominant discourses can 
also be seen in their sharing of posts, such as one from Occupy Wall Street, which denounces capitalism. Indeed, 
on 23 July 2014, groundWork shared a post uploaded by Occupy Wall Street, which quotes John Maynard 
Keynes’s statement that “capitalism is the extraordinary belief that the nastiest of men for the nastiest of motives 
will somehow work for the benefit of all” (2014f). 
215
 According to their website, 350.org is an organization committed to “building a global climate movement.” 
Founded in 2008, their “online campaigns, grassroots organizing, and mass public actions are coordinated by a 
global network active in over 188 countries” (350.org 2014). 
216
 An example of such online instigation of offline action can be seen in their call for people to join in at the 
‘People’s Climate Camp’ in Durban, which included “exhibits showing people’s ideas of an alternative, clean 
energy future” (GroundWork 2013).  
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“rights to a clean environment” (GroundWork 2014a), among other things.217 However, 
although this contestation reflects Cammaert’s argument that the internet offers spaces for the 
expression of disenssus on issues often hidden by the current status quo (2008), 
groundWork’s inability to attract significant online followers, as well as the relatively low 
number of debates and discussions evident on their social media sites, admittedly detracts 
from the extent to which this online space currently facilitates effective contestations and the 
promotion of related agonistic democratic practices. 
  Based on the above discussion it becomes apparent that, although groundWork ‒ as 
the leading ‘right to a better life for all’ movement ‒ is present and accessible online, their 
level of interactivity is low. And since they have largely used their online presence to share 
information on issues related to their environmental justice agenda, rather than to actively 
encourage and initiate online conversations, debates, and contestations, the potential of their 
current use of social media to act as an online agonistic public space, that promotes radical 
democratic change, remains limited.
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5.8 Conclusion 
 
From the above analysis it is evident that although ‘right to life,’ ‘right to a better life,’ and 
‘right to a better life for all’ movements differ in their degree of connection to the internet, 
similarities can be found in their tentative linkages to the online agonistic public space 
framework advanced by Dahlberg. Yet, at the same time obstacles to their respective use of 
this media as an agonistic public space that can facilitate the emergence of the left-wing 
hegemony and radical democracy advanced by Laclau and Mouffe, were also identified. That 
is, despite their use of the internet, and in particular social media, to provide communicative 
spaces for the creation of counter-publics and counter-discourses, the coming together of 
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 Videos and images related to environmental justice are also uploaded or re-tweeted by the organization, and 
connections between groundWork and their affiliates and partners are expressed via the re-tweeting of links and 
tweets. Although uncommon, some of groundWork’s tweets have been retweeted by other Twitter users ‒ 
thereby disseminating their updates to an even wider range of users.  
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 Yet, the potential for such use can be seen in the online activity of ‘right to a better life for all’ group, 
Greenpeace Africa, which currently has 79 522 ‘likes’ on Facebook and 39 700 followers on Twitter (December 
2014). To be sure, Greenpeace is a well-recognized organization in the field of environmentalism and 
environmental justice, and, as such, has gained more widespread recognition and support than smaller grassroots, 
local organizations. However, their use of this media offers promising insight into the potential that it may have 
for other environmental justice movements in South Africa in the future. 
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divergent groups and movements in the articulation of collective identities, and the counter-
public contestation of dominant discourses, only a limited resonance exists between their 
resultant levels of interactivity and those of the social movements discussed in the previous 
chapter. Thus, although the potential for the radical democratic use of social media by new 
social movements in South Africa does exist, it has yet to be realized, because their current 
use of this media lacks the engagement, participation, and contestation needed in order for it 
to facilitate the advancement of left-wing hegemony, or radical democracy, in the country. In 
this regard, despite the participatory potential and extensive reach of social media, it appears 
that new social movements in South Africa tend to view it in much the same way as South 
African mainstream political parties do ‒ simply as a tool for information dissemination. In 
this regard, in their article “The Use of Facebook for Political Commentary in South Africa,” 
Steenkamp and Hyde-Clark examine the online activity of the South African governing party, 
the ANC, and the official opposition party, the DA. Although these parties both have highly 
active Facebook pages (MyANC has over 215 000 ‘likes’ and the Democratic Alliance has 
over 144 000 ‘likes’), Steenkamp and Hyde-Clarke assert that, to a large extent, the parties do 
“not participate in political discussion online,” and do “not engage in a conversation with the 
public” (2012:96). And this despite widespread and vibrant conversations between the 
Facebook group users themselves, which indicates an interest in entering into dialogue of over 
key issues.
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Yet, in spite of these current limitations, evidence of ‘right to life,’ ‘right to a better 
life,’ and ‘right to a better life for all’ movements’ connections to the ideas of agonism ‒ 
especially in relation to their online activities and communication ‒ are nevertheless apparent. 
And despite being very tentative in some instances, these highlight the promising 
opportunities for such media to be used to “shift social relations and political constructions, 
and thus contest and challenge [current]…hegemonic formations in the country” 
(Macgilchrist and Bohmig 2012:87).  
Based on this premise, questions concerning how new social movements in South 
Africa should try to take further advantage of such social media, and what they need to do in 
order to transform their current online presence ‒ from ‘information conduits’ into active 
facilitators of democratic discussion, debate, and contestation ‒ emerge. Furthermore, 
questions concerning what these movements stand to gain from an online agonistic public 
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 Although the parties are usually not involved in the online discussions, vibrant contestation is evident 
between users of the pages. This strongly indicates that the South African public is interested in participating in 
political discussions and debates online. Consequently, it is plausible to suggest that new social movements need 
to make greater efforts to encourage the public to get involved in their conversations as well. 
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space, and how they will benefit from the formation of left-wing hegemony in the country, 
similarly require answers. These, and other questions, will be addressed in the conclusion of 
this thesis. 
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Conclusion  
 
6.1 Thesis overview 
 
Despite the emergence of an array of new social movements in South Africa following the 
country’s transition to democracy in 1994, the ability of these movements to effectively 
challenge the marginalizing power of the ANC-led neoliberal trajectory, has fallen into 
question. This is because, despite their attempts to challenge the injustices exacerbated by the 
current politico-economic orientation of the country, the tendency among these new social 
movements to become too issue-specific and localized, has often resulted in deep divisions 
between, and the corresponding fragmentation of, South African civil society organizations. 
However, the potential for their growing use of social media and mobile technologies to form 
online agonistic public spaces, in which a multiplicity of struggles can come together to 
contest and problematize the neoliberal order of the country exists. And this stands to offer 
intriguing opportunities for a progression toward new social movement cohesion and 
coalition, and correlatively, the incremental advancement of radical forms of democracy in 
South Africa. In the interest of exploring such radical democratic potential of social media use 
by new social movements in South Africa, this research followed the following path. 
In Chapter One, an examination of the connections between neoliberalism and the 
internet was undertaken, via an exploration of the rise of the internet from Cold War military 
‘packet-switching’ technologies, through ‘big business’ funding of internet network 
development, to its domination of the private sector. That is, following an examination of the 
progression of the internet from the military and government networks of the 1960s, through 
Web 2.0 in 2003/2004, to the various interactive social media platforms available today, the 
neoliberal and consumerist underpinnings of contemporary online activities were considered, 
particularly in relation to Dan Schiller’s notion of digital capitalism (2000), and the 
corresponding corporate colonization of cyberspace. After a brief examination of Schiller’s 
work, the impact of the internet and new media technologies on human communication, 
identity formation, and interaction, was then discussed in relation to various conflicting 
scholarly perspectives. To begin with, positive theorizations of this media’s potential to build 
communities, increase participation in public life, and expand freedom in society ‒ as 
advanced by Rheingold (1993), Turkle (1995), Poster (1995), and Jenkins (2006) ‒ were 
highlighted. After this, the more circumspect and ambivalent theorizations of Castells, who 
both promotes certain aspects of online networks, and denounces others, was explored. 
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Finally, negative theorizations of new media technologies for their promotion of 
individualism, narcissism, and alienation from society, were elaborated upon in relation to the 
arguments of Buffardi (2008), Campbell (2008), Twenge (2009), and Turkle’s most recent 
work (2011). This was done in order to thematize the current debate surrounding the influence 
of the internet and new media technologies on identity and society, and to provide insight into 
both the opportunities and challenges that they respectively afford and pose to digitally-
connected people in the contemporary era. 
Next, against this cautionary backdrop, in Chapter Two, evidence of the potential that 
the internet and social media may hold to encourage and enhance mainstream political 
participation in contemporary society, was explored. In this regard, the social media campaign 
of the 2008 US presidential elections, which highlighted the increasing role that social media 
are playing in traditional or mainstream party politics, was considered. However, following a 
discussion of the proliferation of liberal democracy around the world, and its promotion of 
neoliberal discourses and dynamics both online and offline, arguments by Davis (1999), 
Resnick and Margolis (2000), Schlosberg (2006), and Gutmann and Thompson (2004), 
among others, were engaged with. These authors suggest that the use of the internet and social 
media in mainstream politics has simply resulted in the adoption of a standardized neoliberal-
consumer model of politics, which promotes uncritical and consumer-orientated political 
practice. Yet, despite such concerns, evidence of the growing use of the internet and social 
media in the online practice of alternative democratic politics was also identified, and this 
was investigated in the latter part of the chapter. In this regard, the concept of radical 
democracy was elaborated upon, before, firstly, the deliberative approach to radical 
democracy ‒ which has largely been attributed to the ideas of John Rawls (1993) and Jürgen 
Habermas (1996) ‒ was discussed. As indicated, the exponents of deliberative democracy 
propose that “political problems…can be resolved through the force of the better argument,” 
and that reasonable discussions and objective and rational consensus-based decision-making 
are precursors to any democratic transformations of society. And this was followed by an 
exploration of the potential of the internet to promote this form of radical democracy, via a 
range of deliberative online platforms. Secondly, the autonomous approach to radical 
democracy, which highlights the role of community, self-determination, and freedom from 
centralized systems of power in democratic practice, was examined. In particular, the works 
of Cornelius Castoriadis (1991, 1997), who calls for a system of self-government and 
emphasizes the need for a return to a society committed to autonomy and the ‘original’ 
meaning of democracy, were engaged with, along with how his arguments have been 
supported by Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri’s (2000, 2004) works. That is, their similar 
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denunciation of the current liberal democratic system as a neoliberal ‘Empire,’ and their call 
for both a political revolution against the power of neoliberal capital, and the creation of 
autonomous communities and organization, were discussed. And the subsequent 
consideration of the internet and new media networks as a means to challenge neoliberal 
discourses and power, revealed the autonomous democratic potential of this media to bypass 
centralized forms of control and capitalist systems, and to allow for an online formation and 
extension of a ‘commons’ (Dahlberg 2011:863). In short, while this chapter drew attention to 
the role of the internet in the co-optation of mainstream politics by neoliberalism, it also 
highlighted the opportunities that such media have to resist such co-optation, and to facilitate 
alternative ‒ in particular, deliberative and autonomous ‒ forms of democratic participation.  
 In turn, Chapter Three drew attention to a third category of radical democracy, namely 
agonistic democracy, which has been lauded for its deep resonance with online political 
dynamics. Offering an alternative to deliberative and autonomous radical democratic 
approaches, the theory of agonistic democracy was initially discussed in relation to the ideas 
of Connelly (1991), Tully (2002), Honig (1996), and Owen (2002), who advance the 
importance of conflict, difference, identity, and contestation in democratic transformations. 
After this, Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe’s popular conception of radical democracy ‒ 
as expressed through their book Hegemony and Socialist Strategy (1985), and their individual 
theoretical works ‒ was critically engaged with. That is, stressing the overarching presence of 
antagonisms and differences in contemporary politics, Laclau and Mouffe’s argument that 
democracy should not be about achieving consensus, but rather about providing a platform for 
the confrontation of inevitable differences and the constant renegotiation of issues based on 
these conflicts, was discussed. Moreover, related to the ideas of equivalence and plurality, 
their assertion that previously unconnected or dissimilar groups should be able to recognize 
the similarities in their progressive struggles or ideas, and come together to support the 
radically democratic extension of liberty and equality to all, was highlighted. In particular, 
their rejection of deliberative ideas of consensus, and their criticism of autonomous notions of 
‘the multitude,’ were elaborated upon, before their promotion of a new political strategy of 
the left was examined. That is, a left-wing hegemonic project involving the embrace of 
difference and conflict, the transformation of antagonisms into agonisms, and the subsequent 
challenging of un-progressive hegemonies. In terms of this, specific emphasis fell on their 
promotion of co-operation between civil society and social movements as essential to the 
development of such a ‘left-wing hegemonic’ project, and as imperative to the formation of 
radical democracy.   
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Against the backdrop of the above theory, in Chapter Four existing general 
theorizations of online agonism were considered, before specific investigations of salient 
radical democratic use of the internet by major social movements was undertaken. That is, 
firstly, various general theorizations of the agonistic use of the internet in recent social 
movement politics were considered, namely the works of, among others, Kahn and Kellner 
(2006), Kowal (2002), Downey and Fenton (2003), Moghadam (2013), Rahimi (2011), 
Langman (2005), Cammaerts (2008), Hands (2007), and Dahlberg (2007a, 2007b, 2007c). 
Secondly, specific examples of the radical democratic use of the internet by recent major 
international social movements ‒ namely the Zapatista, RAWA, the alter-globalization 
movement, and the Occupy movement ‒ were investigated. And through such investigation, it 
emerged that the online politics and practices of these movements resonate primarily with the 
political dynamics of agonistic radical democracy. That is, the above mentioned movements’ 
connections to the agonistic public space framework, detailed by Dahlberg, were thematized, 
and their use of the internet and social media to function, firstly, as communicative spaces or 
arenas for the development of counter-publics, secondly, as a means to assist politically 
diverse and dispersed groups to network and articulate their collective identities and 
discourses, and to strengthen the effectiveness of oppositional strategies, and thirdly, as a 
means of supporting counter-public contestation of mainstream dominant discourses, was 
considered. Based on this analysis, it was argued that, notwithstanding various degrees of 
continued connection to deliberative and autonomous conceptions of democracy at a 
grassroots level, the movements under investigation evinced a clear progression toward the 
dynamics of agonism in their online activism.    
Finally, in Chapter Five, with a view to discovering whether or not such global 
agonistic developments have local counterparts, the radical democratic use of the internet and 
social media by new social movements in South Africa was explored. In this regard, 
following a brief discussion of the South African political landscape and its history, the 
ANC’s neoliberal turn after 1994, and the subsequent emergence of new social movements in 
the country, a brief overview of the current South African new media landscape was provided. 
After this, the online activities of three new social movement categories ‒ ‘right to life,’ right 
to a better life’ and ‘right to a better life for all’ movements ‒ were analyzed and discussed, in 
relation to the online presence and activism of the leading examples of each, namely the 
Treatment Action Campaign (TAC), Abahlali baseMjondolo (AbM), and groundWork. In 
short, it was determined that, although these South African new social movements’ use of the 
internet and social media does resonate partially with that of the previously discussed global 
movements, for the most part their current use of this media lacks the requisite level of 
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engagement, participation, and contestation needed for it to function effectively as an online 
agonistic public space. That is, a space which can, firstly, provide a platform for the 
development of counter-publics through which agonistic pluralism can be practiced, secondly, 
assist politically diverse and dispersed groups to network and articulate their identities and 
discourses as ‘chains of equivalence,’ to strengthen the effectiveness of oppositional 
strategies, and thirdly, support counter-public contestation of mainstream dominant 
discourses. Instead, due to the predominant use of such media by the selected South African 
new social movements as ‘technological tools’ for information dissemination, rather than as 
‘cultural technologies’ for precipitating dialogue and change, it was determined that the 
potential of their social and mobile media platforms to function as online agonistic public 
spaces of debate and contestation ‒ which open up possibilities for radically democratic 
transformations of society (Laclau and Mouffe 1985:178) ‒ is yet to be realized. And in 
addition to such current formal limitations, what also emerged is that thematic obstacles to the 
creation of such online agonistic public spaces exist. Indeed, despite evidence of growing 
multiple connections and solidarity between an array of divergent new social movements, 
fragmenting differences over the adoption of in-system and extra-institutional strategies 
continue to impede widespread coalition formation on the basis of what Laclau and Mouffe 
call the articulation of ‘chains of equivalence.’  
In this regard, ‘right to life’ movements like the TAC can be connected to the ideas of 
agonistic democracy. Not only are they evidently willing to work with, and form coalitions 
with, a range of struggles, including those whose ideas conflict with their own, but they also 
aim to bring about ameliorative change, by deepening and extending features of the current 
liberal democratic system.
220
 However, they have also expressed reservations about working 
in collaboration with, or forming coalitions with, militant anti-state/anti-neoliberal 
movements (Friedman and Mottair 2006) ‒ the majority of whom fall under the ‘right to a 
better life’ category of movements. Their hesitance to work with or alongside some other 
South African new social movements, they assert, is a result of their belief that these groups’ 
“militancy…tactics and approach will not yield change” (Friedman and Mottair 2007:34). 
Thus, although ‘right to life’ movements have denounced government repression of, and 
violence against, the ‘right to a better life’ movements, they have not actually expressed 
solidarity with them. And in some cases, they have even publicly rejected their activities and 
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 This idea that ‘right to life’ movements aim to bring about change within the current ideological framework, 
namely liberal democracy, is resonant with Laclau and Mouffe’s argument that “the task for the Left…cannot be 
to renounce liberal-democratic ideology, but on the contrary, to deepen and extend it in the direction of a radical 
and plural democracy” (1985:176).  
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tactics.
221
 This rejection has placed strain on the relationship between ‘right to life’ and ‘right 
to a better life’ movements, and has resulted in deepening antagonisms and divisions between 
them, which have limited opportunities for the development of the left-wing hegemonic 
project that the online environment might otherwise facilitate.  
Next, while the leading ‘right to a better life’ movement, namely, Abahlali 
baseMjondolo (AbM), has shown some online inclination toward the ideas of agonistic 
radical democratic practices, at the grassroots level they remain largely autonomous in 
orientation.
222
 That is, they, firstly, are willing to work within institutions in order to facilitate 
the realization of their rights, secondly, demand to be included in political conversations,
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and thirdly, have displayed an online form of kinship with the ideas of agonistic pluralism and 
democratic conflict. But they are still ultimately committed to the political dynamics of 
autonomous democracy, and in particular, achieving an ‘anti-capitalist’ political vision. For 
instance, in a recent statement released by Abahlali baseMjondolo in relation to the Durban 
branch’s 2014 decision to abandon their ‘No Land! No House! No Vote!’ policy, in favor of 
participation in the political elections, they asserted that: although  
 
we have to act to protect our ability to organise and to sustain our living politics right now…[,  
but t]his does not mean that we have given up on our vision of a world where land, cities, 
wealth and power are shared fairly. We call this a living communism and we remain committed 
to it. But we also remain committed to the human beings that we are now and to our families, 
neighbours and comrades. We will make what deals we have to make to protect our politics and 
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 In October 2010, the TAC ‒ in conjunction with COSATU Khayelitsha, Equal Education and the Social 
Justice Forum ‒ denounced ‘right to a better life’ movement Abahlali baseMjondolo’s (AbM’s) calls for 
violence and chaos during a proposed “general strike of informal settlements.” AbM’s alleged encouragement of 
“residents to burn tyres, block roads and throw stones and rubbish” was criticized by the above movements as 
being “immature” and “ignorant,” and showing “contempt for…communities” (2010). In the statement, the TAC 
and its supporters clarified their agreement that the “need for mass organisation to overcome social inequality 
has never been greater.” However, they insisted that “the poor and working-class people of Khayelitsha cannot 
advance their struggle in this way.” Instead, they argued that, “to build their own power they need patient 
organisation and unity with people from Cape Town to Mitchell’s Plein, Gugulethu to Manenberg” (Treatment 
Action Campaign 2010). 
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 While “Abahlali has shared ideas and worked closely with other movements, including some non-
authoritarian NGOs and a few supportive academics, decisions have always been taken by the movement 
without regard to outsiders’ wishes and/or agendas” (Sacks 2014). 
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 In a 2007 press statement, AbM insisted that “the ‘experts’ and the rich and the politicians speak about us and 
for us. They see no reason to speak to us” (Abahlali baseMjondolo 2007). In relation to this, poor people’s 
movements including AbM have demanded that their movements be spoken ‘with,’ instead of being spoken 
‘about’ or for.  
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improve our members’ lives right now[,] but we will not give up on our political vision. 
(Abahlali baseMjondolo 2014) 
 
Accordingly, this movement’s connections to the promotion of a ‘living communism,’ and to 
a correlative total rejection of the current system, comprise major issues. On the one hand, 
these aims tend to isolate them from other South Africa new social movements, especially 
those connected to the ‘right to life’ struggles which, although largely critical of 
neoliberalism, nevertheless work toward change within the current system. On the other hand, 
their politics indicates a significant diversion from the radically democratic ideas of Laclau 
and Mouffe, who argue that the role of the left is to bring about change by deepening and 
extending liberal democracy, in the direction of radical and plural democracy.
224
 That is, 
while the radical democracy advanced by Laclau and Mouffe has a definite anti-
neoliberal/socialist element to it, and although Mouffe asserts that one of “the most important 
task[s] for the left today is to find alternatives to neoliberalism,” socialism is not promoted as 
their core objective (cited in Castle 1998). In addition to this, since ‘right to a better life’ 
movements tend to be suspicious of groups and movements that are affiliated to the ANC and 
certain NGOs, any opportunities for the online creation of something akin to chains of 
equivalence may be stopped short before being realized. For example, although AbM has 
expressed support for the ‘right to life’ movement, the TAC, they have also criticized their 
internal hierarchy and their connections to the ANC.
225
 Moreover, while there is evidence that 
they are willing to work with groups and movements not directly connected to housing, 
eviction, and other basic needs struggles,
226
 their core focus remains the achievement of rights 
and basic services for the poor, as well as building “as much unity as possible between 
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 For Laclau and Mouffe, “liberal democracy is not the enemy to be destroyed in order to create a completely 
new society. [T]he problem with ‘actually existing’ liberal democracies is not with their constitutive values 
crystalized in the principles of liberty and equality, but with the system of power which redefines and limits the 
operation of these values.” As such, they insist that their idea of a “radical and plural democracy was conceived 
as a new stage in the deepening of the ‘democratic revolution’” and “as the extension of the democratic struggle 
for equality and liberty to a wider range of social relations” (2001:xv).  
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 In a 2010 statement, AbM asserted that “we respect the important victories that TAC has won for health care 
over the years and we respect the work that they have done in solidarity with migrants and LGBT people. We are 
clear that our enemies are those who put the interest of the elites, be they in business or politics, before the 
interests of the poor and we are clear that we wish to build as much unity as possible between organisations of 
the working class…However we are very disappointed that TAC chooses to attack our campaign in public 
without first meeting with us as a fraternal organisation to discuss any concerns that they may have had” 
(Abahlali baseMjondolo 2010).  
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 For example, AbM’s website highlights their connection to the environmental justice movement groundWork. 
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organizations of the working class” (Abahlali baseMjondolo 2010).227 Consequently, although 
opportunities for the extension of chains of equivalence between the divergent democratic 
struggles of the above groups do exist, this ‘right to a better life’ movement’s suspicion of 
donor-funded NGOs, and their related refusal to work with organizations such as the Centre 
for Civil Society, stand to limit possibilities for the widespread articulations needed in order 
for radical democracy to emerge. Correlatively, the counter-hegemonic and militant nature of 
many ‘right to a better life’ movements has distanced them from other new social movements 
and organizations, whose members see such militancy as undermining the efficacy of social 
activism, because they feel that such tactics and counter-hegemonic approaches will not yield 
significant change (Friedman and Mottair 2007:34). 
 While the above relationship between ‘right to life’ and ‘right to a better life’ 
movements presents significant obstacles to any online formation of left-wing hegemony in 
the country, ‘right to a better life for all’ movements appear to be more open to creating 
connections with a wide range of  progressive movements.
228
 Indeed, groundWork, the 
leading ‘right to a better life for all’ movement, has recognized the need to create connections 
with both ‘right to life’ and ‘right to a better life’ movements, as well as many other 
progressive elements within civil society, in order to extend the democratic project to a whole 
new range of social relations. In this regard, in a 2004 groundWork report, Hallowes and 
Butler suggest that “an inclusive understanding of environmental justice [may]…contribute to 
building a common and broad movement that…aims to secure the material conditions for 
realising people’s rights to a better world” (2004:88). Although a broad national movement is 
not necessary for chains of equivalence to be made, their recognition of the need for such 
equivalence is important. Additionally, their willingness to work with, and within, the ambit 
of current democratic institutions, in order to fight for environmental and social justice, 
highlights their potential not only to facilitate change, but also to institutionalize that change 
as well. Thus, it can be argued that ‘right to a better life for all’ movements may be engaged 
in the process of what Mouffe calls ‘agonistics.’ That is, “instead of implementing a strategy 
of withdrawal” from the state (as seen in ‘right to a better life’ movements), they have 
tentatively accepted the need to become part of a “progressive ‘collective will,’” aimed at 
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 In addition to their various connections to the ideas of autonomous and agonistic democracy, this call for 
unity also highlights their tentative connection to the ideas of deliberative democracy. 
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 ‘Right to a better life for all’ movements have shared ‘right to a better life’ movements’ concern over the 
danger of NGOs and certain elements of civil society reproducing the status quo, and thereby “becoming a 
transmission belt for the current political and economic order” (Lumsden and Loftus 2003:9). However, they 
have also recognized that NGOs and civil society can play a significant role in the transformation of society.  
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adopting a “war of position” focused on “radicalis[ing] democratic institutions and 
establish[ing] a new hegemony” (Mouffe 2013:127). And it is toward this conception of 
‘agonistics’ that ‘right to life’ and ‘right to a better life’ movements may need to turn, before 
the potential of the internet and social media to facilitate radical democratic practices in the 
country can begin to be realized. 
In sum, although such media have the potential to facilitate the formation of 
something akin to left-wing hegemony in South Africa, which in turn could help to usher in 
radical democracy in the country, obstacles to the achievement of an online agonistic public 
space through which such a formation could occur, exist at both formal and thematic levels. 
Nevertheless, these obstacles are arguably coterminous with the beginning of such political 
use of online platforms. And as discussed in Chapter Four, evidence exists that such use by 
recent major global social movements has had the effect of incrementally shifting the political 
orientation of the groups concerned in the direction of agonism. Consequently, despite the 
current formal and thematic limitations of such media use in South Africa, the fact of the 
increasing employment of the internet, social media, and mobile technologies by local new 
social movements, may yet lead to the realization of something akin to Laclau and Mouffe’s 
conception of left-wing hegemony ‒ albeit only through a slow and incremental deepening 
and expanding of democracy in the country.  
But it is not sufficient to simply wait for this to occur, as though the internet comprises 
some sort of political panacea that only requires time to work its magic. On the contrary, the 
neoliberal underpinnings of the internet ‒ as discussed in Chapter One ‒ remain an ever 
present issue of concern, because of their capacity to undermine such democratic 
development. Possibly, the best defense against this would be a pro-active stance concerning 
ways in which to address the above mentioned formal and thematic obstacles to the formation, 
by South African new social movements, of left-wing hegemony, and in what follows a few 
tentative recommendations will be offered in this regard. 
   
6.2 Recommendations 
 
Despite the continuing divisions between new social movements in South Africa, some 
tentative solutions have already been suggested. In relation to the problem of most new social 
movement struggles being localized, issue specific, and accordingly fragmented, Madlingozi 
has argued that “fundamental change can only come about when community organizations 
engage in sustained collective actions that focus the struggle on wider social change” instead 
of the “single issues impacting on their communities.” Consequently, he asserts that South 
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African new social movements need to focus on “building strategic alliances with others, and 
forming a ‘united front’ which will ensure that particularistic struggles of different 
communities get coordinated at a national level” (2007:92-93). Zeilig and Dwyer develop on 
this idea of a united movement, insisting that “the way forward must be a unity between the 
organized working class, the township unemployed and…social movements” In short, they 
maintain that nothing less than a “unified struggle against neoliberalism in South Africa” is 
needed (2012:125). Yet, one negative implication of unity achieved through a nationally-
orientated movement, namely the potential loss of diversity through progressive conformity, 
remains a concern.  
In opposition to these two perspectives, Greenstein suggests that in order for new 
social movements in South Africa to present an effective contestatory force against the 
neoliberal policies of the ANC government ‒ while at the same time preserving their own 
autonomy ‒ they need to move away from the idea of creating unity between movements and 
rather move toward ‘transformative politics.’ That is, politics which “focuses on shaping the 
practical and discursive routines of social life,” in a way that allows “the untidy nature of the 
new social movements to flourish and spread to hitherto unaffected aspects of society.”  And 
he argues further that this type of politics “works towards ‘empowered democracy’ precisely 
by adopting a piecemeal and cumulative approach,” and correlatively, through “eschewing 
grandiose revolutionary rhetoric that sounds radical but ends up achieving very little because 
it is removed from people’s daily concerns” (Greenstein 2004:17, cited in Madlingozi 
2007:94).  
In support of Greenstein, this thesis indicates that Laclau and Mouffe’s conception of 
radical democracy offers a valuable heuristic device through which the future of the 
expansion and deepening of democracy in South Africa may be pursued. A democracy based 
not on increasing unity, but rather on agonistic conflict and the proliferation of difference, 
within a sphere of political activity understood in increasingly broad terms. In this regard, it is 
important neither to devalue the role of civil society ‒ and in particular new social movements 
‒ in the instigation of such agonistic radical democratic practices in South Africa, nor to 
underestimate the internet and social media as ‘cultural technologies of change’ in their 
hands.
229
  
As mentioned earlier, this thesis divides new social movements in South into three 
main categories, namely ‘right to life,’ ‘right to a better life,’ and ‘right to a better life for all’ 
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 Aaker and Smith have lent support to this perspective, by suggesting that such new technologies allow people 
to “connect” and “mobilize” in a manner that brings about change. They further argue that “the power of social 
technology, when fully engaged, can be nothing short of revolutionary” (Aaker and Smith 2010:xiv). 
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movements. And all three of these categories differ in relation to their strategic approaches to 
attaining the rights which each privilege, with the consequence that antagonisms surrounding 
choices of strategy have developed. That is, on the one hand, the first category which is seen 
to adopt a ‘rights-based’ strategy, focus largely on the implementation of in-system tactics, 
and so are often accused of pandering to, or being co-opted by, the ANC and its neoliberal 
politico-economic agenda. On the other hand, the second category, which adopts counter-
hegemonic strategies focused principally on extra-institutional tactics, is often denounced by 
exponents of the above ‘rights-based’ strategy for their militant and unorganized approach. 
Yet, as discussed in the previous chapter, despite the avowedly different strategic alignments 
of the movements within each category, they are arguably less diametrically opposed and 
more situated on opposing poles of a continuum, along which moments of slippage and 
consequent interface have occurred. After all, evidence exists that all such movements have at 
one stage or another implemented in-system and extra-institutional tactics. For example, 
‘right to life’ movements, which operate chiefly within the current political system, have been 
known to adopt counter-hegemonic tactics of civil disobedience, particularly when in-system 
tactics fail to bring about an adequate or timely realization of their calls for rights to health, 
HIV/AIDS treatment, and life. Similarly, notwithstanding their largely counter-hegemonic 
and extra-institutional stance, ‘right to a better life’ movements have at times adopted in-
system tactics, in order to augment the legitimacy of their claims to land, housing, and other 
basic service rights. Moreover, movements within the third ‘right to a better life for all’ 
category, seem to have embraced both the implementation of counter-hegemonic campaigns 
for social and environmental justice and rights, and supported these with in-system 
challenging of the state and capital. Consequently, since the new social movements of each of 
the above three categories all entail interest in realizing a certain set of constitutional and 
human rights, and are willing to use both in-system and extra-institutional methods to achieve 
these rights, the concept of rights can conceivably function as a ‘common symbolic space.’230 
That is, a symbolic space within which new social movements and activist groups in South 
Africa can proceed to articulate “themselves as equivalent subjects of rights” (Joseph 
2002:xxviii), in a way that transforms existing antagonisms into agonisms. 
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 In this regard, Henderson and Waterstone highlight Laclau and Mouffe’s argument that “the expansionary 
logic of rights-discourse must be extended to ever wider social relations” (2009:205). This is because 
deployment of rights language can facilitate the construction of ‘chains of equivalence,’ thus contributing to the 
development of connections between new social movements, and concomitantly, the opening up of opportunities 
for the establishment of something akin to a left-wing hegemony in South Africa. 
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Accordingly, this would entail the different movements’ adopting a ‘friendly enemy’ 
position, in terms of which they are “friends because they share a ‘common symbolic space’ 
but also enemies because they want to organise this space in a different way” – either through 
a focus on in-system or extra-institutional strategies (Mouffe 2005:20). For Mouffe, this 
means that, although their struggles are not exactly the same, they are going to be linked in 
such a way that, for example, the rights of ‘right to life’ movements will not be pursued (or 
achieved) at the expense of those rights prioritized by ‘right to a better life’ movements 
(2006:73). Furthermore, although such adversaries may argue with each other in terms of their 
differing positions, “they do not put into question the legitimacy of their respective positions” 
(Mouffe 1999a:4). Rather, by extending chains of equivalence, these movements ‒ instead of 
trying to unite all of their demands into a single national homogenous movement ‒ would 
insist on the open and plural character of the social, within which conflict and difference will 
always occur. And within this context, these new social movements would instead recognize 
themselves as ‘equivalent struggles of rights,’ which can begin to effectively challenge 
aspects of the neoliberal hegemony.
231
 
But how do such chains of equivalence come into being? While there is an abundance 
of literature related to the theory of political agonism, and the importance of the creation of 
chains of equivalence, there is significantly less material on the application of this theory at a 
practical political level. Indeed, even Mouffe herself admits that “there are no recipes on how 
to establish a chain of equivalence” between divergent democratic struggles. Instead, the 
application of such theoretical conceptions must remain open to interpretation and be 
determined by local circumstances (Mouffe, cited in Carpentier and Cammaerts 2006:971). 
Arguably, the potential of the internet, and in particular social media, to offer opportunities 
for the expansion of such chains of equivalence, should not be underestimated ‒ especially 
when tentative linkages can already be seen in new social movement and civil society online 
communications. Admittedly, as alluded to above and in the previous chapter, South African 
new social movements’ current use of the internet and social media, although varied, remains 
relatively limited in comparison to that of some of the recent major global movements, 
discussed in Chapter Four, and hence, such media yet to function as something akin to an 
online agonistic public space within the context of South Africa. However, this does not mean 
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 In this regard, the respective struggles of ‘right to life,’ ‘right to a better life,’ and ‘right to a better life for all’ 
movements’ struggles for first, second, third, and even fourth generation rights, can be viewed as both equal to, 
and correlatively supportive of a common symbolic space of ‘human rights,’ within which the different 
movements can position themselves in collaborative relations with one another.   
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that the potential of this media to, on the one hand, provide a space for pluralism and, on the 
other hand, facilitate the contestation of dominant discourses, does not exist. On the contrary, 
from the analysis in Chapter Five it emerged quite clearly that while such media are yet to be 
used to their full agonistic potential, their nascent agonistic use is evident. Hence, it becomes 
important to determine how improvement and augmentation of such nascent use could 
contribute toward the ever greater realization of an online agonistic public space, through 
which chains of equivalence between ‘equivalent struggles for rights’ can be made.  
 Arguably, four possible new media approaches emerge from the discussions of the 
previous chapters: firstly, the augmentation of existing dialogic functions at a cyber-structural 
level; secondly, the active and enthusiastic engendering of virtual discursive momentum; 
thirdly, the provision of a critical buffer against online neoliberal influences as the digital 
divide is progressively overcome in South Africa; and fourthly, the exploration and 
progressive utilization of alternative software that constitutes a more democratic and safer 
means of social networking than current commercial sites and applications.  
That is, firstly, in order for the internet and social media to function as a pluralistic 
online agonistic public space, within which the different views of various South African new 
social movements can be expressed, and dynamic dialogues and contestations can take place, 
greater opportunities for more open interaction need to replace the current rather exclusionary 
dynamics. This is because, while some opportunities for interaction are provided on the 
respective movements’ websites, commenting facilities ‒ when they do exist ‒ tend to be 
largely restrictive in nature, and only allow select visitors to the website (such as members of 
the movement and logged-in users) to participate in discussions. This exclusion limits 
opportunities for dynamic dialogic contestation to occur, and thereby prevents the emergence 
of agonistic democratic spaces. Thus, instead of restricted commenting options, movement 
websites need to move toward the adoption of more open dialogic structures, which allow any 
visitor to sign up, comment, debate, contest, or support the issues at hand. In addition to this, 
none of the websites examined included an online public (or even private) forum facility. By 
including an ‘open forum’ link ‒ similar to that of the Occupy Wall Street website, discussed 
in Chapter Four ‒ new social movements in South Africa would not only open up the 
additional communicative spaces needed in order for counter-publics to develop, for the 
articulation of identities to occur, and for the contestation of dominant discourses to take 
place. In addition, they would also provide a far more adequate platform for a multiplicity of 
expressions and ideas to arise in relation to their respective agendas. Something which would 
open up opportunities for chains of equivalence to be formed, through allowing for dissensus 
and the contestation of dominant discourses ‒ what Mouffe calls “bringing to the floor what 
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[hegemonic] forces attempt to keep concealed” (Mouffe, cited in Carpentier and Cammaerts 
2006:973-934).  
Secondly, although interactivity is seen as a central feature of new media technologies, 
active participation is not a guaranteed outcome of the presence of interactive online 
capabilities, but rather something that needs to be discursively engendered. The lack of 
continuity between interactive capabilities and popular participation and engagement is 
clearly evident in much of the South African new social movements social media use. That is, 
despite the variety of interactive opportunities that are offered on the Facebook, and to a 
lesser extent Twitter, pages of certain of the movements ‒ such as structurally embedded 
commenting and sharing functions ‒ limited active participation and engagement remain the 
general rule. And this stands as a warning to avoid the naïve adoption of a technologically 
deterministic view, which rushes to celebrate new technologies as being directly responsible 
for transforming democracy, instead of focusing on the need for such technology to be 
“actively contextualised and domesticated by [South] African users” (Wasserman 2011:150). 
One possible way of engendering such development would be for South African new social 
movements to follow in the online footsteps of international movements ‒ such as Occupy 
Wall Street ‒ not only by instigating discussions and encouraging participation in counter-
discursive conversations, but also through contesting dominant discourses and debating 
alternative solutions. Moreover, the emphasis on the part of new social movements in South 
Africa should fall not simply on the local contextualization of such types of interactions, but 
also on the enthusiastically encouraging agonistic discursive momentum concerning such 
content. That is, such interaction needs to steer clear of promoting unreflective participation 
which is simply aggregated, such as polling or voting (Schlosberg et al. 2006:217; Gutmann 
and Thompson 2004:13), and aim instead for reflexive debate. For example, many groups and 
pages on Facebook that attempt to bring attention to ‘right to life,’ ‘right to a better life,’ and 
‘right to a better life for all’ issues, simply require supporters to select the ‘join’ or ‘like’ link, 
and add their name to the group’s membership or number of followers. This often means that, 
besides fleeting moments of attention given to various causes or events via a click of the 
mouse, no further discursive participation or action is either expected or encouraged. 
According to Schlosberg and his colleagues, these types of aggregative interactions and 
communications “do nothing to appeal to the shared public good,” and can even “encourage 
self-interested comment” (2006:224). To avoid this pitfall, South African new social 
movements need to engage more actively with the recipients of their social media updates and 
information dissemination, by encouraging discussion and contestations via the commenting 
functions of their sites, and by engaging with those comments that are posted on their 
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Facebook pages or those tweets relating to their movement or activities. And beyond this, 
they also need to encourage debate surrounding the issues and ideas of other ‘equivalential’ 
movements and struggles. To be sure, the new social movements discussed have created 
tentative links with other democratic struggles via their social media, but these remain, for the 
most part, static listings of support. Accordingly, the lack of discussion and participation 
reduces possibilities for the emergence of agonism, and correlatively limits the growth and 
visibility of the webpages in question. In this regard, Shelly and Frydenberg argue that new 
and social media technologies “rely upon the fact that many people visit them and provide 
content to keep them fresh.” This means that “more content leads to more users,” and “an 
increase in the number of users increases the likelihood that many of them will participate by 
providing their own new content” (2010:2), which in turn facilitates the growth and 
dissemination of constantly changing content. Since many of the South African new social 
movements’ social media platforms have a small number of followers, possibilities for 
continuous content development, and thus continuous contestation, are limited at present. 
However, if these movements were to encourage new content development by engaging more 
actively and enthusiastically with their supporters, and by encouraging more participation and 
sharing, more users will conceivably be attracted to their pages, increasing opportunities for 
greater contestation and content development, and concomitantly increasing opportunities for 
this media to function as an online agonistic public space. Again, the Occupy Wall Street 
Facebook page emerges as a good example. With over 654 000 ‘likes’ or followers, issues 
raised and uploaded by the movement are immediately commented on and discussed, thus 
developing more content and attracting more people and groups to participate in the 
conversations and contestations.  
Admittedly, notwithstanding the radical democratic potential of social media when 
harnessed in a more interactive and participatory way, it would be naïve to laud such media as 
‘omnipresent tools,’ through which new social movements in South Africa can begin to 
approximate something akin to Laclau and Mouffe’s conceptions of left-wing hegemony. This 
is especially because of the continuing technological and digital gap in the country between 
those who have access to such media, and those who do not. As discussed in the previous 
chapter, the disparity between those who are digitally connected, and those who remain on the 
digital margins of society, remains high. And this disparity is a result not only of a lack of 
access to new media technologies, but also of expensive broadband costs, slow and 
interrupted connectivity, as well as socio-cultural factors related to literacy, particularly 
English language proficiency. Indeed, according to de Lanerolle, in South Africa, “the 
greatest barrier to Internet use is literacy,” which she ranks as “more important than income, 
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age, home language or occupation.” But she also asserts that, “in countries with very fast and 
cheap Internet access, the Internet is becoming as much about photos, video and audio as 
text,” thus reducing the obstacle of illiteracy. However, “until most South Africans have 
access to cheap fast broadband[,] literacy is a significant barrier for millions of South 
Africans” (de Lanerolle 2012:10). Related to this, the majority of local new social movements 
discussed in this thesis ‒ especially the ‘right to a better life’ movements ‒ are found 
predominantly on the margins of South African society, and it is therefore not surprising that 
they have yet to succeed in transforming their use of social media into a functioning agonistic 
public space. Nevertheless, the fact that they have been able to break into the online 
environment, despite their limited resources, is both highly commendable and a very 
promising sign, which not only indicates increasing literacy rates, but also the possibility for 
such literacy to be channeled into agonistic political engagement.  
The increasing availability and accessibility of mobile technologies is also playing a 
crucial role in helping people and groups from the marginalized and disadvantaged strata of 
society to gradually become more involved in political communication and conversation. As 
Cullum notes, 
 
the turn of the twenty-first century has seen the rise of mobile phones as powerful devices that 
have transformed how people create and share information…[A]ctivists are harnessing the 
power of mobile technologies to improve and expand campaigns, better coordinate activities 
and demonstrations, and increase awareness about social issues...[because a]ctivists armed with 
either low-cost, basic mobile handsets or more complex smartphones, are capable of instantly 
connecting with their network of colleagues and supporters. (2010:47)   
 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, South Africa had over sixty million mobile phone 
connections in 2013, and as costs reduce and networks improve, the influence that mobile 
phones and ICT technologies stand to have on development and democracy in Africa is 
increasingly being explored (Hahn and Kibora 2008:88). And while the “extent to which 
mobile phones can create alternative politics and facilitate social change” is still unclear 
(Wasserman 2011:147), what is clear is that mobile phones are “almost always the cheapest 
and quickest way to communicate” (Etzo and Collender 2010:659). In particular, the range of 
functions available on these devices makes them “an extremely versatile technology” (Ekine 
2010:xi).  
Admittedly, while South African mobile phone subscriber rates have been lauded as 
impressive at 128% ‒ with 66.1 million mobile connections (active SIM cards) in a 
population of 51.8 million people (Deloitte in BusinessTech 2013) ‒ the implications of this 
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penetration for mobile internet connectivity in the country are not as optimistic. This is 
because smartphone (full internet browser capabilities) devices ‒ which are often exorbitantly 
expensive ‒ are currently only reaching a minority of the population.232 Yet, although 
smartphones that offer enhanced capabilities for accessing the internet and a variety of social 
media have a relatively low penetration (approximately eleven million phones have been 
registered in the country), they are not the only mobile devices that offer interactive and 
socially networked virtual environments. For example, WAP (Wireless Application Protocol) 
enabled feature phones, which provide users with cheaper internet and applications options, 
have begun to occupy a significant percentage of the South African mobile market. According 
to Miller, “feature phones, which…boast basic forms of GPS, camera, MP3 player and some 
kind of internet access, as well as the ability to run simple apps,” are “increasingly popular in 
the developing world.” He further asserts that they now “occupy the middle ground between 
basic phones that simply make, and receive calls and text messages, and smartphones” (Miller 
2013). An example of the online capabilities offered by such devices is Facebook Zero – a 
simplified text-based version of the popular social networking site. This text-only version of 
Facebook has been offered by approximately fifty mobile service providers across Africa,  
and it allows users to participate in the basic textual features of the site, free of charge. That 
is, unlike the normal Facebook page, which includes images, photos, videos, graphics, and so 
forth, Facebook Zero is purely text-based. And this enables users to view friend requests, 
comment on posts, write on walls, and interact with updates, among other things. 
Consequently, users do not need to have a fully-fledged smartphone, nor do they need to have 
airtime credit or data available, to be able to participate online.
233
 Mxit is another example of 
a more ‘data-light,’ cost-effective mobile and social network available on feature phones. In 
addition to their general Mxit mobile social network and chat functions, Mxit Reach allows 
individuals, groups or organizations to use the Mxit “platform to make free mobile education, 
                                                          
232
 Although access to statistics allows people to gauge current technological environments, these statistics do 
not necessarily reflect the influence and use of such technologies on democratic participation. As referred to 
earlier, limited internet penetration does not necessarily mean that this technology has a limited impact (as seen 
in Egypt during the Arab Spring), and correlatively, widespread access does not necessarily mean that people 
will automatically participate in politics. As Wasserman points out, “too often discourses around mobile phones 
make a[n] interpretive leap from access figures to speculation about the impact of mobile phones on democracy 
and development. This leap from access to effect, bypassing the unpredictable and highly contextualised usage 
of phones in everyday life, then lead to either over optimistic conjecture about the potential impact of mobile 
phones, or moral panics about their detrimental influence” (2011:149-150).  
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 Although Facebook Zero’s text-based service is free of charge, users are encouraged to migrate to the full 
view option for which they will be charged. 
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healthcare and community apps available to millions of users” (Milanian 2014). These apps 
must be “committed to enabling broad-based education and community upliftment,” and are 
available on over eight thousand different types of handsets around the country. Examples of 
such apps include ‘Red,’ which provides information and online counselling and chat services 
related to HIV/AIDS,
234
 and a Childline app, which utilizes the popularity of the internet and 
meets “young South Africans where they are – online” (Mxit Reach 2014a). Of particular 
importance to the issue of subsequent political use of social media are FunDza, an app that 
focuses on literacy and allows “readers and writers…[to] read and comment on each other’s 
work, allowing for instant feedback to writers and creative collaboration” (Mxit Reach 
2014b). Anyone can apply to create a free portal, which provides cost-effective online 
opportunities for connection and communication. In addition to these functions, feature 
phones also allow for the use of a number of mobile software applications (apps), and 
although many of these apps are consumer-orientated, a number of ‘apps for social change’ 
have also emerged. From apps for transparency, accountability, and reporting, to apps 
disseminating knowledge and information, to apps for philanthropy and activism. These apps 
provide opportunities for people to learn and to get involved in online practices not primarily 
linked to consumer culture, and through such means to contribute ‒ if only incrementally ‒ to 
social improvement and change. A good example of such an app is the ‘Dialogue App,’ which 
can be used by national and local government, healthcare organizations, regulatory bodies and 
trusts, charities, utility companies, non-profits, NGOs, and new social movements, as a means 
to initiate dialogue with their communities or supporters. According to the Dialogue App 
website, this app allows users to “discuss an issue online with the people it affects… and 
produce ideas you can act on” (2014).  
 The above examples of ‘data-lite’ social media platforms, mobile social networks, and 
mobile app possibilities, thus constitute interesting opportunities for participation within the 
South African online environment, where 80.2% of users access the internet through their 
mobile phones (Effective Measure 2014:3). And the potential for such mobile media to be 
used by new social movements in a way that is conducive to discussion, debate, and 
contestation, cannot be overlooked. After all, these mobile functions, because they are largely 
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 According to the Mxit Reach website, “Red aims to give South Africans, particularly youth, easy access to 
HIV and AIDS related information to improve their levels of knowledge around how to prevent HIV, and how to 
live with it. RedChatZone makes HIV counselling available via Mxit,” which “makes it cheap and very private. 
The level of anonymity offered by the service is [also] attractive to users. Red and RedChatZone work through 
Mxit, which is largely regarded as an affordable medium by South African youth. RedChatZone is staffed by 
qualified HIV counsellors from the National AIDS Helpline” (2014c). 
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low cost, can potentially be used by new social movements in South Africa not only as a 
communication device, but also as a means of ushering in something akin to online agonistic 
public spaces. This is especially since these technologies have the potential to be adopted and 
used by marginalized and disempowered people to “transgress boundaries imposed by the 
state[,]…culture, the economy and…the technology[-]capitalism complex itself” (Wasserman 
2011:150). Thus, because the mobile means currently exist, and are becoming more available 
every day, it remains only for the exponents of the new social movements to explore and 
embrace such means actively and enthusiastically, because the digital divide in the country is 
fast becoming an anachronistic excuse for failing to do so.  
Thirdly, it is arguably imperative for such exponents to act fast because, despite these 
mobile possibilities, and the related potential of social media to contribute toward the 
development of chains of equivalence in South Africa, the influence of the above mentioned 
‘technology-capitalism complex’ cannot be ignored. As indicated from the outset of this 
thesis, the internet and related social media technologies have by no means succeeded in 
escaping the hegemony of the neoliberal politico-economic system. In fact, notwithstanding 
initial utopian ideas of its democratizing influence, since the internet was transformed from a 
military device into a commercial product it has, for the most part, served as a means for 
profit. McChesney provides a succinct explanation of this, when he advises us to 
 
pause  [and]…consider how far the digital revolution has travelled from the halcyon days of the 
1980s and early 1990s to where it is today. People thought that the Internet would provide 
instant free global access to all human knowledge. It would be a noncommercial zone, a 
genuine public sphere, leading to far greater public awareness, stronger communities, and 
greater political participation. It would sound the death knell for widespread inequality and 
political tyranny, as well as corporate monopolies. Work would become more efficient, 
engaging, cooperative, and humane. To the contrary, at what seems like every possible turn, the 
Internet has been commercialized, copyrighted, patented, privatized, data-inspected, and 
monopolized. (2013:218) 
 
Similarly, elsewhere McChesney insists that the internet of the 1970s and 1980s was not only 
“non-commercial” but “anticommercial” (2013:101); that is, viewed as a “harbinger of 
egalitarianism and cooperation, not competition and profit,” because computers were 
“envisioned as a benefit to humanity – a tool that would lead to social justice” (Wozniak, 
cited in McChesney 2013:101). And since advertising and commercialism already 
encompassed the entirety of traditional media, they were deemed to have no space on the 
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internet (or ARPANET at the time).
235
 Yet, by the 1990s the internet had transitioned from a 
public service to a private capitalist sector.
236
 In this regard, Schiller’s concept of ‘digital 
capitalism’ set out in his book of the same name, which was discussed in Chapter One, 
highlights the deeply neoliberal nature of the internet, and he disregards the possibility that 
this media could be used for the ‘common good.’ Moreover, in his 2007 book How to Think 
About Information, Schiller expands on the ideas of the neoliberal incorporation and 
commodification of the internet, insisting that the “accelerated commodification [of the 
internet] reorients institutional infrastructure,” thereby distorting social power relations in 
favor of the “increasingly omnipresent” logic of capital (2007:112). In short, he maintains that 
the commodification of the internet has resulted in the online promotion and propagation of 
dominant neoliberal discourses, and the subsequent trivialization of alternative democratic 
ideals. Thus, rather than providing a platform for the extension of democracy, for Schiller, the  
commodified internet ultimately threatens it, something with which even Mouffe partially 
concurs, when she criticizes new media for operating “under the power of corporations which 
are dictated to and promote capitalist interests” (cited in Carpentier and Cammaerts 
2006:967).  
In relation to this, it has further been suggested that the global capitalist networks that 
have emerged as a result of information and communications technologies not only lead to 
greater exclusion from democratic politics, as a result of the digital divide. In addition, they 
also act to foster a form of ‘networked individualism’ among the digitally connected, in terms 
of which an individual’s wants and needs become the focus of all their social relations, in a 
way that negates real democratic participation. In light of this, an array of research has begun 
to focus on the problematic dynamics of such individualism, and on the impact that the 
internet and social media technologies have on the exacerbation of an individualized, 
narcissistic, neoliberal consumer identity. Indeed, as elaborated on in Chapter One, authors 
such as Baldwin and Stroman (2007), Orlet (2007), Buffardi and Campbell (2008), and 
Twenge and Campbell (2009), have all highlighted the role of the internet ‒ and in particular 
social media ‒ in the widespread promotion, adoption, and acceptance of superficial, self-
involved, and materialistic online communications. And they have accordingly placed in 
question optimistic views that the internet can contribute to the expansion of democracy. In 
                                                          
235
 ARPANET (Advanced Research Projects Agency Network), discussed in Chapter One, was the first 
operational packet switching communications network from which the global internet of today was developed. 
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 As McChesney notes, “the Internet was formally privatized in 1994–95 when the NSFNet turned the 
backbone of the Internet over to the private sector. Thereafter market forces were to determine its course” and 
future trajectory (2013:104). 
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addition to this, the alienating and isolating impact of such new media use has similarly been 
explored by authors such as Turkle, who criticizes the internet for operating as a ‘corporate 
trap’ that leads people away from offline ‘real’ relationships, interactions, and connections, 
toward an online world of weak and unfulfilling interactions. Such growing societal reliance 
on the internet and social and mobile media technologies, she argues, has resulted in 
diminished real-world relationships, which has led to an intensification of feelings of anxiety, 
loneliness, and alienation. In many ways, her notion that the internet leads to society being 
‘alone together’ has received support even from those who still advance the political potential 
of social media. For example, Schlosberg and his colleagues highlight analogous concerns 
when they suggest that “virtual…citizenship may be isolating rather than community-building 
citizenship” (2006:209). In terms of this, they refer to Sunstein’s (2001) thesis that, without 
some major guidance, “the Internet’s use with regard to…the public realm will be isolating, 
and will not build any sort of public sphere or community life” (2006:229). Rather, the 
extreme individualism and consumerism that dominate the current virtual realm will more 
likely result in the internet and social networking encouraging a withdrawal from, and the 
fragmentation of, communities, thereby perpetuating a “loss of democratic authenticity” 
(Schlosberg et al. 2006:229) ‒ even in the presence of token democratic gestures. However, 
the American context of such research is very different to the post-apartheid context of South 
Africa, in which the memory of major political transition ‒ and of the importance and power 
of political activism ‒ are still fresh. And within this context, if exponents of South African 
new social movements were to take seriously both the threat of looming neoliberal hegemony, 
and the way in which the closing of the digital divide stands to be coterminous with its 
increasing approximation, they could act to drive a wedge between neoliberal influences and 
South African citizens, by engendering a digital political culture as the digital divide is 
overcome. In other words, they could create a cultural buffer of digital activism, within the 
context of South Africa, and keep it alive through contributing to its discursive momentum, so 
that the closing of the digital divide is not synonymous with the opening of a neoliberal 
consumer culture monologue.  
Fourthly, this buffer could conceivably dovetail with what McChesney identifies as 
the recent “tremendous burst of nonprofit and noncommercial Internet sites and free or open 
software and applications…that have become [a] central part of the digital realm” (2012:108). 
Millan concurs with McChesney on this issue, when she states that “in recent decades activist 
groups have increasingly challenged…[neoliberal] corporations on their own terrains,” by 
creating “alternatives to existing communication infrastructure [and software and]…by setting 
up alternative websites for self-produced information” (2013:1). In fact, Halleck even refers 
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to alternative non-commercial platforms as “infrastructures of resistance” (2002:191) that can 
be used by progressive movements to facilitate democratic participation, in the pursuit of 
justice, and equality. In this thesis, a significant amount of attention has been paid to the 
impact of social movement and activist groups’ use of commercial internet and social media 
(i.e. Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, etc.). And such use remains important because although 
these commercial services have come to dominate the contemporary online experience, as 
Hirsh points out, they also provide opportunities for “spontaneous information sharing and 
collective action” (2011:131), such that their potential to function ‒ albeit to a limited extent ‒ 
as an online agonistic public space, has emerged. Admittedly, though, those “technologies and 
services designed for explicitly commercial purposes are often not ideally suited for activist” 
or social movement use. This is because they often require a range of personal information 
from their users, which opens up questions surrounding the surveillance of activists, 
especially when this media are used in particularly volatile or sensitive political climates.
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Moreover, commercial online products and services “often impose conditions on the 
ownership and dissemination of data that are at odds with activists’ needs to repurpose and 
rebroadcast content across a variety of media and contexts” (Hirsh 2011:131-136).  
This, however, does not mean that the internet, social media, and mobile media 
technologies cannot facilitate social movement communications and activism. On the 
contrary, inspired by the above challenges of the presently restrictive commercial context, 
activists around the world have begun to develop and use similar, yet non-commercial, social 
and mobile media technologies. These non-commercial software offer real alternatives to the 
software of dominant neoliberal media corporations (e.g. Facebook and Twitter), and provide 
platforms that are more conducive to social movement communications. A good example of 
this type of non-commercial, alternative online media, is Crabgrass. As a free software web 
application, Crabgrass was designed to allow for social networking, network organization, 
and group collaboration. According to the RiseUp network, Crabgrass offers users the “ability 
to get to know one another through their online contributions and presence,” to “share files, 
track tasks and projects, make decisions and build repositories of shared knowledge,” and to 
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 Since the early 2000s, new social movement marches ‒ especially those connected to calls for the ‘right to a 
better life’ ‒ have allegedly been violently suppressed by the South African police, and members of the 
movements have reportedly been harassed, arrested and murdered (McKinley and Veriava 2005). Consequently, 
some have expressed concern over the implications of government surveillance of movements’ use of 
commercial social and mobile media, in terms of the continuation and strengthening of government repression 
and criminalization of social movements, along with the subsequent intensification of movement 
marginalization. 
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organize “multiple groups to work together on projects in a democratic manner” (2014). This 
software was developed in reaction to the current need to be able to form adequate online 
connections and dialogues between social movements and activist groups. And it encourages 
social change by allowing groups, movements, and organizations to “get things done, get the 
word out, collaborate and network” (RiseUp 2014).238 In short, Crabgrass offers opportunities 
for communication and collaboration within and between groups and subgroups. Focusing on 
network collectives rather than individual use, this software allows for the creation of 
numerous relationship configurations. For example, relationships and connections between 
individuals and groups, groups and committees, committees and councils, and many more, are 
supported by this software. The features of the site allow these groups and subgroups to send 
personal messages, engage in discussions and contestation ‒ on both public and private 
forums ‒ share files, and participate in non-aggregative decision-making,239 among many 
other things. In addition, since each group and subgroup has control over their membership 
and privacy settings, this networking software helps to ensure the online safety of 
participating groups and movements, and protects them against online surveillance.  
 In closing, for South African new social movements, the obstacles of the digital divide 
and the growing hegemony of neoliberalism, both online and offline, will remain challenges 
that require persistent engagement. Although opportunities for the creation of online agonistic 
public spaces exist within the realm of commercial social media platforms, such as Facebook 
and Twitter, new social movement use of these commercial platforms may be restricted in 
terms of their reach and impact. Moreover, in this regard, since commercial search engines are 
seen as the gatekeepers of the online ‘public sphere’ (Milan 2013:3), alternative discourses 
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 Crabgrass “provides tools like task list management, meeting scheduling, asset management, wiki, and 
decision making,” and it “allows groups to create a customized home page where a group can list their event 
calendar, blog postings, and other public content.” Users can also “rate content, add keywords to content, 
comment on content, annotate content, alert others to content you need their feedback on, and track participation 
and revisions.” While groups can “create networks with other independent groups. These networks provide a 
place to work together on shared content and make decisions. Alternately, you can share a single document if 
that is the extent of the cooperation (in development)” (RiseUp 2014). 
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 In this regard, the Crabgrass voting system is much more dynamic than the general aggregative systems or 
tools found on most commercial social networks. Instead of simply providing options which support ‘majority 
rules’ voting, the software provides tools for movements to “create straw polls that allow users to individually 
rate various options under consideration.” Additionally, the platform also supports instant runoff elections that 
allow participants to rank options rather than simply choosing a single preference” (Hirsh 2011:141-142). 
Supporters of this platform insist that this type of voting helps to protect and include minority views in the 
decision-making process. 
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created and contested on these networks are not only open to exclusion and re-marginalization 
by dominant online discourses (Dahlberg 2007b:143). In addition, they are also open to 
surveillance, and ultimately, neoliberal government/corporate control. Consequently, in order 
to reduce the risk of such control and exclusion, new social movements in South Africa will 
need to seek out alternative online spaces through which to expand their movements and 
connect with other democratic struggles. And since such opportunities are already available 
through software platforms such as Crabgrass, it is moreover conceivable that online agonistic 
public spaces are far more likely to emerge and endure within the non-commercial networking 
environment. In terms of this, notwithstanding her initial reservations, even Mouffe has noted 
the existence of some media diversity, and has asserted that “ideally, the role of the media 
should precisely be to contribute to the creation of agonistic public spaces in which 
possibilities for dissensus to be expressed or alternatives to be put forward are provided” 
(Mouffe, cited in Carpentier and Cammaerts 2006:974). Arguably, within the South African 
context, good opportunities exist for links and ‘chains of equivalence’ to be made via a 
platform such as Crabgrass ‒ between ‘right to life,’ ‘right to a better life,’ and ‘right to a 
better life for all’ movements.  
However, despite their radical democratic potential, these types of new media 
platforms cannot be expected to be directly transformative. That is, new social movements’ 
use of the internet and social media cannot be expected to facilitate and instigate radical 
democratic transformation on their own.
240
 Yet, while the celebration of such media as tools 
with direct transformative effects for the radicalization of democracy in South Africa is 
unwarranted, critical views that they are totally irrelevant and ineffective when it comes to 
agonistic political practices, are similarly unfounded. That is, on the one hand, it has often 
been argued that media can only be considered political if “they have a major impact on 
political decision-making and the public sphere” (Macgilchrist and Bohmig 2012:84). But, on 
the other hand, the above types of online activities can be considered deeply political, 
especially when they are viewed through Marchart’s conception of “minimal politics” (2010), 
in terms of which even seemingly mundane activities ‒ such as those found on social 
networking sites or online blogs and forums ‒ can lead to the creation of gaps or fissures in 
contemporary hegemonies. Consequently, while the internet and social media technologies 
are certainly not a political panacea for South Africa, the findings of this thesis call for their 
consideration as indispensable cultural technologies of change. Admittedly, the conversations 
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 That is, these media cannot be used in isolation, but instead,  need to be used in collaboration with an array of 
offline media, protests, marches, rallies, and meetings, in order to ensure the transition of connections and chains 
of equivalence from online agonistic public spaces, into real-world agonistic spaces.  
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and contestations that stand to take place in the resultant online agonistic public spaces may 
only account for a small percentage of the conversations that will be needed in order to 
achieve left-wing hegemony in South Africa. But as Lefort insists, even though such activities 
may comprise only a tiny rip, “the traces of the rip will remain even after the veil has been 
woven over” (2008:43). In other words, even if such spaces do not have a direct effect on 
transforming democratic politics in the country, they will still play a significant role as 
contributing factors to the development of counter-publics and counter-discourses, the 
articulation of collective identities as chains of equivalence, and the facilitation of the 
contestation of dominant discourses. Through such means they will help to ensure that the 
imperfect and unending democratic practices of conflict and disagreement can play out 
unhindered, as a deepening and expanding agonistic version of radical democracy takes shape 
in our country. 
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